SOCIOLOGY

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To *Frank Hamilton Hankins*

Preface

The subtitle of this book, "An Analysis of Life in Modern Society," is a precise indication of its content and focus of attention. Two questions were kept constantly to the fore: Where is modern American society now as a result of where it has been? Where is it likely to go as a result of where it is now? A definitive answer to the latter, of course, cannot be supplied by the sociologist. But a cautious statement of probabilities within the broad range of present trend lines, it could at least be argued, is the sociologist's supreme task. If it be further argued that the primary purpose of an elementary sociology textbook is to aid the student in acquiring an understanding of his own society, then that task cannot be avoided even at this level.

At the same time, the static aspects of society as generalized concept and as specific manifestation have also been analyzed. The unity, integration, and universality of social relationships in all times and places receive due consideration. Stress is placed on this fact: man is one species faced by certain universal problems that are fashioned by universal needs and necessities. Behind the screen of change and variation a core that is essentially changeless remains.

Within the framework of the two questions, an effort has also been made to capitalize upon the student's interest in his own past, present, and probable future experiences. There is thus more material than in similar books on the processes of personality formation, and life in the family, school, and community. The usually more formalized treatments of political, economic, and family institutions are tempered with discussions of the roles of citizen, job-holder, mate, and parent.

To capitalize upon the beginning student's interest is a valuable pedagogic device. It does not follow that that interest should be pandered to with comic-book sensationalism, or that the student should be spared an intellectual challenge. In those few instances where the nature of a topic demanded a fairly rigorous building of ideas, simplicity of presentation was sacrificed. It is hoped that the student may find this book enjoyable. He is assured that he will not find it effortless.

This book is designed for both the general student and the student who will go on to major in sociology. All of the recognized principles

are fully treated. All of the tested concepts are included. There are also brief, albeit somewhat tangential, introductions to the great system builders, such as Cooley, Durkheim, Weber, and Sumner. In keeping with the descriptive emphasis, however, conceptual and theoretical material has been kept to the essential minimum.

In order to preserve uncluttered pages, the same method of dealing with references was followed that has become standard with many of the journals. References are not listed by footnotes, but by numbers which refer to the list of references at the end of each chapter. The material—book, article, or report—is referred to by the first number, and the page or pages cited by the second number. Thus (3, pp. 10-11) would refer to the third item listed at the end of the chapter, and to pages 10 and 11 of that item.

One final word to the instructor. The number of chapters, 25, was designed to meet the requirements of the 13-week semester which most institutions have adopted. Where that schedule is in effect, the first chapter could be assigned for the first week, and two chapters a week for the remainder of the term. Where the quarter system is in effect, or where the instructor wishes to assign outside readings, 25 chapters may prove somewhat unwieldy. In such cases, the instructor may find that chapters 2, 9, 16, 19, 24, and 25 are the ones which can most easily be deleted and yet preserve the essential theme and continuity of the book.

Arnold W. Green

STATE COLLEGE, PA.
June, 1952

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CHAPTER 1 *Introduction: The Field of Sociology*

SOCIOLOGY DEFINED

Sociology joined the family of the social sciences at a relatively recent time. Sociology appeared when it was already widely recognized that the specialized fields of economics, history, political science, and psychology set limits to the explanation of man's social behavior. The economist studies the production and distribution of wealth. The historian attempts to tell as complete a story about the past as possible. The political scientist analyzes the distribution of power in various societies. The psychologist is primarily interested in the analysis and measurement of individual differences. All of these endeavors explain much about man's social behavior, but each deals with one part of it in isolation from the others.

A field was needed which would deal with social behavior in its entirety. Since sociology does borrow a great deal from other sciences, at first glance it might appear to be a sort of survey of many of them. This is not the case. The focus of attention upon social relationships makes sociology a distinctive field, however closely allied to certain others it may be.

Most of biology remains irrelevant in the explanation of social relationships, but some facts derived from biology help to explain certain universal features of the human family. Although sociology has borrowed from psychology, interest in individual behavior has more or less independently been applied to the study of the meaning that individuals have for others and that others have for them. Unlike the economist, the sociologist is not interested in the price system for itself but only as it is related to the division of labor, the structure of social classes, and the social effects of boom and depression. The sociologist does not attempt to write history, but he uses history to throw light on the development of social relationships, particularly those of the present day.

Sociology, then, generalizes and synthesizes from many other fields in order to explain social relationships. In its later development, sociology has established many principles of social behavior and many ways of analyzing social relationships, which are independent of the work in allied, but more specialized, fields. *Sociology is thus the synthesizing and generalizing science of man in all of his social relationships.*

SOCIOLOGY AS SCIENCE

Science has been defined in many different ways. It has been defined in such a way as to exclude almost every recognized field of investigation; it has been defined so loosely as to mean little more than common sense. Many useless arguments have circulated as to whether sociology, along with the other social-science fields, deserves the label of science.

What Science Is Not

Science has been confused in the popular imagination with engineering and technology, and for many people science has come to mean precise measurement. There is actually no direct relationship between science and measurement, even though the scientist uses statistics and mathematics whenever his problem of investigation calls for such treatment. The geologist and biologist, who use measurement hardly at all, are scientists. On the other hand, the carpenter, who measures throughout his working day, is not a scientist.

Neither is science a matter of what is under investigation. Religion can be as "scientifically" studied as physics. Science is a way of investigation. As Karl Pearson phrased it, "The unity of all science consists alone in its method, not in its material."

What Science Is

Objective. Science deals with what is, and what will be on the basis of what is, rather than with what ought to be. At no time does the scientific investigator state his own opinion of what ought to be or of what is right and what is wrong. His own biases or preferences do not enter the picture. He is neutral in the sense that he will accept without personal reservation what his controlled operations have revealed. Objectivity is the willingness and ability to examine evidence dispassionately.

A conscious process. The search for scientific explanation is a conscious process. Scientific discoveries have been said to occur at times by accident, as in the old story of Newton's discovery of the law of gravitation when an apple fell on his head. Such an "accident," however, can occur only in connection with previous conscious search. Only a trained investigator whose mind has struggled with a range of problems peculiar to a given field ever makes a discovery or establishes a valid principle. Workers in the special field of sociology known as demography spent years collecting statistics before they ascertained the connection between a high standard of living and a falling birth rate. It would be impossible to say at what particular moment in time this particular connection was consciously sought, but consciously sought it ultimately was.

A controlled process. The search for scientific explanation is also a controlled process. By control is meant the elimination, or "holding constant," of all factors which might intrude on the connection sought between two factors or sets of factors. If a physicist compares the pressures of two gases, he must first ensure that the temperature is exactly the same at the time of each comparison. If a worker in the special field of sociology known as criminology wishes to test the effect of reading comic books on juvenile delinquency, he must first make sure that no other factor than the reading of comic books is permitted to enter the test situation. Many other factors are associated with delinquency, of course, but in this instance the criminologist is interested in only one of them. The criminologist could hold other factors constant in various ways. He might select a sample of delinquents and another sample of nondelinquents, and then eliminate individuals from both groups until those who were left in both groups were of the same age, race, social class, intelligence, and so on. Only then could he investigate the reading habits of both groups with any reasonable assurance that he could state the relationship between delinquency and the reading of comic books. There is, incidentally, little if any such relationship between the two.

Theory. All science is based upon theory. Many people have the mistaken notion that facts speak for themselves and that science deals only with facts. It is true that no theory is required to discover the fact about how many Studebakers were manufactured last year, but on the other hand none of the facts with which science deals exists without theory. Several people in the Middle Ages discovered fossil fishes embedded in rock on high ground, but they could not recognize fossil fishes because they had no theory that would reconcile sea creature and mountainous location. Those fossils did not become "facts" until geologists used them to theorize about the age-old rise and fall of continents. The distribution of fossil fishes, in turn, helped to explain when and where present land masses were submerged under the sea.

Connections of any complexity among facts can be drawn only with theory. For a long time the study of different religions dealt solely with names of gods and descriptions of religious practices—in other words, with facts. A few sociologists, notably Émile Durkheim and Max Weber, later fostered the study of comparative religion. They systematically compared various religions in order to discover what constant and variable elements they contained. These sociologists then theorized about various relationships between religion and other social institutions.

Later sociological investigation has turned up other facts that have required the modification of Durkheim's and Weber's theories. Science is an endeavor which constantly shuttles from facts to theory, from theory

to facts. Scientific facts exist in and through theory, but facts are also used to modify or to validate existing theory.

Methodology. One of the requirements of science is methodology, or a statement of the procedure by which an explanation has been reached. A scientific investigator starts with a theory and reviews a series of facts in the light of that theory. Then, through either experiment, statistical manipulation, or the exercise of logic, he combines his facts to see whether his initial theory can be validated. If his theory cannot be validated, he revises or discards it and starts afresh. He will either combine new facts or change the sequence of those with which he started. If his old or new theory is validated—if it will explain adequately the range of facts he has brought together—he may then be able to predict that under certain circumstances the relationship between facts and theory will continue to hold true in the future. He will carefully outline all of the steps of his procedure. The ultimate aim of methodology is to ensure that other investigators who employ the same procedure will reach the same, or at least approximately the same, conclusion.

Some Particular Problems in Social Science

Sociology, along with the other social sciences, is a science in so far as it measures up to the criteria of science mentioned above. There are certain difficulties, however, in utilizing the scientific approach in the study of social relationships. These difficulties are not insuperable, but it is necessary to understand what they are.

Objectivity. It is perhaps more difficult to maintain objectivity in the social than in the physical sciences. In the first place, the social scientist is personally involved in the area he investigates, social relationships, while the physicist and the chemist are emotionally detached from their respective areas of investigation. Whatever the issue involved in social relationships, taking a stand for or against is almost rooted in any individual's habit system. It takes a herculean effort of will to maintain neutrality. Some—for one the historian Charles A. Beard—have argued that the social scientist can never dissociate his loyalties, prejudices, and preferences from what is an irretrievable part of himself, his social world. It is only in recent decades that social scientists have consciously striven to do so.

In the second place, unlike the audience of the physical scientist, that of the social scientist is made up of more than professionals like himself. The social scientist deals with religion, the family, systems of government, and other similar areas of investigation about which everyone is personally concerned and considers himself qualified to pass judgment. The nonprofessionals who make up part of the social scientist's audience

have been trained from childhood to think of those issues not scientifically but in terms of right and wrong.

This situation is not being criticized. Chapter 3 explains how society is primarily maintained—through belief and faith, ethical judgments of right and wrong, and not through logic or science. At the same time, however, the inevitable emotionalized biases of the social scientist's audience make it difficult for him to sustain his own objectivity.

Should the social scientist compare various religions, saying nothing about the superiority of Christianity over all others, he might be accused by some of undermining religion. Should he compare democracy, fascism, and communism, many in his audience would expect to be informed that the first of these was better than the other two. No one is likely to get excited when a psychologist studies the sex behavior of the white rat. A sociologist who investigated the sex behavior of the unmarried female in his own community, on the other hand, would probably find himself and his results called to task. In most circles of our society the unmarried woman is not supposed to have a love life; if she does she is censured. If the sociologist merely pointed out how many actually do, without stating that they should not, he might be suspected of undermining morality.

To what extent inner and outer pressures of this kind interfere with the forward movement of social science would be difficult to assess. It is true that the social scientist has loyalties, biases, and emotionalized convictions—which is only to say that he is human. It is also true that social-science research is watched for signs of unorthodoxy. On the other hand, the tremendous range of subject matter covered by social-science research in recent years and the very evident free play of inquiry over it indicate that perhaps the difficulty of gaining objectivity in the social sciences can be exaggerated.

What the social scientist investigates is rarely free from his personal involvement in social relationships. Most sociologists who have done research in the field of minority-group relations, for example, are personally interested in reducing social prejudice. Personal bias may in part determine what the sociologist investigates, but like any other scientist he strives to ensure that personal bias does not color his evidence or his conclusions. An attempt to discover what *can* be done is a legitimate scientific employment; a statement of what people *should* do is a kind of moral judgment which the sociologist attempts to avoid. In a democratic society such as ours, moreover, relatively wide latitude is permitted investigation of any kind. The outer pressure to conform, when it is experienced, is rarely more than indirect.

There are a few beginning students of sociology who are needlessly worried about the scientific necessity for objectivity and neutrality. Does

being objective mean that one's own beliefs and moral convictions must be discarded? Does being neutral require the attitude that one idea or point of view is as good as another? The answer, very definitely, is no.

Science can reveal how many people believe in God and in what ways they worship Him. But science can never disprove (or, for that matter, prove) the existence of God or select the one correct way in which He should be worshiped. Science cannot pass judgment on the dignity of man, justice, what parents owe their children and children their parents, and good and evil. These various concepts are real enough, in the sense that men believe in them, but they are not reducible to scientific evaluation. This does not mean that any or all of them are "untrue."

Matters of belief and moral conviction can be studied scientifically, but they cannot be proven right or wrong by scientific means. The idea that science can settle what men should believe about nonscientific areas of thought is one that no scientist holds. Those who insist that science should pass judgment on moral issues regard science as superior to morality; they are surely the men of little faith.

Scientific objectivity does not mean the abandonment of moral conviction and belief, but rather the willingness to control one's convictions and beliefs in order to review evidence in a dispassionate way. It is not unscientific for the student of sociology to study other religions and systems of marriage and at the same time to maintain his faith in, say, Catholicism and monogamous marriage. He would be unscientific, however, if after reviewing the evidence he either denied the existence of other ways of thought and action or refused to continue to learn about them.

Persistence of the particular. The problems of scientific control and methodology are somewhat more difficult in the social than in the natural sciences. The geologist's rock or the biologist's cat can be directly perceived by the senses and directly manipulated by eye and hand. Verbal symbols used in description have explicit denotation; that is, what the verbal symbols refer to can be closely linked with a standardized object in a standardized way.

No scientist examines the concrete and isolated thing or event except as it represents a class of phenomena. A biologist does not dissect one cat after another, but dissects one or two with the reasonable assurance that what he has learned about the anatomy and physiology of his specimens will characterize all cats. A fellow biologist who dissects a cat in Japan will be dealing with the "same thing." From one generation to another, as well as from place to place, "cat" as a certain class of phenomena retains its identity. It is true that all science deals with abstractions, in the sense that the biologist's description of the cat is not the cat itself and that no description could ever exhaust the infinite

variety of things which could be said about one or all cats. The biologist's description, nevertheless, will be closely linked with a standardized object perceivable in a standardized way.

The units of social science possess much less explicit denotation. In part, they are always a product of particular historical conditions and thus have unique features. The social scientist must struggle much more than the natural scientist with the persistence of particular circumstances attendant upon what he examines. Sociological units, for example, change and vary in time and space, and they also vary within one time and space. The family in America today is a somewhat different phenomenon from what it was in the America of fifty years ago. The modern American family likewise differs quite markedly from the modern Chinese family. There will even be a considerable range of variation in the concrete families which live on one street. Much the same is true of gangs, governments, economic systems, and religions.

The problem of the persistence of the particular in social science is difficult, but fortunately it is not insuperable. It has been most successfully handled when it has been admitted. By increasing specificity in the statement of attendant circumstances, social scientists have described and drawn inferences that their fellow investigators have been able to test against other empirical evidence. The problems of control and methodological statement of procedure have also been reduced when larger units have been broken down into smaller component parts for purposes of comparison. We have learned a great deal about the modern American family, for example, from sociological investigators who did not attempt to study it in the large. Some investigators have carefully defined the concepts of "middle-class" and "lower-class" family, and then made detailed statistical comparisons of child-training practices, habits of consumption, distribution of authority, and social and political attitudes.

Modern physical science, interestingly enough, is entering upon a period of discovery which may ultimately prove as troublesome to theoretical precision as the large issues of sociology. This situation is developing from a drive to explanation in the opposite direction, to the very small, beyond the "crude" atom. Explicit denotation is waning; the very concepts of identity and recurrence can hardly be applied. The prediction of behavior in units beyond the atom has become increasingly hazardous.

THE VALUE OF SOCIOLOGY

Accurate social knowledge becomes indispensable to the extent that any society becomes complex. The habitual ways of doing which have come down from the past will suffice as a guide to action only in small

and simple societies. Under conditions of rapid social change and heterogeneous social relationships, only accurate knowledge can serve as a basis for social policy and for individual adjustment.

Sociology and Social Policy

The Federal government of the United States in recent years has committed itself to the administration of large-scale domestic and international programs. A growing need for sociological knowledge has accompanied these programs. If responsibility for the aged becomes a primary concern of government, for example, then we must find out what proportions of the population are to be found in the various age groupings and we must be able to predict what those proportions will be ten, twenty, and thirty years hence. We must also ascertain the trend in job opportunities at the different age levels. Equally important are the attitudes adult children have toward supporting their own parents, what responsibility they are presently assuming toward their parents, and the probable future trend of that responsibility. These and many other answers are necessary before a workable program for aid to the aged can be devised.

If the United States government seeks to establish close economic, political, and military affiliations with countries and peoples all over the globe, then we must know more than we do about those countries and their peoples. What are their cultures? What are the prevailing attitudes toward the United States, toward technological development? What beliefs and prejudices of theirs can be enlisted to draw them into our power orbit and what ones will have to be mollified or accepted before this can be done? What are the prevailing social-class structures, the focal points of leadership? Whose cooperation is most crucial before various programs are launched? After such programs have been started, continuing answers to all of these questions must be carefully gathered and checked.

Sociologists in increasing numbers have been taken into various governmental agencies, to conduct research and to serve in an advisory capacity. These are vital functions which have, in many cases, been ably performed. Nevertheless, there are limits placed upon scientific knowledge in the solution of administrative and other social problems. Lack of understanding of this fact has led to much unwise criticism of sociology.

As for research, millions of dollars spent for accurate knowledge about modern housing will not by itself "solve the housing problem." Accurate knowledge will only serve as one basis for intelligent action. Whether or not improved housing will ensue from the sociologist's research depends largely upon the operation of certain political and economic forces over which he has no control. A nation paying for past wars may not be able

to afford a large-scale housing program. On ideological grounds, a majority of the citizens might believe such a program was un-American or might oppose the higher tax levies which would be necessary to pay for it. If the proposed program were a local one, those who owned substandard tenements might exert political pressure to prevent the removal of a profitable slum.

As for the sociologist's advisory function, he is frequently in a position to help determine policy within an organization because of his knowledge and the persuasiveness with which he presents it. His status as an employee, however, does not guarantee that his advice will be followed. In the final analysis it is administrators, not scientists, who determine policy—as several American atomic physicists have belatedly discovered. The scientist's job is to analyze, to explain, and to increase the store of knowledge. His job should not be confused with the wielding of political and economic power, power which he does not possess.

Sociologists are often asked a question that is seldom put to scientists in other fields. If sociology cannot solve this or that problem, what good is sociology? The geologist is asked only to locate oil-bearing rock strata; he is not asked to prevent the "wasteful exploitation of our natural resources." No one asks the biologist to develop a strain of the human species without the useless, vestigial, and dangerous appendix. No one asks the historian to change the course of history. But the sociologist is frequently asked to change society.

Geological knowledge, biological and historical knowledge, the knowledge of any field, sociology included, is of vital importance in the search for solutions to all sorts of problems. The scientist in any field has, however, little control over the course of social action adopted to solve any of those problems. There is only one proper retort to the question, what good is sociology? What good is science?

Sociology and the Person

It might be, as some have argued, that we would all be happier and more at one with ourselves if we lived in a simple, homogeneous society where there was no need for scientific knowledge. The simple fact is that we do not. He who lives in a complex society is almost forced to learn a great deal about it. He may also be well advised to learn something about other societies so that he can compare them with his own and thus gain perspective on his own. The only available substitute for blind sentiment and parochial prejudice in much choice making is sociological knowledge. It is particularly in democratic society, where personal and group decisions require and permit a considerable range of choice making, that the necessity for sociological knowledge is made apparent.

Social life in a democracy also requires the sharing of experience.

Social life in any complex society, however, tends to isolation according to age, region, social class, occupation, and education. The Southern planter and the New England textile worker have somewhat different experiences, beliefs, loyalties, and emotional attachments. In a complex society it is only indirectly, through books and the classroom, that we can come to share the experience of North and South, plumber and architect, Negro and white. Only such indirectly shared experience will afford that kind of understanding which the democratic process requires at least a few to attain.

Very practically, whatever else individual adjustment may mean for those who enter and complete college, it must in part be based upon a knowledge of our own society and its trends. What is modern marriage and what is it becoming? What are the strains and pressures to which our middle class is subjected? What are the occupational and social-class trends? What is the structure of modern organizations and how must the person within an organization adapt himself to its necessities? What shifts in power are taking place? What are the political issues of freedom and security and what do they mean in personal terms?

Final answers to none of these questions will be found in this book. It is hoped, however, that for the beginning student in sociology a journey through these pages will reveal much about these and other issues that was not previously known.

PART ONE

Man and His World

CHAPTER 2 *The Organism and Its Physical Environment*

> [Man's] usual disregard for sanitation and cleanliness may also go back to the trees. From the branches everything dropped to the ground and was gone. There was a kind of natural garbage- and sewage-disposal. On the other hand, animals like wolves had to learn to keep their dens moderately clean and decent. (This is one reason, I suppose, why it is easier to house-break a puppy than a baby.) Also, large forests existed only in rainy countries, and [man's] ancestor was kept more or less clean by the rain. At the same time he had no easy way of getting any other water for bathing. At first perhaps he may have licked himself like a cat, but as his snout receded, he probably lost such a habit. So from living in trees may have come [man's] native carelessness in such matters, which seems to be overcome only at a high stage of civilization.
>
> —GEORGE R. STEWART

Human behavior at any level of expression, including social relationships, occurs within a set of conditions imposed by man's biology and heredity and by his physical environment. These conditions will help to explain what is distinctive in human behavior as compared with that of other species, and to a very limited extent they will help to explain variations of behavior among men.

MAN IN THE ZOOLOGICAL ORDER

The Order: Primate

The most outstanding characteristic of the primate order is the possession of grasping hands and feet, adapted to life in the trees (7, p. 10).* Primates are divided into three suborders, to one of which, the Anthropoidea, man provisionally belongs. All primates are, or have been in their immediate evolutionary history, tree dwellers. All of them can grasp branches or other objects by opposing the thumb to the fingers and, except for man, the great toe to the lesser toes. This characteristic enables them to convey food to the mouth with the hands, instead of grasping it directly with the teeth as do the dogs, and most important of all it enables them to handle and manipulate objects. Man's manipulative skill is more delicate than that of any other primate, and from this in

* Parenthetical numbers refer to numbered items in References at end of chapter.

large measure stems his mechanical superiority to all others. Primate digits are also supplied with flat nails, rather than hoofs or claws; grasping would otherwise be impossible.

The efficient clavicle, or collarbone, of the primates enables them to keep their shoulders stable while rotating the arms. This affords a great deal of free movement to the forearms. The breasts of primates are usually two in number, and placed high on the chest. The brain varies widely in development. The primates include the brainiest animals, but all primates are not more intelligent than all nonprimates. Most primates, nevertheless, have large brains with an intricately wrinkled cerebral cortex. The cerebrum, or upper part of the brain, is in most cases relatively large.

Genus and Species: Homo Sapiens

Man is a remote relative of all other primates, but man is not descended from any other living ape. Darwin never claimed that man descended from the ape, and present authorities agree that man's distinctive line of evolution started several million years ago. "It now seems reasonably certain that the four (main) types of ape and man are independent surviving lines, divergently specialized, all deriving separately from the Miocene radiation" (13, p. 92).

Physique. With regard to size, man might be classified as one of the tailless giant primates, along with the gorilla, chimpanzee, and orangutan (7, p. 38). But man is clearly distinguishable from all of these in physique, even though their anatomical structure parallels man's and their blood is distinguishable from his only with extremely delicate tests.

Apes can stand erect, but only temporarily, and must use their hands on the ground to give occasional support to a drunkenlike swaying-forward movement. Man's posture is uniquely upright. The arms and hands of man are thus freed for exploring and manipulating the physical environment to an extent exceeding that permitted to any other primate. Peculiarities of the human foot and back make upright posture possible. The human foot is almost devoid of grasping ability; it is anatomically structured to support the entire weight of the body, with an elongated heel and developed arch, and with the great toe in a parallel line with the other toes. Man's spine has a forward convexity in the small of the back known as the lumbar or S-shaped curve, which distributes body weight in such a way that balance can be maintained in the upright posture.

Only man possesses a chin; the pushing forward of the chin, along with the opening out and broadening of the floor of the jaws, while perhaps not essential for articular speech, do greatly facilitate it. The canine teeth are reduced to the same level as other teeth in the human jaw; man's resulting defenselessness is compensated by a superior intelligence

which enables him to invent and use manual weapons. Man's body is relatively hairless, and his skin thin and sensitive, facts not unconnected with his use of clothing in colder climates and his seeking protection from the elements with housing of various types.

Physiology. Man shares one dubious distinction with the pig—he can eat, and in different times and places has eaten, every conceivable and inconceivable comestible, from ants to dirt. The human digestive system, in other words, will tolerate an enormous range of both plant and animal food. This characteristic has in part enabled man to range over the planet and to live in almost every corner of the globe.

Human physiology is directly related to certain universal features of the human family, a matter discussed at greater length in a later chapter. Sexual activity for most animals is cyclic, waxing and waning with the seasons and with the oestrus cycle of the female. From puberty to old age, human sexual activity is continuous, and this affords one basis for a permanent sexual union—marriage—between males and females.

Human births are single rather than multiple, for the most part, and the period of human pregnancy is relatively long. The human female requires economic assistance while she is pregnant and during the extremely long periods of infancy in her young. To some extent she is also incapacitated during menstruation, but not seriously, for even under modern industrial conditions menstruation does not appreciably impair work efficiency or increase the rate of absenteeism (14).

The human infant is born with only rudimentary instincts. For sheer survival under any set of conditions he requires a long period of nurture. These protracted periods of helplessness in infant and mature female have required some form of family organization to perpetuate the human species, at least as far back in the distant past as Homo sapiens assumed recognizable form.

The human trait of gregariousness is thus closely linked with human physiology, even though there is no gregarious instinct. To survive, an infant must be born into a group and must remain part of a group. Beyond that, he becomes so habituated to the presence of other human beings, their voices, gestures, and responses, that the need for companionship becomes as acute as the tissue needs for food, drink, and sex.

Instinct. The behavior of animals low on the scale of evolution is instinctive for the most part—they have little to learn. Man, on the other hand, is born with only a few rudimentary instincts, and his adult behavior must wait for a long process of learning plus an almost equally long internal growth process. The sex drive is present in all adult higher organisms, but in man it awaits internal bodily changes that are not fully developed until puberty. Even then, it is questionable whether sexual intercourse would ever occur without a minimum amount of

learning. The usual posture adopted during sexual intercourse, interestingly enough, often differs from one society to another.

Man does not seek companionship because of an instinct for gregariousness. He needs people because he has been trained to need them. Men do not go to war because of a combative instinct. The amount and intensity of aggressive behavior differ widely from one person to another and from one society to another. If we say that men fight because of an instinct for aggression, how would we explain the fact that wars do end? By definition, an instinct must be a specifically *inherited* mode of behavior that is *universal* in its expression. What the human infant brings into the world that will be unmodified by maturation and learning is limited to a few reflexes, such as sneezing, coughing, blinking the eyes, the ability to grasp objects with the hands, to turn his head, and to suck.

Learning. Of all species, man in his individual lifetime takes longest to develop his full capacity for efficient function. The growth of the human individual—physical, physiological, and neuromuscular—is extremely slow. It is not only that as we go up the scale of evolution there is a steady loss of instinctive behavior in favor of learned behavior, but there is also a slower rate of learning in infancy (6, p. 113). An insect first appears on the scene with adaptations to his environment already built into his neural structure; his behavior is almost completely instinctive, but the little he does learn is mastered in a few hours. Except for a few reflexes, and some physiological processes controlled by the autonomic nervous system, every human adaptation must be learned; the more important of these adaptations take years to master.

While the giant primates—in particular, man—are alone capable of learning complex relationships, these cannot be learned except at maturity. There are two types of learning behavior. The first is simple association, based upon small continuous increments of learning and in which trial and error figure. An example would be a maze, with choices to be made among various paths, some of which are blind alleys and one of which will lead to food or some other reward. There are no appreciable differences in the time required for various species to master this kind of learning. Rats and feeble-minded men can learn simple habits about as fast as normal men (6, p. 115). Rats compare creditably with men in learning to move in a maze which is identical except scaled to size.

The second is "insight," or configurationist learning. This learning is an immediate, single-trial, all-or-none flash of intelligence with regard to immediately unrelated phenomena. An example of this would be the chimpanzee's dragging two boxes from a distance and then piling one on top of the other to reach some fruit hanging out of reach. He had not tried to do this before; he had not been trained to do it. This ability to

view a new relationship among separate objects or stimulations is limited to the higher species, and they possess this ability only after a relatively long period of infancy.

Maturation. The reason why insight learning, at which man excels, is so slow to develop is the extremely slow rate of human neuromuscular growth. The ability to make and utilize simple associations must be mastered before the later insight ability appears. Before associations can be made, a sufficient level of maturation must be reached. Maturation refers to organic changes in the tissues and organs of the body which take place with advancing age and without regard for external stimulation. Maturation itself is not learning, but it is a necessary condition before learning can occur. Arnold Gesell and his fellow researchers have established norms of development, for infants and children, which await progressive maturation.

> The baby is a unitary organism and from the very beginning he grows as a single unit. Even in the embryonic period months before birth, the living materials of this organism order themselves into patterned structures. Millions of microscopic nerve cells, marshalled by forces of growth, penetrate into these muscular tissues. In due time impulses will pass through the nerve fibers into the muscle fibers to bring about movements. These movements will have a certain degree of pattern. We shall call them behavior patterns as soon as they take on a characteristic form. The growing mind consists of countless such patterns of behavior, made possible by the progressive organization of the nervous system. [5, p. 16]

In other words, even the simpler type of learning develops slowly in humans and must await rhythms of growth internally established. Not until he is twenty-four weeks of age can the human infant pick up an object on sight. Not until he is fifteen months old can he pluck it with precision and put into the mouth of a bottle instead of in his own mouth. Much of this progressively complex eye-hand behavior is untaught, although it does require the presence of physical objects. A mastery of simple associationist learning, however, whether taught or untaught, is a necessary prerequisite of the later insight learning.

> The child perceives opposites and analogies. He detects differences before he recognizes similarities. At six, he can tell us the difference between *wood* and *glass;* at eight he may be able to tell us in what way they are alike. His judgments are rather concrete, but they lay the foundation for abstractions and generalizations. At twelve he is capable of defining abstract terms like *courage* and *charity.* There is no way of short-circuiting this concrete thinking of the primary school years. Growth proceeds by gradations. Creeping comes before walking; banging before poking; vertical strokes before oblique; concrete before abstract. The five year old can copy a triangle; yet it takes two years more before he can copy a diamond, even though a diamond geometrically is no more than two triangles with a common base. [5, p. 253]

Symbolic communication. The mature human's superiority to representatives of other species in most types of learning is a matter of degree. But there is one special kind of learning which absolutely separates man from all other animals, and that is language. Language exists where a number of persons have learned to communicate ideas by the use of fixed and arbitrary sounds. Language is a universal and learned human characteristic which no other animal possesses. Much more than physique



FIG. 1. Two young bull elephants fighting. Widespread ears are an "expressive symbol" to an elephant of another's hostile intent. (From Quentin Keynes.)

and physiology does language serve to differentiate man from the rest of the animal kingdom. The tool of language, in turn, enables man to expand the number of things he can learn to a seemingly limitless potential, and to pass down to future generations those things he has learned in the past.

Many animals are able to learn that particular sounds or movements coming from another animal indicate what that animal intends to do. When a dog's master approaches him with a leash in his hand, the dog may go to the door in anticipation of a walk. This level of communication is that of the "anticipatory symbol"—through past experience the animal has learned that an initial part of an action can stand for the completed action (3, p. 41).

A second level of communication is that of the "expressive symbol" —in which an animal's fellows have learned that a certain cry or gesture

of his expresses a certain intention or "feeling." Many primates use such symbols extensively. An ape mother will deliberately glance at her infant and indicate that it should come to her by moving her hand. Monkeys are capable of complex communication, such as the practice of duplicity. A female monkey may even practice a form of "prostitution." When accosted by a male who shows too much interest in the food she has just seized, she may present herself sexually to divert his attention and chew and swallow her food unmolested. He may or may not realize he is being duped, and he may or may not call her bluff.

It is the third level of symbolic communication—the "arbitrary symbol"—that is missing in all nonhuman populations. Both anticipatory symbols and expressive symbols are tied to the present act or the present intention. In a real sense they are not symbols, for they do not and cannot refer to situations which are cut off from present companionship and the present time. A nonhuman animal may manifest fear and thereby indicate to his fellows that an enemy is approaching, "but when no enemy is near he cannot describe what an enemy is like and teach his fellows what the appropriate behavior would be" (3, p. 43).

The word "hand," for example, is a purely arbitrary designation free of any specific context of action. It also has many different meanings, all independent of one another. It can refer to a grasping organ, 13 playing cards, a basis for telling one's fortune, or even intent or purpose, such as the hand of God. In other languages, a different term serves just as well to refer to the similarly great range of meanings that can attach to the English word "hand."

In the chapters that follow, the primary role of language in human affairs will become more evident. Lacking language, all nonhumans are severely handicapped in what they can learn and what they can transmit from one generation to the next. Only through personal observation can one generation of nonhumans learn from the previous generation. Partly on the basis of instinct and partly from observing the mother's behavior, kittens become mouse catchers. But the female cat cannot tell her young about mice or describe the technique for catching them. Learning based solely on direct observation means that knowledge cannot accumulate; no generation can know more than the previous one.

A parrot can repeat words but those words have no meaning for him. The structure of the ape's mouth and throat do not present insuperable obstacles to his speaking. Yet long and arduous hours spent in the attempt to teach apes to talk have resulted in complete failure. Only man possesses sufficient neural complexity to master the utterance of speech to which ideas are attached.

HUMAN HEREDITY

We have much less precise knowledge about the mechanics of human heredity than we do of species lower than man on the evolutionary scale. In man, eye color is a "unit character," but such matters as body build, intelligence, and temperament, while we know they are in some measure determined by heredity, are affected by a multitude of hereditary determinants which cannot be isolated and identified.

The Agents of Heredity

Representatives of all the higher species originate from the union of male and female germ cells into a single cell, the zygote, which is formed at the moment of conception. This original zygote divides and redivides, differentiating bone, muscle, and tissue within the mother's womb. These various differentiated parts of the unborn child, or fetus, are all composed of cells which possess the same hereditary determinants as the original zygote—the determinants of eye color in the eye cells are also found in the great toe.

Under the microscope, sets of threadlike objects can be observed in living cells, the chromosomes, which are the fundamental determinants of heredity. The germ cells of the mother (ova) and of the father (sperm) each contain 24 chromosomes. These combine in the zygote to form a cell of 48 chromosomes. Thus exactly half of each organism's heredity is derived from each parent, and as the zygote divides and redivides to form the fetus, each body cell of that fetus will have 48 chromosomes identical with those of the original zygote. Only the germ cells contain 24 chromosomes.

Each chromosome is not responsible for any one hereditary trait. Within the chromosomes, even more minute agents of heredity, the genes, have been discovered. It is not known precisely what they are, except that they must be units in the chemical make-up of the chromosomes. In some instances, the location of certain genes in the chromosome has been established, and their effects on specific physical characteristics have been traced. Yet no definite one-to-one relationship between gene and trait has been shown. The relatively simple characteristic of eye color depends upon a combination of a number of genes. While some genes affect intelligence, racial characteristics, temperament, and body build, these cannot be identified. To the extent that any of these latter traits are governed by heredity, apparently many more genes than in the case of eye color must combine in a certain way to bring about a given result.

The relatively large number of chromosomes in human body cells complicates the tracing of heredity in man. They are much fewer in simpler organisms; the fruit fly, for example, has only four chromosomes

BASIC TRAINING COLLEGE MANIPUR

in each body cell. In each ejaculation of the human male there are 200 to 500 million sperm cells, and only one fertilizes an ovum. The chromosome combination in each sperm cell will differ somewhat, as will that of each ovum supplied by the female. It has been estimated that there are some 300 trillion possible chromosome combinations in a zygote from the union of two human germ cells. This virtually incalculable possibility of variation in the heredity of two children born to the same parents does not take into account the further possibility of an even greater number of potential gene combinations! No two individuals ever have identical heredities, except in the case of identical twins—twins born of of the same zygote which splits to form two beings.*

What Human Heredity Determines

Appearance. However difficult it may be to trace the specific determination of various hereditary traits in man, human offspring, like the offspring of all organisms, tend to resemble their parents in physical appearance. Within a certain range of probability, a person's height, weight, skin color, nose shape, and general body build will tend to assume the character of those traits possessed by his parents. The significance of traits such as these, however, is more social than biological.

Whether a person will be blessed or cursed by his heredity depends to some extent upon current fashions in physical appearance. Among the Hottentots, large fat buttocks—a condition known as steatopygia—are highly prized in females, while in modern America a slimmer feminine figure meets with social approval. Parenthetically, human populations are affected by two types of selection. Natural selection refers to the operation of the physical environment on a given population. Social selection occurs only in human populations, and it refers to more frequent mating with members of the opposite sex who possess those physical attributes which are socially preferred. Over the course of centuries, provided those preferences remain constant, a "pool of genes" is formed in the population which will accentuate the preferred characteristics.

Personality is affected by this combination of heredity with group aesthetic standards, but the relationship is indirect. Other things being equal, where towering height is very highly prized a short person will be handicapped in personal relationships and he may even develop habits of shyness and withdrawal. His short stature does not cause such effects; they result from the negative evaluation placed upon it. Much the same would be true of complexion, weight, regularity of features, muscular development, and so on. Of course, members of few societies permit the errors made by the original zygote to go unchallenged. The

* Fraternal twins result from the independent impregnation of two ova by two sperm.

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millions of dollars spent annually in American beauty salons attest to that.

Sex. The sex of the human organism is fixed at the instant of conception. The sperm of the father, not the ovum of the mother is the determinant. Among the 24 chromosomes in each ovum is included an X chromosome. The sperm are equally divided between those carrying an X chromosome and those carrying a smaller Y chromosome. When male and female germ cells unite to form the zygote, there can be either an XX or an XY combination. In the former case, the child will be a girl; in the latter, a boy.

More human males than females are conceived. The excess may run as high as 20 to 50 per cent. But the proportion of male deaths from premature birth, and of male infants who die, runs much higher than that of females. Curiously enough, the male death rate is higher in every period of life beyond infancy; this is true, at least, in civilized countries where efficient medical practice keeps relatively low the female death rate during the reproductive period of life. This raises the interesting question of which sex is actually the stronger.

The extent to which sex determines personality has long been a subject of popular debate. Since the physiological functioning of males and females is so markedly different, it appears at least probable that to some degree behavior is affected by biological sex differences. The difficulty is that we can establish no line of demarcation between what is and what is not modified by social experience, beyond sheer physiological function itself. How much is a little girl's playing with dolls determined by her sex, and how much by training and social approval? To questions such as these, there can be no definite answers.

Intelligence. There appears to be a clear hereditary factor in intelligence, at least as intelligence is measured by the standardized tests which we use. Intelligence-quotient (IQ) scores of children tend generally to approximate those of their parents. Dull parents, nevertheless, have at times produced children of superior intelligence. The reverse is also true. Intelligence, however governed by heredity, is not the result of simple unitary inheritance. What is inherited is not intelligence so much as it is the capacity to develop intelligence. No measure of intelligence can be made prior to the impact of the physical and social environment upon the human organism, and this fact always lends caution to any interpretation of IQ scores.

One of the difficulties of measurement is the existence of two, not one, dimensions of intelligence. The first is an *innate potential*, a capacity for development, a completely hereditary factor which decides the quality of the brain and the neural metabolism. The second is the functioning of a brain which has to some extent developed, determining an "*average level of performance or comprehension* by the partly grown or mature

person" (6, p. 294). It is only intelligence of the second type that can be directly observed and measured, and this is not free from the influence of environmental stimuli.

Attempts have been made to discount the environmental factor through studies of twins. Identical twins are those born from the same sperm and ovum, and have approximately equal heredities. In one study, the IQ correlation (a correlation is a relative measure of quantitative relationship between two factors—complete correspondence would be 1.000) for fraternal twins reared together was .631, for identical twins reared together .881. The correlation for identical twins reared apart was .767 (10). Some regard these correlations as proof that different environments affect intelligence markedly. Others aver that chance errors of measurement would explain the quantitative differences of intelligence between identical twins reared apart and those brought up together (16).

This is one controversy which could conceivably be settled, provided we had better evidence than has so far been presented. The fact of the matter is that all available twin studies have involved children brought up in the same home or in homes which were similar although not the same. What we need are studies of fraternal and identical twins brought up in radically different home environments, educated and upper class in the one case, poverty-stricken and illiterate in the other, and then test their intelligence at maturity and "try making doctors, or politicians, of both twins" (6, p. 302).

One study after another has consistently shown that children from wealthy homes make higher average IQ scores than children from poverty-stricken homes. Under conditions of even imperfect economic competition, it would appear safe to assume that the highly intelligent are for the most part those who gravitate toward the top of the ladder and tend to pass on a superior hereditary capacity for developing intelligence. The fact remains, however, that we have no means for discounting the effects of a favorable home environment, good and literate conversation, books, an interest in fostering intellectual curiosity in one's own children, and the means of gratifying that curiosity. There also remains the probability that underprivileged children have less motivation to do well on intelligence tests because their parents and associates do not place a very high value on such performance.

Personality. There is nothing in human personality for which the capacity was not transmitted in heredity. Personality is not inherited, but no feature of personality is devoid of hereditary influence (1, p. 105). On the other hand, the child is plastic, learns rapidly, and is subtly influenced by a host of stimuli which impinge upon him from his social environment. A tremendous range of possibility is thus afforded for the *acquisition* of peculiar personal habits and traits. Heredity, then, does

not directly mold personality; however, heredity probably predisposes personality development in one direction or another and sets limits to that development.

> . . . for the present we can only *assume* that there are genes for normal personality traits just as there are genes for other aspects of human makeup and functioning. Where, in members of the same family, in a similar environment, we can see great differences in personality, we may ascribe these in part at least to differences in gene combinations. We can also guess that some of the family similarities in personality are genetically influenced. But we're still a long way from identifying specific "personality" genes, gauging their effects or hazarding predictions as to what the personality of a given child will be on the basis of what we know about its parents. In short, heredity can never be considered as charting a fixed and definite course of anyone's personality. At the best, what anyone inherits are the potentialities for a wide range of personalities, the precise form into which a personality will "jell" being determined by circumstances. [12, pp. 425–426]

The available evidence, in other words, will not support any sweeping and dogmatic claim that personality is biologically transmitted. There is no trait of personality which is unaffected by factors *other* than heredity. The available evidence, on the other hand, will support the claim that there are some traits which seem to be more directly affected by heredity than others. Intelligence, the speed of reaction time, manual skills, sensory discriminations such as the ability to distinguish musical tones—these are basic abilities which tend to appear more highly developed in some family lines than in others, and for which differences in environmental influence appear to be less critical than for other traits. Such matters as one's beliefs, loyalties, prejudices, manners, and mannerisms—one's style of life—are apparently for the most part the result of training and experience. Where a person has the opportunity to make some choice among a range of these, very likely in some obscure and indirect way heredity will in part affect what such choices will be. But we are completely unable to trace such a relationship.

Most investigators of human behavior have abandoned any attempt to separate the factors of heredity and environment in the explanation of human personality. Heredity, environment, and maturation combine together at any given moment in time to produce a given individual, with his total range of traits.* They act and react together, inseparably.

CLIMATE AND PHYSIOGRAPHY

It has long been commonly accepted knowledge that there are certain relationships between how human populations live and the climate,

* We shall later note the limitations of such a simple formula, although it will suffice for the present discussion.

resources, and landscape of their regions. What has been a matter of controversy is the extent to which the physical environment determines human adaptation and human behavior.

As Determinants of Human Behavior

Over two thousand years ago, Aristotle claimed that those who live in Northern Europe are, owing to a cold climate, full of spirit, but lacking in intelligence and skill. They retain comparative freedom, but are incapable of ruling over others. The natives of Asia, on the other hand, are intelligent and inventive, but they lack spirit and are therefore slaves. The Hellenic race, situated between them, is intermediate in character, both high-spirited and intelligent, and thus capable of ruling the world (2, p. 291). In the eighteenth century, Montesquieu claimed that a hot climate makes for "effeminacy" and thus leads to servitude, while the bravery of those blessed by a cold climate enables them to maintain their liberties. Great heat enervates courage, while cold causes a "certain vigour of body and mind" (9, Vol. I, p. 284).



FIG. 2. Personality is the point at which changing environment and fixed heredity meet.

Arguments such as these have by no means disappeared in the realm of serious scholarship. A modern writer has averred that there is a "principle of disinclination to work at high temperatures" and that in consequence most of the world's main civilizations have grown up "where the majority of the months have average temperatures near or below the optimum" (8, p. 269). Since great civilizations once flourished in relatively hot Egypt, Babylonia, and the Indus region, it is argued that the temperatures for at least half the year in those areas drop to a level that is favorable for peoples in an *early* stage of civilization! Topography also enters the picture: "Mountains as well as deserts lead to nomadism and the selective process which favors boldness, hardihood, and the power both to fight and lead" (8, p. 194).

There is one very obvious answer to the claim that climate and topography determine human behavior. Why did the Indians of the North American continent preserve a simple way of life which changed

very little for thousands of years prior to the coming of the Europeans? Why did the Indians of the Northeast, in particular, fail to develop a great civilization, since it was in this region that the transported European civilization first flourished? We are informed that despite their simple way of life the Indians of the Northeast "were notable for their activity and alertness" (8, p. 390). Apparently if one starts with the theory that one factor is, if not the only, at least the principal causative agent in human behavior, then any set of facts can be forced to fit the theory—at least to the satisfaction of the theorizer.

Climate and topography must enter into any explanation of human behavior, but their importance will vary from time to time and from place to place, and their operation is always more or less indirect. The fact remains that great civilizations *have* appeared in regions of widely different climate and topography. Christianity knows no climatic belts. Men are polygamous in high altitudes and flat lands, under tropical, temperate, and arctic conditions. Other peoples have been monogamous under any and all of these conditions. Civilizations change rapidly when no conceivable geographic change or group biological or racial change has occurred. An excellent example of this is the movement of Japan from a feudal-agricultural nation to a modern industrialized one in the short span of seventy-five years.

It is difficult to refute all the extravagant claims of the geographic deterministic, because some of them have a surface plausibility. Particularly plausible is the claim that seasonal variations affect many human actions. Careful observation and collection of data have shown that, among other fluctuations, human conception occurs more frequently in certain months than in others and suicide tends to occur more frequently in the summer and spring than in the fall or winter (4). The usual procedure is to regard such variations as caused by the seasons themselves.

Seasonal variations in the number of conceptions may reflect seasonal variations in the intensity of human sexual activity, but this has not been proven. With regard to suicide, we must clearly give some consideration to the subjective element (11, pp. 324–338). There must be something in the total personal-social experience of the seasons which predisposes to suicide more at one time than another. Further, the suicide rate of Protestants exceeds that of Catholics, and of the unmarried that of the married, in the same countries and during the same seasons. Religious variations, and those of marital status, as a matter of fact exceed seasonal variations. Clearly, changes in the seasons cannot directly *cause* suicide. Proponents of geographic determinism have been guilty of oversimplification, and their interpretations must be closely scrutinized (15, pp. 99–193).

As Limiting and Permissive Factors

Geography does not cause anything to happen, at least in human affairs, but it will limit men in doing certain things and it will permit them to do other things. Great cities could hardly spring up on the Sahara desert. There are no natural resources of any consequence; most of the land is untillable, so that only a sparse and migratory population can live off it. Similar limits are imposed upon the vast areas at and near the two poles.

Where geography and climate are harsh, niggardly, and rigorous, their direct effects are most in evidence. Under such conditions the range of human choice is severely limited. What could certain Eskimo tribes build with but snow, or use but animal skins for garments, or utilize much beyond the seal and fish for food? In the desert, migratory herdsmen are likewise forced to make adaptations to their physical environment within a narrow margin of choice. It is also true that in such areas great civilizations have never arisen, possibly owing in part to the fact that little human energy remains beyond that demanded for sheer survival.

The disposition of topographical features and natural resources also permits certain developments to occur. In some measure the ancient civilizations were permitted to flourish where they did because of access to sea and river transportation routes in an age when overland communication was insecure. Even today, a nation's military power is severely restricted if iron and oil deposits are absent and therefore must be transported great distances at great cost from potential enemy nations which might at any time place an embargo on these essential sinews of modern war.

On the other hand, a potentially favorable physical environment will not itself produce a civilization. The American Indian had at his disposal iron, coal, oil, and vast forest preserves. But he did not have the technical knowledge, the social values, nor the social drives to exploit them. The physical environment is, then, for the most part a passive agent, a potential source of use and change, but in itself it will not guarantee use and change.

Where complex civilizations have been permitted to appear, Lester F. Ward's statement to the effect that environment transforms the animal while man transforms the environment more closely approximates literal truth. Man in the modern West can live anywhere, if he so wills. He can keep warm in cold climates, and he can now artificially cool his buildings to protect himself from excessive heat. He dives under the sea and flies through the air, neither of which element is he naturally equipped to enter. He can conquer microorganisms which subject him to disease,

and he has developed methods for growing food in chemical baths. With radio and electronics, space-time limits are progressively narrowed.

Certain limits remain. The "conquest" of a difficult physical environment is expensive. Only with a tremendous capital outlay can Manhattan Island be made a world center of trade and communication, with bridges, tunnels, and ferries. Man could conceivably build a great city in the midst of the Gobi Desert, with an artificially controlled climate within a glass-enclosed dome, and by transporting food, water, and all other essentials from a vast distance. But the cost would be prohibitive. Man's technology admits hardly any conceivable limit to his conquest of his physical environment, but man's economy might not support his technology in any such quixotic venture.

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CHAPTER 3 *Society*

> More efficacious than all the laws society has made for its self-preservation is the institution of conscience, setting thereby a policeman in every man's bosom to see that its laws are obeyed; and it is singular that even in man's most private affairs, where one might imagine society has no concern, conscience leads him to act according to the good of this organism outside himself.
>
> —W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM

> Men are not hanged for stealing horses, but that horses may not be stolen.
>
> —LORD HALIFAX

Heredity and physical environment do not directly cause social behavior. They are limiting and permissive factors in the formation of social behavior. Many other factors are required to complete the explanation of social behavior. One of these, society, is the subject of the present chapter.

WHAT IS SOCIETY?

Society Defined

Society is made up of two subfactors: an aggregate of individuals (a population) and a permanent organization of their action and interaction. A society is "the largest relatively permanent group who share common interests, common territory, a common mode of life, and a common 'esprit de corps' or 'belongingness' whereby they distinguish themselves from outsiders" (3, p. 340). The crowd at a baseball game is an aggregate of individuals, and to a limited extent it is organized about a common interest. But such a crowd is not a society. Since the baseball crowd disperses at the end of the game, it has no permanence. A true society requires voluntary cooperation and a considerable sacrifice of personal inclination, while the sport fan's obligations are limited to paying the price of admission and refraining from becoming a public nuisance. The common interest of the crowd is limited rather than inclusive in scope. Most important of all, the baseball crowd does not possess a system of moral rules that are mutually binding.

Animal and Human Society

Social insects. A small proportion of the world's ants, termites, bees, and wasps are "social" insects. Some of their societies were perfected at

least 65 million years ago, and they have undergone little if any change since that time (7, p. 83). They erect elaborate housing structures and live in orderly communities of thousands of individuals. Some of the social ants march like disciplined troops and signal at great distances. They even have a complex division of labor. While some fight, others scout, gather food, or care for the young—but all labor for the community.

In various ways the social insects are man's social superiors, for there are no rebels or nonconformists; there are no jails, policemen, or insane asylums. There is no need to control or suppress antisocial impulses, for these do not exist. They do not exist because the social insects are born with all the "correct" social responses. Their social behavior is absolutely fixed by heredity. Their division of labor is not learned; it is based upon physiological specialization. Some are biologically equipped only to reproduce, others to care for the young; some only gather food, others only fight. Their societies are the sole result of biological evolution, rather than primarily social evolution, as is the case with human societies.

Subhuman primates. Most animals, like most insects, are solitary; only a few are social. But most of the subhuman primates are social, in large part owing to the role that sex plays in their lives. Unlike lower animals, primates are capable of sexual intercourse at all times, so that a more continuous association of the sexes is assured. The long period of primate infancy requires a long mother-child relationship, and the mother usually has one child at a time rather than a litter. A semipermanent family unit, a long period of infancy, and few progeny afford better care and more efficient training than are possible among lower animals.

There are other characteristics of primate society which make it more complex and flexible than that of lower animals. Owing to a highly developed neural structure, primates can communicate effectively, and this ability in turn makes possible a diversified social behavior. Through cry and gesture they can signify intention, and they can learn the intentions of others. Some lower animals learn in a similar fashion, but primates can do it better and they utilize communication much more.

Dominance to some extent characterizes the life of all social animals. What is distinctive about primate society is the pervasiveness of dominance within it. Subhuman primate dominance is based much more upon physical force than is human dominance. Males lord it over females. Strong and vigorous males satisfy their appetites for food and sex at the expense of weaker males. The former are usually acknowledged leaders, and the latter steer clear of them when they can. The family group or clan usually cooperates, however, to protect its members from the wider system of dominance, from attack by other species or attack by members of their own species who are not members of the group.

All primate societies share the characteristics enumerated, but these characteristics vary considerably from one society to another. The howler

monkey (*Alouatta palliata aequatorialis*), on Barro Colorado Island of the Canal Zone, has been described as living in geographically isolated groups or "clans" of about 18 members (9, p. 980). The howler family is quite rudimentary; it contains a transient adult male and an adult female and her offspring. All adult males attempt to copulate with any female who is in heat. Specialization and division of labor are based upon the clan rather than the family unit, and within the clan are several specialized groups—females and nursing infants; females, infants, and juveniles; and play, defensive, and retrieving groups, composed primarily of adult males.

The howler is not pugnacious. Males compete for females, but they do not fight over them. Harmony and cooperation characterize howler life. Food is abundant, so "economic competition" is unnecessary, a fact which may have some connection with their lack of pugnacity. Howler males use their "extraordinary vocal powers" to threaten whatever disturbs the clan—hence the name "howler." The universal pattern of primate dominance is not very marked. Males are for the most part "equal," although certain ones take the lead when the clan migrates or in defense of the clan. Specialization and leadership in the howler clan, nevertheless, "appear to follow lines which are determined by sex, age, and individual characteristics and capacities rather than those of psychophysical prowess which influence dominance-subordination" (9, p. 1018).

Quite different from howler social life is that of the South African baboon (*Papio porcarius*). The family, not the herd or clan, is the basic social group. The family unit is polygynous, including an adult male, a variable number of females who accept him as their master, and their dependent offspring. Juveniles are not long encouraged to remain within the family; as soon as they can fend for themselves they are forced to mingle more with the herd than with their family members.

The baboon herd is not so elaborate as the howler clan, and there is less specialization within it. "The herd may be defensive, aggressive, nutritional, or incidentally established in the face of some special biological need, in that several families may come to use neighboring rock shelters and caves as sleeping places or to frequent the same feeding grounds" (9, p. 986).

Unlike the howler male, the baboon male is pugnacious, and he frequently fights to the death to protect his own harem or to poach upon that of another male. Quite often the female about whom the fight rages herself perishes. The pattern of dominance is sharp. The male overlord bosses his harem in no uncertain terms. Toward infants or juveniles of his own reproductive group he may be friendly, but ordinarily he extends them even less consideration than he shows his "wives." And the herd males are ranked according to who can beat whom. Howler and baboon, then, "seem to represent radically different experiments in social

organization, the one being a species of communism, the other a form of absolutism" (9, p. 1019).

The symbol and human society. Interesting as nonhuman society may be, and however informative of certain basic conditions of all societies, the foundations of human society are qualitatively different from those of animal society. Animal society is founded upon instinct, physiological differences, and direct imitation of overt actions. To a much smaller degree, human society utilizes the latter two of these, but adds symbolic communication to build an ever increasing storehouse of learning, only a small part of which any given individual must master, and symbolic communication to transmit moral rules which govern the conduct of individuals and groups.

Man's division of labor and his sexual and his dominance-submission behavior are governed more by his symbolically transmitted heritage than by physical and physiological differences. Among other things, this accumulated learning signifies that the human process of natural selection is societal rather than individual (2, p. 46). A nation conquers another nation because its technology, governmental administration, and military prowess are more efficient, not because its individual members are physically stronger.

THE BASIS OF ORDER IN HUMAN SOCIETY

Up to this point, we have dealt with certain universal features of society. Throughout the rest of the chapter, we will discuss only those characteristics peculiar to human society.

Moral Norms

Every human relationship is governed by two considerations: what in fact exists, and what ought to be. Emotionalized attitudes about what is *right* and what is *wrong* are transmitted to the young by parents, other elders, and playmates. Throughout life, we remain within certain groups, and we move from some groups into others. All of these groups prescribe common moral norms, and each of them prescribes certain specialized moral norms, neither of which an individual may ignore with impunity.

We control ourselves and our associates, we are ourselves controlled in turn, by frequent appeals to standards of right and wrong. These appeals may be accompanied by exercises in logic and rationality, but they are themselves independent of logic and rationality. A child *should* obey his parents. Perhaps he is told that only by doing so will he have the proper diet, preserve his life when crossing the street, or be prepared at a later time to take his proper place in society as an adult. But in any event, he *should* obey. Children should not be late for school. Soldiers should be willing to die for their country. Politicians ought to treat their

positions as a public trust. Husbands and wives ought to be faithful to one another. Even those groups which flagrantly violate the common moral norms must preserve their own specialized moral norms; members of a criminal gang should not "squeal" on their associates.

Human society is built upon this web of should and ought. Without moral norms human society would perish, for two reasons. First, unlike lower animals, the human organism at birth almost totally lacks innate automatic responses of behavior. Of all the lower animals, only the social insects cooperate as much as man must in order to survive. But the social behavior of insects is instinctive, an answer to organic drives. The social behavior man must learn does not so much fulfill organic drives as it violates them. This is the reason why human social behavior must be learned not only intellectually but also as a moral obligation. The human infant could not survive unless some adults fed, sheltered, and protected him for many years. The human adult has no instinct to perform such services; he must learn them *and* accept them as a moral obligation. Only through an elaborate system of mutual moral obligation can each, and thus society, survive. The normative element in human society must then be untold ages old.

Second, human society depends upon each person's performing certain tasks in a certain way at the same time that others perform different tasks. Society requires that individuals be self-disciplined in order to meet the expectations that others have of them. Each must have assurance that others are performing their duties while he performs his own. And so each must do his job, each must deny individualized desires (mainly aggressive and sexual) when they run counter to his moral obligations. Within some indeterminate limit, the individual cannot take his own road, cannot do as the impulse of the moment prompts him to do. It is moral norms which control him so that he does as he should.

Sanctions

The moral norms are by no means always fulfilled. Violations may occur because two norms are contradictory or because a person's desire for something proves stronger than his respect for the norm which forbids it. Every society, and complex industrial society in particular, at times presents some of its members with contradictory obligations. During a strike, an industrial worker cannot be faithful to both employer and union leaders. A man's obligation to his indigent mother may conflict with the claim of his wife and children on his meager salary. A young man who belongs to a religious sect that preaches literal Christianity (thou shalt not kill, turn the other cheek) may be drafted for military service; he cannot meet both obligations.

More frequent than the experience of personal conflict from the inability to obey two contradictory moral norms is the simple violation of

a norm which stands in the path of some desire. It is not always convenient or to one's taste to go to school, to remain faithful to one's mate, to be strictly honest, and to pay one's debts. Oftentimes the easiest and most efficient way to satisfy one's desires is not the socially approved one. There is thus much stealing, bribery, cheating, adultery, and failure to treat with respect those who wield authority. The many occasionally rebel, the few consistently rebel. Faced by a never ending imperfect compliance with its moral norms, society has recourse to *sanctions*, or punishments. The sanctions set forth below are used in all human societies.

Conscience. The continued existence of society requires that the majority, most of the time, accept without question and without overt pressure from the outside their own obligations toward others. The cheapest kind of control, the most widely applied punishment, is conscience. Conscience is the inner acceptance of certain moral norms as right and necessary, with the feeling of guilt if one violates them or is even tempted to do so. Conscience is an automatic warning signal that is tripped off when one wanders from one's own straight and narrow path.

Perhaps few, perhaps even none, ever internalize as conscience all of the moral norms. It is not necessary that they should. Certain of the moral norms are social ideals, and ideals by definition rise to heights beyond normal expectation. All that society requires is that the majority show respect for social ideals, that they overtly obey most of the norms, and that some of those norms become subliminal, automatic, and self-governed, in the form of conscience.

Ridicule and withdrawal. Conscience is self-imposed, but at the same time it is derived from others within social relationships. Conscience is formed, in part, to protect the self from doing those things that might bring ridicule and withdrawal of social approval from others. The little child is a member of a small family and of play groups which encourage him to meet their expectations. Then, and later in life when he joins other groups, he is kept in line with the threat of informal punishments. A *big* girl of six shouldn't dribble her milk like a little baby, and Mamma won't "love" her if she does. Children should not lie to their parents; otherwise Father will take away the Saturday-afternoon movie. A *boy* does not tell the teacher who threw the spitball; if he does, at recess time his classmates will snub him, call him names, ostracize him at least temporarily, and may refuse to allow him to join their baseball game. Later in life, the coed who belongs to a certain sorority must not be too friendly with Negro girls, or she will be threatened with silence when she approaches her sisters.

Informal punishments of this kind are normally invoked less and less frequently by our associates as we grow older. We learn "instinctively" what is appropriate from one situation to the next, and "automatically"

adjust. As adults we remain consciously unaware that we vigilantly protect ourselves from, as well as cooperate with, our associates. So vital is favorable response from others, both to retain self-respect and in order to function as mate, job holder, and club member, that most of the time we act as the group would have us act. And so thoroughly are we trained to do what others expect us to do that only rarely do we realize the potential threat of punishment.

The threats of ridicule and withdrawal of social approval suffice to control individuals in small, cohesive groups. Many preliterate societies need nothing more, since each individual is personally known to the entire population. And there is nowhere else to go; there is no other group to join.

> The Eskimo say that if a man is a thief no one will do anything about it, but the people will laugh when his name is mentioned. This does not sound like a severe penalty, but it suffices to make theft almost unknown. Ridicule will bring almost any individual to terms, while the most stubborn rebel will bow before ostracism or the threat of expulsion from his group. [6, pp. 141–142]

Force. When informal sanctions fail, the ultimate punishment that society visits upon the rebel is force—physical torture, banishment, imprisonment, or death. In one or more forms force is used by all societies to control those who have most flagrantly or persistently violated the moral norms. Force, in the present context, is not mere physical violence. A fight to the death between two drunken longshoremen is force of a different kind, quite similar to the ferocious battles of the dog-faced baboon. The type of force wielded by human society is always a collective act governed by a norm of legitimacy. Force is applied by legitimate, vested authority, in the name of a group or the total society. And it is always rationalized with a symbolized purpose, such as reform, the good of the soul, or the protection of society.

In some circles it is fashionable to plead that force is an antiquated and barbaric instrument of control which should be abolished. The justification for this argument rests on two propositions. First, man's will is not "free," that is, a man is no more " 'responsible' for . . . committing a crime than the flower for becoming red and fragrant. In both instances the end products are predetermined by the nature of the protoplasm and the chance of circumstances" (1, p. 266). Second, research has consistently proved that the majority of imprisoned criminals return to a life of crime upon their release. Force does not reform the criminal.

The first proposition—that the criminal is not responsible for his crimes —is inconsequential, at least from the point of view of maintaining society. Whether a man is or is not responsible for what he does, he must be held *personally accountable* for what he does. Only on the basis of mutual accountability can mutual prediction of behavior take place, without

which all social relationships would be impossible (4, p. 393). We know, for example, that an individual will act thus and so in a given situation because deviation from expected behavior would be to his discredit or disadvantage. He would be punished, either by loss of reputation, ridicule, or, in extreme cases, expulsion. Only by accepting responsibility (accountability) for his actions can an individual invoke upon his fellows their common system of moral norms. Only through a mutual assurance that future behavior can be predicted on the basis of past and present actions can social relationships be preserved.

But the person who denies the concept of responsibility (free will) often attempts to relieve the criminal of responsibility (accountability). It is difficult to see how this latter goal is to be achieved when noncriminals are, and must be, held accountable for their behavior in the home, at school, and on the job. It is erroneous to assume that society can relieve criminals of accountability, when society's noncriminals must be held to strict accountability.

The second proposition—that punishment fails to reform the criminal—is also inconsequential in the present context. The real social function of punishment is not so much to change the behavior of the extreme rebel as it is to give the majority of more or less norm-accepting persons a continued reason to remain norm accepting. As many sociologists, including Émile Durkheim and George H. Mead, have pointed out, punishment affirms moral standards; it functions to reinforce society's values. Punishment serves to set off wrong from right. That in many instances it fails to rehabilitate the individual offender does not destroy its essential function.

Without punishment, organized society is inconceivable. Accountability for personal actions ceases to exist when sanctions are not applied. This fact does not, however, necessitate cruel and unusual punishments. Criminologists have shown that extremely harsh punishment has been associated in history with periods of excessive criminality. It is even quite probable that the severity of sentence provided for certain criminal acts in our law could be considerably modified with no increase in law violation. On the other hand, that *some* forms of punishment are essential for the preservation of society cannot be gainsaid. It is likewise inevitable that the more severe violations, however defined by the given society, shall be visited with punishment in the form of legitimized force.

STATUS AND ROLE

Moral norms are either general or specific. General norms are meant to apply in any and all situations. Specific norms govern particular situations, and they are on the average more rigorously enforced than general

norms. Specific norms are accompaniments of the specific places an individual occupies in various groups. They apply in terms of time, place, person, and attendant circumstances.

Status and Role Defined

It is through an individual's statuses and roles that most specific moral norms are imposed, and some of them internalized. "A status, as distinct from the individual who may occupy it, is simply a collection of rights and duties" (6, p. 113). A status is also a *position* in a social group or grouping, in relation to other positions held by other individuals in the same group or grouping. This position determines the amount of authority which may be wielded or the degree of submission required. Some polar statuses are employer-employee, priest-parishioner, government official–citizen, father-child, gang leader–gang member. The authority wielded is invariably socially defined and limited, as is the degree of required submission. The essence of status is defined superior-inferior relationship, in other words, dominance and subordination, but always within a set of rules. Within specific relationships, status defines what one can expect from others and what is expected of one's self. Status also defines what one owes to others and what others owe to one's self.

Status determines the limits and conditions of social relationships, but status is not synonymous with those relationships. The way in which concrete individuals fit their defined status varies a great deal. How an individual actually performs in a given status, apart from how he is supposed to perform, is his *role*. The role is the manner in which status is fulfilled. It is the dynamic aspect of status, and it is always influenced by factors other than the social definition of position (2, p. 90). The role, in other words, admits of the range of individual psychological differences, as the status does not.

> We find in every group considerable differences between the ways in which particular individuals tend to perform the roles of members. Some try to expand their roles to an ever greater importance, others restrict theirs to a minimum; some adapt themselves to the standards of their circles, others impose on their circles their own independent standards of how their roles should be played. Some members seek in the group mainly companionship, some a background for their social selves; others are chiefly interested in raising or defending their status; others still, in their institutional functions. [10, p. 809]

Status: ascribed and achieved. Statuses are either ascribed or achieved. Ascribed statuses are acquired at birth, without regard for individual ability. An infant gets a family status—a name, the social-class status of his parents, and the right of inheritance. He also gets a sexual status, an initial age status, and a racial status.

Achieved statuses are those which are more or less thrown open to competition. Our society is unusual in the extent to which status is achieved rather than ascribed, particularly in the spheres of occupation, politics, and social class. No society, however, depends solely upon ascribed status; otherwise the sacrifice of individual abilities and skills might force inefficiency to the danger point. But even in competitive societies, such as our own, ascribed overshadows achieved status. This is particularly true of social-class status; a high ascribed status of this kind gives an individual a tremendous advantage in adult competition.

Ascribed Status and Specific Norms

Kinship. The moral norms are always more inclusive and rigidly enforced within the kinship group or family than outside of it. One's primary loyalty belongs to one's mate and relatives. Standards of honesty and fair dealing, and the obligations of mutual aid in time of crisis, are always more imperatively laid upon an individual in his status as relative than in his status as citizen, employee, or club member.

Sex. Status is universally ascribed on the basis of sex, but this is at least as much socially as biologically determined. "Our own idea of women as ministering angels contrasts sharply with the ingenuity of women as torturers among the Iroquois and the sadistic delight they took in the process" (6, p. 116). The human female's physical weakness and her physiological specialization for reproduction universally affect certain aspects of her status, but the social variations in that status are quite marked.

Moral norms imposed upon females vary from one society to another, but universally they also differ to some extent from those imposed upon men. The duties assigned little girls prepare them for later protective, nurturing, and reproductive functions. The adult woman is excluded from most military and many economic pursuits. Woman's ascribed status universally hedges in her opportunities to achieve status. In our own society, little girls are expected to be more obedient and submissive than little boys. Their moral superiority, in most circles, is supposed to be evidenced. The adolescent girl and adult woman are faced by the double standard of sexual morality which limits their adventuring in comparison with their brothers. Males are expected, and permitted, to be more forthright, independent, and aggressive. Although male dominance has been drastically curtailed in recent decades, it has by no means disappeared.

Even general moral norms are somewhat differently exacted according to sex. All Americans are supposed to love their country. For men, this carries the specific obligation of military service in time of inter-

national political crisis; for women, the sacrifice of husband and sons if need be.

Age. Every society recognizes five general age statuses—infancy, childhood, adolescence, maturity, and old age. Except for infancy, these are delayed rather than immediately ascribed. Ascribed rights and duties shift as an individual moves from one age status to another. Children have the obligation of submission and obedience, the right of care and protection. The mature have a maximum of obligation toward immature children, the mate, and aged parents. They also carry the main burden in the division of labor. Their rights would include, among others, sexual expression and some measure of authority.

The status of the aged most differs from one society to another. In the old Chinese peasant society, old age brought honor, respect, and continued authority. If old age was not eagerly awaited, it was at least anticipated without emotional distress. The Comanche society, in contrast, made old age an almost intolerable burden, for Comanche life revolved about the young warriors and the young women who ministered to them. The aged had no defined place. A similar situation is developing in modern America. Gainful employment constantly moves away from individual ownership of land and tools and buildings and constantly moves toward bureaucratic placement in business, industry, and government. As the proportion of wage and salary earners mounts, so also are greater proportions of the aged discarded by the impersonal economic units which hired them as vigorous adults. With families living farther apart, and no longer united in a common economic endeavor, the age-old obligation of mature children to care for their aged parents is deteriorating at the same time that poverty in old age increases. Consequently, the rights of authority and respect continued into old age are also deteriorating.

Race. Many societies do not contain peoples of different races, but ours does. One's race is a matter of ascribed status (fixed at conception and unchangeable), and moral norms will to some extent differ accordingly. Nowhere is the specificity of moral norms more in evidence than here. Black and white may worship the same God, but they do so in separate buildings. The "all welcome" sign which stands on the front lawn of a "white" Protestant church is more than likely not designed to welcome Negroes—nor working-class whites, for that matter, should it be an upper-class church.

Race cuts across many moral norms established for other statuses, such as age, sex, and occupation. The aged are supposed to be accorded at least a verbal respect and deference, but in some parts of the country *all* Negroes must be addressed by their first names. A Negro may overcome his racial handicap sufficiently to become a physician, but he will

remain a Negro and will be treated as racially distinct. Negroes, in fact all minorities, do not compete on equal terms with the majority for achieved status in the job world. Neither do they receive equal treatment at the hands of the police or in our courts of law.

If the majority do not feel compelled to treat Negroes as equals, neither do they impose certain moral norms so rigorously upon them. Southern Negroes are more or less "forgiven" for being less industrious, on the average, than whites. Crimes of Negro against Negro are much less often and much less severely punished than are crimes of white against white, even though crimes of Negro against white are much more severely punished. The Southern Negro male's sexual philandering is treated much more tolerantly than is that of the white male, by both whites and Negroes—provided, of course, that he restricts his attentions to Negro women.

Stratification: Partly Ascribed and Partly Achieved

Society is in all times and places organized on the basis of superior-inferior position. Stratification refers to placement, high or low, in relation to others in the spheres of race, occupation, politics, and social class. It is in the various spheres of stratification—with the exception of race—that achieved status plays its part, even though none of them is entirely free from ascribed status. And it is also in these spheres that the specificity of moral norms reaches a maximum.

Occupational status and specific norms. The laborer owes his employer an honest day's work and enough self-discipline to see that his assigned task is properly completed. The employer owes his employee a "fair deal," which is defined according to time and place; in modern America it might include the prevailing wage, a respect for seniority rights in job security and upgrading, and the obligation to provide decent working conditions. The liability of each is strictly limited. Employer and employee might never meet, and if they should their personal relationship would probably be restricted to the job and nothing beyond the job.

General moral norms are also unevenly applied throughout the occupational sphere. Moral rectitude is expected of all, but clergymen are expected in their private lives to prove their special worthiness to wear the garb of God's chosen. A scandal which catches a clergyman is thus a serious matter which will provoke an extreme reaction. While a businessman might, under certain circumstances, be forgiven for driving a sharp bargain, a clergyman would not. Courage is expected of all, but those who protect society in an official capacity must be particularly brave. Firemen, policemen, and soldiers are expected to distinguish themselves in the face of danger. Legendary stories, group rituals, the wearing of special uniforms, and the pinning on of medals—by these and many other

means is the special expectancy of the total society made manifest to its chosen representatives.

One is identified with one's occupational status. Others must be able to predict that in specific situations the effort will be made to fulfill the moral obligations attendant on that status. It is only modern industrial society—because of its extreme specialization—which must depend primarily upon specific moral norms to ensure the integration of its occupational functions. Without a more or less general willingness to accept these specific moral norms, modern society would disintegrate.

Political status and specific norms. The sphere of politics contains the ultimate authority to enforce the general moral norms. This authority is legitimate; it is exercised in a certain way, for certain defined purposes, and by certain designated representatives. The moral obligation of those who wield power is not to exceed the defined limits of their legitimate political authority. That bribery, corruption, naked coercion, and malfeasance frequently occur is common knowledge. Here, as elsewhere, an individual's role in his status rarely fulfills perfectly the moral norms attendant on that status. It is, however, only common respect for those norms which is essential, the continued expectation that they will be met, and the lack of complaisance when they are violated. Otherwise there would be little effort on the part of defaulting politicians and public servants to hide their betrayal of the public trust, and there would be no means to hedge in their depredations.

The moral obligation of the ruled is to accept legitimate authority and to seek change or redress within traditional law and political practice. Revolt and revolution occasionally erupt. But the usual dynamic of such uprisings is the belief that present political authority has deviated from and violated traditional law and practice. Although the new regime may use force and fraud to seize power (as do established regimes to maintain power to some extent), it must also become legitimate. It must seek and attain the confidence of a majority of the ruled that it holds authority in the collective interest.

Social-class status and specific norms. Moral norms shift their character somewhat as they are aimed across or up or down the social-class structure. Specific class norms often conflict with general norms. Seduction of a young girl is generally treated as a heinous act; on the other hand, young aristocrats have for centuries "betrayed" lower-class girls with impunity. At the other end of the scale, slum dwellers are not generally expected to be so "respectable" or to inhibit their aggressive and sexual drives so much as are middle-class persons. One possible exception is the slum dweller on relief; those maintained at public expense are expected to be exemplary in their conduct.

Standards of kindliness, forbearance, and tolerance operate differently within, and across, social-class lines. Lower-class people are relatively

direct and overtly egocentric with their fellows. Upper- and middle-class persons, in their occasional contacts with lower-class persons, treat them differently than they do members of their own class. They are likely to invade lower-class personalities more openly—ask direct questions and expect direct answers regarding matters that would be private with members of their own class. When members of different classes meet, the tone of voice of each, the manner, and the forms of address used invariably show a mutual awareness of difference in station. Respect for class superiors is much more likely to be overtly expressed than internally accepted by lower-class Americans, however, because our official ideology —"there are no classes in America"; "all men are equal"—falls athwart the actual requirements of behavior in a relationship which brings together persons from different social classes.

Other Status Considerations

The three spheres of stratification enumerated above are more or less open to competition in American society. All are encouraged to compete for higher occupational, political, and social-class statuses, or, in the case of the already successful, to keep what they have achieved. All are encouraged to compete, but there are few places at the top, so that the majority fail to reach the top.

Compensations for failure. Society compensates those who must remain where they are with a secondary kind of approval. It may be said of a man that he is "poor but honest." Another man who has never held political office may still be a "good citizen," since he votes in every election. The "job well done" is praised, the streakless glass of the professional window washer as well as the exquisite lines of Georgia O'Keeffe's paintings. Society encourages each, high or low, to perform his role well, to narrow the gap between role and status.

Nevertheless, the competitive prizes of wealth, power, deference, and prestige go only to those of high status. So long as that high status is retained, its attendant rewards are retained, regardless of role performance. A politician may do a miserable job but continue to hold office through an alliance with powerful interests. A member of the "leisure class" performs no social service whatsoever, but he receives much that the skilled and conscientious craftsman is denied.

Status inconsistency. In most societies, an individual's statuses are consistent; his occupation, social class, and kinship affiliation all dovetail neatly. Even in modern America, statuses tend to be congruent. At the same time, however, there are many individuals in our society whose statuses are somewhat inconsistent, because the area of competition is wide and intensive. A politician who was born and raised in a poverty-stricken family might never attain a social-class position commensurate with his achieved political status. Perhaps the grand sachem of a local

fraternal order washes dishes in a local restaurant. Since higher education is easily accessible today, many an A.B. goes back to a home town of uneducated laborers who hold his attainment in low esteem.

Not many individuals possess widely divergent statuses, but those who do tend to regard themselves up or down as they move from one group to another. Such individuals may have difficulty in working out a satisfactory self-conception. Personality maladjustment often results from vainly trying to keep intact the self-conception derived from one status which is more flattering than that derived from another status.

> . . . it is precisely because in some of his social circles he is not so centrally located as in others or as he conceives himself to be within that particular circle that the individual comes to have successively varying and simultaneously divergent or conflicting conceptions of himself. The recognition of this fact would go far toward illuminating some of the more basic forms of personal maladjustment. [8, p. 968]

Societies that depend more upon ascribed status than ours spare their members this kind of maladjustment.

GROUPS AND GROUPINGS

Society is a group, but most groups are not societies. A society is a group which includes all the other groups of an organized population that has a sense of belonging together. A small band or an isolated agricultural village may be a society. Throughout most of the modern world, however, nation is synonymous with society. A modern national society includes the effective organization of its people, and it includes the sense of unity and belonging together. Within each national society, of course, can be found thousands of other groups.

Group Defined

A group is an aggregate of individuals which persists in time, which has one or more interests and activities in common, and which is organized—that is, some members lead, others follow, and rules and statuses control social relationships within it. A group may be small or large. It is not necessary that the membership be in close physical or social contact, but they must possess an awareness of common membership, and there must be reciprocity among them. They must, in other words, recognize one another, although in some cases this is done at a distance and without personal contact.

Ethnocentrism

The attachment of individual to group far transcends mere consciousness of membership. An individual so closely identifies his self with one

or another group that he has little if any desire to distinguish between his self and the group. The motivation for close identification with a group, at least always in part, is to expand self-importance. When some other member triumphs, the self is congratulated. What the group is, or accomplishes, is never a matter for objective assessment. There is a universal tendency to exaggerate the importance of one's group and thus of one's self. The little boy who boasts that his father can lick any man in the block is at one with the poet who declares the skies bluer over

FIG. 3. An example of ethnocentrism. (From *Newsweek.*)

Poland than anywhere else in the world. Justice Holmes once said that the earth's axis is driven through the center of every small town in America.

To this view of the world in which one's family, community, tribe, or nation is obviously superior to all others is given the name ethnocentrism. It is thought by many to be a social necessity—through this fierce group loyalty cooperation and the acceptance of individual responsibilities are ensured. In any event, ethnocentrism is at the heart of group conflict. Exaggeration of the importance of one's own group at the very least implies a superior attitude toward other similar groups; very often ethnocentrism is charged with hatred for other communities, other tribes, and other nations. Mild or violent dislike is often justified with the accusation that this other group does not respect the moral norms which govern one's own group.

A group "without the law" is indeed believed to be a "lesser breed."

A violent tide of race hatred swept over the United States when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. This action by the Japanese military was considered proof of Japanese inferiority by many Americans. It was a "sneak attack," which violated the American ideal of "fair play." In more than a few churches the Japanese were denounced for having attacked on Sunday, the day of the week sacred to us but not to them.

In versus Out Group

An in group embodies the collective pronouns "we" and "they." To these two pronouns are attached the most powerful of all collective sentiments. The comfort, strength, and thrill which derive from the knowledge that "these are my people" rests upon the inevitable correlate that "those others are not my people." An in group acquires its consciousness of being from the exclusion of some persons as well as from the inclusion of other persons. To some extent its organization is also based upon exclusion as well as inclusion. The marriage vows pledge a cleaving to one flesh, but they also include the pledge to forsake all others. Even a friendship is based in part upon the realization that two people share a unique, and thus an exclusionary, relationship.

If all the people in the world were Germans, there would be no Germany and no sense of German-ness. If all the people in the world were to be converted to Christianity, the organized Christian Church also would wither. The one thing we share with all other human beings is a common membership in the species Homo sapiens. No group has ever been organized on that basis. One could be so organized only if some nonhuman collectivity challenged or threatened the entire planet, such as an alarming multiplication of present insect hordes or an invasion from another planet. It is thus difficult to envision a world state which would incorporate all the human inhabitants of earth in one cohesive community.

Some groups, but by no means all, require exaggerated ethnocentrism and the keeping alive of hostility toward out groups. Nations and political parties agitate hostility toward other nations and political parties as a matter of policy, but families and churches do not, nor do social clubs. The unity of the latter, as well as the former, however, does require a sense of "we" as opposed to "they." Exclusion of others is a matter of policy in the family, and it may or may not be such in the church and club. Every group, in other words, is conscious that others are not with us—at the very least, not with us yet.

Primary versus Secondary Group

Primary groups. Primary groups are small and personal; secondary groups are large and impersonal. A group is primary to the extent that the attitudes of intimate sympathy and close identification are maintained. There are certain physical conditions which foster primary-group

attitudes. One is closeness in space, which in most instances is necessary for intimacy. Another is size. The smaller the group, the more likely it is to include personal sympathy and identification. As a group increases in size, the number of actual or potential relationships among the members increases geometrically rather than arithmetically. "A group of four, for example, which contains 25 actual relationships, appears to be functionally different from a group of six, which embodies 50 relationships" (5, p. 548). With increasing size, the likelihood grows of division in opinion and sentiment among the group's members. Subgroups might arise within the inclusive group. It is the very unusual church congregation or fraternity which is entirely free of cliques and factions. And when a certain size is reached, intimacy becomes impossible. The congregation of a village church, but not that of a metropolitan church, all know one another.

Primary relationships possess two outstanding characteristics. First, individual goals tend to be mutually shared. The relationship itself is regarded as a good; personal advantage is not sought. Each is concerned for the welfare of all. In any concrete group, of course, a friend or family or club member may on occasion oppose others; he may distrust and resist one or all of the other members from time to time. Identity of goals is not complete, but much more complete than it is in secondary groups. Identity of goals usually extends to personality identification. When a child falls and injures himself, his mother may "feel" the physical hurt. One of the most excruciating agonies a man can know is to be present when a close associate makes an ass of himself in public.

Second, the relationship is inclusive. Interest centers in other persons rather than in the specific functions they fulfill. It matters little who serves us in a public restaurant. One waitress will do as well as another, since our only interest is securing a meal. But in primary relationships, it is the entire person, the irreplaceable person, who is valued. Personnel are more or less interchangeable in secondary groups. But a family, clique, or small club is irretrievably changed when any one person leaves the group.

The total self is involved. One shares with others not aspects of the self but its core. The barriers are down, and it is the intensive personalness of the primary group which makes betrayal by any of its members an extremely serious matter. Actions, words, or gestures which are negative in tone are of relative unimportance in secondary relationships, because one meets others only at the outer periphery of one's self. They are of critical importance in primary relationships, because their meaning is magnified by the self's total involvement.

Secondary groups. Secondary groups are usually dispersed in space and so large that the membership cannot maintain close contact. Secondary groups are controlled by formal rules. They are organized bureau-

cratically, with formally defined and formally limited rights and duties in a chain of command. They depend to some extent upon impersonal channels of communication to keep them knit together. Business and industrial organizations, professional associations, labor unions, and armies are examples of secondary groups. Secondary-group life is characteristic of modern urban, industrial society. It is totally absent in preliterate society.

Secondary relationships lack identity of goals. They are not cherished in and of themselves. They are impersonal and noninclusive, that is, segmented and specialized, attached to specific functions. They involve only a part of the self. A rational calculation of private interest is likely to govern such relationships. Personnel are more or less interchangeable in secondary relationships; men can be hired and fired in a factory, or assigned to a different room in another building, without changing the group in any important way.



FIG. 4. The "chain of command" in a secondary organization is built upon primary groups.

The characteristics of primary and secondary groups are a matter of degree rather than of mutual exclusion. Any organized group, secondary or primary, must have *some* identity of goals; it must be valued to *some* extent for itself. Citizens identify themselves with their country much more than employees identify with their corporation, even though the country is larger than the corporation. Neither group could long endure without some measure of loyalty and devotion.

A secondary group can persist in time only because it is made up of a number of overlapping primary groups. An army's foundation is the cohesive primary unit of combat teams in plane and tank and infantry platoon. An industry depends upon work teams in the plant and the personal relationships of supervisors and executives. Communication in a secondary group may be impersonal between top and bottom, and identification between top and bottom may be rudimentary. But within each layer of the organization, and at those points where the layers overlap, communication must be direct and identification must be closer.

Groupings

The term "group" is often misapplied to such categories as sex, age ("the adolescent group"), race, social class, and occupation or income

("the five-thousand-a-year-and-over group"). People who belong in one of these categories may form a group from time to time, but the categories themselves are not groups. Such categories are not organized. They do not maintain relationships which endure in time. The interests which people in one or another category may share are not a focus for common activity. Only when people within a category organize do they comprise a group. Negroes are not a group, but those Negroes who belong to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People are a group.

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CHAPTER 4 *Interaction: The Social Processes*

> Society waits unformed and is between things ended and things begun. —WALT WHITMAN

INTERACTION AND SOCIETY

Social Interaction Defined

By social interaction is meant the mutual influences that individuals and groups have upon one another as they attempt to solve individual or collective problems and as they strive to reach individual or group goals. Social interaction discloses the concrete results of the coming together of people's reciprocal moral norms, reciprocal statuses, and reciprocal striving.

> Interaction may be defined as a reciprocal contact between two or more persons. . . . Without interaction there would be no social or group life. The mere placing of individuals in physical proximity, although it usually results in at least a modicum of interaction, does not weld them into a social unit or group. It is when persons or groups of persons work or play or talk together with reference to a common end, or when they compete, quarrel, or frown at each other, that associative life, properly speaking, is at hand. [12, p. 59]

Society in Action

Society can be viewed as a system of moral norms and defined statuses which embody those norms. Society can also be viewed as a system in action. As individuals and groups meet, as they strive, as they attempt to solve both individual and collective problems and to jockey for the favors which their society has to offer, their statuses and even their moral norms are to some extent changed. Moral norms and statuses comprise the static element in society; social interaction, the dynamic element.

Analogy of the game. To use a rather fanciful figure of speech, society is the total number of players as well as the stadium in which the game of life is played. Moral norms are the rules of the game. Statuses are the parts assigned to the players. Social interaction is what happens after the game starts.

Like all analogies, this one is imperfect. It should not be confused with definition. What actually happens in the game of life is much more

complex than a literal statement of any analogy could indicate. During an athletic contest, the players do not ordinarily change the rules of the game or the positions with which they started the game. Changes such as these are, however, inevitably the result, and often the intent, of social interaction. The game of life is played over a span of centuries, and in their social interaction the succeeding generations of participants attempt, in one way or another, to improve their positions or, more accurately, to change their statuses. If most of them do not attempt to change the rules, at least many of them modify the moral norms as a consequence of seeking to change their statuses.

To cite one illustration, the cooperation of certain women, and their competition and conflict with men in the nineteenth-century women's movement, ultimately made women's status more equal to that of men in several ways. As a result, moral norms were changed somewhat. Deprived of much of their ancient dominance over women, men were also relieved of much of their ancient responsibility for them. As the number of gainfully employed women has increased, for example, so have magistrates shown an increasing reluctance to grant alimony to women who sue for divorce. The moral obligation of men to support their wives, in other words, has been diminished.

Process and the concrete situation. The social processes to be discussed below are conflict, competition, cooperation, and assimilation. These social processes are merely the characteristic ways in which interaction occurs. Interaction is a subtle, complex, and dynamic thing. It can never be totally identified with one social process to the exclusion of all others. Any concrete situation always contains more than one process.

If the unlikely should happen, and two lovers ever thought of themselves in terms of social process, they would undoubtedly insist that their love was pure and harmonious cooperation. They compete, nevertheless, in various ways—at the very least, each tries to prove that he loves more than he is loved. And they quarrel, or conflict—at the very least, over the claim that the other does not love enough. Perhaps a less controversial example should be cited: the members of a local union cooperate in order to compete effectively with management over the division of the corporation's profits. Should the uncertain combination of cooperation and competition which is labor-management negotiation break down, then the conflict of an industrial strike would ensue.

CONFLICT

Definition

Conflict is the deliberate attempt to oppose, resist, or coerce the will of another or others. Conflict ranges from the annihilation of an enemy to the deliberate slight of an associate. Although commonly associated with physical violence, conflict can occur without it. A conscientious objector who *refuses* to fight is involved in conflict as surely as the bayonet-wielding infantryman. While the soldier resists the enemy's will, the conscientious objector resists the will of his own nation. In some personal situations, a refusal to fight may "harm" another more effectively than smashing his nose—provided, of course, that he can be made to feel morally inferior.

Almost any human action is bound to oppose the will of others to some extent, but any such action becomes conflict only if the deliberate intent is to oppose. Securing a job, even when the successful applicant is unaware of the existence of other job seekers, still denies that job to others. The reform group that clears a slum may prevent certain landlords from collecting their accustomed high rent in the slum. Marrying a woman denies sexual access to her by all other males. The insistence that all men should love all other men spoils for some the pleasure of hatred. None of these instances is a conflict situation, however, for in no case is the *deliberate intent* of the action to oppose, resist, or coerce.

Conflict: latent and overt. Every individual and every group finds itself in one or more situations that it deems intolerable in some degree. In most cases, long before conflict erupts in hostile action it has existed in latent form—in social tension and dissatisfaction. Latent conflict becomes overt conflict when an issue is declared and when hostile action is taken.

> Sometimes the actual overt showdown occurs when one side or the other feels strong and wishes to take advantage of this fact. Then, as we say, it "makes an issue" of the differences between the two conflicting parties. Or it "raises the issue." But sometimes actual conflict may exist in latent form for years before there is a formulation of issues or a showdown or crisis.
>
> The danger in our confusing the overt conflict—a strike, a fist fight, a riot—with the conflict itself is that in trying to avoid these crises we may forget that the true issue is much more basic than the precipitant which brings on a crisis. It is a mistake to limit our thinking about conflict to the overt phase of showdown or crisis. If we do, then the study of conflict . . . becomes merely a study of the technology of overt conflict—strikes or riots. It should be much more fundamental than that. We must accustom ourselves to thinking of latent conflict as going on day in and day out in varying degrees of intensity, whether the issues are clearly formulated or not. [3, p. 106]

Why universal. Conflict is deplored in almost all times and places, and yet it occurs in all times and places. Why? Because of the inevitable clash of will and purpose within groups and societies and between groups and societies. The goals men seek frequently require for their attainment opposition to the goals of others, and the moral norms are never extensive enough to cover every potential clash of interests or to indicate in each specific clash who should submit and who should impose his will.

The moral norms are stable and conservative forces in society. They change in time, but they resist change; they change much more slowly than do men's desires, hopes, dissatisfactions, and demands. In part, conflict is caused by the difference between the rate of change in what men desire and insist they shall have and the rate of change in the moral norms which control men's desires. The moral norm that children should obey their parents has persisted in Western society for thousands of years, but it is now disputed by the so-called younger generation as it never has been before. In consequence, there is more parent-youth conflict than ever before.

Moreover, the moral norms—specific as well as general—are so broad in scope that conflicting parties can frequently invoke different or even similar norms to justify their separate claims or demands. If the deliverymen of all the dairies in a metropolitan district should go out on strike for higher wages, they would claim that the dairy managers had been guilty of attempting to break the union and had acted in a dictatorial way, "contrary to democracy." Management would insist that "subversive radicals" (the union spokesmen) were trying to "destroy the free-enterprise system." Should the strike remain unsettled in this murky atmosphere of moral absolutes, consumers would probably call a plague on both their houses, stone picket lines *and* fire rocks through the windows of the dairies' offices. These consumers would also invoke moral norms to justify their actions—the physical needs of babies and invalids and the moral responsibility of all in society to protect the helpless and the ailing, in this case by providing them with milk.

Corporate Conflict

Conflict is either corporate or personal. Corporate conflict occurs among the groups within a society or between two societies. Groups often attempt to impose their will upon other groups because each can secure the scarce goals of wealth, power, influence, and prestige only at the expense of another group. Most of the time, moral norms and the respect in which they are held suffice to keep claim and counterclaim within the bounds of competition or at least latent conflict. From time to time, however, families do feud, race riots clamor in the streets, religious persecution erupts, and class war and revolution rage. When latent group

conflict becomes overt, opposing groups rationalize their failure to uphold the general unity with another moral norm. For example, religious norms commonly enforce that men shall live at peace, but an upsurge of religious hatred may make death to the infidel God's commandment.

Within society: example of labor-management conflict. Long before the founding of the United States, labor-management conflict sporadically broke out in North America. It has done so ever since, and the issues have remained fairly constant: shall organized labor or shall management control wages, hours of work, and working conditions? Management has been giving ground, but it still fights to retain some control over working conditions and the power to hire and discharge workers, and continues to try to hold down its largest cost, wages, in order to keep managerial salaries and stockholders' profits high. Management has generally, although not always, attempted so far as possible to treat labor as a means of production, as something flexible, pliant, and docile, like its physical plant. Organized labor, on the other hand, has striven to keep wages high, to decrease the number of working hours, to strip management of much power in hiring, firing, job tenure, and the like. There is thus a perfect setting for continued labor-management conflict: "two groups that have to share the same world, each wanting mutually incompatible ends" (3, p. 297).

Overt conflict in this instance takes the form of insulting remarks hurled around the "mediation-board" table, delivered from speakers' platforms, or appearing in the press. Its violent manifestations are the union's strike and management's lockout. Overt conflict is sporadic, and it occurs relatively infrequently. Latent conflict is continuous.

Latent conflict in labor-management relations is continuous because each side represents something that neither can discuss with the other, about which each may be consciously unaware, something unacknowledged, that lies back of disputes over wages and hours. The very function of management opposes basic and largely unconscious motives in the workingman.

> Management has its eyes on production. It has orders to fill, contractual obligations to live up to. It has the engineering point of view. Efficiency is its goal. It stands, therefore, for discipline, machines and technology. Life in an industrialized community calls for an extraordinary amount of discipline of human nature by clocks, machines, technology, organization, regimentation. It allows for little spontaneity. It mechanizes our lives unmercifully. We stand for it only because modern technologies turn out so many goods that we want. Management is identified with this disciplinary phase of production. [3, p. 300]

Labor is not the regimenter, it is the regimented. Though labor may be an abstraction, the laborer is a man, with human weaknesses and secret desires. He may want to talk about the Red Sox instead of remaining at

his machine; he may want to smoke, but this is forbidden. The human mind, at deep levels of the unconscious, resents and resists regimentation. It is not a machine, and does not want to be treated like a machine. Management may be excited by some new scheme to increase production, but to the laborer this may mean only more unfair and depersonalized "pushing around."

> The issues between management and labor are not, then, merely economic in the superficial sense. They go far deeper; they have roots that go deep down into human nature. The conflict between management and labor reflects a basic conflict within each one of us. We have all felt it within our own personalities. We might reduce its dimensions by decentralizing industry, but we can never eliminate it. For even if the employer and the employee are one and the same person, the conflict persists within that one person. It is a conflict between his desire for the goods he must work to produce and his desire to relax and take things easy. [3, p. 301]

Between societies: example of war. The corporate conflict of which we are most aware involves total national societies—international war. The world is divided up into sovereign nations, and the moral norm of patriotism has for most of mankind become the supreme arbiter of the universe. My country, may she ever be in the right, but my country, right or wrong. For the vast majority of citizens everywhere, personal loyalty and ego identification do not extend beyond the boundaries of their nation-state. This makes periodic warfare well-nigh inevitable, because when clashes of national interests appear, there is no larger corporate entity than the nation which can be defended or implored to intervene.

Among the most potent causes of war is the fact that the rulers and citizens of all nations identify the interests of their own state with the universal sentiments of peace, justice, and moral right. The conflict between Great Britain and Iran in 1951—which stopped short of war—over the control of Iranian oil is an excellent illustration of this point. Great Britain desperately needs oil, and Great Britain had ironclad contracts with the Iranian government to operate the British-owned and British-developed oil fields in Iran. "Justice" and "moral right" were obviously on Britain's side, and oil was needed to "protect the peace"—to maintain British military strength in order to prevent Russia from making further grabs for territory and influence. On the other hand, an upsurge of Iranian patriotism—in part manipulated by some Iranian interests for their own purposes—demanded expropriation of the oil fields. "Foreign domination" had to end. "Justice" demanded that the "sacred soil of Iran" be freed from exploitation by "greedy foreigners."

One sociologist has insisted that everyone in the modern world is either a conscious or an unconscious nationalist, so that any appeal to "internationalism" can only be a foolish disguise for nationalism.

> The conscious nationalist, if he fights, fights in concrete terms and with full awareness—for America, or for France, or for Japan. . . . The unconscious nationalist, if he fights, fights always in the abstract for "humanity," or "justice," or "freedom," and remains completely blinded to the fact that the way he defines these ideas and ideals is determined by his unconscious nationalistic frame of reference. [7, p. 314]

It is true that the majority of men the world over want peace. But whether they are conscious or unconscious nationalists, the majority will also define peace in such a way that it is synonymous with the power interests of their own nation and therefore detrimental to the power interests of some other nations. Most men want peace, but few men are prepared to appease—to accept the power aspirations of another nation when they do not coincide with those of their own.

The positive aspects of corporate conflict. Corporate conflict—within and between societies—has its positive as well as its negative side. Within societies, the in group is more often than not strengthened by opposing the outgroup. Nothing is quite so effective in drawing the members of a family together as a quarrel with another family. Even rejecting an offer of tolerance and acceptance, in some cases, strengthens the in group. Religious sects and national minorities often resist overtures from the majority, because social acceptance might weaken the character of the smaller group and tempt its members to attach themselves to the majority. The Amish parents who refused to send their children to the public schools provided by the state of Pennsylvania were motivated in this way. The Amish experience has been similar to that of the Jews. During periods of tolerance and acceptance, Jewish customs and religious practices have waned and marriages outside the Jewish sacred society have increased. On the other hand, Jewish loyalty and identification, as well as Jewish religious practices, have been strong and secure during most periods of persecution (4).

War heightens group awareness and group identity. Many hostilities which normally would be displaced within the nation are displaced upon the collective outsider during war. A quasi moratorium on customary internal conflicts may be declared, such as the honored pledge of American labor unions to renounce all strikes for the duration of World War II. "Each nation gains cohesion and strength through emphasizing its own destiny as against that of other nations. It suffers least from internal conflict precisely when engaged in external conflict with an enemy. Internal harmony and external conflict are therefore opposite sides of the same shield" (5, p. 160).

Personal Conflict

Conflict within the group is much more severely restricted and disapproved than that between and among groups. The group as a whole

has little if anything to gain from internal conflict. The Comanche society idealized and practiced war to an extreme that is almost unique in history, yet the individual members of a war party had to cooperate, and quarrels among its members were prohibited. Personal conflict there, as well as elsewhere, however, could not be prevented. Although more severely condemned than corporate conflict, personal conflict is likewise universal.

Various motives. The individuals who make up any group strive for individual as well as group goals. Each person's private goals, within his group membership, comprise one, some, or all of the following: sex, prestige, power, wealth, and leisure. Society, and the separate groups composing society, attempt to restrict striving for these goals to competition. But these private goals are highly prized at the same time that the means for their satisfaction are scarce, so that a few gain more than most and some are totally deprived. Defined statuses and imposed moral norms are not always efficacious enough to prevent hostility and envy on the part of those who have less than others. In all times and places, hostility and envy on occasion spill over into personal conflict.

Vicious and false rumors circulate about the sex life of a Hollywood star or a distinguished statesman. A man in competition with another for a raise in salary undermines his rival's reputation. A student blackballs a boy from his fraternity, a boy who just happens to get better grades in a course they are both taking. A woman who suddenly feels that for years she has been treated like a servant by her selfish family is afflicted with a headache that ends all plans for the picnic her husband and children have been looking forward to. Examples of personal conflict arising out of envy and hostility are probably as numerous as the world's population.

There are other motives for personal conflict besides envy and hostility. Two or more people who combine their efforts and achieve a common goal may have different opinions about how that goal should be shared. Two scholars may collaborate harmoniously in writing a book only to become spiteful enemies over the question of whose name should appear first on the cover. A man and woman have achieved a common goal, marriage, but perhaps the husband expects sexual relations to come first while his wife, with equal vehemence, insists that "intellectual companionship" is more important. In the achievement of a common goal, or the continuance of a personal relationship, in other words, people always have private notions of their own rights and the limits of the other's or others' rights. Very often the private notions of the interacting pair, or few, do not perfectly coincide. Latent conflict is thus to be found in all personal relationships. When latent conflict becomes overt in personal relationships, it usually takes the form of insult, of attempts to diminish the other's conception of himself.

Violence occurs much less often in personal than in corporate conflict. When provoked, a lower-class husband and wife may hurl beer bottles at each other. But in most circles, such conduct is unthinkable. Nonviolent marital conflict can, however, cut deeper into the ego than a beer bottle into the flesh. An upper-class woman may use the term "darling" in such a way as to express loathing for her husband and diminish his sense of importance to the vanishing point.

Love and hate. Close emotional attachment to another can, under certain circumstances, be a cause of personal conflict. To the extent that we come to need a favorable emotional response from another, to that extent do we become personally helpless in the face of betrayal of trust.

> With reference to the stranger with whom one shares neither qualities nor other interests, one stands in objective contrast, and one preserves the proper personality. On that account a difference in a single particular does not so easily carry the whole person with it. In the case of a person quite unlike ourselves, we come into contact only at the point of a single transaction or coincidence of interests. The accommodation of a conflict will consequently limit itself to this single issue. The more we have, however, in common with another, the easier will our whole personality become involved in each separate contact with him. Hence the quite disproportionate intensity with which otherwise quite self-contained persons frequently allow themselves to become moved in their conduct toward their most intimate associates. [9, pp. 515–516]

If one person in a formal relationship should act in a displeasing way, violate a confidence, or express disapproval, the effect would probably not be shattering to the other person, because the relationship is for the most part limited to the specific issue. Such action on the part of the beloved, on the other hand, raises acute anxiety, for one's total self is threatened. There is some truth in the folk saying that hate is close to love. When one loves, he identifies with the other; he reveals his innermost self to the other, his beliefs, interests, and quirks of character. Because of his love he removes many of the masks he is accustomed to wear in more formal relationships. Because of his consuming need for this love relationship, he surrenders to the beloved the power to delight or sadden him. With the act of surrender often goes the assumption that the other likewise surrenders. The other must keep faith with one's private notion of idealized loyalty in love. The most deep and bitter hate that man can know arises from betrayal, and the more intense love is the more intensely can it be betrayed.

One may take little heed of the infidelities of acquaintances, may even joke about them, and may yet be impelled to murder at the infidelity of a lover. Personal violence in any form is rarely condoned by society, and murder provokes a swift and severe penalty. Nevertheless, the so-called unwritten law decrees that juries shall free the man who murders his wife and her paramour if he should catch them *flagrante delicto.*

There is a parallel here in corporate conflict. Civil wars are notoriously more bloody and merciless than wars between nations which have little knowledge of one another. Throughout history, militant churches have much more savagely punished heretics (those who have forsaken the faith) than infidels (those who have never accepted or perhaps even known the faith). The several modern splinters of the original Communist party—Stalinites, Trotskyites, "bourgeois deviationists"—apparently hate one another more fervently than they hate the capitalists.

It is characteristic of both corporate and personal conflict that the traitor is more hated and severely dealt with than the alien, the stranger, even the traditional enemy. Knowledge about others and close association with them can foster hate as well as love. This lesson has been lost on those modern reformers who insist that if only people would get to know one another better they would certainly live together in harmony.

The positive aspects of personal conflict. Like corporate conflict, personal conflict has its positive side. The opposition of one individual to another is frequently the only way in which the continued relationship can be made personally tolerable (9). Vicious gossip aimed at a dictatorial and unpopular supervisor at times permits subordinates to funnel off their aggression without quitting the job or attacking him physically. Much of the fist fighting among lower-class Negroes is interpreted by some psychologists as a "safe" substitute for hostile action against the dominant white society, which is the real object of their hatred. Humor, in the form of satire and parody, is often a weapon of conflict: "humor may conceal malice and allow expression of aggression without the consequences of other overt behavior" (10, p. 569). Humor of this kind strengthens the morale of those who use it and weakens the morale of those who are its target. The verbal conflicts of friends, lovers, and married couples, *provided* they stop short of personal abuse and are restricted to specific issues, often clear the air and permit once again the acceptance of the relationship.

COMPETITION

Definition

Competition is akin to conflict, but it stops short of a deliberate attempt to thwart another's will; it stops short of coercion. In competition, two or more parties strive for the same goal which none is prepared or expected to share with the others. At the same time, this striving behavior differs from that of conflict in one or both of two ways. First, conflict always includes awareness of an adversary, and overt conflict always includes doing something detrimental to the adversary. Much competition, however, occurs without actual knowledge of the other's

existence—as in taking a civil service examination or applying for a job. In competition, two or more parties want something all cannot share, but they do not strive for the purpose of denying or opposing others—else the action would become overt conflict.

Second, competition is always governed by moral norms, while much of conflict is not. Moral norms are particularly explicit in competition where each does have actual knowledge of the other's existence. Both must use only "fair tactics," and he who loses is supposed to accede with good grace. By way of illustration, if two men are rivals for the hand of the same girl, they are competitors provided they do not quarrel or tell lies about each other and provided the loser accepts his fate and drops out of the picture. If the loser should persist in plying the married woman with his attentions he might be in conflict with her; he would surely be in conflict with her husband.

The line dividing competition from conflict is admittedly thin. The felt pressure to gain one's own ends, for one's self or one's group, is often so strong that competition crosses over into conflict. "If the chain stores take business away from the local merchants by offering better goods at cheaper prices, that is competition. If, on the other hand, the small merchants induce the government to tax the chain stores out of existence, that is not competition because the state has the power of coercion" (5, p. 162).

Competition and Achieved Status

Competition is continuous in society, and competition is found in virtually every area of activity and social interaction. So much of competition is aimed at achieved status, however, that the two terms are practically synonymous. Since achieved statuses vary from one society to another, so does the manner of competition.

> Human beings compete as individuals with one another for such things as jobs, honors, mates, customers, status; as members of communities and groups, with other communities and groups for such things as markets, natural resources, industries, adherents; and even as a species, with other species—with insects, for example—for survival. Among human beings perhaps the object most universally competed for is status. Competition in all other fields—economic, political, educational, family, social life, sports—may be interpreted as illustrating the competition for status. The concrete . . . thing which confers status varies widely . . . among cultures. . . . In a Hopi community, girls compete in humility—a trait highly prized among them and therefore one which confers status.
>
> In American communities businessmen compete for wealth and power; women for social position; students for grades; athletes for trophies and awards; scientists for recognition. The person who wins gains status. If ribbons are the badges of status, people compete for ribbons. They will compete for whatever confers status in their community or within their own segment of the com-

munity. Thus, although we may speak of economic, social, and political competition, in all cases competition for status is present. [3, pp. 84–85]

Universal and Restricted

Society depends mainly upon cooperation to get its essential tasks completed, but society also depends upon competition to ensure that those tasks are efficiently performed. While the human being can universally be motivated to cooperate, he can be motivated to do his best only when he receives special recognition—and special recognition can come only from doing something better than his fellows. Competition differs in scope from one society to another, and the objects of striving differ even more, but competition is found in all societies. Society places particular stress upon competition in cooperative and altruistic behavior. The members of society are enjoined to be more self-sacrificing than their fellows, more humanitarian, and perhaps more Christian. Successful competition of this kind, as well as the more mundane sort, is granted special recognition.

To the extent that men represent themselves rather than their society, however, they have been more willing to accept altruistic than worldly competition from their fellows. Men universally tend to demand competition for those rewards they do not presently have, but they try to prevent others from competing with them for those rewards they have already gained. In older agricultural societies, landowners form hereditary classes which exclude others from landownership. In modern industrial societies, men strive to enter an occupation; once in, they organize unions and professional societies to keep others out. Minimum-wage laws, pension schemes, higher income taxes, government subsidies for agricultural products, fair-trade-practices acts, protective tariffs—with devices such as these, men in modern society also attempt to protect themselves from competition. Society can be viewed as a point of compromise between the twin demands for competition and security. All societies in their history shift the balance between the two from one period of time to another. Modern America, in comparison with a hundred years ago, has veered far in the direction of security.

COOPERATION

Even though cooperation is continuous and pervasive, while overt conflict is sporadic and periodic, sociologists have devoted more attention to overt conflict. It may be that the clinical psychologist spends more time analyzing abnormal behavior than normal behavior for the same reason. Both cooperation and normality are taken for granted. They surround us on all sides; they are undramatic and continuous in occurrence.

Definition

Cooperation is the continuous and common endeavor of two or more persons to perform a task or to reach a goal that is commonly cherished. Unlike conflict and competition, which may be but are not always a group enterprise, cooperation is always a group enterprise. But like conflict and competition, there are different forms of cooperation. The three types of cooperation are based upon differences in group organization and group attitudes (6).

Primary cooperation. In primary cooperation, the group and the individual virtually fuse. The group contains all, or nearly all, of each individual's life. The rewards for which each works are shared, are meant to be shared, with every other member in the group. There is an interlocking identification of individual, group, and task performed. Different tasks may be assigned within a hierarchy of authority, but that authority secures the willing compliance of voluntary obedience. Means and goal become one, for cooperation itself is a highly prized value. An example of primary cooperation is the daily routine of life in a monastery.

Secondary cooperation. While primary cooperation is characteristic of preliterate society, secondary cooperation is characteristic of modern Western society. Secondary cooperation is highly formalized and specialized, and each individual devotes only part of his life to the group which is held together with it. Cooperation is not itself a value; attitudes are more likely to be individualistic and calculating. Most members of the group feel some loyalty toward the group, but the welfare of the group is not their first consideration. As in the case of primary cooperation, both goal and means are shared, but distributively rather than in common. Each performs his task, and thus helps the others to perform their tasks, so that he can *separately* enjoy the fruits of his cooperation. Each formally aids the others in a common endeavor so that each, by and for himself, may acquire wages or salary, and, in some cases, power and prestige. An example of secondary cooperation is a business office or a factory.

Tertiary cooperation or accommodation. In accommodation, latent conflict underlies an insecure working together. The attitudes of the cooperating parties are purely opportunistic; the organization of their cooperation is both loose and fragile. Accommodation involves the use by two parties of common means to achieve antagonistic goals, and accommodation always breaks down when the common means cease to aid each party in achieving its separate goal (6, p. 127). This is not, strictly speaking, cooperation at all, since by definition ends and means must be shared in a common enterprise. Hence the somewhat contradictory synonym for accommodation—antagonistic cooperation. Examples of accommodation

are labor-management relations (except for periods of overt conflict) and a temporary marriage of convenience between two political parties in an attempt to defeat a third party.

Whatever type of cooperation appears in group action, no concrete situation ever embodies cooperation to the exclusion of other social processes. The daily round of life in a monastery is an almost pure type



FIG. 5. Cooperation, competition, and overt conflict.

of primary cooperation, but monastery life is by no means secure from competition and conflict. Whatever the concrete situation may be—a marriage, a friendship, a social club, or whatever—conflict, competition, and cooperation are all included, albeit in varying proportions. It should therefore be kept in mind that the social processes are not categories that either totally explain social interaction or totally fail to apply.

The Most Continuous Process

Cooperation is the most pervasive and continuous of the social processes, competition less so, and overt conflict least so. Cooperation surrounds us on all sides; every waking hour we cooperate with others in countless ways. Because of its pervasiveness and continuity, cooperation is the process of which we are least aware.

Psychological necessity. One reason why cooperation is for the most part an unnoticed continuity is the training all individuals receive as children. Each is born into, and trained and nurtured by, a family unit. Close and intimate others do more than fashion the personality of the newcomer; they enter directly into it. The child is made sad when his mother cries. His self and hers are in such affinity that their emotional states are attuned.

As we pass from one age grouping to another, the circle of self-identification expands to include play group, school, community, and nation. Throughout life, we identify with those with whom we are associated. To work with and for others becomes a form of self-fulfillment, precisely because the barriers are down—now more, now less—between self and others. Doing for others becomes doing for self, exactly as feeling for others becomes feeling for self. Individuals vary a great deal, of course, but no individual is so emotionally isolated that he welcomes unrelieved competition and conflict with all others.

Social necessity. Another reason why cooperation remains in large measure an unnoticed continuity is the fact that without it most individual as well as collective goals could never be reached. The individual who sets out to make money or to gain affection accepts without thought the only means available to achieve either goal—cooperation. Love and friendship, even the formal cordiality of the market place, are gained only in exchange. Bread cast upon the waters is returned.

If any individual refuses to cooperate, even to achieve his personal goals, his group must force him to go through the outer motions of cooperation to protect itself. No family unit could long endure in which each demanded and never gave, in which each was exclusively mindful of his individual desires. The end of any group comes when each member persists in going his own way. This does not happen very often. The human herd usually tames its mavericks.

If any child has not been properly trained in the art of cooperation by his family, he soon learns outside the home. The child who insists that all games be played according to his rules is left to solitary play. He soon learns. By the time any child reaches adulthood he is unaware of cooperating incessantly with others, because cooperation has become a habit.

In the adult social world of club, church, job, and politics, cooperation takes on a more formal dress than it does in the family and play group, but it is nonetheless real. An urbanite who goes to hear a public address cooperates many times. He stops his car for red lights, he waits his turn to buy a ticket of admission, he rises with the audience when the speaker is introduced, and he claps with the audience when the speaker has finished. At his job, this same man takes what someone else has done, adds to or refines his work, and passes the product on to the next man.

Without the secondary cooperation of large, formal associations, society would have remained a scattered congeries of isolated agricultural villages, close to the level of subsistence. These smaller units, in turn, could have survived only through primary cooperation.

Even when men compete and conflict, they must continue to cooperate in various ways. Two workers competing to secure the one raise available in an office must still aid each other in completing their assigned tasks. Corporate conflict requires extremely close cooperation within each of the contending groups. Only overt personal conflict is devoid of cooperation. It could, as a matter of fact, be defined in this way.

The Scope of Cooperation Differs from One Society to Another

Two preliterate societies. All societies utilize conflict, competition, and cooperation, but in varying admixtures of the three. Like all societies, the Comanche society rested upon continuous cooperation; in comparison with other societies, however, a towering ideal was made of personal prowess and personal rivalry. The young Comanche warriors competed fiercely to lift more scalps, steal more horses, and seduce more women than their fellows. The personal prestige of each was measured by his success in these three endeavors. Such an intensive focus upon competition is possible—although so unusual as to be almost unique—only where a migratory people maintain a simple hunting economy in which physical and social survival require only a rudimentary division of labor.

In contrast, the Zuñi Indians of the Southwest, settled agriculturists, have made of cooperation their universal ideal as well as practice. A man who wins a foot race is eliminated from the next competition in order that someone else may win. They argue that the race would be no fun if the outcome were known in advance. Little children are forbidden to fight. In the family and in the fields, each is supposed to work for the good of all. There is little motivation to become a leader, to enforce one's will. Attempting to outdo one's associates is regarded as reprehensible and "abnormal" conduct (1).

Modern America. Our society has often been termed a competitive society. If three such diverse societies as ours, the Comanche, and the Zuñi are comparable on a range of competitiveness, then ours would stand somewhere between the other two. It is true that modern America is more competitive than most societies, but at the same time it is more cooperative than competitive. Such glib references as "competitive society" tell us little, simply because there is no way of knowing what the degree of competition should be.

Certainly the relative lack of competition among the Zuñi would prevent them from ever developing those norms of efficiency which a high standard of living requires. It is at least open to question whether many of those who have indicted America for its competitiveness would

ever be willing to accept a lower standard of living as the price to be paid for its salvation. Such indictments have most frequently been made by European intellectuals, despite American aid to Europe, possible only because of efficient American competition.

If any indictment is called for, probably more to the point is the extent to which secondary cooperation has superseded primary cooperation in modern America. Secondary cooperation is formal and specialized according to each individual's particular group memberships. Secondary cooperation is admirably efficient so long as nothing untoward happens, so long as crises that move concurrently across the separate and specialized areas of secondary cooperation do not occur.

General crises in an American community are seldom resolved by immediate and primary cooperation. In the first place, modern American society is sufficiently competitive so that a calculating attitude is frequently held toward cooperation—"what is there in it for me" or how will this affect my family, my friends, or my social club? In the second place—and this reason is probably more important—secondary cooperation in any group trains the members only to perform on cue in standardized ways. People whose training has not prepared them to seize the initiative in resolving a general crisis will often fail to do so. They wait for directions from others or they wait for the man whose specialized job it is to handle the crisis. Passive waiting for others is particularly characteristic of large metropolitan centers where secondary cooperation reaches its apogee.

> Evidence of urban unconcern with stark terrors, which in simpler societies evoke direct personal aid, appears in the daily press. Thus in 1948 the New York *Herald Tribune*, in reporting the robbery of a liquor store, told how the owner pursued the thieves in the crowded streets for seven blocks, shouting "Stop, thief!" without being able to enlist anyone's help. "No one looked around," he was quoted as saying. "You could carve somebody up on the sidewalk there, and they'd think it was a radio stunt." Finally, he called the specialists, police in a radio car, and they found the thieves. Another example: in 1948 a Chicago housewife, according to the New York *Times*, was trapped on a second-story window sill while cleaning her windows. Several men to whom she appealed only laughed. Someone called the specialists, firemen with a ladder, and they rescued her after she had been trapped for more than half an hour. [2, p. 381]

ASSIMILATION

The three social processes discussed thus far—conflict, competition, and cooperation—are universal in all societies and groups. The social process to which we now turn, assimilation, is found only in large and complex societies which have recently added to their population large numbers of aliens.

Definition

Assimilation "is a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life" (8, p. 735). Thus defined, the concept of assimilation is not so much a statement of what happens as it is a statement of what *may* happen, provided the new arrivals and the receiving group accept one another socially.

The need for mutual acceptance. Persons and groups may "acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups," and at the same time be excluded from "sharing their experience" and find themselves indefinitely delayed in being "incorporated with them in a common cultural life." Why? Because many of the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of the receiving group are common property; the inclusive ones in America—such as patriotism, Christianity, respect for private property, and veneration for legendary heroes—are vested in the total society, and they are readily accessible to all. On the other hand, the matter of sharing experience and incorporation in a common life is limited, first, by a willingness on the part of the receiving group, and second, by a desire on the part of the new arrivals to foster social participation.

Although it is usually the receiving group which erects barriers to social participation, the immigrant group, or segments of it, may likewise wish to do so. Finnish farmers and their families in a rural area of Connecticut were found to be less desirous of social participation across ethnic lines than were the local Yankees (11). Contrary to the idea held by many, American Jews represent no cohesive body of opinion. American Jews are about evenly split, for example, on the issue of whether to assimilate or whether to maintain a separate and distinct Jewish way of life.

It is nevertheless much more often the receiving group which practices social exclusion. One tragedy has been repeated many times in America: the children of foreign-born parents become completely Americanized in outlook, play American games, avidly follow the careers of American baseball players and movie stars, speak only English and refuse to pay attention when their parents reminisce about the "old country"; by word, deed, and thought they are Americans, but in some quarters they are not accepted as Americans. The denial of acceptance to a person who has been thoroughly imbued with American values is most extreme where the color line is involved.

Assimilation Does Not Erase All Distinctions

The denial of social acceptance, in most but not all cases, delays rather than prevents assimilation. Almost all foreign-stock peoples who came in

the recent past to America's shores have by this time been assimilated. It should be noted, however, that assimilation erases only one distinction—that of imputed non-American status. Had we received no immigrants whatsoever for the last two hundred years, American society would certainly still be organized along distinct social-class lines, and very probably according to race and religion as well. A "common cultural life," in other words, by no means implies social equality.

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CHAPTER 5 *The Universality of Culture*

> Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. . . . We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation.
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> —EDWARD SAPIR

It was pointed out in Chap. 3 that human society, in contrast with animal society, is based upon culture—social behavior, for the most part symbolic behavior, transmitted from one generation to the next by communication rather than by heredity. Only human society is maintained by culture—a socially transmitted system of knowledge, practice, belief, and artifacts.

THE MEANING OF CULTURE

Definition

What culture is not. The popular usage of the term "culture" is not the technically correct one. Culture is most often spelled with a capital C, to denote either refinement (such as a precise knowledge of dining-table etiquette and the studied avoidance of slang) or acquaintance with and appreciation of the so-called finer things of life (such as operatic scores and Shakespeare's sonnets). When the term is spelled with a small c, in other words used technically, the ditch digger as surely as the society matron and the literary-tea lecturer receives and transmits culture.

Culture and nationality are not necessarily synonymous. Cultural and political boundaries often overlap. Clark Wissler found this to be true when he attempted to draw precise boundaries among the cultural "areas" of the North American Indian tribes. The problem of cultural-political overlap is not lessened when "one steps out of the tribal life into the expanses of the 'Great Society'" (1, p. 236).

Although culture and nationality are not necessarily synonymous, because the nation-state has become the strongest unifying force in social organization social scientists treat modern nations as if they were cultural entities. This procedure appears justified. The tier of Southwestern states in this country may in some ways culturally resemble Northern Mexico more than they resemble New England; considered in its totality, however, the United States does maintain a way of life distinguishable from that of Mexico, again considered in its totality.

Culture and change.° Each man, despite his cultural inheritance, remains an individual with certain unique responses. Groups, as well as individuals, often interpret culture in particular ways. Culture is an inherited blueprint of conduct, a script to follow. In the performance of his roles, however, man to some extent always ad libs from that script. The script never wholly determines what individuals and groups will do. As men cooperate, as they compete and conflict, modifications of the script are constantly being made, some *few* of which are then incorporated into the script. Any modification becomes part of culture only when it is transmitted and inherited.

Cultures change for many reasons. One society may borrow certain cultural elements from another or have such elements forced upon them by superior military and administrative organization; in either case, *diffusion* occurs. In every society, a minority will invent or change artifacts and tools, or ideas, philosophies, and religions. Provided the majority, or a substantial minority, adopts any of these as its own, the new elements then become part of culture, something to be socially transmitted.

One important source of cultural change inheres in what is transmitted, which is not overt behavior but a script of *idealized* ways of doing and thinking. These idealized ways tend to resist change long after overt behavior has deviated from them. "Thus an Indian tribe may preserve the patterns for correct behavior between the leader of a war party and his followers for generations after all warfare has ceased" (8, p. 100). In time, however, any idealized way that has drifted far from its traditional anchor of overt behavior will itself be vastly modified or even discarded.

As a matter of fact, no idealized way is ever completely fulfilled in overt behavior. Always, there is a three-way relationship. First, there is the idealized way which resists change in time. Second, there are the current expectations of various groups within a society. These current expectations, varying more or less from group to group, are subject to the winds of diverse life conditions and to pressures that were not transmitted in the culture that was. Current expectations which succeed in

° How and why culture changes is treated more fully in Chap. 23.

redefining the idealized ways then become part of culture; otherwise, they do not. Third, there is overt behavior, which may comply with the idealized way or deviate from it, which may comply with current expectations or deviate from them.

The following is one example of the three-way relationship in our own society. The idealized way of courtship in Western culture has for thousands of years required virginity of the unmarried woman. Owing to a series of social forces—to be analyzed in a later chapter—the idealized way of courtship has been unevenly preserved according to social class, age grouping, and neighborhood. Some groups have developed curious and finely graded distinctions among kissing, necking, petting, and sexual intercourse. The current expectation of various groups falls somewhere on a scale with virginity beyond mere physical technicality at one end and encouragement of promiscuity at the other.

The ideal of virginity has always been more or less transgressed in overt behavior, perhaps more than less in modern America. Although the ideal of virginity continues to resist the permissive current expectations of various groups, it is obvious that if present trends continue the ideal of virginity will ultimately be modified beyond recognition.

The completed definition of culture. Culture includes more than the idealized ways of knowledge, practice, and belief. Culture also includes artifacts, man-made physical objects such as tools, buildings, roads, means of transportation, and the like. The completed definition follows: culture is the socially transmitted system of idealized ways in knowledge, practice, and belief, along with the artifacts that knowledge and practice produce and maintain—as they change in time.

The Gap between Animal and Human

Language, the communication of ideas with fixed and arbitrary spoken or written symbols, sharply distinguishes man from all other animal species. Only man lives in a world of ideas as well as of objects and organisms. For the most part, man acts and reacts in terms of ideas *about* objects and organisms.

> Man, unlike the machine, the rat or the infant, does not adjust himself directly to things themselves, or to their variable signs or signals but to their mnemonic [memorized] symbols, replicas, and surrogates. There is accordingly slight similarity between the rat's and the infant's psychological drives and needs and man's intentions, goals, and values. [11, p. 266]

Time binding. Other animals can live only in the present. Because they lack language, their knowledge is limited to instinct plus what is learned by direct observation and by trial and error. Such learning can never accumulate. It remains static from one generation to the next.

Only man simultaneously inhabits past, present, and future; this he

is enabled to do because he possesses language. Whatever has been learned in the past can be transmitted to him; he can enlarge upon this base and transmit accumulated knowledge in turn. Knowledge, beliefs, and techniques thus grow in time. Each generation can start from a point beyond that reached by the previous generation and steadily push back the horizon of the known. It is this unique ability that has made man the master of his planet.

Culture is the *total* social heritage, carried by society. No individual ever masters all of that heritage. It is unnecessary that he do so; it would even be disadvantageous to his society if he tried. Because of language, each man can specialize. He need only master that part of the social heritage which is appropriate to his sex, age, station in life, and livelihood. Through language, however, each man learns enough about those specializations he does not intimately share so that he can integrate his efforts and values with other specialists.

He can also orient himself with respect to the life of his ancestors, which has been preserved for him in legend or written record; he can orient his children, to some extent even his more remote descendants, in terms of that part of the culture he mastered and that part he merely learned about. One vital segment of the total culture is received and passed on with only minor modification, and that is the society's moral norms, both those which are universal and those which are specialized according to status.

Language: freedom and slavery. The possession of language frees man from many hazards. He does not, as do all other animals, have to solve anew every problem ever faced by his ancestors. He is prepared, owing to language, for situations that he has not as yet experienced, that have only been described for him. A dog must be either hit by an automobile or physically checked by his master several times before he learns to wait until a road is clear before crossing it. The consequences of not waiting can be explained to a child, and he can modify his future actions accordingly.

Language is, then, freedom. But language is also slavery. Only man lives outside of as well as in the present, so that only man has a foreknowledge of his own death. Only to man can all things—his strivings, purposes, and loyalties—become vanity. Only man lives in a dark and threatening universe peopled with imagined horrors. Since man lives not only in a world of things and organisms but also in a world of *symbolized* representations of things and organisms, he is mentally torn and lashed when these dominate, as more often than not they do, what is immediately perceived by the senses.

A caribou can perceive a wolf as a threat to him by its overt behavior, its snarl, and its raised hackles. To a limited extent the meaning of the present threat is formed by the caribou's past experiences. The caribou,

however, does not and cannot perceive the world around him through a screen of *linguistic stereotypes*. Man does, so man can perceive a threat even when he cannot see, hear, or feel it. In a very real sense, man does not live in a world of men at all, threatening or otherwise, but in a world of believers, atheists, heretics, Communists, capitalists, organized labor, princes of privilege, and friendly and unfriendly nations. He can also perceive death, starvation, illness, a thousand threats to his way of life, angry gods, and bloodcurdling ghosts. Language not only enslaves man, it also makes him the most "inhuman" of all the species. Only man tortures and kills his own kind for the reason that, in his imagination, they threaten precious symbolized representations he holds dear.

But symbolized representations in the mind, positive or negative, are not unreal. They are the very stuff of mind and man and society. Man does not so much live among other men as with brother, father, friend, foe, defenders and enemies of mankind, and with duty, allegiance, loyalty, prejudice, hatred, and love. Hate and love are more intensely human than animal experiences because only man can define such concepts for himself. A young person may be puzzled as to whether someone is in love with him (or her) or "in love with love"; obviously, there can be no sharp distinction drawn between the two. Certainly our emotions and the words we use are bound together. Our verbal concepts not only express emotion but they also channelize and heighten emotion. Only man has the concept "happiness," so that only man worries and frets about whether or not he has it or about how much of it he has.

Language enslaves man in other ways. Physical danger lurks in the connotations of some of our verbal concepts. An investigator hired by a fire-insurance company discovered that where gasoline drums are stored care is exercised by employees. On the other hand, cigarette butts are likely to be carelessly tossed about where empty gasoline drums are stored. The latter are much more dangerous, for they contain explosive vapor, but the word "empty" has the general connotation of lack of hazard (15).

Language and culture inseparable. Language is not only the means for transmitting the social heritage, culture; it also in a real sense embodies culture. Intensive study of language structure has shown that man's perception and interpretation of reality is in large measure governed by the particular language that he uses.

> It is only by utilizing the symbols common to his group that a thinker can think and communicate. Language, socially built and maintained, embodies implicit exhortations and social evaluations. By acquiring the categories of a language, we acquire the structured "ways" of a group, and along with the language, the value-implicates of those "ways." . . . A vocabulary is not

merely a string of words; immanent within it are societal textures—institutional and political coordinates. Back of a vocabulary lie sets of collective action. [10, p. 677]

As any language develops, subtle shadings of meaning and emotionalized response become attached to words and phrases. In part it is because speaker and writer are consciously enabled, and subconsciously swayed, to evoke common meanings and emotionalized responses in themselves and in listener and reader that human society is maintained. At the same time, these connotations and identifications attached to different vocabularies interfere with the growth of understanding among different peoples. By way of illustration, an American anthropologist asked a Japanese "with a fair knowledge of English" to translate back from the Japanese that phrase *now included in the new Japanese constitution* that represents our "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." "He rendered, 'license to commit lustful pleasure'" (7, p. 154).

The sheer *structure* of language determines, or at least fosters and limits, the line of social development. Concepts such as measured time, velocity, and matter are possible to us because our nouns—like those of all European languages—contain not only "real plurals," *i.e.*, ten men, but also "imaginary plurals," *i.e.*, ten days. Imaginary plurals are not and cannot be made an assembled unit. Our verbs have three major tenses. These structural peculiarities—of imaginary plurals and three tenses—existed long before the rise of modern science. They permitted, even fostered, modern Western science.

A people like the Hopi, with neither imaginary plurals nor tenses, do and must adopt a totally different world view. Like all peoples, they have a concept of time, but one which varies with each observer and has zero dimensions: "it cannot be given a number greater than one. The Hopi do not say, 'I stayed five days,' but 'I left on the fifth day'" (14, p. 248). A science *could* be built on such a basis as this, but the linguistic values behind the mathematics would be different; hence the universe described would be "different."

The structure of our language enables us to objectify time. We have a keen sense of where one event ends and another begins. So long as the Hopi remain imprisoned within the structure of their language (as we are in ours), they cannot describe events in this fashion. To the Hopi it is implicit that everything that ever happened still is, but in a necessarily different form from what memory reports. There is, then, less incentive to study the past. As for the present, the incentive is not to record it but to treat it as a "preparing" for a *continuous* transition. On the other hand, "*our* objectified time puts before imagination something like a ribbon or scroll marked off into equal blank spaces, suggesting that each

be filled with an entry" (15, p. 88). Thus we have developed a keen interest in records, diaries, accounting; in the exact sequence of calendars, clocks, time wages, histories, and so on. Time, measured off, fosters interest in "saving time" and in "speed" (15, p. 89).

Writing and civilization. All civilizations are cultures, but not all cultures are civilizations. What follows is an excellent statement of the difference:

> *Civilization*, from the Latin word *civis* (meaning town dweller), implies growing aggregations of people with more complex culture. It is marked by written language, advanced technologies dependent on the use of metals, plow agriculture, complex economic and political systems, varying levels of science, and more or less systematic philosophies. Such cultures developed in pre-Christian times in China, India, Assyria, Babylonia, Egypt, Greece, and Rome of the Old World and in Central America and in Peru in the Americas. Our own Euro-American civilization of today is chiefly an extension of and addition to that of Greece and Rome. [16, p. 32]

Preliterate cultures lack the attributes listed above. The basic deficiency, however, upon which perhaps all the others rest, is lack of written language. The importance of this factor is shown by the term used to distinguish those cultures which are not civilizations—*preliterate*, which means lacking written language.

A preliterate people is also prescientific, preindustrial, and preindividualistic. There is no history, only legend. Time and space are narrowed. There is little knowledge and less curiosity about other peoples. There can be no very definite theology or cosmology. There can be no science, for science requires a series of stair-stepped advances in verified knowledge, which in turn require a written record of observation and test, so that he who follows can systematically build upon that which is bequeathed to him. The energy and time of preliterate peoples is spent in mastering the knowledge, techniques, legends, and beliefs that are laboriously handed down by verbal precept and person-to-person demonstration.

Cultures such as these change very slowly; they do not "progress" rapidly. Until the written word is introduced, they cannot. Such cultures, however, do have certain advantages. The homogeneous pattern of tradition defines conduct in such a way that there is relatively little social conflict. "No one is forced to take a stand against popular opinion or to stand alone for the right. No one lives alone and there are no books to give variant notions. Conflicts and differences occur but friends, or the assembled elders, are at hand to arbitrate, and loneliness as modern man knows it has not yet come to them" (4, p. 7).

The gap between civilization and culture can hardly be explained as the result of biological superiority in the one case and inferiority in the

other. Individuals from preliterate cultures have become engineers and philosophers, once taught to read and exposed to other Western influences. Superficially, the difference between civilization and culture is almost as marked as that between culture and nonculture. Yet one absolute difference remains: in the first case the gap can be bridged, while that between culture and nonculture can never be.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF CULTURAL ELEMENTS

Cultures, however much they may differ, are structured with the same elements. The elements of culture are universal, if not in content, at least in type. All cultures are based upon folkways, and all cultures elaborate folkways into mores, laws, and institutions in a sequence of organizational complexity.

Folkways

Those ways of acting that are common to a society or a group, and that are handed down from one generation to the next, are known as folkways. They develop out of past group experience, are handed down without reflection, and, as often as not, without rational purpose. They are the common ways of behaving that are more or less unconsciously followed. For the most part, they are not made obligatory by the group. They are sanctioned informally; gossip and ridicule alone are directed against their violation.

The folkways decree whether two, three, or eight meals a day shall be eaten. What is eaten is usually governed by the folkways: the Caribs prize tree worms as a delicacy, and the Veddahs of Ceylon dote on rotten meat. Punctuation of writing differs in England and the United States; the cadence and rhythm of the spoken word differs in the two nations as well as among the different regions of the two nations. Differences such as these arose "unconsciously," as do all folkways (13, p. 4). They were unplanned and uncharted. The origin of even such a latter-day folkway as driving on the right or left side of the road would be impossible to trace.

The folkways are the foundation of every culture, even though they are different, even polar opposite in some cases, from one culture to another. When fully assimilated, they become personal habits. They are the great savers of energy and time; they are assumed, in self and others, so all are freed to solve problems and strive toward individual and collective goals. What an utter chaos human life would be—it could not long endure—if every day we had to settle by family debate or authoritarian decision how many meals we would eat *this* day, at what hour of the day or night. What if there were no ways to excuse and pardon when two people accidently bumped on a crowded city street? What if there

were no predetermined order for serving customers in stores? Could any nervous system bear the strain of facing kinsmen, wives, children, strangers, and the boss with no cues from the culture as to how each should be approached and addressed?

Variation in application. There is a considerable variation in the folkways *within* any culture as well as between cultures. Variation according to age and sex is universal within all cultures. Modern American folkways also vary according to region, ethnic group, race, social class, and occupation. In many rural communities, tobacco chewing by males is part of the folkways, whereas smoking by women and the use of cigarette holders by men is a violation of the folkways. In most metropolitan areas, the reverse would be true on each count. Addressing members of one's own sex as sweetheart and darling is part of Hollywood's folkways, something which would—in the case of American males—almost anywhere else in the country elicit an unfavorable response.

Folkways vary with social-class status. The folkways decree that a man shall tip his hat to a woman acquaintance when he passes her on the street. This practice is unknown in many lower-class circles. Folkways also vary with occupational status. The salesman wears affability like a badge—with a prospective customer. The physician shows watchful sympathy, the so-called bedside manner, to his patient. Much role playing in occupational statuses, as a matter of fact, has become part of the folkways.

Mores

Common ways of acting which are more definitely regarded as right and proper than the folkways and which bring greater certainty and severity of punishment if violated are the mores (from the Latin *mos*, *mores*). "When the elements of truth and right are developed into doctrines of welfare, the folkways are raised to another plane" (13, p. 30). Violations of the mores, but not of the folkways, are looked upon as an evident danger to the rights of others. By way of illustration—that a man should walk on the side of the sidewalk nearer the street when accompanying a woman is a folkway; that a man should marry the woman he has seduced is a mos.

The mores include such prohibitions as "thou shalt not kill," the taboo against one sex wearing the clothing appropriate to the other, and the insistence upon sexual separation for excretory functions. The mores also include such positive injunctions as protecting children, caring for aged parents, duty to one's country, property rights, and sexual fidelity.

William Graham Sumner said, "In the folkways, whatever is, is right." This could more properly be said of the mores. Out of the mores—whose origin, as Sumner said, is "lost in mystery"—come our religious dogmas and our definitions of what the age groupings, races, social classes, and

sexes owe one another. Out of the mores come our profound convictions of right and wrong, convictions that transcend argument and "rational" demonstration. When we learn that peoples at a distance live with different folkways—such as the grinding and blackening of teeth among the Subanese of the Philippines (white teeth, they feel, belong only to dogs, cats, and other animals)—we are amused. When we learn of their different mores, such as the duty of the Iglulik Eskimo wife to "help" her aged husband when he requests death, we are not amused. We tend to feel, instead, revulsion at such a violation of "human nature."

The mores change in time. Deeply rooted in society and socialized personality as they are, the mores more successfully resist change than do the folkways. Sumner, the sociologist who first defined and analyzed the mores, has pointed out, however, that the mores also change in time. They change more rapidly in civilization than in preliterate culture. Perhaps they are changing more rapidly in modern America than in any previous civilization.

Several concurrent revolutions are now taking place, such as in the mores governing sexual behavior and in those governing property rights. As in all complex, dynamic cultures, there are also dramatic conflicts in the mores, such as that between political faith in equality and equalitarianism and the belief that the Negro is inferior and should be so treated. The general prohibition against seduction versus the specialized upper-class morality that makes marrying a lower-class girl much more heinous than seducing her is another example of conflict in the mores. The new philosophy that it is right and proper for the Federal government to tax those with property, not only to finance government but also to make the poor more "equal" in material advantages, is *becoming* part of the mores. Yet this new philosophy stands opposed to something else that is still in the mores—the inalienable right to retain private property and to pass it on to one's heirs.

Perhaps the use of such a term as conflict in the mores is inadmissible. "Conflict" in the mores is always transitional. For example, the right to retain private property is on the wane. The right to retain private property is steadily being encroached upon by legitimate central government in the name of military efficiency and necessity and in the name of improving the lot of the common man. The mores change and some conflict with others when they change, but, as Sumner pointed out, "there is a strain toward consistency" in them.

It is likewise doubtful that the use of such a term as revolution in the mores is admissible. Change in the mores does not mean that behavior is likely to cease being controlled by them. A certain mos is modified in time. Viewed against the past, and considered by itself, a vast and dramatic change has occurred. But if socially controlled versus socially uncontrolled behavior is the basis for comparison, the change then ap-

pears much less startling and inclusive. In more concrete terms, the specific mos that unmarried females shall retain their virginity has in recent decades been weakened; at the same time, the *whole* range of sexual behavior is now only a little less subject to social regulation than in the past. A total view reveals, now as always, that men are ruled imperiously —more accurately, they rule themselves—with the power of the mores.

Laws

In most preliterate societies, the folkways and mores suffice to maintain order. Successful violation of the mores is difficult if not impossible. If a man steals, where will he hide the object? When and how can he use it? If he is detected or suspected, there is no underworld, not even another village to which he can flee. He will be ridiculed and ostracized, terrible enough punishments under conditions where he has little private life and where his survival requires that others cooperate with him.

Customary law. In many preliterate societies, however, there are some elements of social control that surpass, if only slightly, the informal operation of folkways and mores. If a village or tribal council meets to determine guilt and passes sentence upon a serious infraction of the mores, if the mores "have some special organization for their enforcement, we may call them laws" (2, p. 65). Law such as this is customary law; it lacks codification, settled procedure, and enforcement specialists.

Enacted law. Codification, settled procedure, and enforcement specialists are characteristic of enacted law. Enacted law arises not out of culture as such but out of civilization, where populations are large and the division of labor is highly specialized, where there is accumulated wealth and, most important of all, where the folkways themselves are diverse. Under these conditions the informal sanctions of folkways and mores, even customary law, will no longer suffice. Enacted law requires a concentration of governmental power, and it is accompanied by a host of enforcement specialists such as judges, attorneys, policemen, and prison wardens and guards.

Regulatory law. Much enacted law arises out of, and reinforces, the mores—such as those laws which protect the person from assault and his home from breaking and entering. There is another type of enacted law, regulatory law—without roots in the mores—that has developed in answer to the need for regulating secondary-group relationships that are both new and rapidly changing. Our traffic laws are one example, the regulations covering the activities of labor unions and business corporations another. These regulatory laws, separate from mores and traditional sentiment, "are in themselves regarded from a secular point of view, which encourages a tendency to violate them whenever a suitable opportunity offers itself" (2, p. 68).

The course of legal development in America has been peculiarly haz-

ardous. The rise of secondary-group society so rapidly supplanted primary-group society that clashes of interest and a multiplication of regulatory laws piled one on top of the other. In the state of Rhode Island, for example, the number of crimes for which the citizen may be prosecuted has multiplied eight times in one hundred years (12). Changed labor relations, changed domestic relations, and new occupations all breed new laws and create difficulties for the interpretation and administration of old laws. The introduction, in rapid succession, of the railroad, electric transportation, and the automobile not only increased mobility and diminished consensus and primary-group control, but also these new means of transportation themselves required new regulatory laws.

Legal administration and enforcement have also been made hazardous and difficult in America by the opposition of two traditions. One is a latter-day Puritanism which actively demands laws, more laws, laws "with some teeth in them," to order others about and see that they do what they should. This sort of popular demand is most likely to manifest itself in the sumptuary area—that of censorship of morals and the taxing or prohibition of minor vices. In contrast with this tradition is that of the free, untrammeled pioneer, with his frontier disrespect and suspicion of all law and restraint, with his demand for liberty, rationalized, whenever necessary, with eighteenth-century notions of "natural law" which makes the "people's will" the supreme court of appeals (12).

Only the opposition of these two traditions will explain the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment—which prohibited, until repealed, the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages—along with the ten-year orgy of violation which accompanied it. Our mores have condemned vice in any form, but our folkways have celebrated personal liberty, including the right to drink, when, as, and if we choose. The habit of drinking is rooted deep in our culture. The Puritans, after all, were not nearly so puritanical as our legendary history would have us believe. Massachusetts Bay Colony harbored many notorious tosspots, and noise from the taverns was forbidden by law during the time of church services! Nowhere in Colonial New England was prohibition ever attempted (3).

Institutions

An institution is the organization of several folkways and mores (and most often, but not necessarily, laws) into a unit which serves a number of social functions. The definition can be applied to the modern institution of religion in the following ways. Among many religious *folkways* are wearing one's Sunday best to church, the reverse collar of the clergyman, and, in Protestant churches, the minister's shaking hands with the congregation as they file out after the service. The proper and respectful treatment of ritual and overt compliance with religious precepts are the *mores*. American *law* separates Church and State and divides control

of the marriage ceremony between Church and State. Interpreting the relationship between man and the supernatural and providing the ultimate source of moral cohesion in society are the *social functions* of religion.

The basic institutions everywhere are marriage, the family, religion, education, economics, and politics. These institutions everywhere are integrated with one another. Beliefs, practices, and knowledge crisscross among them, creating mutual support. Education transmits the techniques, beliefs, and status acceptances that are essential in the division of labor; education also transmits appropriate respect and veneration for who and what rules in this life (tribal chief or state) and in the next (the gods or God).

The family and religion are always closely integrated. Religious beliefs support the family; the gods or God is always viewed as bestowing approval upon it. Conceptions of the supernatural, in turn, reflect the family. The God of the Judeo-Christian tradition is Father, appropriate to a patriarchal family. God is not and could not be father to a people who trace descent through and receive property within the mother's line.

The family and the economic order are usually closely integrated. In most preliterate cultures, the family is the unit of both consumption and production. The family is the unit of economic consumption in civilization, but production is more or less separated from family activity and control. Institutional integration is universal, but it is never so complete within cultures that are also civilizations as it is within cultures that are not, because the sheer population size and complexity of organization in civilization create greater specialization in belief, knowledge, and practice.

The various elements of culture all change in time, and institutions are no exception. Institutions, however, are organized units of simpler and lesser elements of culture. As such, institutions can preserve much of their essential character while some of the particular folkways and mores which comprise them are changing radically. It is for this reason that institutions have been called the great conservative forces of history.

> . . . social changes usually produce only minor modifications or disturbances among man's persistent institutions. Church, state, family, education, and language, show this. Even sub-phases of these institutions, once established, such as monotheism, monogamy, autocratic governmental practices, Indo-European language forms, and the university persist with only minor variations and elaborations through the centuries and millennia. [6, pp. 47–48]

By way of illustration, our rapidly mounting divorce rate occurs within an institution of monogamous marriage that has persisted for centuries and may very likely persist for centuries to come.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF CULTURAL FORMS

All cultures are structured with similar elements: folkways, mores, laws, and institutions. Cultural universality is, however, manifested not only in similarity of structure but also in similarity of function. Not only do all cultures include social institutions, not only do they include the same social institutions, but also these same institutions function in similar ways—despite the diversity of content in social institutions from one culture to another. The universality of institutional functioning is based upon two facts: man is one species; man is faced by a number of social necessities that are constant in all times and places.

Biological Bases

Man is a hairless, thin-skinned biped. This fact is not unconnected with his wearing of clothing and building of shelters to protect himself from the elements. His clothing ranges from a loincloth to protect the sexual parts from the insects and underbrush of the tropics to the Eskimo's bulky fur garments. Shelter ranges from cave and mud hut to the Empire State Building. The range of variation has the impress of cultural design upon it, but not the basic response to the physical need.

The male of the species is everywhere stronger and heavier, on the average, than the female, a fact not unconnected with universal male dominance. The period of infancy in humans is longer than in other species; care and nurture, even under extremely simple life conditions, are required to ensure the physical survival of the organism through the age of twelve or fourteen. This has fostered a universal arrangement whereby certain constituted adults care for the child. The fact that human sex interest and capacity are continuous rather than cyclic, as with most other species, affords a basis for permanent mating.

Man is not a hardy animal. He is subject to many diseases and he cannot, at least he could not historically, as an individual protect himself from predatory animals larger and stronger than himself. Sanitation, hygiene, and organization in the hunt and defense were at least stimulated by the nature of his organism.

Social Necessities

There are other purely biological factors than those mentioned above, but purely biological factors are of secondary importance. Universal social necessities are of far greater importance; in strictest accuracy, man's biology and the social necessities he faces are hardly separable. The biological species, man, evolved as a group-living social creature. His physical and social structure developed concurrently. His social arrangements are not a matter of inner drive or instinct; man possesses few in-

stincts, and these are always in large measure controlled and directed by his culture.

Neither are man's social arrangements the result of conscious thought. Man's all-consuming purpose is survival, and this *must* be groupwise. Man, a social creature, cannot survive as an individual. The need to survive made permanent groups necessary. Man, who communicates with language, created and refined moral justifications and group sanctions to ensure group permanence. Thus concepts of mutual right and responsibility are universal; so is group punishment for exceeding one's rights and transgressing one's responsibilities. Beyond informal controls of the mores, man has universally developed an ultimate authority and ultimate formal control—legitimized government or political organization. Other universal forms of collective security are hygienic practices and war.

Institutions arose as an accretion of tradition and experience. Survival is more efficiently ensured when the group rules are elaborated into institutions. Institutions, like the folkways which they include, did not result from conscious plan and design. They developed spontaneously as man historically was faced with a number of universal social necessities in coping with his physical environment. Since man lacks any developed instinctive way of caring for his young, and since human infancy is so prolonged, the need to survive required that certain adults have a defined and legitimized relationship to the child. The human family *must* be an institution, with permanent responsibilities transmitted by communication and supported by permanent group sanctions. The need to survive made an economic surplus necessary—thus the division of labor, several people performing different tasks at the same time and exchanging their different surpluses.

The possession of symbolic speech in part enabled all these developments to occur, and in turn it forged certain necessities of its own. To transmit the vast store of techniques arising out of the division of labor, and moral precept out of the mores, a much more extensive and conscious process of transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations was required than subhuman trial and error and direct imitation—hence education.

By comparing "the instrumental imperatives of culture" with "the cultural responses to these imperatives," Bronislaw Malinowski has summarized what we have said thus far (9, p. 125):

IMPERATIVES	RESPONSES
1. The cultural apparatus of implements and consumer goods must be produced, used, maintained, and replaced by new production.	1. Economics

IMPERATIVES	RESPONSES
2. Human behavior, as regards its technical, customary, legal, or moral prescription, must be codified, regulated in action and sanction.	2. Social control
3. The human material by which every institution is maintained must be renewed, formed, drilled, and provided with full knowledge of tribal tradition.	3. Education
4. Authority within each institution must be defined, equipped with powers, and endowed with means of forceful execution of its orders.	4. Political organization

The Drift of Attention

The same basic institutions are to be found in all cultures, but each culture places more emphasis upon one or more institutions than upon others. The Kwakiutl Indians and the Alorese of the Dutch East Indies celebrate competition in acquiring personal property. The other institutions in both cultures are made subservient to the economic. The Comanche Indians celebrated war. The Tanala of Madagascar made the extended family and ancestor worship the central themes of their culture. The Saulteaux Indians have made good health and the avoidance of disease, if not the central themes of their culture, at least a focus of attention that likely surpasses that of any other people (5).

Why one culture elaborates one set of interests and another culture a different set of interests cannot be answered (8, p. 463). If meeting the challenge to survive under basically similar life conditions has resulted in universal social institutions, this fact will not explain why different cultures emphasize one or more institutions rather than others. Like the origin of the folkways, that of particular drifts of attention is lost in mystery.

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CHAPTER 6 *The Variability of Culture*

> I have just landed at my private airport in my helicopter. This is not an uncommon thing because almost everybody nowadays owns a plane such as this. . . . My children don't even go to school because we have a television set in our home and they stay home 3 hours each morning and get their education over television. . . . I am trying very hard to get myself another job. As it is I am making only $10,000 a year and I want to make almost $5,000 more. This would help a lot as I would like to buy my son an atom-driven car. These are very fast but are not as good as I would like. They only cost $6,749 and all the faster they will go is 175 miles per hour. This is not fast enough for these days because you should average 200 m.p.h.
>
> —FROM AN AMERICAN HIGH-SCHOOL BOY'S THEME: "WHAT I SHALL BE DOING IN 1965"

The elements and forms of culture are universal. The content of those elements and forms varies, however, in an astonishing wealth of concrete detail. So much do cultures differ in content, and so radically different are dominant motivations, that "human nature" appears to reflect time and place as much as it expresses human biology. Within the limits of uniform cultural elements and forms, human nature is extremely plastic.

VARIABILITY AMONG PRELITERATE CULTURES

The Todas of India practice polyandry, the marriage of one woman to two or more men, while most preliterates sanction polygyny, the marriage of one man to two or more women. Some Eskimo peoples hold to the custom of lending wives to visitors, as do the Australian Arunta. The Yahgans of Tierra del Fuego permit trial marriage, and adolescents are normally expected to have several liaisons before settling down with a permanent mate. Descent is reckoned through the female line by the Trobriand Islanders and the Hopi and Zuñi Indians. In matrilineal systems such as these, it is often the mother's brother who assumes responsibility for training and disciplining her child rather than her husband, the child's father.

The expression of basic biological drives is largely governed by culture. The "natural" positions during sexual intercourse is determined by time and place, likewise the definition of what is and what is not "sexual perversion." The Mohave young are suckled for three years; cultural

variation elsewhere ranges from less than a year to seven years. The child is suckled only by his mother in one culture; in another, any woman who has recently delivered, and who overhears an infant's wail, will minister to his needs.

Neither emotion nor the means of expressing emotion is free of cultural definition. The Maori express joy by shedding tears, the Todas signify respect with hand open and thumb on nose. If an Australian "blackfellow" mother has a burdensome number of children to care for, she is permitted to kill one of them; even the so-called maternal instinct is apparently as much a matter of geography as anything else. Modesty becomes a mercurial thing, once it crosses cultural boundaries. The Fuegians of both sexes cover the entire back with a cloak but leave the front exposed; the Desert Taureg women keep even their faces completely covered.

The above-mentioned facts are curiosities, a series of interesting but isolated items. Of far greater significance is the elaboration of culture into a dominant theme whereby one or more institutions are stressed at the expense of others. Extreme variations occur, even where "racial stock" remains constant in the same continent. Following are brief descriptions of three Indian cultures in North America.

Kwakiutl

The Kwakiutl of Vancouver Island engaged in an endless quest for prestige through economic competition. Other institutions, such as the family and religion, were used to subserve that major goal. The kin group, or *numaym*, contained both nobles and commoners. The Kwakiutl division of labor did not extend beyond the cooperating *numaym*, the members of which all worked together to enhance the prestige of their own noble chieftains. Marriage centered about the competitive struggle, with each *numaym* haggling and bargaining with other kin groups to marry off lower-status individuals to higher-status individuals, if possible.

Coins, blankets, canoes, and other forms of property were accumulated and then offered to noble chieftains of rival *numayms*. The donor *numaym* was hardly motivated by generosity, for any gift had to be repaid with interest, or else the recipient would lose prestige. The purpose of offering such gifts was not economic betterment in our sense, however, for when a particularly large accumulation of gifts had been made, a noble chieftain, representing his kin group, would dump it into a ceremonial fire—this gesture effectively flattening all of his rivals.

Religion rendered direct service to the quest for individual and kin-group prestige. Religious ceremonial dances were *owned* by individuals, and these dances were passed down to descendants along with honorific titles and crests. Religious ceremonials erupted in a frenzy of shouting

and whirling in which, as an individual and as a representative of his *numaym*, each dancer attempted to "put down" his rivals. The shamans, or medicine-men priests, cured the sick in an attempt to "put down" *their* rivals. The Kwakiutl, in brief, brought all of their activities into the arena of competition.

Comanche

Like the Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver Island, the Comanche Indians of the Western plains made rivalry for prestige the central theme of their culture. The Comanche strove to accumulate scalps, however, rather than property. Owing in part to their extremely rudimentary war and hunting economy, the Comanche family was a weak structure, with no means of reckoning descent. Comanche culture, while not devoid of religious thought and ceremonial, made them of less importance than any other culture that has been recorded.

Every phase of Comanche life celebrated the young warrior in his quest for prestige. The prestige of young warriors was measured by the number of enemy scalps they took, the number of horses they stole, and the number of women they seduced. (Social control of sexual relations was reduced to a minimum that almost approached the situation in the baboon herd, where a male must fight to prevent other males from poaching upon his female property unless he is known as a dangerous adversary.) Heralding the exploits of warriors, war, and preparation for war—this was their way of life. Young males who were unable to make the grade either chose or were forced to go to the camp of the berdache, where they assumed women's garb and busied themselves with women's tasks.

No more than in the case of the Kwakiutl will the major theme of their culture lend itself to rational economic explanation. The Comanche were fond of fighting the Utes, who were also little interested in accumulating property and from whom the Comanche wanted only their scalps. The Utes were fierce fighters, so that a Ute scalp brought much prestige to the taker. The Comanche did occasionally war on the relatively wealthy Pueblo Indians to the southwest, but with distaste, for they would prudently fade from Comanche sight if they could. War on the Pueblos was profitable, but there was no glory in it.

Hopi

In direct contrast to both Kwakiutl and Comanche are the Hopi Indians of Arizona. They stress the institutions of family and religion in a cooperative, harmonious existence which makes of the self-effacing individual the ideal. The Hopi individual is trained to feel his responsibility to and for the Peaceful People—the Hopi's own term for themselves.

Fighting, bullying, attempting to surpass others or to rise above the group bring automatic censure and ridicule.

Implicit in the Hopi view is an original and integrated theory of the universe. With this they organize their society in such a way as to obtain a measure of security from a niggardly and hazardous environment made up of human enemies, famine, and epidemics. They conceive of the universe—man, animals, plants, and the supernatural—as an ordered system functioning under a set of rules known to them alone. A law of universal reciprocity governs their universe, and they attempt to regulate their behavior, emotions, and thoughts in a prescribed way, in order to fulfill the requirements of this law. Unlike the Kwakiutl and the Comanche, the Hopi insist upon both outer and inner tranquillity. The "good heart" means that one ideally feels neither fear, anger, sadness, nor worry.

There are two axes of Hopi life. One is the matrilineal household, which regulates the division of labor in field and pasture. The household is a strong and cohesive unit, in large measure controlled by the women. But it is not organized *against* other households in any culturally defined way as is the Kwakiutl household. The other axis of Hopi life is the religious societies, which are the sole province of the men. Only adult males may enter the kiva, the subterranean chamber where each religious society lodges its sacred objects. Only the men participate in the kachina cults of the masked gods, the ancestors who give rain, food, and peace. The activities of men and women may separate along these two axes, but they are not thereby driven apart. The matrilineal household and the religious societies permeate every aspect of Hopi life. In and through both of them is wrongdoing punished, by gossip, ridicule, censure, and the threat of incurring the wrath of the ancestral gods.

Cultural Variability and Personality

It should not be assumed that these descriptions of three different cultures also describe three distinct personality types. By no means are all Kwakiutl individuals obsessed with economic competition; many Comanche males were indifferent and reluctant warriors; and many of the Hopi are disgruntled with enforced harmony and vent their pent-up hostility in malicious gossip and black magic.

Culture was defined in the previous chapter as comprising *idealized* ways of knowledge, practice, and belief. Preliterate cultures transmit to the individuals who participate in them fewer and more consistent idealized ways than do modern and complex cultures. For this reason, the "fit" between culture and personality is closer in the former than in the latter case. Nevertheless, the *range* of personality types in all cultures is probably the same; there are some peaceful and some quarrelsome people, some generous and some stingy people, to be found at any place

in any period of time. On the other hand, any culture—particularly preliterate culture—*encourages* personality development in one or more directions rather than in others. Thus, while there were self-effacing Comanche individuals, and while there are aggressive Hopi individuals, the majority in Comanche culture were aggressive, and the majority in Hopi culture are self-effacing. The fit between culture and personality in both cases is close enough to warrant the terms aggressive Comanche culture and self-effacing Hopi culture.

VARIABILITY WITHIN PRELITERATE CULTURES

Preliterate societies are small, homogeneous, and relatively isolated. They crudely resemble a kind of community that has not yet entirely disappeared from the American scene—the small, fairly inaccessible agricultural village with a few hundred people. In both instances, there is a narrow range of variation in outlook, experience, and activity.

Specialization

Preliterate culture does include specialization, however rudimentary it may be. In all times and places, different tasks and different degrees of authority are assigned according to sex, age, and kinship. Men are always more or less dominant over women, and skills, tasks, and obligations appropriate to each sex are defined and sanctioned. All cultures recognize infancy, childhood, adolescence, maturity, and old age as a series of transitions in activity and authority; definitions of required and appropriate behavior shift as one moves from one age category to another.

In comparison with civilization, the preliterate division of labor is indeed rudimentary. All mature men and women are expected to be reasonably proficient at the tasks appropriate to their sex. In extremely simple cultures, such as that of most Eskimo villages, *all* men are hunters and fishermen. On the other hand, where the margin of subsistence is not so close, and the range of choice making thus somewhat wider—as among the Trobriand Islanders—some men may specialize in canoe making and barter their surplus with fishermen specialists. Shamans (medicine men, or witch doctors) are often recognized functionaries who combine the activities of priest and physician.

Personal relationships are governed largely by paired statuses within the family. Rules of mutual obligation and of approach and avoidance must be learned by husband-wife, father-child, brother-sister, cousin-cousin, uncle-nephew, and so on. Some cultures restrict such rules to the immediate family of husband, wife, and offspring; other cultures extend them across lines of blood and affinal (by marriage) kinship in a bewildering maze which covers an entire tribe, all of whom believe they

are descended from a common totemic ancestor, such as a tree or a wolf.

Authority is never evenly divided. Family or clan heads assign tasks and settle most intrafamily disputes. Often, a village or tribal council of elders settle disputes according to customary law, particularly in the case of quarrels between members of different families or kin lines. Tribes are sometimes ruled by a chief, and if the society is scattered over a large area it may be governed by a king.

Nevertheless, specialization within preliterate culture is much less extensive than what each intimately shares with all others. The total preliterate way of life is a consistent whole, known to all, directly experienced by all. Each individual is closely bound to all other individuals. Specialization within preliterate culture is so rudimentary that each is permitted to know and understand, share and sympathize with, all others.

No Basis for Separative Organization

One primary group or several overlapping primary groups comprise preliterate life. Social tradition does not permit the organization of new formal groups. A collective demand for special privileges not already in the mores would fall on deaf ears. Since each shares intimately in the activities and purposes of all, it would be virtually impossible for some to organize collective grievances against others. When the white man appears, however, preliterate resistance to separative organization weakens. "Youth movements" may flare up; property owners may combine to deny the tribal law that all families may use the pasture lands. This is only to say that the old culture is moving in the direction of civilization.

The white man's influence, however, is not equally disruptive everywhere. Some cultures for long periods more successfully resist separative organization than do others. The Navaho Indian veterans of World War II have been able to maintain themselves as a unit, in part because the Navaho pattern of settlement is scattered, with a loosely organized system of controls. The Zuñi Indian social organization, on the other hand, is much more compact in space. Zuñi veterans have been unable to maintain a separate organization, for they returned to family units which are crowded together.

> As a result, social control through gossip, rumor, ridicule and witchcraft was most effective. The behavior of the veterans was readily observable to the village as a whole. Their actions were discussed in the kiva and curing house societies. These well-defined groups were capable of exerting pressure on the individual veteran and his family in such a way as to bring about effective conformance. [1, p. 558]

Institutional Integration

Institutions are much more unified with one another in preliterate culture than in civilization. They show "primitive fusion," to borrow

one of Professor MacIver's terms. There is no separate agency, such as the school, no separate specialists, such as teachers, to educate the young. Nor is there a specialized body of knowledge distinct from the round of daily life. All adults in an informal way transmit the beliefs and practices of their culture to the next generation. There is an immediate connection between what is taught and what children now do or soon will be doing. Older males teach a Manus boy to spear fish in a sheltered inlet, not in a classroom. The boy does not read about fishing as a delayed preparation for something he might or might *not* do as an adult. Preliterate education thus has functional immediacy.

The ends and means of living are woven tightly together. Religion and making a living are not, as with us, more or less distinct. They are one. Prayers to the tribal gods are voiced *while* the seed is planted, *as* the hunting party prepares to enter the brush. The family and economic endeavor are one. The family or kin group marks the outer boundary of production and consumption and, in some cases, exchange. Regarded from any point of view, then, there is little variability within preliterate culture.

VARIABILITY WITHIN MODERN AMERICAN CULTURE

Relative Lack of Institutional Integration

Compared with the primitive fusion, American institutions—the family, education, the division of labor, religion, and recreation—are isolated in function, activity, and loyalty. When the national scene is viewed totally, the remote and cohesive agricultural village becomes a waning vestige of the past. Change, here as elsewhere, is in the direction of breaking the primitive fusion.

Education and recreation continue to depart from the family. Education for the most part is now controlled by a specialized agency, the state-supported school; it is now in the hands of bureaucratic functionaries, state-hired teachers. Recreation is either commercialized or specialized according to age and sex groupings or both, rather than a union of family and neighborhood in a common activity.

The steady trend in the West has been separation of Church and State. Today, religious practice and observance is absent from most homes. The economic realm is almost isolated from religion; this state of affairs not only stands in contrast with medieval Europe but also, if in lesser measure, with America of the Victorian period. The division of labor now hires individuals *out* of the family, instead of uniting them in an integrated family enterprise.

An exception? There is one seeming exception to the decline of institutional integration—the growing domination by government of the

economy. Government has penetrated agriculture, industry, business, and the professions. Governmental control has emerged in part, however, because making a living is no longer a community activity, unified with family and religious institutions. The control which government now exercises over the economy is formalized and bureaucratic, not institutional. By institutional control we mean the organic unity of action and purpose that arises out of shared conviction. Administrative decree and administrative law take over in civilization with the partial breakdown of consensus, and thus of institutional control.

The family has been the most important institution in the Western tradition for centuries. Until approximately a century ago, the division of labor, religion, education, and recreation was almost encompassed by the family. Government was not an integral part of family life; it touched the lives of the majority at few places. Then came a dramatic shift. Within a few decades the functions of government advanced as fast as those of the family receded. Today, government not only extends control over the economy but also increasingly supplants age-old family functions, such as nurture, protection, recreation, and education.

Nevertheless, government has not so much created a new basis for organic unity as it has become an administrative colossus, holding together a vast collocation of separative tendencies by law, fiat, and force. Whether government can ever create institutional unity we do not know. All we do know is that government has never done so in any other society.

Separative Organization

The American Medical Association, the Episcopal Church, the American Legion, the Young People's Socialist League, the American Association of University Professors, the Teamsters' Union, the Republican party, the Odd Fellows, the Farm Bureau, the Boy Scouts, and the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals are but a few of thousands of organizations that claim nationwide membership. And there are many more state and local than national organizations.

Modern America is bureaucratically organized in every sphere of activity—political, religious, professional, and even leisure. Ours is a multigroup society, in contrast with preliterate society and with our own historical perspective. The ways of doing and believing within multigroup society vary considerably from one separate organization to another. The range of variation falls within a three-point scale.

Similar in purpose. There are separate organizations with similar goals and purposes. Although the American Legion protects the material interests of war veterans and provides social fellowship at its local posts, its ultimate reason for being is the social value of patriotism. A common focus upon patriotism makes the American Legion and the Boy Scouts

fairly one, despite the fact that the latter has a much younger membership and is a "character-building" organization that teaches adaptation to a long-defunct frontier. Likewise, such separate organizations as the Baptist Church, the Red Cross, and the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals are focused upon a common set of values—in this case the religio-humanitarian. Organizations which are similar in purpose tend to have overlapping memberships. The Baptist Church member is more likely to belong to the Red Cross and the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals than, say, to the Socialist party.

Like in purpose. Whereas organizations similar in purpose tend to have overlapping memberships and do not ordinarily compete with one another, organizations with exactly the same purpose do not have overlapping memberships and do compete with one another—for membership, loyalty, and power. On this basis business competes with business, Republican with Democratic party, American Legion with Veterans of Foreign Wars, Odd Fellows with the Redmen, and AFL with CIO. This kind of competition, however, creates only minor disunity. The competition of business with business upholds a common heritage, at least a vocally shared faith in private enterprise. The competition of Republicans with Democrats is held to be one way to preserve democracy. The resolutions passed at the national conventions of different veterans' organizations are likely to be indistinguishable—for example, those on military preparedness and loyalty investigations.

Opposed in purpose. It is the third point of the scale, that of organizational opposition, that makes for extreme variation of thought, belief, and action. Most organizations actively oppose some other organizations, and by so doing they inflame parochial attitudes, interests, and loyalties. Conflict is the attempt to thwart the will and purpose of another, or others. The conflict of organized bureaucracies in modern America clangs above the din of individual and local-group conflict: organized management versus organized labor; the Roman Catholic Church versus the several Protestant denominations; organized farmers versus organized labor; organized medicine versus various group-hospitalization schemes; veterans' organizations versus "radical" organizations; government bureaus versus legislatures; organized isolationists versus organized interventionists; organized medical research versus organized antivivisection outfits; one set of pressure groups pitted against another; and one set of reformers attempting to howl down another. The list could be indefinitely extended.

All of these bureaucratic organizations claim ultimate values and sentiments—Christianity, patriotism, democracy, and so on—as almost their private property. They charge their adversaries with being dangerous atheists, traitors, fascists, subverters, malefactors, or crooks, only to have the same epithets hurled in turn at themselves. Ultimate values and sentiments become confused when they are invariably used to attack someone

else. Where various organizations go their own way, frequently oppose and conflict with other organizations, the moral unity which alone preserves society is both weakened and threatened.

There is a point, probably impossible to fix exactly, beyond which no society can hold a clash of will and purpose, a mounting disunity of shared belief and action, and still cohere. In short, while culture need not be a seamless fabric, neither can culture be ripped to shreds and continue to bind society together.

> It is the common adherence of a society's members to the elements which form the core of their culture which makes it possible for them to function as a society. Without a wide community of ideas and habits the members of a group will not react to particular stimuli as a unit, nor will they be able to coöperate effectively. Such coöperation really rests upon the predictability of the other individuals' behavior. When there are very few elements of culture in which all the members of a society participate . . . [the] society is no longer able to feel or act as a unit. Its members may continue to live together, but many forms of social intercourse will be hampered by the impossibility of predicting the behavior of individuals on any basis other than that of their known personalities. Even economic coöperation will be seriously interfered with, due to the lack of fixed standards of integrity and fair dealing. It is obvious that this condition puts the society at a marked disadvantage, and it is probable that there is a point below which participation cannot fall without a resulting collapse of both the society and the culture. [4, p. 283]

Specialization

Ways of thought and action are universally transmitted according to status groupings. These status groupings tend to be few in preliterate society, many in civilization, and perhaps reach a maximum in number and specialization in modern American culture. Specialized sharing of cultural elements according to status groupings in modern America is peculiar and complex. In most other cultures there is just as much—in some cases perhaps even more—variation in culture sharing according to a *few* status groupings, but the different ways of thought and action are integrated with those of people in other status groupings. The old Hindu caste system, for example, defined radically different ways of life for people in different castes, but at the same time the mutual rights, duties, obligations, and interaction of people *across* caste boundaries were firmly defined. Some preliterate cultures contain three languages, one shared by all, and two other special vocabularies, one of which is known to and used only by men, the other by women. A considerable variation in culture sharing according to sex results, but only in one sense, for here, also, mutual rights, duties, obligations, and interaction across the barrier are firmly defined. In both cases, therefore, cultural integration is guaranteed *within* diversity.

The American situation is much more complex. There is great diversity according to *many* status groupings; at the same time, rights, duties, obligations, and interaction across the boundary lines of them are—in comparison with most other cultures—ill defined and fluid. While differences in culture sharing exist in all societies, differences within American society create a greater disunity and segregation of experience than in most others.

Age. As indicated earlier, the age groupings of infancy, childhood, adolescence, maturity, and old age are universally recognized. Appropriate standards of behavior for each age grouping are universally specialized. In preliterate cultures, however, initiation and other ceremonies make the transition from one age status to another both definite and relatively easy. These ceremonies mark shifts in status, authority, and activity. The individual knows where he stands at every period in his life.

No such condition prevails in modern America. A man may be a "social adolescent," dependent upon his parents, from fourteen to forty. Just when he ceases to be an adolescent is a matter to be settled more or less in each family. What cultural definitions of changing age status we do have are inconsistent. A man (or boy?) may drive an automobile at sixteen, leave school at eighteen, be subject to the draft at eighteen and a half, and vote at twenty-one.

With the accent on youth in our culture, there is for many a reluctance to doff "young" clothing, to leave romance behind, and to accept adult responsibility. At the same time, there *are* striking discontinuities in culture sharing according to age. The so-called youth subculture, for example, is a world of irresponsibility, specialized lingo, dating, athleticism, and the like, which rather sharply cuts off adolescent experience from that of the child and from that of the adult, however reluctantly the latter status may be accepted in many cases.

Sex. In America, as in all cultures, statuses, activities, and functions are marked off according to sex. The majority of men work outside the home to support wife and children; the majority of women are wives and mothers. Still, a considerable blurring of the classic design has taken place. Women, particularly, may sometimes find themselves among members of their own sex whose lives are different from their own, for these others may range from housewives and mothers devoted to their children and subordinate to their husbands to "emancipated" women who compete professionally with men, have casual sexual affairs, and flaunt their independence.

The traditional division of labor in the family is undergoing considerable modification. That the husband will busy himself with a number of "housewife" tasks is increasingly taken for granted by both sexes.

Women now make up one-third of the labor force, and the majority of working women are married.

Social class. Every society is stratified. Culturally defined ranks of higher and lower are universal. However, the range of stratification is always narrow in preliterate society and always wide in civilization. The American class structure contains a further complication. Not only is the way of life of different classes somewhat separate and distinct, but also the lines of demarcation among them are quite blurred. Rather than a relatively universal class structure, such as that which still prevails in Great Britain, America has a series of local class structures. An individual's manners, dress, speech, wealth, and the deference he either grants or receives are indications of his social-class position, but these indications are for the most part recognized only locally. We do not have a definitive set of rights, obligations, and privileges that separate, *and at the same time unite,* distinctive national classes. It is precisely *because* class in America is a more fluid than rigid definition that class more divides than it integrates values and purposes.

The one value that permeates class in America is more individual than social, more distributive than collective. It is the hope and striving for individual success. This circumstance lends a tentativeness to position, even to achievement. Class in America is not so much a matter of settled ranks as it is a series of temporary vantage points for a greater effort to climb. The individual who constantly strives to "better himself" (one of our common folk phrases) rapidly changes his group memberships and his social relationships. The result is a general tendency toward isolation of experience, for success or failure is more an individual experience than one shared within the family and circle of friends.

Who owes whom what and what one can legitimately expect of self and others are not undefined—if they were society could not endure—but such definitions in modern America are relatively loose. On the one hand is the peculiar American myth that all men are equal. On the other is the inescapable fact that they are not, either in ability or in position. When fact meets myth the American of low status becomes envious, sullen, and often spiteful; the American of high status often appears to feel guilty because of his position. It is only in America that political, professional, and business leaders must adopt a "just folks" manner when writing, speaking, or being interviewed. But acceptable to the majority or not, the ways of life of our social classes are very different, and largely because of mass hatred for that which they do not share, social class in America is disruptive, a focal point of disunity.

Occupation. Never in history has the division of labor been so minutely specialized as it is in modern America. The diversity and isolation of thought and action are more than anything else the result of an almost endless list of job classifications. It is not only that farm laborer, bank

teller, TV technician, night-club entertainer, dentist, and police reporter perform different tasks; they also tend to view the world through the narrow tunnel of the job. Owing to his continuous association with bums, grafters, gamblers, prostitutes, and divorcees, the police reporter, for example, will doubtless have a dim view of man's honor and woman's virtue; he may read about, but he may also remain *actively* unaware of, life in upper-middle-class suburbia or the agricultural village.

Should the unlikely happen, and the farm laborer and bank teller meet socially, they would have difficulty in finding common ground for conversation. If going to college is not a job, at least it tends to be job preparation, and more than one college freshman has looked up his high-school pals during the Christmas vacation only to find that they are no longer his pals. They do not share his new interests and activities, and after a somewhat halting recount of "old times," conversation slows to a stop. Every wise hostess makes sure that her guests have not entirely dissimilar occupational interests.

In modern America, occupational specialties are not primarily held together by common and shared experience and personal integration of different and specialized tasks, as is the case in most cultures. They are held together primarily by a depersonalized medium of exchange—money—and by formalized bureaucratic administration: paper directives, paper agreements, decisions transmitted by paper, radio, telegraph, or some other impersonal means of communication. Job experience tends to create disunity, because mutual understanding and trust cannot form in a depersonalized environment where one group does not know the other with whom it must formally cooperate. Thus appear the constant demand for special privileges by formally cooperating but opposed parts of the job world and the constant specter of force ready to weld the whole together when those moral norms shared across the division of labor periodically crack under strain.

Education. In other societies, past or present, all people or the majority of them have lacked formal training. Our society is unique in the number and proportion of its people who have acquired a higher education. In some instances, education leads to greater knowledge of and sympathy with remote others. In perhaps a greater number of instances, formal education tends to compartmentalize sympathy and *social* knowledge.

Compartmentalization moves along two axes. First, the gulf of general knowledge serves to keep apart the grammar-school graduate and the high-school graduate, the high-school graduate and the college graduate. It is not alone sheer knowledge but also the "snobbish" distinctions attached to diplomas and degrees which operate in this manner. Second, the growing specialization of knowledge tends to separate the highly educated from one another almost as much as knowledge itself separates

the educated from the uneducated. At one time, the educated had a common background of Latin and Greek, of the Scriptures and Shakespeare; they accepted the same basic postulates, affirmed the same meanings, and shared the same outlook. But so specialized has knowledge become—in part made necessary by the sheer accumulation of knowledge—that the "English major" and the "chemistry major" may go through college without reading a single book in common. The older unity of the educated is insecurely preserved with "English Composition for Engineering Students" and "Physics for Liberal-arts Majors."

Ethnic group and race. America contains many peoples of different nationality backgrounds and a large Negro minority. The way of life of the former has rapidly, that of the latter more slowly, come to approximate the "American" pattern. Yet certain nonracial minorities have been unevenly assimilated. Backgrounds continue to differ between majority and minority, in some cases even into the third generation. To a greater or lesser extent, differences persist in language, dress, habits, and, most important of all, loyalties and identifications.

On the average, marked cultural differences between majority and several minorities have waned more swiftly than majority prejudice. Our official political ideology both denies difference and demands equal treatment of those who are different. On the other hand, prejudicial treatment of those who are different is part of the American mores! This situation is, then, fraught with confusion and cross purpose.

Religion. No more than in most other modern Western cultures does religion in America make for divisiveness and segregation of experience. With the rise of secularism, differences in religious background and affiliation have become matters of relative indifference. Religious affiliation does, however, continue to be more important in rural than in urban areas. There is more "religious tolerance" in the Far West than in the Southeast. Still, across the major groupings of Protestant, Catholic and Jewish, there remains *throughout* America some measure of prejudice, parochialism, and exclusion from social participation.

Spatial location. A good if superficial case could be made for the following proposition: within the geographic limits of the United States are to be found as dramatic contrasts as those between two preliterate cultures separated by thousands of miles. "South Sea natives who have been exposed to American movies classify them into two types, 'kiss-kiss' and 'bang-bang'" (5, p. 14). If "bang-bang" actually does not happen very often in modern Hollywood, "kiss-kiss" does; sex and sexiness are in the air. Hollywood is the symbol of sex to the world, and the symbol is made reality.

Hollywood is also an arena of blatant hedonism, rampant egotism, incessant jockeying for position and power, and insecurity—a man is

"as good as his last picture." Mobility operates without brakes. A man out of a job is out of friends, and the employed associate with no one in a lower income bracket while constantly seeking to associate with those whose incomes exceed their own. Hollywood's hustling inhabitants are therefore without roots. Hollywood is a series of interlocking dictatorships, extending from assistant director to producer. The producer is the high mogul before whom all bow and tremble, but he in turn bows and trembles before the New York bankers who control his studio.

An agricultural village in northern New England is separated from Hollywood by more than mileage. Its natives have their roots down in local tradition. Their lives are adjusted to the rhythms of succeeding generations and the seasons, not to the turn of fortune's wheel. Men do not use endearing terms with one another, but they know one another better and they can have greater trust in one another. Their livelihood is not manipulating other people, but handling tools on their own land. They do not live in perpetual crisis.

A rigid conformity to settled community standards is exacted. The exciting news of an occasional sexual scandal buzzes and hurries from home to home, post office to Congregational Church, and titillates and enlivens those who have not been caught in it, who may even secretly envy the activity which brought on the scandal. But both violator and persecutor know what sin is, there are few doubts and shades of distinction about it, and no one would use the Hollywood nice-nellyism for a notorious case of fornication: DAWN DEIDRE AND EDWARD EVARTS REPORTED ENGAGED. Hester Prynne may not wear her scarlet letter, but she and her neighbors still regard her as an adulteress.

Democracy, in the classic sense, is retained, at least in the conduct of local affairs. There is little kowtowing to men of power; there are no men of power in the Hollywood sense of those who control the fate of others through their prerogative to grant or withhold favors. Dramatic posture, tantrum, and neurotic demand for a chorus of yes men do not appear; if they did, they would be isolated with ridicule. There are no local saviors or "leaders of the industry." There is a quiet and deep awareness of individual rights and of the limits to the demands that each man can make of others. Each man stands up in town meeting to be counted as he makes known his wish about who shall administer, what the tax rate shall be, and how public moneys shall be spent.

Hollywood and an agricultural village in northern New England represent a polar contrast in American community life. In general, however, the urban way of life is somewhat distinctive from the rural, particularly the rural farm. Regional traditions within the country also differ considerably. Nevertheless, in recent decades distinctions of both kinds have been narrowed. Large metropolitan centers more and more dominate

their rural hinterlands with economic centralization and style of life. Regional variations are being blurred, in manners, speech, recreation, and economic activity.

Is the Rise of "Mass Society" an Effective Counterforce?

The above discussion of status groupings includes a seeming contradiction: status groupings in modern America produce wide variations in culture sharing, while many status groupings blur distinctions that have been transmitted from the past. Paradoxical or not, the progressive blurring of sex, class, community, and religious distinctions has produced only a surface uniformity in American life; "mass society" is a thin veneer over variations in culture sharing that are more extreme today than ever before.

Several factors can be listed which *appear* to be making Americans "more alike." Unlike their grandparents, modern Americans are more affected by national and international events than by events in their local community. Americans are moved, are acted upon and react, more as units dispersed in space than as rooted local groups. At the same time, the division of labor welds all together in a formalized integration under hierarchies of control, and Americans are reached almost simultaneously by the same mass media of communication—radio, newspapers, movies, and television. The fate of all Americans is in large measure decided by the same remote bureaucrats, and most Americans laugh at the same radio comedians; in brief, they are subjected to the same mass control and mass stimuli.

The steady pressure of mass stimuli has produced mass values: commercialized amusements, hedonism, and having a good time; a patriotism that increasingly demands mass compliance instead of individual liberty; a growing uniformity of tastes and possessions, a vague kind of American equalitarianism which creates anxiety to be and to do as others are and do. European visitors have claimed that there is no individuality in America; they say that everybody seems to be or wants to be like everybody else.

The uniformity of American life is, however, relatively superficial. The important fact is that modern Americans receive many specialized cultural elements from their status groupings, and the trend toward blurring distinctions within some of the status groupings only *further* specializes and segregates experience. There is, in comparison with other cultures, much less functional integration of mutual rights and duties within and across the status groupings.

A uniformity of mass participation does not necessarily produce unity in thought and deed. Unity of any cohesive strength does require a personal knowledge, understanding, and emotional acceptance of those cultural elements that one does not share. Sheer difference in cultural

sharing need not lead to segregated experience and disunity, *provided* these differences are integrated in mutual-personal belief and practice. The preliterate tribesman may exclude his wife from active participation in hunting and fishing; he may even have a specialized vocabulary that she may never share. At the same time, their mutual rights and duties are mutually known and mutually accepted. The household functions of the wife and the outside functions of the husband are integrated complements of each other. Each knows the place of the other, how and where separate activities intersect, and each identifies with the resulting functional unity.

Many modern American husbands will not share a similar mutual understanding and cohesion with their wives, even though they wash the dishes and their wives, like them, hold office jobs. By the very fact of performing the *same* tasks, each is made somewhat functionally independent of the other. At the same time, each has had a social-sexual background and training that was very different. In a period of rapid social change these differences are being modified, but they are not being modified evenly in personal experience. Since this is the case, husband and wife may have somewhat dissimilar notions of what each owes the other, and any lack of consensus on this score drives a wedge between them. He or she—and the latter makes the more interesting possibility—may have been reared in a more traditionally patriarchal household than the other, where the husband and father ruled, washed no dishes, and demanded and got subservience. It is the unusual young married couple today whose parents balanced the roles of husband and wife in the same way. Compared with their grandparents, the modern young husband and wife will thus be likely to have more disparate views of appropriate husband and wife behavior, and they will thus be less unified in act and purpose. Husband and wife today are, on the average, more "equal" than their grandparents. In the sense that each now does many things that the other does, they share more experience. But in a functional sense they share *less* experience than their grandparents, who worked —one in the fields, the other in the home—on the farm together, not in separate business offices that hired them as individuals to work outside the family. In similar ways the blurring of distinctions within other status groupings has diminished unity and shared experience and thus has diminished uniformity.

Little better than sheer conjecture, the following is not to be accepted as a verified observation. But assuming that modern Americans tend to lack individuality, may this not paradoxically arise from the individualization of experience? Individuality is not being unlike everybody else, for individuality rests upon shared experience. Individuality is hardened conviction and strength of character, and it is nurtured upon unassailed and fixed beliefs. Although in any society the play of interest and counter-

interest alternately supports and denounces now this and now that belief, the person who was born and raised where a few consistent ways of thought and deed were supported would later in life be prepared to take a stand against the world should his convictions be challenged.

Conversely, the person who early in life was propelled into a shifting social environment, who was surrounded by others with different backgrounds and beliefs, whose livelihood separated their interests, activities, points of view, and loyalties from his, would almost of necessity develop a "tolerance" for others' attitudes and opinions. Such a person would also doubt who he was and what he stood for.

The very individualization of experience makes the affirmation of individuality difficult, in many cases impossible. Where one's previous activities and ideas, even one's biases, receive uncertain support or are attacked as one early in life moves into the future, where opinion (which shifts) tends to supplant conviction (which does not), the loudest booming noise uttered by politician, advertising copy, or promoters of intellectual, dress, or amusement fad rather easily absorbs the distracted attention of the one in the mass. It is drifting with the lonely crowd, with querulous doubt in them and in one's self, which lends a surface appearance of uniformity to American life.

Dominant Cultural Orientations in America

Now that we have seen how variable cultural sharing is in modern America, is it possible to describe a "core culture" in modern America? Many sociologists have denied that this can be done; the following quotation is typical of this school of thought.

> The sociologists would seem to have over-worked the concept of "culture." Modern life cannot be fitted into the frames of uniform "culture patterns," and the attempt to force a fit often results in a neglect of basic features of *social structure*—the objective realities, such as the need to make a living in a certain social system, which enforce a certain type of behavior regardless of pre-existing norms, values, and social rituals. One of the outstanding characteristics of the modern world is, in fact, the destruction of culture by sweeping changes in social structure. The adjustment to modern industry and modern cities wrecks the complicated and varied cultural patterns built up in the American rural hinterland, or in European villages. [8, pp. 377–378]

This is certainly an extreme statement. The author could scarcely deny—despite rapid social change and diversity in modern American life—that some fairly common ways of doing and believing are still maintained and transmitted. In a brilliant paper, Florence Rockwood Kluckhohn has demonstrated the usefulness of the culture concept, even when it is applied to the complex and diverse reality of modern America (3). All societies, especially highly differentiated ones such as our own, have "at one and the same time *dominant* cultural orientations and *al-*

ternative orientations. More precisely, societies have a discoverable *dominant profile of cultural orientations* and also discoverable *substitute profiles*" (3, p. 376).

There are five "common human problems," in Dr. Kluckhohn's view, and different cultures develop different answers to these problems when they are stated in question form. First, what are the innate dispositions of men? Second, what is the relation of man to nature? Third, what is the significant time dimension? Fourth, what type of personality is to be most valued? Fifth, what is the dominant modality of the relationship of man to other men?

The ways different cultures "answer" these questions are shown in Table 1.

Table 1 The Way Cultures Answer the Five Common Human Problems °

Innate Predispositions	Evil	Neither good nor bad (or mixed) †	Good
Man's Relation to Nature (includes man's own physical nature)	Man subjugated to nature	Man in nature	Man vs. nature (rational mastery over nature) †
Time Dimensions	Past	Present	Future †
Personality	Being	Being in becoming	Doing †
Modality of Relationship (man's relation to other men)	Lineal	Collateral	Individualistic †

° Reproduced with author's and publisher's permission from 3, p. 378. The items set with † are those which are characteristic of the American culture.

Total cultures rarely if ever make one answer to each question in such a way as to exclude altogether the other two answers. But what our culture does, as do all others, is to emphasize clearly one of the three answers to each of the questions.

On the other hand, within any complex culture, such as our own, a *relatively* large number of deviations from each dominant emphasis is clearly apparent. These deviations are of two kinds. The first is a collective deviation which violates the norms of the total American social system, such as the "delinquent subculture." The second kind of deviation involves "substitute profiles of cultural orientation" within the dominant "core culture." These do not excite collective sanctions, punishment, as does the delinquent subculture. These substitute profiles are perfectly acceptable ways of doing and believing, but more or less atypical ones. For example, most American communities stress the principles of future, doing (personal achievement), and the individualistic emphasis. Some communities in areas of older settlement, however, stress rigidity of status, and represent "for whatever social or psychological reasons," something of a shift:

. . . from the *achievement* to the *being* or *being-in-becoming* principle, from the *individualistic* to the *lineal* relational principle, from the *future*-time to either a *past*- or *present*-time orientation (past-time for the upper group and present-time for the lower). This *substitute profile* is neither sharply delineated nor completely followed for the reason that in the American system as a whole, of which, after all, the towns are a part, these alternative principles are not those of major importance. [3, p. 387]

Following Table 1, then, we can make a few tentative generalizations about the total American culture.

Innate predisposition. The predominant American idea about innate disposition is that man is evil but perfectible; human nature is believed to be mixed, in other words. The residue of Calvinism left in the American culture is still potent enough to lend an air of reality to sin and guilt. On the other hand, there is a counterfaith in man's ability to conquer both his world and himself. Such an affirmation of self-confidence will be found in Hollywood and in a northern New England farming village.

Man's relation to nature. This view is similar to that of innate disposition: man's relation to nature is one of rational mastery over it. The predominant attitude of the Comanche is quite similar, while the Hopi think in terms of man in nature, or "the loss of the self in the world of nature of which the self is a part." In most cultures, time is an involuntary journey to which one must submit. The average American attempts to conquer time, at least to bring it under control; if he "loses time" he will doubtless try to "make it up"; he attempts to be "on time," or better yet, to "gain time." Time is an adversary, to be resisted and fought. In large measure our gigantic cosmetics industry has been built by the determination of factually aging women to dispel the ravages of time.

The American culture preserves a view of the self and nature as things to be conquered. There are many American elaborations of this theme. The historic tradition of both capitalism and the frontier has been building and wrecking, tearing down whatever obstacle lies in one's path, sheer joy in exploitation of physical materials and resources. The motif of rapid movement through space runs clear, from the tall tales of a hundred and fifty years ago about Daniel Boone's swift marches through the wilderness afoot, to the airline's assurance that if you get on a plane in New York tonight you can have breakfast in Los Angeles.

The American devotion to technology is another elaboration of the same theme. The Hollywood technician and the New Hampshire farmer pride themselves equally on their know-how, their ability to handle and fix machinery. In academic circles, a new Ph.D. is often referred to as someone who has just come off the assembly line. It is no accident that the present has been described by many newspapermen and commentators as a war of production.

Sheer techniques, ordinarily means to ends in other cultures, are in

America ends in themselves. An image projected on a TV screen may be praised or blamed, but any criticism of it is likely to be softened with reverence for the process which made it possible. Many GI's returning from the European theater disturbed civilians with an obviously higher appreciation for the enemy than for some of our wartime allies: "The Germans are like us. They know machinery."

Consonant with the paean of praise to technology is the American emphasis upon the practical rather than the theoretic, the contemplative, or the artistic. The Hollywood producer and the New Hampshire farmer are eminently practical men, they neither waste time nor have "foolish notions." They get *things* done. The "finer things of life" receive a real although secondary appreciation, but an appreciation shown by only a minority of even the formally educated. Art, aestheticism, and the pause along the way to evaluate one's self or one's surroundings with the inner eye comprise, in America, substitute profiles.

Time dimensions. Our predominant time dimension is the future. One example is our pervasive concept of collective progress, another our basic value of individual success, mortgaging the present for the future, in the Lynds' phrase, living *at* the future. In contrast, the classic civilizations were oriented to the past. Seneca's "golden age" was the past. During the medieval period, Western culture was still celebrating the past. It was the rise of modern science and modern capitalism which, more than any other developments, were associated with the shift toward future orientation.

Rather than past or future, some cultures celebrate the present. The Mexican, Hopi, and Balinese cultures are oriented in this way.

> The Iatmul [of New Guinea] and we ourselves see life as divided into sequences of neutral or unpleasant conative acts [striving toward future goals] ending in satisfactions, but the Balinese do not see life like this. They are a busy, active people—but they are infinitely willing to suffer interruption. . . . They seem to take a very definite pleasure in mere activity in the present. . . . [2, p. 353]

More than any other culture, past or present, the American is future oriented. The symbol of America as the hope for the *world's* future has consistently appeared in the addresses of America's chief executives, from George Washington to Harry S Truman. Building and changing *for* posterity has been and still is a theme that swells to hymnal refrain. Minor variations are to be found in the peculiarly American accent on youth and the emphasis upon science and education. A predominant orientation to the future is of course accompanied by relative disregard for the past and for traditionalism, which will in part explain American secularism, a relative indifference for religion.

The qualifying adjective "predominant" has been employed. There

are two ways in which American future orientation is limited. In the first place, there are several substitute profiles of past and present orientation. As has been noted, some communities in older regions of settlement are largely oriented to the past, with a rigid local class structure, many antique shops, and an enthusiastically supported historical society. Also, the American theme of hedonism, having a good time, is a demand for present enjoyment. Finally, confidence in the future has waned considerably in recent decades. This failure of nerve has taken many forms, not the least of which is the demand for security—guaranteed profits, wages, jobs, pensions, and the like.

In the second place, since culture is what is transmitted from the past, the American culture can be oriented to the future only in comparison with other cultures. It can hardly be oriented to the future in any absolute sense. Our folkways, mores, and moral norms are rooted in the past, and they irretrievably link us to the past. Basic to the American culture, present as well as past, are monogamous marriage, patriotism, private enterprise, Christianity, and humanitarianism. If America does possess a core culture, this must have persisted from past to present.

> The American culture . . . can be described as the culture which is represented by the lower middle class, composed of people of Anglo-Saxon descent and of Protestant religion. It is the core culture, because the first settlers came from English speaking countries, because they set the cultural standards for the new country. All later immigrants were compelled to adapt to these standards. Public opinion in America is largely an expression of this core culture. We find it in novels, on the radio, in newspapers, public speeches, and in the opinion of the man on the street. [6, pp. 126–127]

Personality. Of the three personality-type evaluations of being, being in becoming, and doing (achieving), the American culture clearly accentuates doing. Unlike most cultures, the American contains several idealized personality types. Nevertheless, the American culture has raised the idealized portrait of the businessman above all others—the hard-working, aggressive, competent man of commercial and technological action. The supreme American hero is neither scholar, priest, artist, nor even statesman. He is the businessman, but not the salesman, the manipulator of men and markets. Instead, the supreme American hero is the engineer-entrepreneur—an idealized type that would include the inventor Thomas Edison, the mechanic–captain of industry Henry Ford, and the builder of economic empire John D. Rockefeller.

The appreciation of doing, at the expense of being and being in becoming, is accompanied by many other cultural manifestations. One is the importance granted to quantity and size at the expense of intrinsic excellence. Not only do Hollywood studios advertise the size of the hurricane or mob or battle scene in their next colossal epic, but art

museums boast of the number of their pictures and churches of the number of visitors they can seat. Another example of the supreme importance of doing is the well-nigh universal desire to get an education, *i.e.*, achieve diplomas and degrees, accompanied as it is by little interest in, much disparagement of, education, *i.e.*, useless book learning. In part this situation has developed out of the American obsession with quantity and size, in this case the number of years of formal training and the number of diplomas and degrees.

In general, Americans place as high a value upon physical comfort as do people in any other culture, much more than do many others, as a matter of fact. But more apparent than real is this substitute profile of "being." The desire for physical comfort in America does not lead to calm relaxation with what one already has so much as it goads a restless determination to *acquire* something that one does not already possess—automatic central heat, two bathrooms, or a more luxuriously upholstered automobile. Comfort is rarely distinguished from possessions.

Modality of relationship. The predominant orientation of man's relation to other men is the final item considered in Table 1. All cultures recognize and utilize the three aspects of human relationships, but not equally. Some stress the lineal, that is, the transmission of hereditary statuses, as did traditional Hindu India, with its rigid caste system. Others stress the collateral, that is, kinship relations, as do the Tanala of Madagascar. Finally—the Comanche and our own culture are dramatic examples—still others stress the individualistic and "interpret the collateral and lineal aspects, however important in themselves, in terms of it" (3, p. 381).

The American culture is unique in the extent to which it is "imbued with the ideals of self-initiative, independence, individual freedom in religious, economic, and political affairs, and success—to be gained through individual endeavor" (7, p. 280). Hollywood and an agricultural village in northern New England may part company on many values, beliefs, and activities, but they are solidly united in allegiance to the "egocentric values" which are "fundamentally related to the frontier way of life" (7, p. 280). There are many subsidiary themes which illustrate the individualistic emphasis of the American culture. One is the tendency to view international relations in terms of individual relations. Instead of picturing to himself opposing or cooperating power hierarchies—national governments—the American is more likely to think in terms of foreign and domestic *individuals*, either disliking one another or getting to know one another better. Another example of stress upon individualism is the national myth of romantic love, a love that is ideally freed from control of kinship (collateral relations) and from any consideration of status differences (lineal relations). That the reality of sexual relations only too often departs from the myth has so far, at least, left the myth unmodified.

Many traditional values receive less support from American social organization than they formerly did. Particularly are the ideals of independence and individual freedom more discussed than they are achieved. Private enterprise remains a quasi-religious doctrine, but the proportion of private enterprisers diminishes, year by year, as the proportion of the gainfully employed who work for others increases. Modern business organization is not so much competitive private enterprise as it is a series of bureaucratic empires with administered price structures and controlled markets. Meanwhile, centralized government looms over business organization and individual citizen alike. Suspicion and jealousy of authority have persisted in our culture from pioneer beginnings to bureaucratic present. It remains to be seen how long pioneer values can persist in an urban, industrialized, and bureaucratic social order.

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CHAPTER 7 *The Organism Becomes a Person: Socialization*

> Train up a child in the way he should go; and when he is old he will not depart from it. —OLD TESTAMENT

> There are three Johns: 1, the real John, known only to his Maker; 2, John's ideal John, never the real one, and often very unlike him; 3, Thomas's ideal John, never the real John, nor John's John, but often very unlike either. —OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES

ORGANISM, PERSON, AND PERSONALITY

Man is not born human. He is born only with the potentiality for becoming human. He becomes human as a result of the social influences which play upon the anatomy, physiology, and neural structure with which he is born. To the potentiality of becoming human we give the name organism. To the human being with his language and thus his thought, with his attitudes and purposes and values, we give the name person.

A person is a human organism that shares the socialized traits which are universal in all human societies—language, defined statuses and socially determined functions, loyalties and beliefs, and, most important of all, a common universe of moral norms. Personality refers to what is distinctive about any person as well as what he shares with other persons. Personality is the sum of a person's values, the objects of his striving such as ideals and prestige and power and sex, plus his nonphysical traits, his habitual ways of acting and reacting. Physical traits are part of the organism, not the personality. It is the person's reactions to his physical traits which are part of his personality. If a person reacts defensively to, say, his short stature, then it is his sensitiveness to short stature which is part of his personality.

Personality is more than a sum of values and traits; it is their dynamic organization, a matter to be discussed in the next chapter. For the present, in order to clarify some basic principles, personality will be treated as if it were a sum, a bundle of values and traits. This bundle is common in the sense that all traits are to be found in all societies and all values within a society are to some extent shared. This bundle is unique in the sense that each person has certain traits and values to a greater extent than his associates.

THE DETERMINANTS OF PERSONALITY

The phrase "determinants of personality" must be treated with caution. It is true that, viewed in the abstract, personality is a result of the combination of factors discussed below: heredity, physical environment, culture, and particular experiences. On the other hand, no concrete personality can be explained in its unique totality in this manner. Exactly how the factors *combine* to produce a concrete personality cannot be traced by any known method of science. It is far easier to explain personality in general than it is to explain any particular personality. The former is our present task; it is questionable that the latter is a proper subject of scientific investigation.

The Ultimate Conditions

It will be recalled that in Chap. 2 we discussed the effects of physical environment and heredity on personality formation, and we concluded that both were permissive and limiting factors rather than causative agents. Only under harsh and niggardly physical conditions, where both choice and cultural development are narrowly restricted, do social and personal adjustments closely coincide with climate and topography. Nevertheless, to the extent that the physical environment controls or limits cultural development, and to the extent that culture in turn determines personality, a relationship between physical environment and personality can be drawn.

The effect of heredity on personality is somewhat more obvious and direct than that of the physical environment. Nevertheless, an exact knowledge—hypothetical, never actual—of an individual's heredity would not enable us to predict his traits and values. Heredity clearly affects intelligence potential, but heredity will assure neither intelligent nor stupid behavior. In no instance does the impact of the social environment fail to move the organism in the direction of certain traits and values rather than others. The social environment is made up of culture and particular experiences, which are discussed below.

Culture

Some students of human behavior have popularized the notion that personality is the subjective aspect of culture, that culture and personality are two sides of the same coin, that culture, in a word, determines personality. This is a half-truth. Ralph Linton (8) has pointed out that personality traits differ in any culture, that *some* people in any culture are more aggressive than others, some are more submissive, kindly, competitive, and so forth. It is because culture is only one determinant of personality, among others, that personalities differ to some extent within any culture.

The half-truth in the idea that personality is the subjective aspect of culture is this fact: cultures emphasize certain practices, motivations, and values; within any culture, the majority embody in their personalities the dominant action patterns and thoughtways. Culture exerts a powerful and consistent pressure on the development in personality of common and socially approved traits and values. On the other hand, the correspondence between cultural emphasis and personality is closer in some individual cases than in others, and in no case do culture and personality ever coincide exactly. When we say, for example, that the supreme value of modern America is individual success, we by no means describe the entire American population. Some relish competition as a game and play it to the hilt. Others compete indifferently. Still others renounce personal success altogether, condemn it as the devil's work, and retire in physical or psychic seclusion. There are, after all, American-born Trappist monks who dedicate their lives to poverty and mystic contemplation. As for those who relish competition, many may flout some other dominant value, such as marital fidelity. Personality is not totally determined by culture, even though no personality escapes its influence.

General influences. Every culture preserves universal features which exert a more or less uniform influence. Most personalities contain these universals to some extent, but even those who do not are unable to flout them with impunity. Not all Comanche males were aggressive warriors, but short shrift awaited him who verbally attacked the warrior role. The modern American who argues that money making and materialism are false gods had better be prepared for an icy stare from most other Americans.

Common social values rule our lives, such as fair play in competition, humanitarianism, patriotism, monogamous marriage and sexual fidelity, respect for private property, Christianity, a belief in American destiny, and a belief in progress. The belief in individual rights, respect for individual accomplishment, and the drive to individual success—at least in comparison with other known cultures—can also be regarded as uniform and universal. To a perhaps lesser extent this would also be true of personal cleanliness, veneration of machinery and technology, and philosophic acceptance of direct action in preferance to contemplation and passivity.

Humdrum techniques of daily living, as well as common values, directly affect personality. All modern Americans wear clothing of a cut and design which does not differ markedly except between the sexes. We live in houses with certain universal features. We eat three times a day and sleep at about the same time of the day. These are purely arbitrary cultural matters. Common artifacts to some extent become part of us—modes of rapid transit, for instance, or monstrous and noisy machinery.

We are familiar with large aggregates of people in store, factory, and athletic stadium; we learn to treat others as physical objects in many of the secondary relationships which attach to these aggregates. Unlike people in some other cultures who live to the rhythm of day and season, we impose upon our organisms the artificial regularity of the clock; we eat, work, play, and make love at stipulated and limited intervals.

Specific influences. No culture is ever transmitted in its entirety to all the members of a society. Even the simplest cultures are too rich and diverse in content for exact sharing. In a complex culture such as our own, the way of life of one family, region, social class, occupation, race, religion, and ethnic group varies considerably from that of another. It follows that the impact of American culture upon personality can hardly be assessed unless these separate status groupings are taken into account. Statuses, and their accompanying moral norms, are transmitted along these status groupings, as we have seen in previous chapters.

Particular Experiences

The traits and values of personality are also determined by another factor, particular and unique experiences. There are two types—those that stem from continuous association and those that arise suddenly, perhaps by chance, and are likely never to recur.

Continuous association. The factor of continuous association permits wide variation of experience within even the same group or placement grouping. The personality of his clergyman often does more to affect a child's personality than the child's being trained to one faith rather than another. One priest, for example, may be kindly, tolerant of boyish pranks, interested in athletics, and anxious to encourage his young charges to develop their separate interests. Another priest may be gruff, quick tempered, arbitrary, and insistent that attendance at mass shall be the pivot of all thought and deed. A child's relationship with either of these men will be a different experience, and the relationship will have a different effect upon any child's personality development. What a child's parents are like, his play-group members, and his schoolteachers are also determining factors in his personality development.

There is a further complication. An individual's experience of his associations is never one-sided. What his own personality has become at any moment in time will in part determine *how* that association is experienced. Neither of the hypothetical priests cited above would affect all children in an identical way. The "typical" American boy—robust, outgoing, athletic, little given to soul searching and introspection—would be likely to find in the first priest a model for behavior, a model that would deepen already apparent personality trends, the groundwork for which had been laid in his physique, temperament, and previous family experience. Another boy—shy, retiring, introspective, bookish—might find such

a man personally distasteful, reject him as a model, and thus intensify the opposed personality trends already apparent. Or the boy might feel compelled to model himself after his priest, fail, and suffer personality conflict as a result. Further possible combinations of personality development could be traced regarding the effects of the other priest upon the same two boys.

Nonrecurrent event. Psychoanalysts, novelists, and dramatists have spun elaborate webs of supposed personality development from supposed critical and nonrecurrent events. A small child views a bloody accident, and ever after is said to be obsessed with the horror of pain and disease. A young girl's experience with a rapist, it is claimed, forever condemns her to a life of sexual maladjustment. Not all such experiences need be traumatic—some men, for example, have claimed that one book which they read in their youth challenged them to seek and to accomplish great deeds.

It is extremely difficult to assess properly the impact of experience of this kind. A hazardous temptation is offered the student of personality at best, since the personality of any adult can so plausibly and easily be traced to some single dramatic episode in his past. The old yarn is called to mind about the two men who explained to each other their attitudes toward drinking. One announced that as a child he had once come upon his father drunk, and from that time on he had felt that it must be permissible for him to do likewise. The other stated that as a child he had once found his father drunk, and he was so disgusted that he then vowed he would never in his life touch a single drop.

Most modern students of personality tend to discount, or at least to minimize, the lasting effects of isolated episodes upon personality. Personality is instead viewed as a *trend* of development started early in life, a trend of development that is modifiable in later years but with a lessening potential for change (4, p. 533). Personal experience is not made up, for the most part, of isolated episodes, because the meaning of any new experience is transmuted by the total meaningfulness of all previous experiences. New experiences usually deepen, rather than render unimportant, the meaning of previous experiences. For example, in Arthur Koestler's novel *Arrival and Departure*, Peter slices out his younger brother's eye with a boat hook and is haunted for the rest of his life with the thought that this may not have been an accident. In a sense, this nonrecurrent event caused his continued need for punishment. At the same time, however, it was Peter's *continuous association* with his parents, particularly with his father, that nurtured his punishing sense of guilt.

The lasting effects of nonrecurrent events can perhaps most safely be traced in the case of physical accident or disease which cripples or weakens. But it is later failure to adjust and to function and the way one's condition is later assessed by others that are the source of feelings

of inadequacy, defensiveness, or whatever other trait may be manifested. As Otto Rank has pointed out, each and every person attempts to make some sort of adjustment to the present, not to the past, even though his personality has been largely determined by his past.

How Do the Determinants Combine?

Heredity, physical environment, culture, and particular experiences will explain personality—its formation, development, and maintenance—if personality is viewed in the abstract. The difficulty is that there is no way yet known to measure the effect of each determinant nor to state how the determinants combine to produce a given result. The behavior of a juvenile delinquent is affected by his heredity and his home life, but how much is contributed by each factor, and how they combine, remains a mystery.

Does the admission of inability to state exactly how the determining factors combine open the door to the argument that personality is self-determined, that personality is the result of free will? Not necessarily. What personality is or becomes, like everything else in the universe, is determined. If one process or event could be proved to be unconnected with all other processes and events, then the basic assumption of science would be destroyed. The specific relationship of all the factors which determine personality does, however, elude final and conclusive analysis. The time element—if nothing else—would present an insuperable obstacle, for the isolation of a set of factors violates the organic and (to some extent) constantly changing unity that is personality. Any arbitrary factorization of personality determinants assumes a static condition which in fact does not obtain.

We deal with paradox: free will, at least in the scientific view of the universe, does not exist, yet the given personality is capable of initiating changes in its immediate environment, even in itself, that are not traceable to any one determining factor or any isolated combination of factors. The potentiality for initiating action, in personality, *is* something different from all of the factors *that are amenable to analysis* which *did* determine that personality. Thus while psychiatrists and clinical psychologists agree that personality problems are determined, they also agree that unless the client is motivated *to do something* about his own difficulties, his case is hopeless.

THE SOCIAL ORIGIN OF SELFHOOD

Personality is a bundle of traits and values. Selfhood, or the self, refers to distinctive human nature. The two terms are sometimes used interchangeably, but there is some point in keeping them apart. In a very rudimentary sense, other of the higher animals possess personality, at

least to the extent, say, that one dog is more vicious than another or more loyal to his master. Dogs differ in the capacity for expressing affection; some dogs welcome seclusion while others constantly seek out human and dog companionship. Some chimpanzees are more fearful and shy than others. Dogs and apes exhibit individual traits, but they do not possess a self.

The sharpest distinction between human and animal personality is the inclusion of selfhood in the former. Selfhood arises only in human beings and only through social interaction with other human beings. Only through interaction is language, the means of symbolic communication, acquired, along with statuses and symbolized human goals and purposes. Perhaps most important of all, only through human communicative interaction with other humans does an *awareness* of self as distinct from other selves emerge, through the adoption of the attitudes of others toward the self.

By logical inference we can state that a human individual hypothetically deprived of all communication with other humans from birth would never *become* human. He would possess no language, and his thinking would extend little farther than momentary recall of sense impressions. He would probably apply his mouth directly to his food instead of conveying it to his mouth with his hands. He would have no statuses, no loyalties, no beliefs. He would love no country, have no concept of mother, and worship no god. He might possess a rudimentary personality, but he would have no self, for he would not recognize the rights of others or their expectations of him and he would not know the boundaries between his self and that of others, for the boundaries would not have been defined for him by others.

The key phrase in the above paragraph is "hypothetically deprived of all communication with other humans from birth." The fact is that we do not have a single authenticated case of a human individual who ever survived infancy totally deprived of human contact. Modern scholars are skeptical of popular yarns about "wolf children" and "gazelle boys" supposedly raised from infancy among animals. The physical requirements for human infant survival, of delicately controlled temperature and regular specialized feeding, if nothing more, make stories of this kind extremely dubious.

How Culture Gets into the Child: Socialization

Socialization is the process by which the child acquires a cultural content, along with selfhood and personality. The child does not, however, experience any such abstraction as culture directly. He experiences only social interaction with a limited number of other human beings, first and primarily with his parents, and siblings, if any. These initial contacts are little more than physical. The infant learns to distinguish others be-

fore he distinguishes himself. Through both neurophysical maturation and learning (by association) he comes to recognize his mother by her smell, bodily contour, voice, and gestures. This recognition becomes associated with pleasure goals, such as being fed, changed, stroked, and dandled.

Early frustration. The mother and, in time, others become associated not only with pleasure ministration and relief from physiological tension but also with frustration. The infant has no personality, no loyalties, beliefs, or knowledge of social relations. He knows only the imperious demands of his own physiology, and he reaches and grabs and clutches at every object that comes into view. Both by unavoidable routine and by design, the large moving objects he comes to know—not by name, at first—interfere with his yearnings and his random clutchings.

Between the cry of unsatisfied hunger or uncomfortable wet and the appearance of the ministering mother, a period of time elapses, and the child is left feeling helpless. According to the psychoanalysts, he feels a sudden onslaught of resentment or hatred which only very gradually he learns to control or disavow. Most of his frustrations, however, are deliberately designed by his parents. Certain objects for which he reaches, like a rattle, are allowed him. But others, such as a vase on a table near his crib, are removed from his grasp. He is later subjected to feeding on a schedule, to bowel training, to upright posture. All of these he may more or less stubbornly resist for a while, but because of training and a growing sense of their "rightness" he ultimately accepts them.

When he has acquired speech, many more prohibitions frustrate his free activity and egocentric demands. Little boys should not pummel their guests. He learns the tragedy of private property, that while certain things are *his,* others are *not,* and one must respect that which is not one's own. Later he learns of more abstract rights which others possess, such as a quiet household for Daddy when he takes a nap.

Identification. How does the child manage to keep his rebellion overtly unexpressed most of the time, and beyond that how does he come to regard rebellion as wrong? Primarily through the process of identification. Of those with whom he is intimately associated—in our society primarily the mother—the child at an early age introjects an image within himself, with the pleasure, attachment, and also the prohibitions associated with them. Peculiarly enough, the concept of self (in part, the distinction between self and others) arises through identification.

The hopes, fears, beliefs, and attitudes of others become welded within the self as one takes over the image of others into the self. Conscience is composed of self-prohibited actions and perhaps thoughts, but it arises through identification with those persons who transmit the prohibition. Only later in life does conscience become more or less separable from mediating others. The child first experiences prohibition as physical re-

straint; later as something which will anger or make unhappy those with whom he identifies; later still as a solid core of duty, necessity, and moral norms that he mistakenly believes are peculiarly and uniquely his own.

Since the family gets the organism first, it largely determines both personality and self-development. It is here that one's basic traits, attitudes, loyalties, prejudices, and points of view are established. Later experience will modify all of these. One identifies in later life with other persons and other groups, but never with the monolithic intensity of early family experience, so that later experience erects a superstructure upon a foundation.

So the organism is socialized, becomes a person, and develops a personality. Nevertheless, the organism is never *completely* socialized. The holiest of saints is frustrated from time to time. Some small querulous complaint that the world should adapt itself to the irreducible me, with my desires, my wishes, my aggrandizement, ever wells up in the noblest of breasts. Some of these complaints are social, with the welfare of others in mind since one is identified with them; some others are not. Into the deeper levels of the subconscious may be driven the wish to bilk one's creditors, seduce the wife of one's neighbor, praise self instead of others, drive one's individualized purposes roughshod over others who by accident or design stand in one's path, but such impulses are never totally uprooted. The old man's armchair stands close to the crib which first received him.

Role taking: assigned. The child's social experience includes a series of roles—literally, parts in the life drama—which are assigned or adopted within social interaction. At a very early age, the child is assigned roles by his mother, his father, his brothers and sisters. These assigned roles are appropriate to the child's present status, and they are appropriate (from the point of view of parents and siblings) to training for the statuses which the child will later fill.

These assigned roles are packages which include negative prohibitions plus those positive overt responses which others expect from the child. Thus the prohibition against poking exposed electric outlets becomes part of the role assigned the child by his mother, which might also include loving obedience, pride in keeping his toys neatly stacked, respectful deference to adult visitors, and so on. It is through identification with her, a growing need for her approval and a fear of her disapproval, that the youngster is enabled to absorb those attitudes and values included in the role package.

The child early begins to develop personality traits, or habitized tendencies to respond, as the limits and potentialities of his heredity are fashioned by assigned roles. At the same time, he also develops a secondary ability to become *overtly* a somewhat "different" person as he

interacts with different people who may assign somewhat different roles to him. Thus the boy who is supposed to be a "nice obedient child" with his mother may soon learn that his father expects forthright behavior from a son who can stand on his own feet in competition with other boys outside the home. The child's trait development soon determines what he will "really" become, but such is the plasticity of human nature that he succeeds to some extent in playing different roles approved for different situations. Individual ability and willingness to do this vary considerably.

It is because we derive our sense of self from others, from their somewhat *differing* attitudes and expectations of us, that at least the more sensitive and introspective persons are acutely aware of the multidimensions of self. "There are times when I look over the various parts of my character with perplexity. I recognize that I am made up of several persons and that the person which at the moment has the upper hand will inevitably give place to another. But which is the real me? All of them or none?" (9, p. 23) Nevertheless, the writer of this passage, Somerset Maugham, possesses self-unity amid diversity. Like all adults, he has a distinctive set of traits. In his case these include love of luxury, fierce pride in craftsmanship, intellectual integrity, ironic cynicism, and a philosophy of resistance rather than passive acquiescence to the implacable forces of fate.

Assigned roles contain three elements—the specific expectations of others, certain social values, and sheer techniques of adaptation. The bulk of what is transmitted to the child in assigned roles is made up of such techniques as mastery of language, donning and doffing clothing, school tasks, handling tools, adjustment of organic rhythms to work and play schedules—in other words, the long series of stair-stepped skills which ultimately produce a housewife or a bank clerk.

Techniques are more directly imposed than are social values. There is likely to be more initial resistance to them by the organism, since they require effort, while social values are absorbed as a by-product of the daily round of activities. The child who happily takes his tin soldiers out of a closet to play with them—and thus fosters patriotic attitudes within himself—is not likely to accept so readily the steady pressure to keep a neat playroom and return his soldiers to the closet when he tires of his play.

Praise and blame and reward and punishment are freely utilized in training the child to deny the organically pleasurable impulse of the moment in order to tie his laces, learn to read, treat his guest courteously, and the like. He also denies the impulse of the moment because he identifies with those who make such demands of him. But it is only when techniques are later fused with social values that they become an integral part of the self. For example, the child who initially resists keeping

clean may shortly, and touchingly, take pride in being well groomed. First he wanted to escape punishment. Then he wanted to please his mother. Finally he came to regard cleanliness as something distinctive about his self; during this process he doubtless heard and accepted various appeals such as "soldiers in the foxholes bathe their feet and change their socks every day."

Role taking: assumed. The child does not perfectly act out the roles assigned him by family associates, partly because these are never perfectly consistent. He is unable to act out two assigned roles, at least concurrently, should they markedly differ or conflict. As his structure of personality traits develops, he finds some assigned roles more congenial than others. Finally, by trial and error the child attempts to impress upon the roles assigned to him several derived interpretations of his own, which normally change as he grows older. Sitting on his mother's lap may be part of the role of "loving, obedient little boy" assigned by her to him, but when he goes to school he may learn that other boys take a dim view of lap sitting, and he may then resist his mother's continued overtures. The nearer a child approaches maturity, the more does his role behavior incorporate assumed as well as assigned elements.

Role taking: projected. Further, in imagination, fantasy, and play, the child constantly acts out the roles of older persons whom he knows or has read or heard about. Using adults with whom he closely identifies as models, he *projects* his role behavior into the future. The little girl plays mother. She dresses, undresses, rocks to sleep, feeds, and disciplines her dolls in imitation of her mother's behavior. The little boy pushes out his undeveloped belly and pompously swings an imaginary club in copy of the policeman who walks past his house every day. In his daydreams he rescues princesses from a fate of which he has but an inaccurate knowledge, or he becomes Ted Williams smacking a ball clear out of Fenway Park while thousands shout themselves hoarse.

This is how culture gets into the child: from acting out with present others assigned and assumed roles, testing them for modification as his personality structure becomes more rigid in time, and from projecting himself in play and imagination into adult roles.

It is only through role taking that the child acquires culture, always a slow process. The child's world is concrete, specific, dramatic, and personalized. Children of six or seven have difficulty in defining even things, except in terms of their use. Young children usually define a chair as something to sit on. At eleven and twelve most children can define things and events logically. But only at approximately fourteen can a child define such an abstraction as patriotism.

Obviously the child begins to absorb patriotic attitudes long before he can define patriotism, and even long before he is consciously aware of love for his country. When very small he listens to legends about the

heroes of his nation's past. When he later goes to school he encounters history, which is not in the lower grades so much a factual account of the past as it is a medium for transmitting patriotic and, more specifically, militaristic attitudes. Graphic phrase and pointed illustration present him with such concrete models as the wind-and-snow-torn Washington, brooding paternally over the anguished faces and bloody tracks of his troops at Valley Forge. The majestic figure of Lincoln stirs the crowd with his address at the Gettysburg battlefield. The child seizes upon the news of a thin line of Americans facing hordes of Chinese in Korea and plays war games with his peers in an open lot.

He identifies with all of these. More than this, he successively *becomes* in his own imagination Washington, Lincoln, and an American infantryman. Only because he has for long years acted out these various roles in play and fantasy is the child later able to integrate a consistent value complex—patriotism. As an adult he stands on a street corner and feels a thrill of pride, glory, and self-expansion at the sound of martial music and the sight of flags twisting in the breeze as the parade moves past him. But the abstract symbol of red, white, and blue cloth elicits this reaction only because it has become a summation of many concrete roles that have been embedded in his self.

Culture is thus transmitted to the child in a *personalized* way. Culture is acquired as an accompaniment of the self which the child laboriously builds with the help of others. Culture is introjected within and focused upon the self. Culture, in the present context, is fused with a given person's self-conception, with the present roles he plays and those which he projects into the future, and with the goals of achievement he sets himself. By direct or devious route, all of these are derived from others, even though none of them ever exactly duplicates what has been derived from any single other.

SELF: SOCIAL AND ANTISOCIAL

Whether man is a moral being or a beast has been debated for centuries. Poets and philosophers have argued both ways, pouring sarcastic ink on their opponents. The debate probably never will be ended. Meanwhile, we will review the brief of a brilliant American social psychologist, Charles H. Cooley, and the rebuttal of the Viennese psychoanalyst, Sigmund Freud.

The "Looking-glass" Self

Cooley held that self and social are two sides of the same coin. Our ideas, loyalties, attitudes, and points of view derive from others. One means of their transmission Cooley called the "looking-glass" self. Within intimate social relations we infer how we are regarded at the moment

by others, how others see our appearance and action, and how they interpret our vocal responses. Then we imagine what their judgment is of what we infer they see. Finally, we react to our imagination of their judgment, are pleased or downcast, flattered or dejected (2). In brief, we derive our self-conception from others; we live in the eyes of others.

In terms of our previous discussion, the looking-glass self assures the child which phases of his assumed roles and his testing of assigned roles will bring praise, which blame; which ones are acceptable to others, which ones unacceptable. The attitudes which others adopt toward the roles that the child tries out on them the child in turn adopts toward his self. The self thus arises when the person becomes an *object* to himself, when he is capable of taking the same view of himself that he infers others do. The moral order which governs human society, and is unique to human society, in large measure depends upon the looking-glass self. "The fact that every human social order operates as a moral order is, among other things, contingent upon man's becoming an object to himself" (5, p. 169).

The process of self-development is very slow, and it is closely linked with the mastery of symbolic communication. Infants learn the names of others around them before they learn their own names (1). Only quite gradually can infants learn to distinguish their self from mother and even from such physical objects as nursing bottle and crib. It is only through symbolic communication with others, it is only when one can infer what attitudes others have adopted toward one's self, that one acquires a self.

Through his careful observation of children at play, Jean Piaget has shown that the self-adoption of others' attitudes is dependent in part upon maturation (11). Infants and small children are egocentric. For example, a child's typical action is to clutch marbles to himself, to stroke them or roll them on the floor; in any case to play in a hit-or-miss fashion, the while ignoring any other children who may be present. Later he will play a game of marbles with another child, but a game which is confused and chaotic, with the attention span of each wandering easily, and with each shouting out his own interpretation of the rules. Only at about eleven and twelve years of age are children able to accept a mutually binding set of marble-game rules. Each then knows what he can and cannot do, and each then accepts the outcome of regulated action. Not until this age does each thoroughly grasp the point of view of the other; only then can each consistently and regularly adopt the other's point of view toward his self.

Criticism of the "looking-glass" self. The concept that Cooley developed has been validated in research. No criticism could argue that it is wrong; criticism could only state the limits of its application, which is our present purpose. The looking-glass self does not operate in any total fashion, particularly in our complex and differentiated society. The look-

ing-glass self is in some ways more adequate to explain social behavior in the first few years of life, the period of maximum plasticity. With increasing age the child develops a more or less stable personality structure. His traits become more rigid, and to some extent they resist the evaluation of some persons (never all) with whom he interacts. The adult who is habitually aggressive, for example, finds it difficult to dissemble his aggressiveness when in the company of those who show aversion for aggression. Even though such a person might be sufficiently sensitive to realize their perhaps unspoken criticism of his conduct, he might find it impossible or inexpedient to meet their expectations.



FIG. 6. The looking-glass self is a double image.

With advancing age, moreover, one meets more people—people who inevitably possess somewhat different codes of conduct, attitudes, and values. It becomes impossible to readjust one's overt behavior to meet these different expectations when they conflict. With advancing age, one tends to seek out those others whose expectations are more or less compatible with one's present personality structure. The accomplished pianist, for example, may live in an isolated world of musicians, composers, and critics. The looking-glass self, for him, may be restricted to these. He may be totally unconcerned with how he is "reflected" by politicians, businessmen, and bobby soxers. What is more important, he may judge all others in terms of their attitudes toward and knowledge of music. A similar statement could be made about businessmen, scholars, and professional soldiers. The concept of the "looking-glass" self, therefore, is an oversimplification. The mature self not only regards itself as others view it but it also appraises others as it appraises itself. It seems strange that anyone like Cooley, so very much aware of the interconnectedness of self and social, should not have conceived of the looking glass as a double image. At some indeterminate point in life history, in other words, discrimination appears. One is much less concerned with how one is reflected or regarded by some than by others. Many psychotherapists, in fact, distinguish neurotic from normal personality in terms of the for-

mer's anguished concern about how everyone he ever meets, however casually, regards him.

More than one college boy preserves this precious fantasy: some day, when he is rich and famous, he will drive down Hometown's Main Street in a fire-red Cadillac and drop in at the drugstore. There he will order a sundae from the member of his high-school class who was captain of the football team and who was voted the man most likely to succeed. This soda jerk, whom he at one time envied, shows in manner and speech that he now in turn envies him. Should the college boy ultimately become a success, he will in all probability never make the glittering pilgrimage. By that time he will have new friends, interests, and goals. He will be indifferent to the appraisal of his companions of long ago. He may even smile ruefully to himself when he recalls his juvenile motivation, which is now supremely unimportant although not forgotten. That motivation may, indeed, have prodded him along the path to success.

So far, only the extent to which individuals are motivated by others' attitudes toward their self has been criticized. In one particular, however, the looking-glass concept can itself be called to question. That particular is Cooley's assumption that we always reflect *accurately* the attitudes of others, whatever we may do about it. As Cooley himself observed, "the locus of society is in the mind." Thus we do not react to Mr. Jones; we react to the mental image we have of Mr. Jones. It is a commonplace observation that people do not fall in love with a "real" person, but with a person viewed hazily through a soft-focus screen of ideals, yearnings, and romantic fictions.

Cooley realized that A and B often have markedly different mental images of C, and that each might accordingly react in different ways to C. What Cooley apparently did not realize is that A and B might erroneously interpret the mental image that each had of the other. One of the most frequent sources of human conflict is what Harry Stack Sullivan has called "parataxic situations," in which the mental images that two persons have of each other do not mutually coincide and in which each simply misses or misinterprets the expectations of the other. Subtle and mutual misinterpretations of this kind often lead a husband or a wife to complain wildly in a divorce court, "I just don't know what went wrong."

The Freudian Demurrer

Sigmund Freud was not the first to point out a real dualism in selfhood which Cooley failed to grasp, but his name more than any other is associated with this point of view. Freud claimed that the id and ego (approximately the self) are separate from and eternally hostile toward the superego (approximately the social conscience). "The struggle between individual and society" is a phrase he used again and again. He

conceived man to be motivated primarily by his sexual and aggressive "instincts," but more often than not these are overruled by the superego. The superego, for Freud, is the introjected image of the forbidding mother; within the self, it is still apart from and even alien to the essential self. The extent to which superego dominates id and ego Freud interpreted as a measure of neurosis, as a measure of the burden of guilt and anxiety.

In Freud's view, society is an organized plot to deprive the self of its pleasure goals and assertions. The more complex society becomes, the more horrible human fate becomes: "the price of progress in civilization is paid in forfeiting happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt" (3, p. 123). The pleasure principle, which dominates all human striving, is "in conflict with the whole world." To the extent that frustration and repression cap the organism's sexual and aggressive drives, hidden or overt hostility explodes.

Some young aggressors. Studies of child behavior corroborate Freud's arguments—at least his central idea that the self is at war with its social environment. Children, after having been given dolls to play with at the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station, have been informed that the various dolls are "Mother," "Daddy," "big brother," and "teacher." Then the children are left to their own devices, while being observed through a one-way glass screen through which the children can see nothing.

> Little girls, I hear, are made of sugar and spice and everything nice. Uh-huh. You should watch a lovable little curly-head parboil mamma in a toy bathtub full of imaginary boiling water. You should watch these little three-year-old darlings who love their dear preschool teacher—you should watch them flush dear teacher doll down the toy toilet. [12, p. 69]

A mother has reported listening at the door to overhear the following lines, majestic in their cadence, solemnly intoned by her four-year-old son at his bath:

> He will just do nothing at all,
> He will just sit there in the noonday sun.
> And when they speak to him, he will not answer them,
> Because he does not care to.
> He will stick them with spears and put them in the garbage.
> When they tell him to eat his dinner, he will just laugh at them,
> And he will not take his nap, because he does not care to.
> He will not talk to them, he will not say nothing,
> He will just sit there in the noonday sun.
> He will go away and play with the Panda.
> He will not speak to nobody because he doesn't have to.
> And when they come to look for him they will not find him,
> Because he will not be there.
> He will put spikes in their eyes and put them in the garbage,

And put the cover on.
He will not go out in the fresh air or eat his vegetables
Or make wee-wee for them, and he will get thin as a marble.
He will not do nothing at all.
He will just sit there in the noonday sun. [10] °

Susan Isaacs, in her Malting House School, made a systematic study of her three- to five-year-old pupils, and has revealed a world of "primary egocentricity" where self in the naked sense pushes to the fore. These children are dominated by personal pleasure seeking; they are motivated to grab, hang on, and resist the claims of their associates. "Frank again began very quarrelsomely. He drew the 'crocodile' on the floor, and when the others did the same, he rubbed theirs out. In modelling, he spoilt the other children's models of a garden, crushing his own *first*, so as to avoid retaliation" (6, p. 65).

Small children left to their own devices do not behave as a constituted group, but as a number of independent persons, each concerned with his own immediate ends. They cannot safely be left unsupervised for long because of the physical havoc they might wreak on property or their companions. Without the presence of a punishing and rewarding adult, they cannot gain a sense of the rights of others. Taking turns on playground equipment is one of the hardest things for children under five to learn and to accept, for they do not trust others to relinquish *their* turn later. "Nor does one believe in the good-will of the others who are enjoying their turns first—one knows only too well how readily one would exclude *them* if one were allowed" (6, p. 223). When stable, dependable, and trusting relations first appear among small children, they are very frequently cemented with a common hostility aimed at someone else (6, p. 251).

The most cruel animal. Displacement of hostility—the justification of one's own hostility toward another by the conviction that he has a hostile intent toward you—brings little children to gang up on the visitor of the moment, to taunt him and pummel him. This same psychological mechanism has woven a scarlet thread through the fabric of human history, with its maiming, killing, and burning, in the name of king, country, and God. Man acts cruelly because of hostility displacement and also because he, unlike other animals, lives in a world of symbols as well as of things, a world peopled by fears and terrors that are not so much a part of the real world as they emerge from a combination of symbols in the mind.

Peculiarly enough, the very qualities that man calls inhuman are, in fact, characteristic of his own species and of no other.

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No other animal is so deliberately cruel as man. No other creature intentionally imprisons its own kind, or invents special instruments of torture such as racks and thumbscrews for the sole purpose of punishment. No other animal keeps its own brethren in slavery; so far as we know, the lower animals do not commit anything like the acts of pure sadism that figure rather largely in our newspapers. There is no torment, spite, or cruelty for its own sake among beasts, as there is among men. A cat plays with its prey, but does not confine and torture smaller cats. But man, who knows good and evil, is cruel for cruelty's sake; he who has a moral law is more brutal than the brutes, who have none; he alone inflicts suffering on his fellows with malice aforethought. [7, p. 128] °

On the other hand, only man inhibits and represses cruelty, naked self-assertion, and sexual and aggressive impulses, because only man of all the animals symbolically defines these, under certain circumstances, as morally wrong. *Not* yielding to drives and temptations of all kinds becomes, in sum, much more an integral part of the self than does aggression, sexuality, and cruelty. Even where society sanctions any of these as defense and protection of itself, their expression is still limited and controlled.

Clearly, Cooley on the one hand and Freud on the other were half right. Man is a social being, person and society interpenetrate and fuse; at the same time, there is some irreducible core of the self which resists socialization.

Personality: a Compromise Formation

Naked aggressions are often inseparably fused with social values. The old maid who demands punishment for the young mother of an illegitimate child may harbor a secret resentment of anyone who fulfills his biological cycle—something which fate has denied her. As a matter of fact, man's *organized* cruelty to his fellow man is more than justified by social sanctions; it is sometimes part of those sanctions. Men must kill the state's enemies in time of war, must imprison those who have violated certain laws, must banish from the group those who rebel —in all these cases men fulfill the moral demands of society, but at the same time they may derive a personal and cruel pleasure from so doing.

Most "antisocial" behavior is uncomplicated by mixture with social values. Man is a social being, and he identifies with his total society and more completely with certain individuals and groups within it, but there is always a part of him which is concerned with the *isolated* self, with *my* purposes, *my* wishes, *my* desires, *my* bodily and self gratifications. Even in the close and beloved circle of family or friends, there is a still

° Reprinted from the January, 1944, issue of *Fortune* magazine by special permission of the editors.

small voice which cries out, as did Sindbad the Sailor, "I am a foreigner and not subject to your customs."

What is remarkable is not the scope of the naked ego thrust in organized society, but the narrow gap between individual purpose and social design. The majority do not feel that society's prohibitions and restrictions are clearly unjust, because those prohibitions and restrictions have become *almost* an indissoluble part of the self. Thus it is that the majority come to accept their low station in life and their circumscribed sexual and aggressive outlets without a constant sense of personal frustration and resentment. Each personality, in other words, reaches some point of compromise with his society.

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CHAPTER 8 *The Structure and Unity of Personality*

Nought loves another as itself,
Nor venerates another so,
Nor is it possible for thought
A greater than itself to know.
—WILLIAM BLAKE

In the previous chapter, personality was briefly defined as a bundle of values and traits. In this chapter, values and traits will be examined in greater detail, and the subject of dynamic unity in personality will also be discussed.

THE PSYCHOSOCIAL SYSTEM OF VALUES

There are three levels of social values: abstract sentiments, moral norms, and the self as social value. Our discussion of social values thus far has mainly concerned moral norms in terms of their social-control aspect. We will now discuss the three levels of social values in terms of personal experience.

For our present purposes, a value is simply a relatively enduring awareness plus emotion regarding an object, idea, or person (adapted from 9, p. 92). A value becomes such to a person only when three conditions are fulfilled. First, he is aware of the existence of an object, idea, or person. Second, his awareness is a matter of concern to him; he has an emotionalized attitude, pro or con, toward the object, idea, or person; he regards it as good or bad in some degree; he is not, in other words, indifferent toward it. Third, his awareness and emotionalized attitude are more than transitory; they endure in time.

Our discussion is limited, for the most part, to social values. Individual values, even many that are commonly shared, are not necessarily social values. Many dominant modern values are common and shared, but enjoyed or sought by each individual for himself alone, and are therefore not social values. Money, power, sex, and romantic love all rank high, followed closely by a host of creature gratifications such as breakfast coffee, cigarettes, chewing gum, beer, popular fiction, movies, and baseball. As distinct from individual values such as these, a social value contains, explicitly or implicitly, a concern for others' welfare. Our pres-

ent discussion is in part a prelude to the next chapter, in which the subject of personality stability and conflict will be taken up.

Abstract Sentiments

Every culture contains certain social values that are abstract sentiments or ideals, more or less separable from concrete goals of action, such as "the American way," "the land of opportunity," "all men are born free and equal," and "do unto others. . . ." Among sentiments of this kind, necessary though they are to knit society into a coherent unity, there is and always has been a great deal of inconsistency. Shifting interests, new and critical problems of group survival, occasionally make one value a rallying cry for action while some others are held in abeyance; and rationalizations are ever ready for application. While "brotherly love and humility" have been a part of Christianity's heritage, so also has "righteous indignation" appeared whenever group aggrandizement, violence, and death had to be justified.

In our society—this is said not because other societies are presumed to be different in this regard, but only because the evidence presented below is drawn from our own—there appears to be a more or less normal development of moral sense which stops short, for the bulk of the population, at verbal consistency of abstract sentiments. The human being is capable of absorbing contradictory abstract sentiments without their becoming issues of personality conflict. Indeed, expressed sentiment and practice can be considerably at variance with similar results.

The child. The world of the child is concrete and personal. Only gradually does he incorporate *some* abstract sentiments as part of his self.

> To us it is both psychologically and statistically queer to have positive correlations of approximately .50 between "aggressiveness" and "sympathy," for instance, because notions of "good" and "bad" and the behavioral dichotomy which they assume are so deeply ingrained in our attitudes toward behavior. From the point of view of the child, however, the issue is between social responsiveness and inhibition, and it is only natural that if you respond at all to another person you will fight him when he grabs your shovel and help him up when he gets a bad fall. [22, p. 1042]

When attempts are made to teach the child a high moral abstraction, such as that war is evil, he interprets this in terms of his personal relationships with parents and playmates. After verbally accepting the sentiment, he may quite calmly line up armies of toy soldiers and annihilate one side or the other (2). It has been pointed out that adults kill animals for pleasure (hunting, fur coats), utility (meat), convenience (excessive kitten litter), phobia ("creepy and crawly things"), necessity (garden pests), and at the same time demand that their children be "kind to

animals." Yet the majority of children are not upset by this contradiction. Most of them fail even to recognize it (15).

The rulers and the ruled. The men who wield power also manipulate abstract sentiments in their own interests. This does not mean that the abstract sentiments are *merely* hollow masks for deluding the ruled, or even that the rulers dissociate themselves from the sentiments with which they brightly paint their actions. In any event, the captain of industry claims to seek the preservation of the "American free-enterprise system" rather than to make a profit. The union leader forges a chain of command with the justification of "economic democracy for all." The politician vies for office with the plea that only *his* election will ensure continued "peace and prosperity" and secure "this hallowed soil from the Communist conspiracy."

Men of power wrap themselves in popular slogans in order to attract the eye and approval of those they wish to control. Men of power cannot be subjected to psychological tests. We simply do not know how much their selves "really" embody the abstract sentiments they publicly espouse. Self-assurance derives from the wielding of power, however, and in most cases self-identification with the sentiments manipulated appears to be close. And since they must be monolithic in purpose, and since nervousness does not befit the mighty, it would appear unlikely that they suffer much personality conflict from manipulating abstract sentiments for private ends.

The mass of the ruled are unaware of inconsistencies among the sentiments addressed to them. The ability to distinguish consistency in abstract sentiments varies with age and education (25, pp. 80–81). This ability also probably varies with social-class position. Of a group of unemployed South Wales miners, as they discussed the international situation during the immediate post-Munich period, it was said:

> In the case of the Welsh miner the Protestant Chapels, or nonconformism, supported the individualistic ethos of capitalism with its emphasis upon self-evaluation of success and failure in the Calvinist tradition; and, contrariwise, they provided much of the impetus to British socialism in the concept of the "brotherhood of man." One can see both elements appearing in the recorded discussions—on the one hand, the interpretation of socialism in definitely religious terms of brotherhood and, on the other hand, the effort to assess blame in terms of individual sin and the transformation of conditions by means of soul-cleansing. [1, p. 133]

These miners shunted about the labels communism, capitalism, and democracy, and made convenient combinations to support contradictory abstract sentiments. In other words, where abstract sentiments are voiced, we must be sure that intellectual awareness of what they are is present before we make assumptions about the emotional effect of inconsistencies among them.

The more glittering the abstraction, the more dim become the critical faculties. When attitudes on such controversial issues as government housing, Federal limitations of income, and legal limits to profit taking are recorded, poor as well as rich tend to agree that government should stay out of such enterprises–*provided* the questions are asked in these terms: is this (or not) good Americanism? (17) On the other hand, when poor and rich are simply asked whether they favor such measures –with the Americanism label left out of the picture–the poor are rather consistently for and the rich equally consistently against, thus indicating their "real class interests" (5).

Very probably only one social type, the intellectual, has ever been gravely concerned with the internal inconsistency of abstract sentiments. That is why the following claim, made by some intellectuals, can be justifiably viewed with skepticism: the majority of Americans suffer emotional distress because of an inconsistency in our abstract sentiments and because of a disparity between our creeds and our deeds. The person who makes such a claim may be accurately describing only himself and a number of other intellectuals.

Moral Norms

Moral norms comprise the second level of social values. They are the compellers of social action, more or less absolute in simple societies, more differentiated and less absolute in complex societies. Moral norms are the specific ways that abstract sentiments are supposed to be fulfilled. The young man's obligation to go to war, for example, is a way of fulfilling the abstraction "love of country."

The connecting link between moral norm and abstract sentiment is strong or weak depending upon social trends. As the trends toward international warfare and state socialism reinforce each other, the obligation of military service is tied more securely to its supporting abstractions. Conversely, the moral norms required to fulfill the abstraction "brotherly love"–which developed during a historical period of rural familism when the gamut of social relationships was mostly intimate and personal–would in today's bureaucratic social order be more difficult to determine.

Abstract sentiments are the common property of a total society, while moral norms are transmitted to individuals through their group memberships and status groupings. These group expectations, and the statuses which include them, may differ from or even compete with those of other groups, but they are nonetheless binding. Even though modern society contains many different groups and thus many different moral norms, there tends to be a similarity in the moral norms of any one person's group memberships. A member of the Daughters of the American Revolution, for example, probably belongs to other groups which also espouse

militarism, respect for property rights, and respect for authority and elongated lineage.

Moral norms are immediate and pressing. They impinge directly upon a person's self-conception. He is made vitally aware of them, and because they are specific demands to act made by his group, they are much more stable—at least in personal experience—than are abstract sentiments. For the majority, they have the power to silence any previously accepted abstract sentiment which they may oppose. For centuries, Europeans and their cousins have planned, condoned, or actively engaged in the organized killing of other human beings—in the name of the Prince of Peace. A more violent *logical* contradiction could scarcely be imagined. Two air-force psychiatrists have explained the resolving of this "personal conflict": "The combat soldier can become a killer without guilt . . . by virtue of his identification with the group" (13, p. 132).

The ways inconsistency is resolved. It is not only true of contradictory abstract sentiments, but also of contradictory moral norms, that inconsistencies can simply be ignored, and divergent life activities find support in isolated compartments of the self. The following comment was made about a group of British schoolgirls who had just entered a factory:

> The moral values they had been taught in school were confronted with an inflation of the importance of efficiency to the exclusion of morality. Nevertheless, the absorption of this new value system was achieved with incredible speed. But the two systems were not reconciled, nor was one abandoned for the other. They coexisted in strictly separate compartments of the personality; the issue of conflict was evaded by the departmentalizing of the personality. [6, p. 23]

These girls had previously accepted standards of industriousness, individual achievement, intelligence, respect for those in authority, and personal neatness; they soon absorbed, if they did not integrate, new standards of flippancy toward superiors, depreciation of competition, appreciation of romance and gaudy clothes and thick make-up (16). They were apparently young and impressionable and plastic enough so that the previously accepted moral norms had not become settled personality traits.

In a recent experiment (24) an "overprivileged" grouping of sophomore college women—homogeneous in age, intelligence, and socioeconomic status—were compared with a battery of tests, questionnaires, and interviews, in an attempt to discover the correlates in "liberal" and "conservative" evaluations of the "modern feminine role." A clear majority of *both* liberal and conservative students favored equality with the husband *and* "the traditional subordinate feminine role in the wife and mother relationship"! The liberals—those tending to favor equality in

job competition with men and freedom from conventional sex restraints —showed more "hostility, guilt, and anxiety feelings." The price they pay for their nonconformity is "apparently insecurity." One important correlate of "liberalism" was a family background that departed from the traditional pattern: broken homes, parental divorce, career mothers, lack of siblings, and failure to idealize the father.

Still another study (26) compared 157 Dartmouth men and 27 members of the Young People's Socialist League. The latter were found to have less self-satisfactory relationships with parents and lower personal morale (self-satisfaction); among the former, "there was a consistent tendency . . . for men with good family morale to be more conservative, more nationalistic, and more aggressive." The investigator concludes that conservatism and a happy family pattern go together, along with social aggressiveness on such issues as war and capital punishment.

These studies show that intimate social relations are the primary source of moral norms and abstract sentiments. They suggest, although they do not conclusively prove, that moral norms are more centrally located in the self than are abstract sentiments. They further suggest that the tone of intimate social relations is associated with the degree to which logically contradictory abstract sentiments can be absorbed without their becoming a source of personal conflict.

It must not be assumed that moral norms, unlike abstract sentiments, always motivate the person to whom they are transmitted. If it violates the self, any social value will be rejected. All individuals by no means accept all the values of their groups. A person may absorb contradictory moral norms, but he may also reject one of them because it conflicts too much with another that is more clearly identified with his self. It is usually much more difficult to accept contradictory moral norms than to accept contradictory abstract sentiments.

The Self as Social Value

At the third value level, by far the most important for present purposes, is found the self as social value. The self contains many abstract sentiments and moral norms, but not all of them; those which it does contain vary in their power to motivate the self. Further, the self to some degree usually resists some abstract sentiments and moral norms which are given formal allegiance. At times such resistance is symptomatic of personality conflict, but not always.

One young woman, burdened with a penniless and infirm mother, joyfully assumes her responsibility. Another rejects that responsibility. A third accepts it and at the same time has a vague presentiment that she is being forced to make an unfair sacrifice. The girl who rejects her mother may or may not suffer guilt as a consequence. The girl who

willingly assumes her moral responsibility may discover at her mother's death that a small sensation of relief cannot be altogether quelled. This girl ultimately may feel more guilty than the other two.

The self arises in social experience; self and social are one. At the same time, the self is distinctive from, and to some extent resistive of, the social. Resistance to the social is particularly apparent in modern society, where the whole gamut of traditional moral norms is subjected to a steadily mounting pressure from individualized (nonsocial) values. "I have my own life to live" is a claim more often made in private conversations with the self than publicly expressed.

Self-conception. Through social interaction, each person builds a conception of himself; the self-conception is thus in large measure derived from associates. But beyond some indeterminate period in infancy, the self-conception is never a merely passive recipient of others' evaluations. The person also constantly strives to gain a favorable impression of himself. Within the limitations of his appearance, abilities, and social position, he tries to inflate his self-importance. He dramatizes himself. He strives to make his own self-conception a flattering portrait.

High or low, saint or sinner, selfish or unselfish, no one escapes. The neurotic who deliberately accuses himself of being mean, dirty, and insignificant only magnifies his vices and deficiencies. He exhibits, to himself as well as to others, a perverse pride in them; he also never fails to proclaim compensatory virtues. "A man cannot . . . worship his God without seeking his private and peculiar good" (19, p. 412). Even the saint—who sacrifices all hope for wealth, achievement, and acclaim in this world, who insists that his self has been reduced to nothing—associates and identifies his self with God, the most majestic symbol known to man.

> Ultimately all psychical goods—simple and distinctive—which we receive from the outside become converted into and contribute to the creation of inner psychical goods, of thoughts and emotional complexes, which we cultivate and which sustain us in the social and natural struggle. Art, philosophy, religion, science, principles in general, serve as the objective material of these inner psychical goods and, consciously or unconsciously, they center in us around the "I" concept. From the latter there develops more or less clearly in every person a personality picture of himself, which is perhaps his most precious possession. If this is on a high level and unchallenged, the whole organism functions fairly well; if it is questioned, attacked and lowered, serious consequences for the wellbeing, mental and physical, of the individual may follow. Thus the preservation and elevation of inner psychical goods, more or less centering around a personality picture, become the main objective and the principal agent in the social struggle. . . . [18, p. 639]

While all human behavior above the level of automatic reflex is connected in some way with social values (12), *the self-conception remains*

the primary concern, throughout his life, of every person. In actual operation the self-conception, itself in part a social value, is not distinct from other social values. Instead, it converts them into a psychic substratum to uphold the self-conception when it encounters new situations and evaluations, particularly when these conflict with previous ones. Those abstract sentiments and moral norms which have been self-incorporated are used to stabilize the self-conception. We have already noted that this self-conception, particularly in modern society with its wide range of diverse values, groups, and evaluations, is a highly individualized product.

The developing self-conception *seeks out* other social values to support at least the self-flattering aspects of that conception. The small child who early in his life has found gratification in being generous and kindly will in all probability find the Christian religion compatible. Nevertheless, the same social value often has a different meaning for different persons. Men embrace pacifism, or express political radicalism, often for different and sometimes for opposed reasons (8 and 20).



FIG. 7. The self-conception is the point at which social values are organized in personality.

An ethical connotation of "self-ishness" has hindered a wider acceptance of the view that the self-conception assumes primacy over all other social values. Nevertheless, it is evident at every level of human activity. Any interpretation of Christianity other than one which places the elect on the right hand of God has never appealed to the majority from the time of primitive Christianity to the present. At a perhaps loftier plane of idealism, the Catholic nuns on Molokai, by renouncing the world to minister to the creature needs of horribly disfigured lepers for thirty or forty years, also achieve personal ends. This is not to imply that idealism must be made to pay off in any vulgar sense. Social idealism, for both the admirer and the admired, does, however, depend upon some form of self-dramatization. All the great martyrs of history—Socrates, Christ, Savonarola, John Brown, Tom Mooney—had a keen sense of the histrionic.

The extent to which abstract sentiments and moral norms are "real" apart from self-aggrandizement would be impossible to prove. So posed, the question is unanswerable. As personality develops within social interaction, the dichotomies of self and social, although not identical, in

fact break down. Each exists in and through the other. A radical distinction has been drawn by one social scientist between private attitudes toward war—personal safety, opportunity to make money, blood lust; and publicly expressed attitudes toward war—national policy, international law, human welfare (27, Vol. 2, p. 1004). Yet no matter how "really personal" the attitude toward war, the fact that an ideal is publicly expressed is significant. As Franz Alexander succinctly phrased it, the tiger feels no need to justify his aggressions. Man, however, does.

Idealism and moral behavior flatter the self-conception. Only this vital connection makes ethical conduct possible. On the other hand, a vital connection does not spell identity. Aldous Huxley's dictum—that an ideal "is merely the projection, on an enormously enlarged scale, of some aspect of personality"—is a half-truth. The reverse—that a mere enormously enlarged projection of some aspect of personality is an ideal—does not hold. Any totally realistic view of human nature is as false as any totally idealistic view. In brief, ideals flatter the self-conception, but they have real existence. It was a self-effacing and deeply religious mystic, who dedicated his life to the service of God, who declared, "Nought loves another as itself." He did not intend that his words should be literally interpreted.

The self-conception is more than a social value. It also seeks praise, attention, and approval in competition with others. Continuously it compares what it is with what others are, but it is usually kinder to itself than others are. The self-conception does more than put down roots in moral norms; it seeks more than stability; it also strives to be flattering to itself in those areas of competition which are available. It is not necessary, however, that the person achieve a tremendous success in order to hold a stable and satisfactory self-conception. Most adults accept frustration to earlier romantic dreams, and they strive within a fairly narrow range of potential achievement.

A person's self-conception is often like the new house a family has planned to build. A person is aware that other houses are finer, larger, and more pretentious. This may from time to time be a source of discontent. But the loving care that goes into the planning, building, furnishing, and landscaping of the new home makes its very limitations an object of affection. A bit of doggerel sung by lower-class British schoolchildren is brought to mind. They know full well that the mansion at the edge of town is not for them, so they sing, "Our 'ouse is a nice little 'ouse, our 'ouse is." So, for most, is the self-conception.

Roles. Assumed roles are distinguishable from the assigned roles that are performed in the fulfillment of statuses. While any role is an integral part of the self, assumed roles are always more precious to the self than are assigned roles. One performs an assigned role in the status of student, which can be assessed as well or badly performed by others, but the

assumed role includes one's own idea of the assigned role of student, along with the attitudes and aspirations that one has regarding it.

The assumed role, in brief, is what one is impressing, or plans to impress, upon the assigned role. A fraternity pledge has an assigned role, a rather modest one to be sure. His assigned role is what others see —in some cases, perhaps, what they wish they saw. As part of his assumed role a fraternity pledge might plan to gain a reputation—remarkable in one so young—as a Paul Bunyan of the bottle. The assumed role is an ever watchful opportunist, waiting for an opening to impress others and to increase self-importance.

Assumed roles, in other words, are not only impressed upon present assigned roles; they are also often projected into the future, beyond the current area of social interaction. The little boy projects fantastic roles into the future, such as himself a gun-slinging cowboy, or perhaps he more realistically dreams of becoming a soldier. The lost hope of projecting roles into the future is one of the most frequent tragedies of old age. What one is has become quite clear to self and to others, and there is no time left to become what one would have liked to be. This is one reason why so many of the aged turn to the haven of religious orthodoxy, with its promise of a new and glorious role in the afterlife.

Goals. Unlike roles, goals are *always* projected into the future. A goal is the hope of a specific achievement, apart from how it is planned to use the achievement. For example, a man strives to amass a million dollars. His goal is the money; his projected role is what he intends to do with it, how he intends to act as a wealthy man, what admiration he foresees in the eyes of envious others. A woman's goal is marriage; her projected role may be herself the star of a domestic scene with an adoring audience of husband and children.

Like the self entire, goals include social values; at the very least they are limited by the external constraint of moral norms. Peculiarly enough, it is often when a person sets himself a goal that is not common in his society that goals appear most clearly as social values. Human frustration must also be viewed in this light. A woman may make of virginity a goal, in which case virginity becomes a "burden" easily borne. Through resignation to God's will, a poor man may escape a sense of failure. Or he may compensate with a goal of communing with nature, which to him far transcends in importance the petty grubbing for dollars which, he may further believe, only breeds avarice, envy, and hatred.

PERSONALITY AS DYNAMIC UNITY

One controversy has raged for many years. Is personality an expression of traits, or is it explainable in terms of the social and other stimuli to which it is subjected? The trait approach is a "drive" psychology; it

assumes that personality is *in* the person, fixed, stable, autonomous, and unchanging. During the course of his life, it is assumed that each person develops a core of fixed behavior attributes—stealthy or open-handed, generous or stingy, composed or excitable, sensual or ascetic, and the like—which resist change in new situations. The situational approach, on the other hand, assumes that personality is malleable, that it flows as the channels external to it—situations—change their course. It is further assumed that traits either have no real existence or appear and disappear according to the changing situation. The ruthless businessman who drives his competitor to the wall without compunction, it is said, may be kind and gentle with his own children.

It is true that personality is made up of a series of traits that are not indefinitely modifiable through new experience. It likewise remains true that personality is to some extent shaped, molded, and changed as it is subjected to new and different social situations. The constant error on both sides has been the failure to view personality as a dynamic unity, the failure to ask these crucial questions: what is this given self and what is it trying to do, what is it striving for, how does it view the world? On both sides, personality is approached as if it were a mechanism—either a series of neat and fixed compartments, unchanged and unchanging, or something that reacts to a changed external stimulus in a calculable way. Although each view is necessary, neither is complete or adequate. Both can be reconciled, but only by a consideration of the dynamic unity of personality.

Personality (as if) Trait-determined

A radical attack has been made upon the trait theory of personality in recent years through comparing tests of children's honesty in classroom situations with their behavior in situations outside the classroom. The behavior of most children, from one situation to the other, appears to vary almost at random. Nevertheless, it is questionable that data of this kind prove that no child is basically honest or dishonest. Suppose that one child consistently tells the truth when challenged, observes scrupulous honesty with his relatives and friends, and never steals under any circumstances. Suppose that another child consistently lies, continually steals—but never, unlike the first child, cheats on an examination. The first child cheats on an examination because passing with a high grade is important to his self-conception; the second child does not cheat in that situation because passing with a high grade is not important to his self-conception. The first child is honest, the second dishonest. On the other hand, neither child is motivated by the trait of honesty or dishonesty. Personality is motivated only to attain and to maintain a stable and flattering self-conception and to strive for certain goals, within a range of inner limitations and outer circumstances.

It is already obvious that the term "trait" must be employed advisedly, if by that term is meant a permanent and unchanging entity. Personality is a unity, a purposeful, striving unity, at the core of which lies the self-conception. Almost everything that a person is aware that he does, believes, and says is directly or indirectly aimed at shoring up the stable image of himself which he has. The dilemma of trait "inconsistency" is resolved if we focus not upon the specific action but upon the total personality in a *series* of actions. A man who possesses the trait of honesty to a maximum may also identify closely with his brother; when his brother is justly accused of causing an accident the honest man may deny on the witness stand that this is true. Such a man may be consistently honest except when he is required (from his point of view) to be disloyal to his family, and thus to damage his self-conception. "Every act is an integral part of a personic system and can be understood fully only in terms of that system" (7, p. 89).

Critical situations and latent traits. Certain traits in any personality have real existence, in the sense that they resist change when outer circumstances, or situations, change. But the "reality" of a trait must be assessed in terms of the self-conception, in terms of the unity toward which the self is striving. "If there is a correspondence of certain traits it is because the individual's struggles toward personal fulfillment have produced it. Lack of correspondence appears for exactly the same reason" (23, p. 493).

It is precisely when some situation interferes with "the individual's struggles toward personal fulfillment" that it *is* likely to affect one or more traits that make up his personality structure. Critical situations and emergency situations operate in this fashion. Critical situations are those which challenge or damage the previous self-conception, and they change personality traits. Emergency situations do not challenge or damage the previous self-conception, and they do not change personality traits. Emergency situations do, however, temporarily force *latent traits* (potential but nonhabitual ways of action and reaction) into overt expression, an expression which quickly lapses once the emergency is over. For example, a mild-mannered clergyman attacks a man he observes abusing a small child. Now the clergyman has never struck another man in his life; he has only a latent trait of violence. But in this emergency situation his overt behavior is not so much motivated by the trait of violence as by his "real" traits of kindliness and love of children; most accurately, he is not motivated by any trait at all, but he strikes the man because his own self-conception is such that he could not live at peace with his self were he to refrain from doing so. The emergency over, he becomes mild mannered again. In terms of his total personality, the literal truth is that he has never been otherwise.

The bloody carnage of war has disclosed latent traits in more than one man:

> Another soldier who was among those parachuted down to take part in the bloody and losing battle of Arnheim makes the following statement: "Towards the end we knew the situation was bad. We knew we were hemmed in and might never get out. I will never forget the way our men behaved. *Men you knew as the toughest fighters became gentle–kind and considerate to one another.* [4, p. 35]

Again:

> The captain was a southerner in his mid-twenties. He had been a rifle-company commander on the western front. He was very well liked by both his fellow patients and the hospital personnel. His outstanding personality traits were modesty and the friendliness and kindliness of his disposition. As a boy he had been fond of duck-hunting but had given up the sport because, as he said, "I didn't see much fun in killing." Once, during a discussion of war experiences, he told the following story. He had commanded a company during the disastrous Battle of the Bulge, when the German Army had broken through the American lines at the Ardennes Forest. The captain found himself cut off from the rest of our forces and surrounded by the enemy. His situation was desperate. He had only about 40 men left, no food, little ammunition and no idea where the American lines were. In addition to these difficulties, his company had a large number of German prisoners on hand. There was no way to get rid of the prisoners by sending them to a camp in the rear area. Guarding them with his depleted forces was out of the question. Therefore, he determined to kill the prisoners. He and the sergeant took them out in the woods in small groups and shot them. Among the captain's group was a young boy, only about 15 or 16 years old. The captain concluded his story with this remark, "He was crying and begging me to save him and I was kind of sorry I had to kill him." [4, p. 36]

The captain remained modest, kind, and friendly. His aversion for killing ducks was unchanged. He killed in time of war—but his patriotic values and identification with the group for whom he was responsible proved strong enough so that he retained his previous self-conception, even though he killed a sixteen-year-old boy. Other men would have found this a critical situation. It would have damaged their previous self-conception, and their personality traits would have been changed to some extent in consequence. His were not. The captain's war experience, then, was an emergency situation; it called forth latent traits but did not change his personality.

Personality traits do change in critical situations. Such a situation—ultimately if not immediately for all men who were subjected to it—was the Nazi concentration camp. A psychologist, who was himself a prisoner in such a camp, has recorded some invaluable observations. The most important of these observations is the relationship between previous

self-conception and the degree of resistance to personality change under conditions of maximum stress. The politically educated prisoners showed much more resistance than any other type. They "sought support for their self-esteem in the fact that the Gestapo had singled them out as important enough to take revenge on. In their imprisonment they saw a demonstration of how dangerous for Nazis their former activities had been" (3, p. 360). The traits of these prisoners were slowest to change because punishment was part of the normally expected risk of political dissidence, because punishment enhanced their self-regard, and because punishment—up to a certain point—did not force them to revise their self-conception.

The nonpolitical middle-class prisoners stood in direct contrast. They had closely identified with German military might and had accepted the essential rightness of German authority. They had represented a law and order which now outlawed them. The prison experience quickly smashed their previous self-conception; their personality traits quickly changed in consequence.

> They had no consistent philosophy which would protect their integrity as human beings. They had obeyed the law handed down by the ruling classes without questioning its wisdom. And now the law-enforcing agencies turned against them, who always had been their staunchest supporters. . . . After some time they could not help realizing their actual situation. Then they dissintegrated. Suicides were practically confined to this group. Later on, they were the ones who behaved in an anti-social way; they cheated their fellow prisoners; a few turned spies. They lost their middle-class sense of propriety and their self-respect; they became shiftless and disintegrated as autonomous persons. [3, p. 630] °

The self-conception of some, however, can resist successfully—for a time—even the most horrendous of situational changes.

> The writer feels that he was able to endure the transportation and what followed, because he convinced himself that these horrible and degrading experiences somehow did not happen to "him" as a subject, but only to "him" as an object. The importance of this attitude was corroborated by statements of other prisoners. They couched their feelings usually in such terms as, "The main problem is to remain alive and unchanged." What should remain unchanged was individually different and roughly covered the person's general attitudes and values. [3, p. 632] °

They practiced self-detachment, in other words. But every man has his breaking point. Systematic beating, starvation, overwork, being forced to insult one's own parents, parading naked—these and other practices smashed the previous self-conception, ultimately, of those few prisoners who stayed alive and became "old prisoners." Their self-con-

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ception *now* identified with the guards! They stole bits of Gestapo uniforms with which to bedeck themselves, talked like the guards, and tried to outdo the guards in practicing brutalities upon their "friends."

> The satisfaction with which old prisoners boasted that, during the twice daily counting of the prisoners, they had stood well at attention can be explained only by their having accepted as their own the values of the Gestapo. Prisoners prided themselves on being as tough as the Gestapo members. This identification with their torturers went so far as copying their leisure-time activities. One of the games played by the guards was to find out who could stand to be hit longest without uttering a complaint. This game was copied by old prisoners. [3, p. 637] *

A trait classification: coping and expressive. Most traits discussed thus far are part of the self-conception's *conscious* effort to maintain itself or to resist critical situations. Traits of this kind have been called "coping behavior"—purposive, conscious, and motivated. But many traits cannot be characterized in this way. "Expressive behavior" refers to those traits which are unmotivated, uncontrolled, and uncontrollable. Expressive behavior

> . . . simply mirrors, reflects, signifies or expresses some state of the organism. Indeed it most often *is* part of the state, *e.g.*, the stupidity of the moron, the smile and springy walk of the healthy person, the benevolent mien of the kind and affectionate, the beauty of the beautiful woman, the sloping posture, lowered tonus, and hopeless expression of the depressed person, the style of handwriting, walking, smiling, dancing. . . . These are non-purposive. They have no aim and no goal. They were not elaborated for the sake of need gratification. [21, p. 262]

Another classification: real, sham, and pseudo traits. Traits have been divided into real, sham, and pseudo "qualities of personality" (14). Blending this classification with what has previously been said, traits can be further classified as follows: "real" traits are expressive or coping traits which resist situations, even critical ones, to a maximum. A person who has the expressive trait of stupidity acts stupidly in almost all situations. Real coping traits also exhibit a remarkable consistency. Captain Eddie Rickenbacker has been quoted as saying that he will fight like a wildcat when "they" nail down his pine box. He is a man whose steel-hard courage, from boyhood to gray-haired maturity, has not only welcomed but has also sought situations to put it to a continuous test.

Real coping traits are central to the self-conception. Personalities differ, however, in the degree to which one or a few such traits make up that core. One or a few real coping traits in some personalities are more resistive to critical situations than are those of other personalities.

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Only a few men in history have embodied completely in their personalities one or a few real coping traits. The ordinary run of mankind compromise with the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, and it is for this reason that personalities like that of Christ and Rickenbacker—which represent polar opposites of cosmical self-abnegation and Promethean defiance of fate—are frequently worshiped by the same people and, curiously enough, for much the same reason; both are "strong" personalities.

Real expressive traits never change through social interaction. Real coping traits change only through critical situations. "Sham" and "pseudo" traits are coping traits that are more closely controlled by the looking-glass self than are real ones. Sham traits appear, in part, as a result of meeting the different expectations of others in different social relationships. They are similar to what we have previously called latent traits. So-called sham traits merely stand intermediate between real and pseudo traits. They are less fixed and rigid than real traits, more so than pseudo traits.



FIG. 8. Social situations permeate and determine the appearance of some traits more easily than others.

Pseudo traits are deliberately adopted to manipulate or impress others, and are therefore almost divorced from the essential self. The self in this instance is acutely aware that it wears a mask. One example is the false-hearty laugh plus phony handclasp of the salesman whose expressed purpose is friendship but whose private purpose is to sell his line of goods. Another is the virtuous cast of household characters who entertain the minister at dinner. As personality moves from real to pseudo traits, it shows greater flexibility in adapting to given situations and others' expectations.

Personality (as if) Situation-determined

Practically all situations are given to the infant and small child, that is, situations are defined for them by powerful adults who take little heed of their will. That is why situational analysis has proved most useful in studies of personality at these age levels. The infant and small child are faced by a series of situations which demand a maximum of conformity and in which others' expectations tend to be rigid.

At later stages in life we are also faced by given situations, when we

acquire a new status and are assigned a new role, such as the adolescent freshman in high school and the young adult on the job. Initial responses in later given situations also tend to be only the approved ones, the ones presented to the self in the expectations of others. But the adult—even the child, to a lesser extent—in time becomes familiar with the given situation, begins to test it out to see what elements of assumed roles can be imposed upon it.

Within the confines of a given situation, the growing child or adult has a narrow or wide latitude for creativity. To a lesser or greater degree, the individual creates, within the given situation, further situations to which he will in turn react. The result of his action either is planned or remains unforeseen. As an example of the former, the adolescent in school deliberately misbehaves in order to be expelled so that he can go to work; his output exceeds that of his fellows so that he creates a situation favorable to his advancement. As an example of the latter, the child rejects one parent as a love object, and the resulting estrangement between his parents leads them to the divorce court.

The admission of the creative element in social situations (what is created is of course the result of choices made within the total configuration of person in social environment; all behavior is caused) requires a further consideration of personality traits. It is not enough to study mere reaction and response. Why does a person go about creating at least some situations to which he will in turn react? Because of what he objectively *is* at any given moment in time (11).

On the other hand, personality traits do change to some extent in time. What is most symptomatic of change in personality is a critical situation, a new situation that severely challenges or damages the previous self-conception. But it is rarely the critical situation as it might be assessed by the observer which determines personality change. More often it is the assessment of the person under observation which does so.

While child behavior, much more than adult behavior, is composed of reactions to given situations, children in many cases are better able to absorb traumatic shocks—as assessed by an observer—than are adults. The child's ability to "take it" derives from a self-conception that is less elaborate than that of an adult's, more plastic, with fewer rigid expectations of self and surrounding world, except within the intimate circle of the family.

London children were repeatedly bombed during the blitz, some of them even buried in debris. The British government evacuated many of the survivors to private homes or nurseries in the open country. It was noted that the new arrivals at one nursery showed little excitement or disturbance. They slept and ate normally and played with whatever toys were available. The blitz was a vague and emotionally detached mem-

ory. But those who had lost or who were separated from their parents became severely maladjusted. The threat of absent parents was real in their limited experience; war was not (10). Again, children react to physical punishment in different ways, depending upon the extent to which they identify with the punishing parent and their need for that parent's love. The analysis of a situation which ignores differences in personality is like the stage of a concert hall, with chairs and instruments in place but no musicians.

Personality as Dynamic Unity

"The personality is a dynamic, changing, moving, and emerging phenomenon, not a static thing" (7, p. 141). The personality is more than situational responses and itemized traits. The personality is a dynamic unity in action, partly expressive and partly coping, striving, and self-aggrandizing. Human motivation is so complex, and real and latent traits appear and subside in action so readily, that any mere recounting of traits which does not take into account identifications, beliefs, goals, status groupings, and, most important, self-conception provides but a shadow outline—perhaps accurate enough, but revealing little.

Traits do not appear in overt behavior twenty-four hours a day. They are not fixed and eternal inner entities which absolutely govern behavior any more than outer situations do. What does for the most part rule personality is the self-conception, the focal point of all personality determinants. The adult personality approaches the world around it with habitual expectations of self and others. It takes a more or less consistent view of itself and the surrounding environment. It strives to achieve within limitations of self-incorporated moral norms, and within limitations of appearance, ability, and statuses. It strives also, and most persistently, to stabilize and aggrandize its self-conception. Through striving activity, traits or habitual reaction patterns emerge, at least those which are nonexpressive. But these traits cannot be added up to an arithmetic sum of personality; one comes to the fore, others recede, or two or more shade into one another at any given moment in time as the self assesses the total dynamic and shifting scene in which it, to itself, takes the principal part. "The personality is a dynamic, changing, moving, and emerging phenomenon."

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CHAPTER 9 *Personality Stability and Conflict*

> And for those also, the veterans
> Of another kind of war,
> Who say "No thanks" to the cocktails, who say "No thanks.
> Well, yes, give me Coca-Cola" with the trained smile,
> Those who hid the bottles so cleverly in the trunk,
> Who bribed the attendant, who promised to be good,
> Who woke in the dirty bed in the unknown town.
> They are cured, now, very much cured.
> They are tanned and fine. Their eyes are their only scars.
>
> —STEPHEN VINCENT BENÉT

The human personality strives for unity, for wholeness, for balance—to stabilize the self within itself and with the outer world, starting with the circle of intimate associates and extending to the entire universe. This purpose is never entirely accomplished. There is no personality which is perfectly stabilized in both its inner and its outer aspects.

SOME DEFINITIONS AND WARNINGS

Adjustment and Integration

Personality stability is not synonymous with adjustment. As the latter term is commonly used, it refers to a mechanical relationship between the inner and the outer, with primary stress placed upon the outer. Adjustment is hardly distinguishable from social conformity; it is a moral judgment, which in our society connotes middle-class respectability.

Thus the man who marries and remains married, raises a family, is well thought of, holds his job, "gets ahead," pays his debts, belongs to a church and several other organizations and meets his civic obligations—such a man is usually considered to be adjusted. But many such men "lead lives of quiet desperation." They may be torn by unfulfilled desires and bitterly, albeit secretly, resent their lot. It may be true that *most* men who are adjusted are also stable, but the assumption that the relationship always holds, under all circumstances, is another expression of the erroneous belief that self and social are always perfectly attuned. Beggars are hardly "adjusted," but the personalities of some beggars are more stable than those of some wealthy businessmen who serve as church deacons.

Nor is personality stability synonymous with integration. The con-

cept of integration places emphasis upon the inner to the utter disregard of the outer. To the extent that a person achieves self-consistency in thought and deed he is integrated, but he may now or in the future be liable to severe conflict if that self-consistency is challenged by the outer world.

The psychotic who believes that he is President of the United States may be integrated, because in all his waking hours he acts out the role of President. Affairs of state occupy his mind and tongue, he orders mythical subordinates about, calls his mythical Cabinet together, issues orders to his mythical generals. His demeanor is dignified and he wraps himself in the aura of power and responsibility. But, after all, he is *not* the President, and he may be subject to violent seizures when some chance word or gesture intrudes brute reality into his private universe. The integrated personality is stabilized, then, only when the self-conception is supported by objective experience in the outer world.

Neurosis and Psychosis

The term "neurosis" has almost as many specific meanings as the number of people who employ it. It has, nevertheless, a common core of meaning. It refers to a self-conception which is so damaged, so beset by cross-purposes and contradictory goals, that any action, forward or backward, is painful. The neurotic personality is so loaded with guilt and anxiety that it cannot determine what its desires are. To some extent all personalities are in conflict, but only when conflict reaches the state of self-paralysis does the term neurosis properly apply.

In the parlance of the layman, the psychotic is "crazy." The experts make no such simple distinction between sane and insane. But however the psychoses may be defined and classified, they lie outside the present subject of discussion—personality stability and conflict. Neurosis is a point on the extreme upper range of personality conflict, but there is no proof that psychosis is an extreme manifestation of neurosis in the same way that neurosis is an extreme manifestation of personality conflict. Psychosis is very probably a separate phenomenon. The fact that many psychiatrists, with the evidence at hand, are in a position to insist that severe bodily malfunctioning always accompanies psychosis lends some basis to this claim. No one has been able to make a like insistence about neurosis. Further, the neurotic person strives, however unsuccessfully, to live in the "real" world of common meanings recognized by his associates, while the psychotic lives outside of it.

Is Personality Conflict on the Increase?

A great deal of available *presumptive* evidence supports the widely held opinion that personality conflict is on the increase in the modern world. But the opinion remains an opinion. It cannot be proved because

comparative data are lacking. There is no way to find out how many people—and to what degree—suffered personality conflict ten, fifty, a hundred years ago. Indeed, only crude estimates can be made about the present situation, and any estimate is likely to contain a large margin of error.

"More" people contract appendicitis today than fifty years ago—simply because appendicitis can now be correctly diagnosed. It is not only that more has been learned in recent years about personality disorders but also that much more interest is shown in them. Popular magazines, even newspapers, now print many articles on "mental health," problems of child development, and how to be happy though lacking this, that, and the other advantage. In other words, much of the *apparent* increase in personality conflict may result from greater knowledge and interest.

Official War Department statistics show that neurosis was a much more prevalent "cause" for rejection and discharge from the armed forces in World War II than in World War I. It is likely that there was some real increase in neurosis, but it probably was not so great as the statistics at their face value would indicate. The armed forces exercised greater care in its detection in World War II, and psychiatrists were utilized to a much greater extent than they had been in World War I.

STABILITY: THE CONTINUITY OF LIFE EXPERIENCE

The most important source of personality stability is a continuity of life experience. Stability is achieved when the self is acceptable to itself, when it moves with assurance from one experience to the next, from one group to another, from one age level to another, with a feeling of satisfaction at where it has been and where it is going. Personality stability can withstand shock and disappointment so long as the risk of these is known in advance and the self is prepared to meet such a contingency.

Stable personalities are capable of absorbing frustrations which would appear, to an outside observer, to be self-disruptive. Stability is thus in large measure an inner phenomenon. Every personality, however, has its breaking point, and no personality is completely insulated from critical situations which might impinge upon it from the outside. Personality stability is a balanced inner unity which is preserved so long as the self is spared from critical situations of long duration. A stable personality might be able to withstand a temporary and fortuitous accident or deflation of self-importance and yet disintegrate in a concentration camp. A stable personality might absorb financial reverses or even loss of a job but suffer severe conflict during a ten-year period of alternating unemployment and military service. Once established, personality stability can resist discontinuous experience. On the other hand, the achieve-

ment of personality stability requires a long period of continuous life experience, and stability can be broken if later discontinuity is too severe.

Time and the Self

At any given moment in time a stable personality has a gratifying self-conception; it has goals, on the one hand, and roles, on the other, that do not contradict one another. All three elements of personality change, in time, but as easy and continuous transpositions. For example, the stable personality of an adolescent girl easily accompanies changes in her family role—from daughter to wife and mother. As personal experience, however, this change is more seeming than actual. The girl has come to regard family life as proper and inevitable. She has closely identified with her mother and has probably accepted her as a model. In fantasy, imagination, and play she has projected into the future her role behavior as wife and mother. In other words, the stable personality is prepared for, and for the most part achieves, later goals and roles that have been projected from the past.

The personality simultaneously inhabits past, present, and future. It views what it is in terms of what it has been, and it projects what it hopes to be into the future. In viewing the past, the mature, stable personality finds no more than a narrow gap between aspiration and achievement. In viewing the future, a continuation of that experience is foreseen. It is when the present discloses a wide gap between projected hope and accomplishment, a gap that the future shows no sign of narrowing, that the personality is liable to conflict.

Perhaps a concrete illustration will serve to make the above statement clearer. Doc was the young leader of a street-corner gang in the slum of a large Eastern city (14). Like his companions, as a small boy he had made the code of toughness and physical dominance part of his self-conception. He had had feelings of inadequacy and inferiority, however, because his withered arm could not be reconciled with or made acceptable to his self-conception. But he was physically strong, and in a classic example of overcompensation he made himself a locally famous fist fighter. His feelings of inferiority and inadequacy disappeared, because his projected role and goal were achieved.

Naturally enough, at *this* present he projected into the future a continuation of the gang-leader role. But young adult leaders in the slum base their leadership not so much upon physical dominance as upon free spending and political "pull." The depression of the thirties left Doc jobless, and some of his former inferiors now became leaders in his stead. The forced revision of already achieved role and goal, and the frustration of his projected role and goal, led to a nervous breakdown and severe neurotic symptoms.

Frustration Tolerance

The stable personality has another attribute, which has been termed "frustration tolerance." The fond dreams of childhood, dreams of scaled heights and tumultuous public acclaim, rarely take solid form in adulthood. Perhaps very few ever become the person they would like to be. Wide or narrow, the gap between aspiration and achievement is never totally bridged. One clinical psychologist has hazarded the guess that no one marries the mate he really wants. Modern America, with a cultural emphasis upon individual success that is unique in history, forces some degree of disquiet upon the majority of her population.

The stable personality, however, holds no unceasing debate over what he really wants or would really like to become. He accepts what he has and who he is and strives to improve both only within the outermost boundary of his own limitations. He might *really*—possibly deep in the inner recesses of the self, perhaps only at the subconscious level—want to be a captain of industry or cut a swath through the beauties of Hollywood. But, if he must, he actually and happily lives with his prosaic wife and cultivates his garden. He does not, like the neurotic, question his every motive and activity and achievement.

The stable personality is not necessarily one who neither strives for nor reaches success. The stable personality can also be a public lion, a movie star, or a world-famous statesman, provided his aspirations, too, remain within reach of his actual and potential accomplishments. Neither is it necessary that the stable personality be perfectly adjusted. The contradictory demands placed upon people even in much simpler societies than our own make perfect adjustment anywhere only hypothetically possible. The stable personality can be dissatisfied from time to time, can strive and fail, can experience conscious frustration. He need not exhibit the nice, quiet conformity to which so many of the "mental hygienists" would like to "adjust" the entire population. But whether he cultivates his garden, runs a railroad, organizes opposition, fails or succeeds in any specific enterprise, the gap between aspiration and achievement remains narrow. To say essentially the same thing, he maintains a fair continuity of gratifying self-conceptions and consistent roles and goals. Where the cultural setting makes this continuity particularly difficult, the incidence of personality conflict is assumed to be high.

One particular frustration, however, is the common lot of mankind, regardless of cultural setting. That is aging, a process both physiological and social. The individual has different statuses, different rights and duties, and different social relations as he moves from one age level to another. The stable personality maintains its essential self while accepting the modifications appropriate to each new age status. A goal of sexual adventure, for example, is socially inappropriate in the old man

or woman. Psychological and physiological aging often get out of gear, however, with the consequent threat of insecurity. It has been remarked that it is both humiliating and painfully frustrating to continue to be attracted to the opposite sex when one has ceased to be attractive. Possibly the most difficult lesson to learn is simply to be one's age.

The stable personality has the ability to tolerate, more or less successfully, frustrations of this kind—to submit to an irreducible adult authority as a child; to wield authority as an adult; to relinquish much authority as an elder. Roles, goals, and conception of self are modified by the dramatic rise and fall of physiological function. At the same time, cohesion and unity remain, for in memory one is now what one has been throughout one's life.

CONFLICT: THE DISCONTINUITY OF LIFE EXPERIENCE

There would be small point in defining personality conflict, which is simply the obverse of stability, already defined at some length. Nevertheless, it is necessary to repeat one statement made above: in the final analysis, personality stability or conflict is an individual experience. Every society contains both stable personalities and those that are not. On the other hand, some societies appear to contain a much higher proportion of people who are at odds with themselves and their world than do others, so that an examination of sociological factors should throw light on the *probability* of personality stability or conflict.

If, for the moment, the often repeated charge that modern American society engenders a great deal of personality conflict is accepted, how would this condition be explained? The most popular explanation, at least by itself, appears inadequate. It has been claimed that the sheer complexity of modern America—its hustle, bustle, noise, and confusion, its many and diverse status groupings, and its many and diverse values systems—is the direct cause of personality conflict on an almost epidemic scale. This hypothesis deserves consideration, although some extremely simple societies appear to contain a larger proportion of neurotics than does modern America, a fact which lends caution to the hypothesis.

Conflict among Preliterates

Cultures engender personality conflict by imposing roles, goals, and self-conceptions which are inconsistent and thus self-defeating upon various categories of persons—most commonly, according to age and sex. Most often the inconsistency is found in a time sequence: at a later stage in life history, roles to be enacted and goals to be striven for contradict earlier roles and goals. Less frequently, two goals or two roles which are supposed to be fulfilled *at the same time* are contradictory. Examples

of how these two types of inconsistencies operate within different cultures are cited below.*

The Ojibwa Indians of southeastern Ontario (sources: 6 and 7). While very young, the Ojibwa boy is surrounded by near and dear parents and siblings, but his dependent and secure role is short-lived. He soon learns that only the role of successful hunter and warrior—a highly individualized, solitary pattern among the Ojibwa—will bring the respect and adulation of others. His culture offers him no other approved role. Unlike the neighboring Dakota Sioux, there is no berdache camp to which he can go, where the timorous deviant finds a secondary but real appreciation in the peaceful role of craftsman. The Ojibwa male is faced by collective as well as individual stress. The "Ojibwa ethos" is saturated with anxiety, which has a realistic base in recurrent periods of starvation. Similar harsh conditions among the Eskimos to the north strengthen community bonds, however, and they are not so damaging to self-security for, unlike the Ojibwa, the Eskimos share available supplies of food during periods of economic depression.

The adult Ojibwa male, whether faced by individual or by collective stress, cannot gratify a self-conception through cooperation with other males, since only the individualized hunter who "exerts power over people for his private ends" is highly regarded. But achievement of this goal penalizes him, for he becomes more vulnerable instead of secure. The boy is trained not to rely upon the "weak and competing humans about him," but to rely instead upon the aid of supernatural beings. Attainment of supernatural power (proved by success as hunter and warrior) forces the respect of others, but they fear him and leave him alone. Other hunters, jealous of his power, direct *their* supernatural powers against him.

The constant pressure to achieve a goal that is self-defeating leads to "severe anxiety neuroses" on a large scale, to "melancholia, violence, and obsessive cannibalism"—all subsumed under the Ojibwa term *windigo*. This is the most savage goal-frustration experience imaginable. The position of the Ojibwa adult male is analogous to that of a rat in the laboratory situation described by A. H. Maslow (9). A rat will not inevitably break down when it is deprived of food for twenty-four hours, for a situation in which the animal must give up something must be distinguished from one in which it must give up nothing; it is the necessity of making a self-defeating *choice* which is the clue to extreme goal conflict. When a rat is both hungry and thirsty and is made to *choose* between food and water, he experiences more threat than if he were forced to endure both deprivations. Similarly, the adult Ojibwa male must sacrifice one of his two supreme goals, security and prestige.

* What follows is largely adapted from a previous paper by the present writer, 5.

The Hopi of northeastern Arizona (sources: 2, 12, and 13). Personality conflict is common among the Hopi, but it is apparently not so severe as among the Ojibwa. What culturally induced stress does exist comes from two sources—that which is indigenous to the Hopi culture and that which results from training in the government boarding schools.

Later childhood experience within the home is somewhat discontinuous with that of early experience. Maternal care is indulgent, weaning is late, and there is no early and severe bowel training, oral frustration, or masturbation taboos. But after "the first few years of pampered childhood," the child is required to accept a considerable responsibility in cooperative labor. When boys are initiated into the kachina society, they learn that the kachinas (ancestral gods) are not real gods but masked human representatives. So the double burden of waning indulgence and waxing disenchantment is said to cause much psychic distress (2).

Hopi descent is unilateral, through the female line. Girls are more prized than boys in this matrilineal system, and they have a more stable position and greater security throughout their lives. Throughout her life, the female is surrounded by a closely knit and powerful group of female relatives, while the male, at the age of four or five, must break away for the more hazardous male world outside the household. With the male's adulthood-initiation ceremony he must *suddenly* become a man, assume adult responsibilities, eschew all quarreling—demands which are imposed more slowly upon the female.

Impulse expression that is allowed free play in earliest childhood is later frustrated and limited, for both sexes. Boys, however, exhibit more personality conflict than girls. The girl is consistently trained from earliest childhood for the ultimate role of clan mother. While she has less freedom outside the household than her brother, she is not particularly concerned about it, and she is not subjected to so many contradictory experiences:

> The responsibilities and tasks which, for the Hopi boy, are only limiting duties and hard work without much fun, are those which he has to perform at home to help his mother—hauling water and chopping wood. . . . At the same time he observes, and feels, at home, the more or less firmly established authoritative position of his mother, and his father's peripheral significance. He also hears that his sister and not he himself will become the real head of the clan. Thus, while away from home he feels himself as an important and useful assistant to his father and the whole family, while back at his mother's house he has to become the obedient little boy again. And in fact this would not be so unpleasant, considering the warm security of food and bed and the affection given him by his mother, other relatives and friends, if the different position of the males and the females were not so noticeable in the home at-

mosphere. This may explain why we find in boys the vague anxiety of bewilderment which the girls show less frequently. [12, p. 114]

The white man's intervention has fostered antagonism and dependence and has lessened self-confidence, security, and pride. In the boarding schools, the personal dignity of children is "systematically offended"—clothes burned, hair cut without permission of the sheared, and names summarily changed. There is an important sex difference, however, for the boarding school disrupts the continuity of male life experience more than female. The boy must sacrifice the adult status he acquired in the initiation ceremonies, must sacrifice his achieved goal of independent action, and must return again to the role of small, obedient child. At the same time, the boarding-school experience encourages him to feel independent of tribal customs, an attitude that is challenged when he returns to the tribe.

Taking all of these circumstances into account, why are personality conflicts on the average *less* serious among the Hopi than among the Ojibwa? The main axes of Hopi life are the household and the religious ceremonial system. While the former is dominated by the women, the latter is the sole province of the men. Everyone is initiated, and learns the secrets of the masks, but only males may take an active part in the kachinas religious rituals. From earliest childhood, boys are enabled to *project* into the future a secure and highly prized role. Although contradictory demands are made of the boy during childhood, these arise out of a clash between situations within and outside the household, not between situations within the household. Mother and siblings remain a warm, nurturing unit. Discontinuity of male life experience, then, is on the average not too severe.

Finally, there is the peculiar function of the supernatural and of witchcraft in Hopi society. Although Hopi children have many "unreal" fears, these are transferred into the supernatural realm, "a fact which implicitly will accentuate (on the one side) the security represented by the mother's lap, the familiar house, the laws and rules, and finally the group itself" (12, p. 105). Further, the intensive cooperation demanded by Hopi culture has led them to decry exceptional ability and any attempt to outdo one's associates. The supernatural fears transmitted to them in order to enforce this pattern have given rise to widespread fear of, and accusations of, witchcraft (13). Accusing others of witchcraft serves to funnel off aggressions that have no other sanctioned outlet; in some measure such accusations compensate for the repression of forbidden goal seeking.

It has been stated that each society tends to "emphasize one segment of the potential raw stuff of human behavior" and to repress others. But each society compensates for what it represses, either in occasional cere-

monial allowance of the forbidden behavior or in "the satisfaction of emotional-impulsive drives that receive no overt expression in the generalized culture pattern" (1, p. 121). It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the same amount of compensation can be found in all societies. The Hopi culture, for example, handles this problem much more effectively than does the Ojibwa.

Some Tentative Conclusions

In the first place, the role, goal, and self-conception scheme can be applied regardless of cultural dissimilarities. Any two cultures can be compared in terms of the extent to which culturally defined roles and goals, appropriate for status groupings such as age and sex, are consistent or inconsistent at any given moment in time and the extent to which these cultural definitions, at different moments in time, are consistent or inconsistent.

Second, the distinction between roles and goals as projection and as achievement or frustration is an important one. Projection is a personal seeking of assurance that a desirable future state will ensue. Where achievement is likely, more present frustration can be borne without serious damage to the self-conception—a state of affairs noted in Hopi. A secure projection of roles and goals is a form of compensation for one's present condition. Different cultures develop varying kinds and degrees of compensations for roles and goals which concurrently conflict as well, and in such cases offset much personality conflict that would logically be expected to ensue.

Third, the extent to which the child identifies with those who transmit the culture to him is also important. The tentative hypothesis is offered that with less identification, more inconsistency between earlier and later and more failure to attain desired roles and goals can be assimilated, precisely because inconsistency or failure elicits less guilt. When one closely identifies with another, the image of that other is taken into the self along with that other's expectations of one's self. Close identification eases the process of socialization; particularly, it facilitates the acceptance of many *present* frustrations. But if later experience grossly contradicts those rooted expectations, then that earlier close identification may in part cause a later personality conflict.

In a discussion of child training in a modern Polish industrial community, it was found that a combination of "bad parental care" and failure to identify with parents resulted in very little personality conflict (3 and 4). An army psychiatrist has claimed that the Okinawan child—firmly emancipated from his mother's influence at the age of four in order to develop independent adult roles and goals early in life—is able to withstand shelling, dirt, hunger, severe physical pain, and infectious disease without becoming neurotic (10). The Okinawan identifies neither

with a mother supposed to protect and ease him from pain nor with the Christian God supposed to deliver him from all evil (11). It is hoped that this explanation of Okinawan stoicism is as accurate as it is ingenious.

PERSONALITY STABILITY AND CONFLICT IN MODERN AMERICA

The method for examining personality stability and conflict in modern America need be no different from that applied to preliterate cultures. Here, as elsewhere, personality stability and conflict do not stem from the abstraction "culture," but from how the experience of that culture impinges upon self-conceptions, roles, and goals.

Cultural Diversity Works Both Ways

Compared with other cultures, and with its own past, modern America is not so much a unified and cohesive way of life as it is a vast collocation of opposing ideologies and conflicting values, whirling in rapid social change. Viewing this state of affairs, some observers have inferred that a steady increase in personality conflict has accompanied it. This point of view should be considered.

Cultural diversity. We are a peace-loving people who have fought a major war on the average of once every twenty-five years since the founding of the Republic. We worship one God of love and humility and another of money, success, and power. We are a people who have made of youthful attractiveness and youthful vigor a national shrine, located in our dimly lit and hushed movie palaces, and we are an aging population. We preach brotherly love and the doctrine of let the best man win in a ruthless competition, and the latter is further contradicted by appeals to the state to rescue us from competition.

We laud chastity and monogamous marriage and a vestige of puritanism makes hard the lot of Hester Prynne's descendants, yet our literature, art, advertising, and much of our conversation prickle with the forbidden joys of the flesh. With some justification Americans have been called the most sex-obsessed people ever to inhabit the planet.

We forge a binding obligation on all to strive for grand prizes of wealth and power which only a very few can ever attain. We are a nation whose majority welcome increasing intervention by government in the national economy and we hate socialism. We have made a fetish of equalitarian treatment and we systematically deny equality to several minorities. We officially proclaim the abolition of social classes and yet vie for class status with might and main.

Ideology clashes with ideology, religion with religion, group with group, region with region. More than this, modern America is made up of semi-isolated worlds of experience. The sharecropper and the banker

may live within half a dozen miles of each other, yet never meet, never know any people known to the other or enter any group of which the other is a member. They may dress differently, talk differently, project different goals, and share few beliefs. Their homes, families, and occupations may differ almost as much as those of the Hopi differ from those of the Ojibwa. Aside from a common use of English, they share a few key abstract sentiments more than they share a common life. The diversity, complexity, piling of contrast upon inconsistency, on the one hand, and the relative isolation of group from group and grouping from grouping, on the other, accompany an ever widening gap in consensus.

Cultural diversity not an inevitable cause of personality conflict. Any manifestation of cultural diversity becomes a source of personality conflict only when, directly or indirectly, the self—its conception, roles, and goals—is threatened by that manifestation. In the case of a contradiction between two abstract sentiments or between creed and deed, personality conflict may result provided there are both intellectual awareness and emotional alarm. These two conditions are filled more often by intellectuals than by any other social type, as was pointed out in the previous chapter. A large number, perhaps the majority, are unaware of or simply ignore much of the booming, buzzing confusion which is the present. Several public-opinion polls have clearly shown that the majority live out their lives within the restricted area of the personally known and the personally experienced. They must have identified for them most places, names, and issues before they can express an "opinion." They are affected by events and ideologies operating at a distance, but these become consciously "real" only when the normal course of personal activity is disrupted or appears likely to be disrupted by them.

Given certain attendant conditions, a simple culture can engender more personality conflict than a complex and diverse one. The Ojibwa culture is one of the simplest on record, and it is also perhaps the most conflict ridden. The reason for this is the absence of any avenue of escape from the *few* possible choices of roles and goals. Ojibwa males have no alternative but to strive to become successful warriors and hunters, and "success" is invariably self-defeating. The very diversity of modern American culture—however much insecurity may inhere in its lack of consensus —does create many choices among roles and goals, many opportunities to attain a stable personality.

If one is dissatisfied with his present community, within greater or lesser limits he can move to another place. He can change jobs, leave one group to enter another, seek out a circle of people whose values will support his own. He can compete or retire from competition; there is pressure to compete, but it is not nearly so uncompromising as the like stress in Oijbwa. He may choose Bach or bop, be theist or agnostic, scholar or baseball fan or both. It is true that the multiplicity of choices

available engenders some personality conflict, but only when choice making threatens the self-conception.

The likelihood that choice making will threaten the self-conception is lessened for the majority by virtue of their actively participating in only a small part of the diverse total culture. Abstractly conceived, "modern woman" has a choice between wife-and-mother role and career-woman role, whereas her grandmother had no such choice. For some modern women, this choice is a focal point of conflict, especially if they vacillate between the advantages of both, and remain unsatisfied with either, because they are then denied the advantages of the other.

But very few vacillate. Most women project marriage and family as the supreme goal of their lives, and they achieve it. Work prior to marriage is regarded as a mere interim. Work after marriage is a means of augmenting family income. The career woman may remain outside the span of the personally known, may remain a shadow figure encountered only in print. Most young girls do not project such a role. For the most part, only girls in "emancipated" urban circles do so.

A greater proportion of women marry today than they did in the past, when there was no choice, hypothetical or real, between career and husband. The modern woman who (either voluntarily or involuntarily) does not marry *can* escape the fate of the old-fashioned old maid, who was forced to live with married relatives and accept their charity. The modern bachelor girl, who has the opportunity of gainful employment and thus the opportunity of independence, is very probably more self-secure than her Victorian old-maid counterpart. This is one homely illustration of how cultural diversity can protect from, as well as cause, personality conflict.

A Factor of Personality Conflict: Culture

The diversity and inherent contradictions of modern American culture *are* productive of personality conflict, in so far as these are personally experienced as a threat to the self, its conception, its roles, and its goals.

Social values: opposed moral norms. Many social values in modern American culture are inconsistent and contradictory, and this is particularly true of abstract sentiments. Nevertheless, as was noted in the previous chapter, conflicts of this kind are more likely to become personality conflicts for intellectuals than for any other social type. Contradictions between moral norms are much more likely to foster personality conflict, for these, unlike abstract sentiments, contain directions to act in specific ways.

A person may find that two of his groups, two of his status groupings, or one of his groups and one of his status groupings offer him contradictory directions to act. The multitude of diverse groups and groupings in modern America affords an enormous *potential* for personality

conflict, when personal loyalties and identifications clash. Thus the industrial worker receives different directions from his management and from his union; these may or may not be a source of conflict in any particular instance, depending upon the extent to which close identification is maintained with both. The moral norms of loyalty and financial aid within the family and ethnic group are often compromised by the striving for individual success. He often travels fastest who travels alone. In America, individual success usually requires, or at least is often accompanied by, new friends, new clubs and associations, a new residence, and a more or less wholesale forsaking of past social relationships. But the self occupies past as well as present. Successful people frequently express regret at having left old acquaintances behind. Pressure to cut self off from family is particularly strong when a person's social-class position is now or in prospect of being several rungs higher than that of his parents and siblings. He can't take them with him. But his success will prove a mixed blessing to the extent that he still identifies with them.

A consistent view of self is not easy to maintain when—as is especially characteristic of our large cities—sexual, ethical, family, and community standards glaringly contrast as one moves from one group to another. Upon accepting an invitation to dinner at the home of a new acquaintance, one must often be prepared either to bow one's head while grace is said or to accept a cocktail and laugh at a smutty story. A psychic readiness to adapt to ever changing situations is not for some a source of personality conflict, but for others it constitutes a painful compromise with self.

Social values: moral norms and individualized values. The whole range of traditional moral norms is under continuous attack by individualized (nonsocial) values. In family, religious, and community life—in all social relationships outside the economic and political realms—the area of choice making continues to expand. As we have already observed, choice making can rid self of an intolerable situation and thus foster personality stability. But, at the same time, choice making causes personality conflict when one is simultaneously impelled to uphold a traditional moral norm and tempted to "live one's own life."

Living one's own life means a renunciation of traditional obligation and responsibility. For a college freshman woman, it might mean choosing sexual experimentation and flouting parental-instilled respect for chastity. After marriage it might mean party behavior which leaves the children unsupervised or, in extreme cases, divorce. It might mean sending one's aged parents to an institution rather than taking them into one's home. It might mean denial of one's religious faith to secure a better job or an advantageous marriage, or changing one's name to avoid a minority-group identification which has become irksome.

It does mean, for many modern Americans, a continuous debate about

what am *I* getting out of this or that relationship. Frequent dissatisfaction leads to frequent violation of the moral norms which govern social relationships. Provided one's self were totally unidentified with the traditional obligation, personality conflict would probably not ensue. But this rarely occurs. Further, the majority of American adults have absorbed certain moral norms, as children, which are not supported by later experience. Traditional moral norms are being so swiftly undermined at the present time that a young twenty-year-old finds that his contemporaries live by a radically different code than the one his parents transmitted to him when he was, say, five years old.

Not only does much personality conflict stem from failure to uphold moral norms but also from failure to transgress them! Much personality conflict arises when one wishes in retrospect that one had done what one wanted to do rather than what one ought to have done. Many parents come to feel that they "have sacrificed too much for the children." One clinical psychologist has expressed "amazement" at the number of aging males who express bitter regret at having failed to take advantage of many sexual opportunities in their youth. He also reports that many men who drop out of college in order to "lead a normal life," *i.e.*, marry and raise a family, later come to resent wife and children as a block to career advancement. In many cases, severe personality conflict arises when a projected goal that has been suppressed later reawakens—when it is too late to achieve it. The statement that "under conditions of social disorganization, willingness and ability to experiment in matters of social relationships is one attribute of the well-adjusted personality" (8, p. 135) is particularly applicable to those who have *already* experienced severe conflict because earlier and later roles and goals have clashed.

Social values and social structure. There are many inconsistencies between social structure and social values which are often transformed into personality conflicts. One example is the growing practice in industry of getting rid of employees who are forty-five or more years of age; these same men are expected, and expect themselves, to be self-supporting. Again, the frequent crisis of international war holds in suspension the careers of millions of young men, careers they have been trained to regard as a social obligation as well as a personal fulfillment. The retained concept of individual responsibility in a world increasingly organized along bureaucratic lines, where hidden decisions made at a distance can ruin the individual career, is another example. According to prevailing ideology, higher education is dedicated to fostering mature, independent judgment, yet the decade-by-decade lengthened period of school attendance lengthens the period of dependence upon parents. As a final example, we hold to a general "accent on youth" and a general goal of romantic love while our population rapidly ages.

A Factor of Personality Conflict: Status Groupings

The cultural inconsistencies cited above may or may not become matters of personality conflict. Probability is increased when the following status groupings are taken into account: age, sex, social class, occupation, education, ethnic group, race, religion, and spatial location (regional, rural or urban placement, and the like). Cultural inconsistencies impinge in different kind and varying degree accordingly.

Age and religion. Obviously, a culture with an "accent on youth" flatters the young self-conception as much as it makes the old insecure. At the present time the Catholic religion, much better than the Protestant, prepares its votaries to accept the responsibilities of marriage and family life by more arbitrarily restricting the desire to "live one's own life." Yet at that point where frustration tolerance is broken, a Catholic couple may experience more personality conflict than a Protestant, since the choice of divorce is not granted to them.

Sex, education, and social class. The inconsistency between expected independence in thought and deed and the factual dependence in extended school attendance is transmitted differently according to sex. The continuation of passive-dependent roles from childhood into young adulthood is a source of greater conflict to men than to women. This conflict is experienced more acutely by middle-class youngsters than by those in the upper and lower classes. Because they do not have to compete nearly so much, upper-class late adolescents may continue in habits of dependence upon others without endangering their careers. Late adolescents of the lower class are "spared" this conflict altogether—they have already left school to go to work.

Occupation. Wars and depressions may become critical situations for people in some occupations, while they aid people in other occupations to achieve their roles and goals. Depressions in America have hit farmers the hardest, while they have been personally advantageous to people with fixed incomes because prices drop and the value of the dollar increases; depressions have also expanded opportunities in social work and civil service. In time of war, most civilians in uniform are occupationally frustrated while professional soldiers are upgraded. Some businessmen profit during war or depression; others are wiped out.

In the "normal" course of events, many professors regard themselves as underpaid and unappreciated in a society which offers more verbal than financial support to intellectual advancement. Artists frequently rail against a "Philistine society" that neither understands nor heeds their creations. Clergymen today address a more secular congregation than did the Victorian minister, and they are consequently denied much of the satisfaction that derives from vigorous spiritual leadership—yet most clergymen, today as yesterday, early in their careers project such a role.

Waitresses, barbers, bellhops, and servants live in a society which "looks down on" personal service. There is no American tradition comparable to that of the British gentleman's gentleman.

Ethnic group and race. Because of rapid social change, the mutual expectations of parents and their children tend to be out of gear in modern America. The wedge driven between the generations is especially obvious within certain minorities. Parents attempt to hold an Old World dominance over children who have learned different standards in the world outside the home. But even a residue of identification with one's parents, siblings, and ethnic group will cause guilt feelings and a damaged self-conception if, as so often happens, a member of the second generation finds that his minority status is held in low esteem, and he attempts to renounce his own background in order to gain a more complete acceptance from Americans of longer lineage than his own.

Of all minority Americans, Negroes are faced by the most naked contrast between Christian and democratic ideology on the one hand and systematic denial and suppression on the other. Other status groupings of social class, education, and spatial location, however, either mitigate or exaggerate this cultural inconsistency in personality conflict. It is the Northern, urban, educated, upper-class Negro who suffers maximum frustration. He is motivated to become independent, successful, and respected and to wield power—and very little of these can he achieve. On the other hand, the uneducated Southern Negro sharecropper is relatively "protected" from severe personality conflict. He does not project roles and goals of such magnitude, and he is therefore relatively content with his racial status. Also, lower-class Negroes anywhere are spared much of the heavy burden of respectability, the organic dissatisfaction from doing right and the guilt from doing wrong.

Spatial location. A so-called backward region like the Southeast preserves a greater continuity with the past and a simpler way of life than, say, the Pacific Coast. Urban communities, in comparison with rural, expand the range of modern cultural inconsistency and contrast. It is in megalopolis that choices and alternatives abound, accompanied by a feverish stimulation to achieve. It is here that standards of luxury and hedonism and the experience of rootlessness are common. Each is measured more by what he has than by what he is, and each is surrounded by thousands who have more. It is here that individual fate is more obviously controlled by depersonalized organization, and aspiration and frustration soar together.

A Factor of Personality Conflict: Self-conception, Roles, and Goals

Self and personality are received and acquired within organized groups, not status groupings. Any group represents status groupings, either singly or in combination. A child is socialized in his family of

orientation, a family that has a spatial location and that represents a certain social class, ethnic group, race, and religion, all of which the child shares. To some extent his parents' age and education and his father's occupation also determine how the culture shall be transmitted to him.



FIG. 9. A sociological schema of personality stability and conflict.

At the same time, the experience of two children in two different families is never duplicated exactly, even though their families combine the same status groupings. The unique personalities of those who transmit the culture to the child play a large part. For example, a pronounced emphasis upon success is universal throughout the middle class. But one middle-class father may be especially ambitious for his son, and for essentially private and perhaps even unacknowledged reasons. He may be embittered because he failed to achieve his own projected goal of physician. Now, for obscure reasons of his own, with subtle hint and flattery or with threat and recrimination, he encourages and browbeats his son to become a physician. If his son *wants* to become a medical doctor, if he has ability and intelligence, if he is willing to defer getting married for a longer period of time than most of his companions, and if, further-

more, his father has the money to send him to medical school and to help him to furnish an office—then his son in all probability will not suffer personality conflict, at least on the score of his father's direction of his career. But if any or all of these qualifications are not met in the boy's experience, he probably will suffer personality conflict, provided, of course, that he closely identifies with his father and makes his father's expectations of him his own expectations of himself.

The point now being made is that personality conflict finally arises in social interaction, in group relationships. From the more general to the more particular, the factors making for personality conflict move from culture to status groupings, from status groupings to social interaction, and from social interaction to self. Apparently, in all times and places, there are some who achieve stability and others who fail, regardless of how high or low the general rate of personality conflict may be. Unfortunately for the sciences of human behavior, the "same" situations are not always interpreted or experienced in the same way, so that their effects are not uniform. On the other hand, inner and outer are not in a state of haphazard concurrence. In our brief review of two preliterate cultures, we saw that with variant outer pressures and supports the *rate* of personality conflict varies from one culture to another.

The complexity and diversity of modern American culture makes virtually impossible a comparison with other cultures on this score. Nevertheless, it does appear *probable* that the majority of observers of this problem are correct, and that ours is a culture productive of much personality conflict.

In order to clarify the various relationships described, the previous discussion is presented in Fig. 9.

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PART TWO

Numbers, Distribution, and Organization of People

CHAPTER 10 *Population*

> The human race is passing through a time of crisis, and that crisis exists, so to speak, on two levels—an upper level of political and economic crisis, and a lower level of demographic and ecological crisis. That which is discussed at international conferences and in the newspapers is the upper-level crisis—the crisis whose immediate causes are the economic breakdown due to the war and the struggle for power between national groups possessing, or about to possess, the means of mass extermination. Of the low-level crisis, the crisis in population and world resources, hardly anything is heard in the press, on the radio or at the more important international conferences. The Big Threes and Big Fours do not deign to discuss it; leaving the matter to the subaltern and unauthoritative delegations to conferences on health or food, they devote their entire energies to the question of who shall bully whom. And yet the low-level crisis is at least as serious as the crisis in the political and economic field.
>
> —ALDOUS HUXLEY

The study of population deals with numbers of people and their distribution in space. Numbers and their distribution are the result of three factors—birth rate, death rate, and migration; in other words, over a period of time, the number of people who are born, the number who die, and the number who move in and out of the area under investigation.

Unfortunately, only gross estimates of these three factors are available, for the past everywhere, and even for the present in most areas of the world. The United States has a better record than any other nation for gathering population statistics, but our first national census was taken in 1790, the first count of immigrants from Europe was made in 1820, and only since 1929 have birth and death figures been gathered throughout the country. In such heavily populated areas as China and India there has never been an actual count of numbers, not to mention the gathering of birth, death, and migration statistics.

Demographers (professional students of population) have, however, been able to make reasonably accurate estimates of total numbers in large areas where no census has ever been made. By taking an actual count in different parts of the total area, by comparing these with other parts that are similar in such life conditions as number of tilled acres and level of technology, by keeping track of reported famines and epidemics, export and import statistics, and the like, demographers are able to arrive at a total estimate.

WORLD POPULATION

Whatever the margin of error may be in estimates of the world's population—and for estimates of what it was a hundred years ago that margin must be very large—the evidence is certain enough that the population of the world has been increasing in recent decades much faster than at any time in the past. The world total has doubled in the last fifty years, placing a strain not only on man's capacity to feed himself but also on the balance of economic and military power throughout the world. The world is now faced by a problem of numbers that may, in future perspective, turn out to have been the most critical problem in the experience of man.

Historical Growth

The problem of numbers is new. Throughout most of history, man, like all other species, has bowed before the so-called law of stationary population: when numbers exceed a limited food supply, the death toll holds reproductive capacity in check. There were only some 500 million people throughout the world in the seventeenth century, and that number had probably remained fairly constant for thousands of years. Thereafter, with gradually increasing effectiveness, the law of stationary population was abrogated. In the past 150 years, "the net increase of human beings has been much more than during the whole previous million years" (12, p. 63).

The following crude estimates are accurate enough for purposes of comparison. The world's population in 1650 was 545 million, in 1800 it was 906 million, in 1900 it was 1,608 million, and in 1933 it was 2,057 million (8, p. 42). By 1951 the estimated world total scaled over 2,370 million people. The geographic and population size of the various world areas are compared in Fig. 10. However, unless the world total of 545 million people in 1650 is kept in mind, today's numbers have little meaning. Why has the world's population multiplied more than four times in the past three hundred years?

Industrialization. The upsurge of world population—which started about the middle of the seventeenth century—was led by the European, and until recently the European continued to hold the lead. It is true that Asiatics now comprise over half of the world's population. Between 1650 and 1933, however, Asia's population increased but three and one-half times (from 330 to 1,121 million), while Europe's population increased five times (from 100 to 519 million). The Europeans in North America increased from a negligible number to about 130 million in that same period.

It was in Europe that modern industrial civilization was born, only later to be transported to the rest of the world. Slow but steady improvements in agricultural practices and technology released workers for industry, commerce, and the professions. The industrial revolution increased output and, through improvements in transportation, more efficiently distributed goods and services. Trade with the New World, a virgin land of natural resources, produced still more wealth. Northern Europe exploited the tremendous reservoir of food and raw materials that was North America, and created there an expanding market for manufactured products. Without this two-way traffic, both the industrial revolution and the increase of population would doubtless have been slower to develop and more modest in scope. It was in Europe, then, that in a short span of time more food, more goods, and more wealth were made available to man than ever before in history.

The death rate fell. These new material assets "caused" numbers to increase only in so far as they affected birth and death rates. An expansion of goods and services requires more workers, and an expansion of food production permits more mouths to be fed, so that—at least in the earlier stages of the industrial cycle—the birth rate rises. Nevertheless, throughout history, a prolonged rise in the birth rate has always been preceded by a lowering of the death rate. Europe of two centuries ago was no exception. Mortality declined before the birth rate began to climb.

European mortality declined for two reasons. First, through advances in agricultural and industrial production and improvements in transportation, the ancient enemies of man—famine, undernourishment, and susceptibility to disease—were cheated of much of their ancient toll. Second, advances in medical practice and knowledge and in public sanitation—especially with regard to pure-water supply and hygienic disposal of sewage—likewise played important parts. The fall of the death rate was swift. In mid-eighteenth-century France, for example, only 484 children out of 1,000 survived to their tenth birthday, while in 1920 to 1923, 855 did.

The fall of the death rate was doubtless associated with changes in political ideology. At least the steady increase in life expectancy made *possible* the democratic ideal that the life and death of the individual, his welfare and his importance, are "self-evident."

Growth and the standard of living. Throughout most of human history, females have given birth to a large number of children, most of whom have died at birth or in infancy. The habit of frequent conception was carried over into the early stage of the industrial cycle in Western Europe and in America—as it is today in Russia and China in their early stage of industrialization—with the result that a spurt in numbers accompanied the falling death rate.


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

FIG. 10. Geographic and population size of the various world areas compared. (Redrawn from *The New York Times.*)

During the early stage of industrialization the average standard of living remains low. As the volume of food, goods, and services steadily increases, however, the average standard of living apparently motivates adults either to maintain or to augment it, so that in a later stage of industrialization there is a widespread voluntary reduction of births. Where a high standard of living prevails, children are taken off the labor market, and instead of economic assets they become liabilities.

The decline of the birth rate in the West has not, however, resulted in a decrease of numbers. The decline of the birth rate has only lessened the rate of increase of numbers. Total numbers continue to increase because the lower birth rate is maintained by a large population with a low death rate. To illustrate, let us suppose that there are now 1,000 women in the reproductive period of life for every 500 such women at some period in the past and that each of the 1,000 gives birth to *two* children, of which 2,000 children 1,800 survive. On the other hand, let us suppose that each of the 500 women in the past gave birth to *four* children, of which 2,000 children only 1,500 survived. Then a lower birth rate would still be associated with an increase of numbers.

Is the Increase of Numbers a Clear and Present Danger?

Demographers have been engaged in a great debate during the past few years. Does the continued increase in world population spell ultimate disaster for the human race? Will population continue to increase, bringing universal war, famine, depletion of natural resources, and the end of civilization as we know it?

The negative answer. Those who refuse to take alarm make two claims. First, numbers continue to increase, but at a decreasing rate of increase. Second, available natural resources and man's engineering ability will suffice to feed much larger numbers than the world now holds.

From 1790 to 1880, with the exception of the Civil War period, the population of the United States increased 30 per cent in every decade. Between 1920 and 1930, however, the increase was only 16.1 per cent. Between 1930 and 1940, the increase was only 7.2 per cent—an all-time low. A similar decrease in the rate of increase has appeared throughout Western Europe. Urbanism, industrialism, literacy, science, medicine, a rising standard of living—all of these in combination with an *earlier* expansion of numbers motivate a people to practice birth control in order to maintain their technology, the state of the arts, and their high standard of living. These achievements of modern society require a surplus of wealth, a surplus that in turn requires a reduction of fertility.

If any people utilized science, technology, and economic organization merely to increase fertility and to feed the maximum number of people possible, then their science, technology, and economic organization

would deteriorate, and that people would be forced to the margin of subsistence.

To keep people from starving, economy after economy would have to be introduced. For a while the country might gain in efficiency, but eventually it would begin to lose it, primarily because real cultural advance would stop. The medical profession, for example, would soon begin to go downhill, because it would be without the aid of research in pure science and thorough education of its members, and yet would have an increasingly heavy task on its hands as the standard of nourishment went lower and the number of pregnancies grew. Agricultural progress would be halted for the same reasons. In the end, then, the very economies that were enforced to secure adequate nourishment would curtail advances in food production. The death rate would begin to rise and would eventually reach the point where it balanced the high fertility. The population would then be "adjusted" to its environment, but the adjustment would be that of subsistence, not that of advanced civilization. Furthermore, the actual population would probably be less than that supported formerly at the higher standard of living. [10, p. 9]

Even though such nations as Russia and China are now increasing in population much faster than the West, by their adoption of Western technology and science they will cease at some future time to expand at their present rate.

Not only does the rate of population increase inevitably decrease with industrialization, but also the world's known resources and man's ingenuity could support even larger numbers than at present. Much of the planet remains uninhabited and uncultivated. Presently used and unused land could be made to yield more abundant fruits. It has been claimed for the Union of South Africa that despite "erosion, drought, and other hazards" it could adequately support 30 million people, "two-thirds more than she supports today, on today's standard and in the light of today's knowledge of production of foodstuffs" (15, pp. 256–266).

Offhand one might think that the amount of land could be readily calculated. But man is always making land, practically speaking, by the irrigation of deserts, the drainage of swamps, and even more important, by the discovery of means whereby a given area can produce many times what it formerly did. Man is, thus, really creating land through his agricultural and engineering arts. At this time, there seems to be no discernible limit to which man may go in this extension of the resources which can be derived from the earth's surface. [9, pp. 346–347]

Recent proposals for river development in the United States show a vast opportunity for "making" land and serving it with hydroelectric power. Improved flood control would prevent much further wastage of the soil, and new irrigation dams would make productive a great deal

of present waste land. The Grand Coulee Dam is designed to open up a million acres for cultivation within a few years.

The affirmative answer. The above arguments fail to convince those demographers who believe that the number of people in the world constitutes a clear and present danger. A decreasing rate of increase in population is deceptive, they say, because with the large population base of today even a decreased rate of increase produces more people than did a higher rate of increase at any time in the past. Thus the 7.2 per cent increase between 1930 and 1940 in this country meant a far greater *numerical* increase than did the 35.6 per cent increase between 1850 and 1860. Further, the falling birth rate in the West has been arrested in the past decade, and this may not be a temporary change. But whether that change is temporary or not, the population of the West along with that of the rest of the world will continue to expand.

The other argument, that much land remains uncultivated and that technology and agricultural arts enable man to wrest ever more wealth from the earth, is claimed to be a specious one. First, the amount of *arable* land is limited and man is approaching those limits. "There is, in all the world, not enough available untilled land to fill the net increase of 50,000 stomachs every day" (17, p. 79). Second, and far more important, intensive soil cultivation, mining of minerals, cutting of timber, and drilling for oil add nothing to the available or potential supply of any of these. They are, in fact, being rapidly wasted and depleted. It is only one foot of topsoil, in arable areas, that can serve to raise man's food, and it is being mined by intensive use, blown away by wind, and washed away by water.

Dr. Hugh H. Bennett, chief of the United States Conservation Service, said in 1939, "In the short life of this country we have essentially destroyed 282,000,000 acres of land, crop and range land. Erosion is destructively active on 775,000,000 additional acres. About 100,000,000 acres of crop land, much of it representing the best crop land we have, is finished in this country. We cannot restore it" (quoted in 1, p. 20). Nevertheless, the political crisis continues to take precedence over the population crisis. In the spring of 1951, the Department of Agriculture was encouraging Western farmers to plow land to grow wheat for export to our allies—land that the Department of Agriculture had previously advised be left to grass, to form a "brake" to wind and water erosion.

The Secretary of the Interior wrote in his *Annual Report* for 1945:

> Only nine of the major minerals remain in our known domestic reserves in great enough quantity of usable grade to last 100 years or more. Our known usable reserves of 22 essential minerals have dwindled to a 35-year supply, or less . . . it behooves us to learn the true meaning of our meagre supply, which is not that we will be weak in a hundred years, but that we are relatively weak now. [Quoted in 1, p. 18]

If the position of the United States in diminishing resources and increasing numbers of people is bad, that of Europe can only be described as desperate. Exclusive of Russia, Europe contains almost twice as many people as the entire North American continent, and only one-fifth as much area. Europe's cropland has been tilled for many more centuries. It has been "mined" much closer to the point of exhaustion than has ours.

The United States contains only 6 per cent of the world's population. The ratio of available arable land, unmined minerals, and untapped coal and oil reserves to that population is much more favorable than anywhere else in the world. A combination of lowering the birth rate and utilizing technology to renew the vitality of the topsoil would avert disaster, we are informed (17, p. 265). If we take heed, we may escape the doom of the rest of the world: "If our population stays within reasonable limits and if technology can make great progress in conserving our top soil, in breeding more productive plants and animals, and in finding ample substitutes for mineral resources, America may escape the fate of Asia toward which Europe is moving" (1, p. 19).

It is probable that the situation in this country is not so serious as the alarmists aver; what is equally probable is that it merits more careful attention than it has heretofore received. In any event, the subject is hardly one for dogmatic assertion. There are two unknowns. What will future changes in birth and death rates be? Provided numbers continue to increase indefinitely, will the peculiarly American genius for handling the physical environment and for solving technical problems outwit a not-so-maternal Mother Nature?

Numbers and Power Politics

Although the Europeans have increased their numbers at a faster rate than the Asiatics have, in recent centuries, they no longer do so. With even a modest introduction of Western technology and medical science, the death rate in Asia is being arrested, and only a slight decrease in the death rate will be enough to mushroom Asia's population. Perhaps of more immediate importance in a discussion of power politics, Russia, exclusive of her present satellites, contained 170 million people in 1940, a number that it has been estimated will increase to some 250 million by 1970. Even with the present upturn of the birth rate in the United States, France, and England, time—on this score, at least—is with the Russians.

The industrial cycle and age distribution. Numbers alone do not determine how many will be available to work in the factories and to man the guns. Military potential also depends upon the age distribution of those numbers. Nations like France and Great Britain have so-called old populations—a relatively small proportion of children and a

large proportion of people over forty. These nations are far advanced on the industrial cycle, which means that a century of mechanization, urbanism, efficient medical practices, and high standard of living has lowered their birth rate as well as their death rate. A low death rate reflects an increase in life expectancy and thus in the number and proportion of old people; a low birth rate reflects a decrease in the number and proportion of children who will move into the reproductive period of life, roughly fifteen to forty-four years of age.

The United States entered its own industrial cycle at a later time, so that the United States is now at the approximate middle of it. The United States has, then, a "mature" population. Compared with France and England on the one hand and Russia on the other, the United States presents a balance between young and old in its population.

Russia stands at the beginning of her industrial cycle, and thus has a "young" population. The death rate, although coming under control through expanded production and improved medical practices, is still high enough to keep down the number of old people. The birth rate remains high. Not only by historical necessity but also through deliberate state policy, the standard of living is low. At the beginning of her industrial cycle, Russia's population is still concentrated in rural areas. A rural population, with a low standard of living, has in all times and places had a high birth rate. Russia's high birth rate, combined with even a modest lowering of the death rate, expands and creates a potential for further expansion of numbers in the lower age brackets—numbers that will reproduce and work and serve in the army.

Approximately 50 per cent of the Russian population, it has been estimated, are now under twenty years of age. In 1950, 34.2 per cent of the United States' population—and a much smaller percentage of the population in France and England—were in that age category. In other words, Russian numbers expand at a faster rate than those of the United States and her allies, and at the same time a much higher proportion of those larger Russian numbers lie within the age range of military and industrial efficiency. Fortunately, at least from our own point of view, age distribution alone does not determine military potential any more than do numbers alone.

Other factors. Nations which are far advanced on the industrial cycle have fewer and older citizens, but their per capita rate of production, for goods of all kinds, is much higher. The people who work may be fewer and older, but they have a greater accumulation of capital, knowledge, techniques, and, by no means least important, wealth. They cannot put so many young men in the field, but they can equip them better. Modern war has by no means eliminated the infantryman, but modern war increasingly weights the balance against numbers in uniform in favor of size, number, and efficiency of engines of destruction. Even

without atomic and bacteriological weapons, with only "old-fashioned" artillery, tanks, and bombers, the outnumbered UN troops in Korea—as this is written in early 1952—continue to hold at bay tremendous numbers of Chinese troops armed with rifles and mortars.



FIG. 11. The great antagonists compared in the sinews of war. Russian figures for 1950, as correlated in Washington, give this comparison with United States production. (Redrawn from *Newsweek*.)

History may yet record that the numbers in Russia and China tipped the balance against those two nations in the tragic years of the middle of the twentieth century. Their teeming populations—it may be written—required that too many work on farms, and thus the rapid industrialization which would have been necessary to impose Communist domination was hindered. A warring nation must still feed its people, and be-

yond a perhaps indeterminate number, the more there are to feed the more the industrial potential—critical in modern warfare—is reduced.

Moreover—and although the change will doubtless prove to be a temporary rather than a permanent trend—the birth rate in Western Europe and the United States has in the last decade begun to climb. This is true not only of the crude birth rate (the number of children born per 1,000 persons in a given population for a given period of time) but also of the net reproductive rate.° The net reproductive rate for the United States in the period 1935 to 1939 was 978; in 1946, it was 1,359. For France in 1935 it was 870; in 1947 it was 1,310. For England and Wales in 1933 it was 747; in 1946 it was 1,111.

Granted the unlikely, that the birth rates of these three countries should either continue upward or level off at the latest figures cited above, numbers in these countries would still lag far behind those of Russia and China. Even so, the picture that has sometimes been drawn, of "hordes from the East" smashing an effete Western civilization that had failed to match their reproductive powers, is probably inaccurate for the reason that numbers alone do not determine military effectiveness.

POPULATION OF THE UNITED STATES

Numbers of People

The 1950 census count for the population of the United States was 150,697,361. The 1940 count was 131,669,275. The *numerical* gain of 19 million was the largest ever made in any decade of the country's history. The *proportional* gain, however, was only 14.5 per cent, a lower rate of growth than in any preceding decade except 1930 to 1940 (6). Between 1850 and 1900, for example, the population increased almost 25 per cent, on the average, from one decade to the next. The numerical gain from 1940 to 1950 was the largest ever made in part because the country contained more people—specifically, more mothers—at the starting point, 1940, than it ever had previously.

Sex ratio. For every 100 females in 1940, there were 100.7 males; for every 100 females in 1950, there were 98.1 males. The 1950 census was the first to show an excess of females over males. War losses of males were only a contributory factor, for the national population had been moving toward an excess of females since about 1910. Prior to that

° Stated simply, a "net reproductive rate" of 1,000 means that each generation would just replace itself. A rate above 1,000 implies a potentially growing population; a rate below 1,000, a potentially declining population.

Stated technically, this rate measures how many daughters a group of 1,000 newly born female infants would bear during the course of their lives if subject at each year of age to prevailing age specific rates of birth and death. A rate of 1,000, in other words, means that 1,000 newborn females will give birth to a sufficient number of girl babies so that 1,000 of the latter will survive through their own reproductive period.

approximate date, the United States contained a considerable excess of males for two reasons—a high death rate for women in the child-bearing period of life and a heavy migration from Europe that always brought more men than women. Both of these factors have now been virtually eliminated. The death rate for men, which is now higher than that for women at each year of age, will probably give us an even greater excess of females in the future.



FIG. 12. Proportion of population by age groupings in the United States, 1900 to 1950.

Age distribution. The median age—the age at which exactly half of the population is older, half younger—was 29.0 in 1940 and 30.1 in 1950. The median age has been steadily climbing for decades. Figure 12 shows that the older age groupings have been claiming larger proportions of the population over the past fifty years. The one exception is the 10.8 per cent under five years for 1950, a rise over the 1930 proportion in that age grouping which represents the boom in the baby crop of the last few years. For reasons discussed later in this chapter, however, the trend toward an aging population will doubtless not be more than temporarily slowed because of it.

Since immigrants are on the average younger than the receiving country's population, a secondary cause of the trend toward an aging population has been the virtual cessation of immigration. The primary cause has been a continued drop in the death rate. A low death rate means that large numbers of the old are surviving, because any death rate, high or low, takes its chief toll at the upper end of the age range.

Our high standard of living and constantly improving diet and medical care mean a longer life for most than heretofore; thus the median age of the population is likely to continue to rise.



FIG. 13. Birth and death rates per thousand total population in the United States, 1870 to 1950.

The steady drop in the death rate can be expressed in another way, as lengthening life expectancy. Life expectancy at birth in the years 1879 to 1889 was 34 years, in 1930 it was 57.4 years, and in 1950 life expectancy at birth was 68.2 years. Better diet, improved medical science and sanitation, and a rise in the standard of living have meant savings in every age grouping.



FIG. 14. Modern Americans live longer. (Redrawn from *Newsweek*.)

PERCENT OF CHANGE IN TOTAL POPULATION, BY STATES: 1940 TO 1950
(BASED ON PRELIMINARY COUNTS OF POPULATION)



FIG. 15.

The Regional Trend

The numerical gain in the years 1940 to 1950 was not evenly distributed throughout the country. The Northeast made the smallest gain, the West the largest. The percentage increases for the various regions were as follows: Northeast (9.2); North Central (10.2); South (12.6); and West (39.8).

The gains made in Western population should not be allowed to obscure the fact that the West, the largest region, contained in 1950 only about 13 per cent of the total population. The smallest region, the Northeast, contained over 26 per cent; the North Central region and the South each contained about 30 per cent of the total.

But the trend is unmistakably westward. California's population increased over 50 per cent in that ten-year period. Differences in regional birth rates are relatively slight, and they will not explain recent shifts of population. In 1948, for example, the national birth rate was 24.2, while that of the Pacific states was 22.9. The shift westward has resulted mainly from migration. There has been, in recent years, a net migratory movement westward. Figure 15 shows the percentage gain or loss in population made by each state.

Expanding agricultural enterprise has attracted some to the West; the lure of scenic surroundings and a salubrious climate have enticed others, mostly retired oldsters. Yet the West has a smaller proportion of farmers than the United States as a whole and about the same proportion of residents gainfully employed. The main reason for the new trek west is the expansion of a new industrial and commercial "frontier." During the forties, the labor force in the West increased by almost 40 per cent, that of the nation only 13 per cent. In 1949 the median income of families was $3,435 in the West, $3,362 in the Northeast, $3,257 in the North Central region, and $2,248 in the South. The median income of families and "unrelated individuals" was $2,907 in the West, $2,924 in the Northeast, $2,841 in the North Central region, and $1,940 in the South.

Table 2 Income in 1949 of Families and Unrelated Individuals for the United States and Regions *

INCOME RANGE	PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION FOR THOSE REPORTING INCOME				
	United States	*Northeast*	*North Central*	*South*	*West*
Under $500	8.6	7.0	7.0	12.4	6.3
$500–$2,499	30.9	23.5	27.4	42.7	25.6
$2,500–$4,999	40.7	46.1	44.4	31.3	44.7
$5,000–$9,999	16.9	19.6	18.4	11.6	20.2
$10,000 and over	2.9	3.8	2.8	2.0	3.4

* Adapted from 7, Table 9, p. 36.

The Differential Birth Rate

Throughout history, apparently, the birth rate of the countryside has been higher than that of the city. The birth rate of the lower classes has likewise been higher than that of the upper classes. Yet recently there has been accumulating evidence—in both Western Europe and the United States—that, while these differences have persisted, the gap in each case has been narrowing.

Rural-urban. The crude birth rate increased in urban areas from 17.1 in 1940 to 24.7 in 1948; in rural areas, from 19.1 to 23.9. In that period, in other words, the urban birth rate increased 44.4, the rural 25.1 per cent (13, p. 13). The urban birth rate has continued to increase faster than the rural rate.

The crude birth rate, however, is an unsatisfactory measure. It is true that more children are being born to every 1,000 city dwellers than to every 1,000 people in the country. But the "real" birth rate is still much higher in the country. What the crude birth rate hides is the fact that the city continues to attract young migrants, in the reproductive period of life, from the countryside. The city contains a much higher *proportion* of people in the reproductive period. If this fact is discounted, a somewhat different picture emerges. In 1949, for every 1,000 women aged fifteen to forty-nine in the United States there were—"standardized for age of woman"—550 children under five years of age. For every 1,000 urban women, 500; rural-nonfarm, 599; and rural-farm, 658 (5, adapted from Table 5, p. 9).

Nevertheless, the trend is unmistakable. The gap is narrowing. This is made clearly apparent in Table 3.

Table 3 Net Reproduction Rates in the United States, Urban and Rural: for Indicated Periods °

Residence	*1905–1910*	*1935–1940*	*1944–1949*	*Per cent of increase 1944–1949 over 1935–1940*
United States	1,336	978	1,385	41.6
Urban	937	726	1,186	63.4
Rural-nonfarm	1,499	1,150	1,628	41.6
Rural-farm	2,022	1,661	1,806	8.7

° Adapted in part from 3, Table 34, p. 26.

Social class. So far as such indices as education and occupation represent social class, they disclose that the gap in fertility between upper and lower classes has also been narrowing in recent years. For every 1,000 women in the United States fifteen to forty-nine years old, there were—"standardized for age of woman"—465 children under five in 1940

and 526 in 1947—a gain of 13 per cent. For those women who had less than five years of grade school, there were 634 children under five in 1940 and 718 in 1947—a gain of 13 per cent. But for women who had completed four or more years of college, there were 333 children under five in 1940 and 446 in 1947—a gain of 34 per cent (2, Table 5, p. 6).

The gap may be narrowing, but the well educated still fail to replace themselves. The same is true of the wealthy. In April, 1949, for every 1,000 women in the population—"standardized for age of woman"—there were 550 children under five years of age. But there were 677 such children in the under-$1,000-family-income bracket, and 407 in the $5,000-and-over bracket (5, adapted from Table 6, p. 10).

Another index, occupation of husband, shows that not only have upper-class people recently become relatively more fertile, but so also have white-collar in comparison with blue-collar employees.

Table 4 Number of Own Children under 5 Years Old per 1,000 Men 20 to 59 Years Old, Married and Wife Present, by Major Occupation Groupings, Standardized for Age of Man: Civilian Population, April, 1947 and 1949 °

Occupation of man	*Total number children under 5 in 1949 in thousands*	*Children under 5 per 1,000 men*		*Percentage change children under 5 per 1,000 men*
		1947	*1949*	
Professional and semi-professional workers	956	465	459	− 1.3
Farmers and farm managers	1,496	549	559	+ 1.8
Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm	1,627	412	464	+12.6
Clerical and kindred workers	835	389	413	+ 6.2
Salesmen	695	395	453	+14.7
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	2,598	454	462	+ 1.8
Operatives and kindred workers	3,197	469	482	+ 2.8
Farm laborers and foremen	435	634	740	+16.7
Laborers, except farm and mine	1,022	502	522	+ 4.0
Service workers	522	406	424	+ 4.4

° Adapted from 5, Table 9, p. 11.

By way of summary, the countryside and the lower classes continue to have a higher rate of fertility than the city and the upper classes. The difference in both cases, however, is now less than it was a few years ago. Whether this is only a temporary shift instead of a reversal of the long-term trend cannot yet be definitely settled—the change is too recent for dogmatic assertion. Most demographers are of

the opinion that present relatively high urban and upper-class rates of fertility will not be indefinitely maintained.

A Problem of Numbers for the United States?

Provided we do have a problem of numbers, there appears to be considerable confusion as to what exactly it is—too many or too few? Some politicians and social reformers view the decreasing rate of increase with horror. They point to the long-term trend toward smaller families and an increasing proportion of older people, to an ultimate time when fewer workers will be available to man the industrial plants and the army. They regard an expanding population as essential to national strength and prosperity, even to survival.

Some civil servants, demographers, and social reformers warn that even a decreasing rate of increase will suffice to deplete our natural resources, that ultimately a lowered standard of living and national retrogression will set in unless we drastically reduce the birth rate, unless we propagandize the further knowledge and use of contraceptive devices.

At least part of the answer would be forthcoming if we were able to predict with any accuracy what our future numbers will be. But projections of population increase—statements of future numbers based upon varying estimates of future birth and death rates—made even as recently as 1949 have proved to be in considerable error.

This is the big question: is the birth rate likely to remain high enough to increase our population by about 20 million in future decades as it did in the period 1940 to 1950? One researcher has marshaled all the favorable evidence for his conclusion that the population of the United States will reach an approximate 250 million by the year 2000 (11). On the other hand, one of our foremost authorities has vigorously rebutted any such claim.

> The gist of the matter is that a part of the increase in birth rates since 1940 must be regarded as making up for births postponed before that time. Another part must be attributed to the large number of marriages to be expected when the babies born in the years of high birth rates following World War I came of marriageable age. They began to reach this age in 1940. Still another part must be attributed to the psychological atmosphere engendered by the war which encouraged the marriage of men in military service and the having of a baby without delay.
>
> A careful study of the birth statistics for the past few years by age of mother and order of birth shows that first and second births to young mothers account for a very large part of the total increase. This makes it very doubtful whether the increase in the crude birth rate which has attracted so much attention represents any increase in the average number of children in a family. It may be a mere redistribution of births during the lifetime of a

considerable number of the women who have married since about 1938 or 1939. If the latter is the case, then the relatively high birth rates since 1940 represent only a temporary upward bulge, and not a change in this trend. The writer believes this is the case; hence he believes that the slower growth of our population will soon be resumed and that within two or three decades we shall not have even a crude natural increase [the number by which births exceed deaths], while the net reproduction rate may again fall below 100 within a few years. (In 1940 this rate was only about 96.) Thus the declining birth rate is not only leading to a slow growth of population but may quite soon result in an actual decline in numbers if immigration is kept at a low level. [16, pp. 65–66]

In the main, this quotation is representative of prevailing opinion among demographers. Those who quarrel with its point of view argue that the increase in first and second births has been accompanied by an increase in third and fourth births as well. The high marriage rate of recent years, the war, and "a mere redistribution of births during the lifetime of a considerable number of women," in other words, will not suffice—it is argued—to warrant the assumption that the birth rate will again decline. Large families, in brief, are said to be coming back into fashion.

The above prediction has, however, only a superficial plausibility. The *percentage* increase of third and fourth births has risen, but the *numerical* increase of third and fourth births remains small. If we define, for present purposes, the birth rate as the number of children born per 1,000 female population fifteen to forty-four years of age, we get *percentage* comparisons for 1940 and 1948 as shown in Table 5.

Table 5 Percentage Change from 1940 to 1948 in Birth Rates by Race and Birth Order: United States °

Birth order	*White*	*Nonwhite*
Total	+42.2	+46.2
First child	+42.2	+46.1
Second	+62.9	+68.8
Third	+55.1	+53.6
Fourth	+30.9	+37.8
Fifth	+15.2	+31.1
Sixth and seventh	− 5.4	+26.3
Eighth and over	−22.6	+15.5

° Reproduced from 14, Table D, p. 134.

This table appears to indicate the probability of a steady increase in numbers that will in future decades surpass that of 1940 to 1950. There are, however, several qualifications to be noted. The percentage increases for the third and fourth birth orders are based upon relatively small numbers. There were 2,009,352 first and second white birth orders in 1948, but only 441,005 third and 207,701 fourth. The 1948 rate for first

and second white birth orders—according to the definition of birth rate used—was 39.1 and 30.3 respectively but only 15.2 and 7.2 for third and fourth birth orders respectively.

Further, Table 5 compares a later "high" year with an earlier "low" one. Even so, the "higher" rates of 1948 fall far short of those of thirty years before. The fourth white birth-order rate in 1948 was 7.2, but it was 7.6 in 1930 and 10.8 in 1920. The over-all recent increase in the birth rate, then, does appear to have rested mainly upon first and second birth orders.

The birth rate had declined for many years. It could not have continued to do so indefinitely. The recent increase in the birth rate, however, has already leveled off and has started to decline without approaching that of the turn of the century; the crude birth rate in 1900 was 29.8, in 1949 it was 24.0, and in 1950 it was 23.5. Although prediction is hazardous, the following appears to be a reasonable assessment. Many families are presently motivated, and in a position, to have more children than during the great depression of the thirties—but still a *limited* number. The immediate future will probably see a quasi stabilization of fertility above that which was the low point in the historical trend, but not very far above it. Many of the factors which operated to raise fertility during the World War II and postwar periods are already slackening. "In other words, it is still uncertain whether there has been any significant change in the ideal family size or whether the recent rise was primarily an economic and wartime phenomenon" (18, p. 366).

Throughout history, the operation of such forces as a high standard of living, mobility, and urbanism have been associated with personal motivation to limit family size. The means of family limitation—efficient contraceptive devices—are becoming known to and are used by increasing numbers of married couples. In summary, then, there appears small warrant for alarm over the problem of too many people—at least for the United States.

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CHAPTER 11 *The Modern Community Trend*

> Mind *takes form* in the city; and in turn . . . the city records the attitude of a culture and an epoch to the fundamental facts of its existence.
>
> —LEWIS MUMFORD

> Population-wise, the city of the future may be little more than a glorified work-room, railroad station and parking lot—crowded by day, empty and echoing by night. Around the hollow center, circle on concentric circle, would lie the teeming suburbs. Beyond them, only the open farm land and the lonely lights of farm-houses, sprouting television antennas.
>
> —TIME

WHAT IS COMMUNITY?

A community is a cluster of people, living within a narrow territorial radius, who share a common way of life. A community is a *local territorial group.*

In most preliterate societies, community and society are one. In most civilizations, society is made up of separate but intersecting communities which share a *more or less* common social life. At the same time, however, those communities are quasi-independent and are in *some* measure distinguishable in dress, manners, habits, and social codes. In both cases, the community itself is a local territorial *group.*

In modern society, unlike preliterate society and unlike most other civilizations, the local territorial group is ceasing to be the hub of social organization. By modern convention, community and local political unit (village, town, or city) are treated as if they were synonymous. Local political units are used for purposes of classification and designation because often communities, in the classic sense, are not present, *because social organization in modern society is veering away from community, and the local territorial group is steadily losing its identity and therefore its real existence.*

The Near North Side of Chicago does not, any more than the city entire, constitute a community in the technical usage of that term, even though it holds a cluster of people within a narrow geographic radius. What is lacking is a cohesive social participation within that radius. In physical proximity, each section of the Near North Side—the Gold Coast, the Rooming House District, the Slum Lodging Area, Towertown, and the Foreign Slum—lives in social isolation. People from each

section meet those from other sections only as strangers on the street. *Within* each section, "the older organization of the community, based on family ties and local associations, is being replaced by an organization based upon vocational interests and attitudes" (31, p. 241).

As will later become clear, in the modern world common interests and shared ways of life are shifting from local place to large horizontal organizations—industries, labor unions, political parties, professional societies, fraternal orders, nations, and so on—that transcend community. Several other trends have accompanied this major one. Economic life and political life are increasingly controlled and directed by bureaucratic units that have no one specific location. Urbanism and mobility make uprootedness an ever more common experience. Recreation is now something more often brought to individuals by bureaucratic and commercial agencies than it is a common local activity in which kinsmen and neighbors participate. The present loosens the ancient bond between people and local place. The movement away from community is the central theme of this chapter.

HISTORY OF THE COMMUNITY

The phrase "history of the community" may convey the misleading inference that "the community" has changed uniformly in time from one type to another. Such is not the case. There were large, populous cities in the ancient world, and there are small hamlets in the modern world. As a matter of fact, the majority of people in the world today still live under conditions that are more rural than urban. On the other hand, the world-wide *trend* is in the direction of urbanization—the crowding of people into constricted areas, with economic specialization and heterogeneity of social life. This trend is farther advanced in America than anywhere else in the world.

Band

There are two social units "which appear to be as old as the human species and which probably were present even at the sub-human level. [One is the family.] The other of these ancient units was the local group, an aggregation of families and unattached males who habitually lived together" (19, p. 209). Out of the local group grew tribes, cities, and nations. Although the local group has evolved to more complex units from time to time, it has never entirely disappeared. However fractured the local group may have become in modern society, it is now, as always, the foundation, even though often unseen from the mists surrounding the lofty social structure which has been built upon it. When great civilizations crumble, social life settles to that foundation.

The band probably represents the original form of the local group, at least it appears at the lowest level of social organization—that of migratory hunters. A group of males can much more efficiently combine for hunting, defense, and building shelters than can immediate families of man, wife, and children. Some males can range far to hunt and explore, leaving others behind to protect the semipermanent encampment with its property, oldsters, children, and pregnant women.

Village

Not always, but usually, the village has historically risen upon the economic base of settled agriculture. Unlike the band, the agricultural village requires a permanent location and a rudimentary division of labor that includes trade. Like the band, however, the preliterate village approaches community as "ideal type"—the preliterate village is a complete society, more or less isolated and self-sufficient, independent of trade outside but not within the local group, and unified with common attitudes and practices.

In Europe, homes and outbuildings have generally been located within the village and tools and animals housed there. Every morning the farmers and farm laborers have left the village to work their land or tend their flocks in distant fields, and they have returned to the village at the end of the day. Social life has thus been centripetal, focused at the community center. Only in certain parts of the Province of Quebec has this pattern been preserved in the New World.

Throughout most of North America a different pattern was established. It was borrowed from Northern Europe, but was pushed even farther in the New World where land was free, or cheap, in any case abundant. It was a centrifugal social life, with large isolated farms whose residents went to the village to attend church, possibly sent their children there to school, and made periodic visits to buy goods and procure services. The villagers themselves tended to be retired farmers and tradespeople and professionals. The "independence" traditionally associated with the American farmer stems in large measure from this atypical pattern of farm settlement. The American farmer is as free of the intimacy of village and town—where close scrutiny and gossip spin a tight cocoon of social control—as the urbanite. The reasons, however, are different. Privacy is the result of physical isolation and economic independence, in the one case, and of social isolation and anonymity, in the other (30, pp. 213–214).

The social life of the modern American villager approximates community, and so does that of the farmer, to a lesser extent, in the neighborhood of adjoining farms. The neighborhood of small family farms in rural New England still preserves some remnants of ancient community life, with occasional barn raisings and "changing works" in group hay-

ing bringing farmers together in cooperative endeavor. Nevertheless, even here, the movement is *away from* community.

Two modern American villages. In Landaff, New Hampshire, a small isolated farm village of 72 resident families, the farmers now most often "change works" on a cash basis. The older practice of self-sufficient and diversified farming has been reduced to one cash crop, milk. Local farmers are now dependent upon the vagaries of a state-wide market. They are controlled by a Boston milk corporation, whose "outside" managers run the local milk plant; they are also controlled by decrees governing prices, hygienic standards, and marketing restrictions which emanate from the state capital and from Washington.

The young go to the movies and attend dances with others of their own age. They no longer participate in the old informal debates, singing, and spelling bees that once brought the entire village, regardless of age and sex, together. There is more mobility: the young leave the farms to work in large cities, and the recreation and "summer people" industry of northern New England diffuses urban standards of dress, manners, and morals throughout the entire area. We are, of course, dealing with a *range* of behavior, and these farm families still more closely approximate community than do the residents of our large cities. There is relatively little specialization in Landaff, each is known by all, the old habit of visiting crisscrosses the village, and local government continues but little changed in the Town Hall (20).

Mineville, Montana, with a population of 1,410, is a classic example of the village—a local group bound together by kinship, friendship, fraternal, business, and religious ties. Everyone knows everyone else, gossip controls every life; everyone complains about enforced intimacy, and yet the natives say of those who leave, "They always come back." The bane of village life, the personal knowledge of others and the awareness that they have a personal knowledge of you, is also its blessing. The lonely city crowd of socialized atoms, warily circling about one another at the outer periphery of self, is absent here.

Nevertheless, Mineville like Landaff is moving away from community:

> On every hand Mineville is caught in the great web of economic and other standardizing agencies of the state and nation. The dentist, physician, engineer, lawyer, pharmacist, or teacher . . . has graduated from a standard college. . . . State and national educational associations set the standards for the schools; the books of the city and county offices must be passed by a state inspector; farmers have their cattle inspected by a state cattle inspector and display them at a state fair; working conditions are approved by the state . . . And all the while Mineville is exposed to the same national advertising campaigns as are city dwellers—on billboards, in periodicals, in the movies, over the radio. . . . [5, p. 395]

Town

The medieval town was small. It contained generally three to four thousand people. It possessed not only the social characteristics of the modern village, however, but also some of the economic characteristics of the modern city. The primary social characteristic was personal association, in church, guild, and civic responsibilities (23). Rembrandt's painting "The Night Watch" depicts a group of Dutch burghers, with pikes and lanterns, about to enter the night to patrol the streets of their town. They are taking their turn as policemen, these men who are tinkers, merchants, lawyers, weavers, and shoemakers during the day. Like the modern city, on the other hand, the medieval town produced goods and services for a rural hinterland, and it was not dominated by a larger agglomeration of population.

The modern town is not easy to define, since it represents an indeterminate point of transition between village and city. The modern town, unlike the modern village, is large enough to have broken the social unity of community. Like the modern village, however, it is controlled and dominated, in both production and distribution, by some urban center. What distinguishes modern town from *city*, on the other hand, is not so much sheer size of population as it is the criterion of dominance. Thus places of 5,000 population in Kansas (a "rural state"), far removed from large urban centers, places which clearly dominate large rural hinterlands, may be regarded as cities, while some places of 10,000 population in the Northeast, near the outer rim of a metropolitan center, from one point of view at least may be regarded as towns.

City

What are ordinarily termed cities are also quite diverse. They vary in size from a few thousand to several million in population.

> Some function as simple rural service centers while others are large and complex centers of industry, commerce, finance, or government. Some are highly specialized in one activity; others perform many functions. Cities can be alike in size and function and yet be composed of populations which are very unlike in regard to such characteristics as age, sex, nationality, education, or even religious and political affiliation. [6, p. 5]

Many attempts have been made to state the concept "city" statistically. As late as 1940 the Federal Census Bureau defined a city as an incorporated place with 2,500 or more people. But sheer numbers and social characteristics are not related in a standard way. We are told, for example, that Burlington, Vermont, an incorporated place of some 25,000 people, has many "rural" social characteristics (2). For sociological purposes, "a city may be defined as a relatively large, dense, and permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals" (29,

p. 8). The key word is "heterogeneous." The city, then, represents the farthest point on the continuum of community.

Ancient. There is no point in time when cities appeared and before which they did not exist. It was not until the rise of the Mediterranean civilizations, however, that cities of appreciable size were formed. One of the earliest of these was Memphis, "the capital of Egypt under the old Empire, which came to its close about 2500 B.C." (16, p. 17). Others were Tyre, Nineveh, Babylon, and Carthage.

Cities, by themselves, represent an economic and social imbalance. They are not self-sustaining; they are areas of political and economic power and of cultural influence, which must both exploit and render service to a vast hinterland of farms and villages. Cities must attract people and raw materials. They must return finished products and services. In history, these latter have included military protection, art and philosophy, religious organization, and commercialized entertainment.

Whenever it was that cities "originated," they awaited an agricultural surplus, a sufficiently complex technology to exploit that surplus, and the means of transporting goods to and from a rural hinterland. That the first known great cities arose in and around the Mediterranean is not difficult to explain. The rich alluvial valleys of the Nile, Euphrates, and Tigris compensated for an only slightly advanced technology; these valleys produced an agricultural surplus and permitted easy water transportation. The later ancient Greek city-states capitalized upon intra-sea transportation.

As much as any other factor, the impossibility in the ancient world of developing efficient *overland* transportation placed severe limits upon city size and influence. The greatest city of antiquity was Rome, with a population which in largest estimate never exceeded a million. Even with Rome's highly developed maritime commerce and her levying of imperial tribute upon the entire Mediterranean basin, a larger city populace could not have been fed (16, p. 18).

The important distinction between ancient and modern times does not, however, inhere in the relative size of cities but rather in the fact that "urbanized society" did not and could not arise until modern times. The few ancient cities were outposts surrounded by a rural world. On the other hand, in the most advanced areas of the world today—Europe and North America—the *majority* of people are urban dwellers; wherever Western technology and bureaucratic administration have penetrated (they have scarcely failed to do so anywhere), the urban trend speeds ahead.

Modern. The ancient way of life for the bulk of mankind was an unchanging existence within rural village or farm neighborhood. It was unchallenged down to approximately a hundred years ago. The agricultural revolution, which increased per capita farm output and thus re-

leased workers to augment the city's population, was the harbinger of modern urban civilization. That revolution was followed by the industrial revolution, which not only produced wealth but also gradually solved the ancient problem of overland transportation. Improved roads and wheeled vehicles enabled a rapid shuttling of population and a more rapid, cheap, and efficient shuttling of raw materials to the city and of goods and services from the city to the rural hinterland.

Down to the middle of the nineteenth century, the few small American cities were located along the Atlantic seaboard or at the mouth of or along rivers—a mere repetition of ancient necessity. *Urban civilization awaited overland powered transportation.* From approximately 1850 to 1900, the so-called railroad era laid down railway junctions in the basic pattern of American city location that has prevailed to the present time; many of them were entirely freed from waterway connections, but these landlocked cities tended to appear where the new sources of construction and power—iron and coal—were accessible.

The twentieth century has been called the automotive era. The internal-combustion engine in truck and automobile, combined with the new and elastic crisscrossing motor highways, have all but erased the ancient rural-urban dichotomy. Large metropolitan centers are still railway junctions, but with automotive transportation they have been brought closer to smaller cities, towns, and villages in their hinterland. All are now interconnected in an enlarged city complex, a new type of "regional community" (21).

In the urban revolution, new means of transportation were accompanied by new means of administrative organization, such as the joint-stock company and then the corporation. The new type of bureaucratic organization expanded in two dimensions: vertically, in lengthening hierarchies of policy makers, functionaries, and workers; and horizontally, in space. Through horizontal expansion, bureaucratic organization —from underwear manufacture to syndicated gambling—has ceased to be local, even in terms of the city where its central office is located.

The scope of modern bureaucratic organizations in a real sense makes them "free" of specific location. For instance, although the central office of the American Gypsum Company is in New York City, the corporation owns or controls factories, kilns, distributive outlets, and other offices in other localities. The American Gypsum Company is held together with distant telephone conversations, ticker tape, posters, directives, mimeographed statements, and office files which integrate formal operations throughout and even beyond the nation. That corporation is most certainly not *in* New York City in the same sense that the locally owned, locally managed, and independent factory of a few decades ago was *in* Hometown. The tentacular growth of modern bureaucratic organization—industrial, business, and government—is the ultimate mani-

festation of the movement away from community. The so-called metropolitan community has brought large metropolitan center and its hinterland closer together only in the formal economic and physical sense, not in terms of social unity.

THE URBAN TREND IN MODERN AMERICA

In 1790, 5.1 per cent of the American population was urban; in 1940, 56.5 per cent; and in 1950, approximately 59 per cent. From census decade to census decade, this linear trend has continued without interruption.* It is likely to continue to do so, although at a slower pace.

From Country to City

Urban growth. The American city has grown primarily because of migration from rural areas. The city hardly ever replaces itself by natural increase. From ancient times to the present, the city has expanded by attracting population from the countryside. The tempo of migration (movement in space) in modern society, however, is unique in world history.

Ours is an uprooted population of impermanent residence. In April, 1947, approximately 70 million persons were not living in the same house in which they had lived on April 1, 1940. "Some 44 million persons had changed houses within the same county, 13 million had changed counties within the same State, and 12 million had changed their State of residence between 1940 and 1947" (8, p. 1). One out of every five persons in April, 1948, was living in a different house from the one he had lived in a year earlier. "Of the 20 million persons who had moved to a different house, 19 million had moved within a county and 9 million had changed their county of residence" (9, p. 1). The count taken for April, 1949, saw the one-in-five ratio continued (10, p. 1).

These figures serve to illustrate the movement away from community in our society, for a mobile population retains much less social unity than does a stable one. Further, one of the chief net effects of recent internal migration has been the continued movement from rural-farm areas to the city, shown in Fig. 16.

* According to the "new" (1950) census definition, 64.0 per cent of the population is urban. The figure of approximately 59 per cent, cited above, is based upon the "old" census definition of a city as an incorporated place of 2,500 or more population. The new definition follows: "For the 1950 Census, urban territory has been defined to comprise (a) places of 2,500 inhabitants or more incorporated as cities, boroughs, and villages; (b) the densely settled urban fringe, incorporated or unincorporated, around cities of 50,000 or more; and (c) unincorporated places of 2,500 inhabitants or more outside of any urban fringe. The urban territory also includes incorporated towns of 2,500 inhabitants or more except in New England, New York, and Wisconsin, where 'towns' are simply minor civil divisions of counties. All other territory is classified as rural" (12, p. 1).

From 1920 to 1940, there was a net loss of rural-farm population through migration of several hundred thousand in each year—approaching and passing a million in some years—with the exception of 1932, the so-called bottom year of the depression. From 1940 to 1947, the net movement away from the farm exceeded 3 million. But the urban population gained by over 9 million in that period of time. Most of the gain stemmed from the unprecedented rise in urban fertility during the forties. The likelihood that this was a temporary phenomenon was explored in the previous chapter.



FIG. 16. The movement of population continues away from the land.

Occupational shifts. If we view occupational instead of residential changes, we still deal with the same phenomenon—the movement from country to city. About 50 per cent of the nation's total labor force was engaged in agriculture in 1880. This percentage dropped to 19 in 1940 and to 13 in 1950. Ever higher levels of agricultural production have been achieved with improved farm practices and technology. Those released from farm employment have not only, in net effect, gone to the city, but they have also engaged in urban work—sales, clerical, managerial, professional—the white-collar employments, in other words.

The proportion engaged in direct production (blue-collar work) has remained fairly constant in recent decades. The major shift during the same period, from agricultural to white-collar employment, has not abated: from 1944 to 1950, professional and semiprofessional workers increased from 5.8 to 7.2 per cent of the civilian labor force; proprietors, managers, and officials (except farm), 8.1 to 10.4; salespeople, 4.9 to 6.3; and the various blue-collar classifications registered slight proportional losses (13, Table D, p. 4). These two points in time, 1944 and 1950, of course, compare a total-war with a quasi-war economy. If full-scale war once more occurs, we may reasonably expect a proportional

increase of blue-collar workers at the expense of white-collar workers. But an increase in either, at the expense of the other, would mean an increase of urban employment and also of urban residence.

The future. Urban growth in America has been historically associated with three factors: a high birth rate and an accompanying falling death rate; a gigantic tide of immigrants from Europe which, around the turn of the twentieth century, found economic opportunity in the industrial city rather than on the vanished frontier; and internal migration from rural areas, particularly rural-farm areas (17).

Our cities continue to grow, but they do so at a diminishing rate of increase. The reason for this is that all three sources of recruitment are diminishing. The *long-term* trend in the birth rate is downward, and the death rate can go little lower; in fact, with a constantly aging population, it must at some time in the future start to rise. Immigration has dwindled to a trickle and, given our present politico-economic situation, it seems improbable that the flood gates will ever again be lowered. Most important of all, although internal migration from the countryside —the present lone source of urban recruitment—continues, it will soon for two reasons also diminish. First, the long-term falling birth rate, which first appeared in the cities, is rapidly diffusing throughout the city's hinterland. Second, as we have already seen, our rural-farm areas contain a diminishing proportion of the total population. Thus, unless some unforeseen source of recruitment appears, our cities at some time in the near future will likely reach stabilization and then decline in population.

Suburb and Central City

Recent urban growth has occurred in the suburb and not in the central city. The proportionate gain in American central cities, between 1940 and 1950, was less than that for the total population. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to infer that our metropolitan centers are diminishing in importance or that their economic and political power is waning. True, the increasing use of telephone, automobile, and electric power has enabled residential suburbs to push out farther and farther into the central city's hinterland. But at the same time the downtown congestion of massed office workers, professionals, and shoppers has thickened.

What has happened in recent decades is that there has been a residential movement away from the central city by a growing number of workers, shoppers, and entertainment seekers who commute to and from the central city. Thus, while there has been no recent increase in the proportion of central-city *residents*, the power and influence of the central city continues to grow as it draws into its orbit more and more people.

So marked has this trend become that the Census Bureau adopted a

new measure, the "standard metropolitan area," to apply to 1950 population data. This measure expresses the growing dominance of the central city over adjacent counties, suburbs, and towns, which in many cases are "independent" political entities, sometimes in different states. For instance, the standard metropolitan area of which Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, is the central city contains Burlington, Camden, and Gloucester counties, which are in New Jersey. Almost 84 million people —more than half the total population—were living in 168 standard metropolitan areas in 1950.

> A standard metropolitan area contained at least one city of 50,000 or more in 1950, and each city of this size is included in one standard metropolitan area. In general, each standard metropolitan area comprises the county containing the city and any other contiguous counties which are deemed to be closely economically integrated with that city. In a broad sense the country's standard metropolitan areas include all the leading urban centers together with all adjoining territory that has been demonstrated to be closely linked with the central cities. [11, p. 1]

Over 80 per cent of the total population increase from 1940 to 1950 occurred in these standard metropolitan areas, and almost 50 per cent of the total population increase occurred in the suburbs of the central cities. For a detailed comparison, see Table 6.

Table 6 Population Increase of the United States, 1940 to 1950 *

Area	*Number*	*Per-cent increase*	*Per cent of increase*
United States	18,186,317	14.3	100.0
Standard metropolitan areas	14,653,382	21.2	80.5
Central cities	5,652,053	13.0	31.0
Outlying parts	9,001,329	34.7	49.5
Outside standard metropolitan areas	3,532,935	5.7	19.5

* Adapted from 11, p. 1. Computed on the basis of preliminary figures for 1950 which exclude crews of American vessels in ports of the United States and persons enumerated away from home who have not yet been credited to their specific usual place of residence.

Urban Dominance

In the twentieth century, the city is being superseded by what is known as the "metropolitan community," which is the approximate conceptual equivalent of the Census Bureau's statistical measure, the standard metropolitan area. "This new urban unit is an extensive community composed of numerous specialized parts the functions of which are correlated and integrated through the agency of a central city" (6, p. v).

A number of careful statistical studies, the most notable of which are

(6) and (21), have shown that large metropolitan centers increasingly "dominate" our entire society. Those villages, towns, and smaller cities in the hinterland ° either adjust themselves to the conditions "imposed" by the metropolitan center or they become "ghost towns" (6). Metropolitan dominance is, for the most part, a function of two variables—size and distance. The larger the center, the more it dominates, and the farther its sway; likewise, the closer the given point in the hinterland to the center, the more it is dominated. Since we have already seen that the movement of population is toward the rim of the central city, then the further trend toward metropolitan dominance is made clear. Further, statistical indices demonstrate that:

> If the index for degree of specialization is used to measure the extent of the dependency of any zone upon another part of the metropolitan community for services, wholesale trade, and manufactures, then it can be stated categorically *that every zone in the hinterland is dependent upon the metropolis for wholesale trade and services, and that the outer zones are dependent upon the metropolis and the inner zones for manufacturing.* In short . . . a large part of the dominance of the metropolis rests upon the inability of the hinterland population to provide most economically or most expeditiously all of the wholesale, service, and manufacturing activities which they require to sustain themselves at present levels of living. [6, p. 140]

Another way to state the general trend is this: population in the nineteenth century was, relatively speaking, evenly spread throughout the country. The few clusters of population in town and city dominated a hinterland of narrow scope. More important, since production and distribution were locally owned and managed and were restricted to local areas, the smaller towns were relatively independent of the large cities.

In the twentieth century, population increasingly agglomerates about the great metropolitan centers from which a tentacular economic control radiates. Smaller cities manufacture not primarily for a local market but serve as subcontracting agencies for metropolitan centers. Muncie, Indiana, for example, manufactures *parts* for General Motors, the orders for which, and the ultimate control of which, emanate from Detroit; it is in Detroit that these parts are assembled, along with parts manufactured in several other small cities, into finished automobiles.

Even the "independent" farmer is caught in the same web. At one time the New Hampshire farmer was largely self-sufficient, and the small part of his crop that was sold went to local markets. Today he

° The "hinterland" falls outside the commuting distance of the central city's suburbs. In the present context, it is the outlying trade area dominated by a given central city. Where one hinterland ends and another begins is easier to determine in the West, where most large cities are distant from one another, than it is in the Northeast, where they crowd one another. The hinterland boundaries of Providence–Boston or New York–Philadelphia are quite indeterminate.

specializes in milk production for the Boston market, and his pattern of settlement creeps closer to the dominant center: "Both the rural-nonfarm and the rural-farm populations occupy more intensively those counties which contain a large hinterland city than they occupy counties which contain a small city. With each increase in the size of the largest city contained, the average level of land occupancy tends to rise" (6, p. 129).

The actual source of dominance. Dominance is exercised not so much by the "metropolitan community" as by separate bureaucratic organizations, which do so along isolated channels of production and distribution in heavy industry, textiles, publishing, retail sales, transportation, commercialized recreation, and so on. The chemical empire of Du Pont, for example, employs 85,000 people and controls 72 plants in 25 states. It is incorporated in Wilmington, Delaware, but maintains central offices in many large cities. The city of Wilmington does not "dominate" Ellenton, Georgia, where Du Pont is building a $600-million plant to make the components of the hydrogen bomb (27, p. 94). But Du Pont does.

When the total metropolis is depicted as exercising dominance in the modern world, the concept of dominance is rendered obscure and metaphysical. The several large-city offices of the Du Pont company do not so much add to the "dominance" of each separate city as they collectively sum the "dominance" of the corporation. For the most part, dominance in the modern world is *extracommunity;* the over-all trend, here as elsewhere, is away from community.

URBANIZED SOCIETY

The term "urbanized society" does not describe what all cities are, not even what radically distinguishes cities from towns, but rather the direction in which our entire society is moving. The following analysis is, however, at present most fully exemplified in our large metropolitan centers.

The Urban Way of Life *

Heterogeneity. The city is the focal point of economic expansion and social innovation in modern society. The city is thus a magnet of economic opportunity which draws people from its surrounding hinterland and packs them close together in restricted living space. Not only are many jobs available, but there are thousands of different kinds of jobs. People with widely variant interests and capabilities are attracted to the city, people of different races, nationalities, religions, social classes, and occupations. It is the diversity of background in its attracted migrants, on the one hand, and the intensive specialization of tasks, on

* In part adapted from 14, pp. 329–336, and from 29.

the other, which create the social heterogeneity so characteristic of the city.

Spatial segregation. Social heterogeneity is encouraged by other factors, not the least of which is specialization of space, or spatial segregation. The hub of the city is the downtown area of maximum land rent, where skyscrapers push upward and where the basic functions of finance and government are carried on. Here also will be found the highly expensive commercial activities, centering in hotels, theaters, large department stores, and small "exclusive" shops. A certain amount of manufacturing, of such expensive and light lines as jewelry and fur garments, may be carried on here, but heavier manufacturing tends to withdraw to the center city's inner rim, where truck and railroad transportation is more accessible and where land rent is not so high. Throughout the city, local clusters of retail stores and professional services will be found, even though the downtown area remains the commercial hub.

In many large metropolitan centers, a so-called zone in transition has been described as immediately surrounding the downtown area: an area of slums, rooming houses, flophouses, and cheap entertainment—burlesque theaters, tattoo parlors, shooting galleries, and third-run movie houses. In the earlier history of the city, this area was a "more desirable" residential section. But as the city expanded outward, the more advantaged people withdrew from advancing industrial and commercial activity. The zone in transition is a deteriorating residential area where rents are cheap, since landlords are mainly interested in speculative opportunities. As business advances, they expect to sell land at a large profit; in the meantime, they have little interest in improving the buildings now standing on their land. Here social problems flourish—poverty, prostitution, violent crime, and delinquency; here are attracted and held the dispossessed and the outcast, those defeated in the competition for money and status.

In general, the socioeconomic status of city dwellers rises as residence is removed from the downtown area. The more advantaged live beyond the inner rim. Yet economic activity remains concentrated within the inner rim, so that the outer-rim suburb is an area of residential specialization. Retreat to the outer suburb, which got under way in earnest in the latter part of the nineteenth century, had two effects.

> First, it was a segregated community, not merely set apart topographically from the central areas of a city: but its occupants were laterally segregated from other economic classes. Except for a small detail of tradesmen and handymen, the suburb was a one-class community: it boasted, in fact, of its "exclusiveness"—which means . . . that it was not and could not become a city. Further, suburban living encouraged a complete segregation of consumption from production: there was no visible connecting link, except the iron rails

that led to the city, between the barbarous industries that manufactured the goods and the romantic suburban homes, remote from the grime and sweat, where those things were consumed. [23, p. 215]

The residential movement outward created what Mumford has called a "de-politizing" process, with social life isolated not only from economic activity but also from interest in the municipal government of the center city. This residential retreat of the "better element" is not unconnected with the continuance of municipal corruption, the last topic to be discussed in this chapter.



FIG. 17. Schematic representation of the center city.

Within the inner rim of the center city, residential segregation separates racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groupings—thus Harlem, Little Italy, the Gold Coast, Bronzeville, Beacon Hill, Georgetown, and the like. But there is much less of community in such so-called neighborhoods than in even the residential suburb. For the most part they are mere local agglomerations of population. People live their lives isolated from others who pay a similar rent. Attempts at community organization invariably fail (31, Chap. 10).

Mobility. It is in the city that one of the most dramatic features of contemporary society, social mobility, is sharply limned. Rapid movement, rapid change, specialization—these foster and require intensive competition. Ascribed status is antithetical to the tempo of city life, which pays relatively little heed to family and background. The range of opportunity, the emphasis upon externals of dress, manner, and money, and

the impersonality and anonymity of the city in one sense free the individual and permit him to exploit his talents and ingenuity.

Urban mobility constantly tends to destroy social class, or at least to make social class imprecise. Unlike the large town, the metropolitan center does not possess a system of status gradations known and recognized by all its residents. Competition for achieved status is itself specialized, in terms of politics, wealth, or occupational recognition, and further specialized according to the narrow range of personal acquaintance in one's business office, profession, or factory.

So far as the entire local population is considered by the competitor, he may strive for publicity or envy in the eyes of the passer-by for his clothes, limousine, or triumphal entry into an expensive night club. But such motivation has little relevance to class structure. The envied and the envious are too isolated, from each other and from community, for that.

Social participation. The urban trend is also toward *minimal* social participation. When the basic rural-urban dichotomy engaged the interest of sociologists, around the turn of the century, the confident stereotype was presented of the rural dweller as belonging to primary groups —family, neighborhood, church parish—with an overlapping membership, where each intimately knew all others and shared mutual sympathy, understanding, and experience. The urban dweller was conversely depicted as belonging to many voluntary, secondary groups, formed about specialized interests and with segregated memberships.

In some ways fairly accurate, this classic picture has since been revised by empirical research. With increasing size of urban place, membership in voluntary associations falls off drastically. The majority of New York City's population, for example, are unaffiliated with *any* voluntary association (lodges, PTA, hobby clubs, and so on). "The old neighborhood, the larger kin group might have broken down but they have not been replaced by the specialized voluntary groups to nearly the extent usually assumed" (18, p. 686).

Nonmembership in specialized voluntary organizations does not, however, necessarily mean social isolation, provided a person has friends. Many people who join social organizations are precisely those who lack friends and who have few cultural (artistic and literary) interests. In fact, nonmembership in voluntary associations is more likely to mean social isolation for the rural than for the urban dweller, according to Fox's statistical comparisons.

> The urban inhabitants engage in one type of social activity to the exclusion of the other types of social participation; the rural inhabitants, on the other hand, tend to engage in all the activities to the same extent—that is, those who participate least, or most, in formal activities also participate least, or most,

in cultural and informal activities. This fundamental difference between urban and rural participation appears to be one of kind, not of degree. [15, p. 82]

The urbanite more often finds himself with more people than does the rural dweller, but with reduced personal initiative and mutual reciprocity. He does not interact with groups so much as he passively joins crowds. Instead of the social club he will enter theater, shooting gallery, taxi-dance hall, arena, or night club. His only control and responsibility inhere in his paying the price of admission. He is a faceless patron or seat filler who remains for a while and then leaves to make way for another paying customer.

In the economic and political realms, the majority in megalopolis are more controlled and manipulated categories of persons than they are organized participants. Economic and political activity is highly organized, to be sure, but bureaucratically organized and with delegated authority. The trend toward majority passivity is of course universal in our society, along with mass apathy in the face of remote and concentrated power, but this trend reaches its apogee, and very likely will remain there, in megalopolis. Exhorted to "do something" about municipal corruption, the New Yorker will stay glued to his television screen or radio, watching and listening to the drama of bribery and malfeasance of a crime investigation. The New England farmer can go to town meeting and take action (at least in local affairs) when he is aroused; the New Yorker can only vote—for men he does not know, for members of parties about whose activities he remains ignorant until some opposition insider tells him just enough to influence his vote.

Because primary controls can be evaded, the city must ultimately have recourse to secondary controls. It must curb the spirit of mutual exploitation that arises from close, diverse contact between people having no sentimental or personal ties. The specialized policeman, the department store and hotel detective, the numerous civic bodies and planning commissions, all have a hand in regulating the complex and predatory relations between urbanites. Even religious control, in so far as it exercises an influence in the secular city, does so largely through secondary associations operating as legal entities and pressure groups. . . . [14, p. 332] °

The new "folk heroes" of urbanized society, depicted in movie, detective story, comic book, and radio and television drama, are very frequently "extra-legal supermen [who are] called in to accomplish by extraordinary measures what is impossible within the traditional organization of society" (4, p. 93). Can it be that the hero who does not have to cooperate formally with others, who does not comply with vested authority, who operates alone, in an often brutal way, satisfies momentarily the frustration of many people who feel themselves to be out-

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side of community, for whom an ordered life with others is increasingly unbearable?

Personality. There have been many, and altogether unsuccessful, attempts to distinguish between rural and urban "personality types." The same range of basic personality traits is to be found in country and city —generous-stingy, active-withdrawn, brave-cowardly, and the like. A few secondary personal-social attributes, nevertheless, appear more frequently in the city than in the country. Social tolerance (or indifference) is an example. "Given the diversity of its population and the impersonality of its contacts, a certain tolerance characterizes the city. People rub elbows with and become indifferent to extremes of all kinds—extremes of opinion and interest, extremes of poverty and wealth, extremes of education and background" (14, p. 331).

The resident of megalopolis also tends to be highly individuated. His immediate world is big, and much of it is remote. He is tied to others primarily by the nexus of cash, bureaucratic organization, and specialized temporary relationships. He can and does move easily from group to group (more often, from crowd to crowd), in each of which he may be the only common member. This atomization of experience makes him acutely aware of his uniqueness, of the private wall of separation between self and others. Paradoxically, however, it is relatively easy to manipulate him, to cajole or to panic him, into sudden mass enthusiasms. Socially isolated for the most part though he is, he has been conditioned to watch and wait and get directions and cues from others. Signs warn and direct him, ushers point the way, traffic cops whistle and he stops or moves. On the job he formally cooperates with others, not in making things but in working with people. His career primarily depends upon how well he can please others, how efficiently he can respond to the cues of others. He is thus under pressure, and tends to be anxious, to conform to the externalized standards of the moment—in dress, manner, smile, speech, and conversational topics.

He not so much participates with others, to act and to decide, as he is directed by remote political and economic power, and as he passively acclaims "public personalities" in newsprint, television, radio, and movies. The externalized standards of the moment are more imposed than they are created. More accurately, they are created *for* the public by political, recreational, and business policy makers at the lowest common denominator of prevailing mass tastes, through deliberate flattery and cajolery of the public. In megalopolis, the standards of the moment capture *both* policy makers and public.

The urban citizen is controlled at a distance and stimulated from a distance. Very different from others, highly individualized in experience and point of view, he tends to lack convictions, which require widely shared experience and values, at least in the formative years. His very

atomization and social isolation prepare him for crowd rather than group participation. The group organizes about shared interests on a more or less permanent basis; the crowd is temporary, anonymous, and focused upon generalized emotions and sentiments, at one and the same time capable of fanatic common action and easily pushed and pulled by leadership.

The urbanite tends to be more cynical than the rural dweller; it is he who has made almost a code of "not being taken for a sucker"; that is, he is wary of being manipulated to adopt a course of action contrary to his own interests. He is aware that he is the target of advertisers, politicians, and other bureaucratic manipulators, and he resents his own helplessness. Nevertheless, he is so conditioned to receiving cues from others, and acting upon these cues, that he actually has less sales resistance than the farmer.*

Apparently he seeks to find in others an honesty and integrity that he tends to deny exist. At any rate, once his thin armor of cynicism is pierced by particularly shrewd manipulation, he quickly falls in line to buy, to sing, to shout, and to move. Kate Smith's wartime defense-bond broadcast elicited a tremendous response. Her hoarse and patient voice continued its exhortation as the hours ticked off in the all-day broadcast, and hundreds of thousands sat glued to their radios. Investigation showed that it was a commonly shared belief in her honesty and integrity and self-sacrifice that commanded crowd enthusiasm (22). She stressed sacrifice and patriotism and, unlike other manipulators, made no appeal to the investment possibilities of war bonds. The fact that she was not trying to "sell patriotism" was remarked upon by informants again and again.

It is not to question Kate Smith's patriotism or honesty to point out that this *was* manipulation. Whatever the justification for wartime propaganda, it is simply not true that "the boys will be brought home sooner" or that "you can shorten the war" by buying bonds.

> Actually the buying of bonds does not in itself shorten a war, nor is their purchase necessary for supplying munitions to the front. The buying of bonds is a means of reducing inflationary pressures in a war economy and of modifying the distribution of financial obligations making up the national debt. It is interesting to note that the public stereotype of Kate Smith as a primary group figure (a mother image) and her sacrifice in making the broadcast were both involved in the motivations leading to the buying of bonds. This case fully illustrates the potential irrationality present in the social relationships composing a public. [28, p. 306]

* This problem has not been systematically studied. The generalization is based upon two years of professional interviewing conducted by the present writer in rural and urban areas.

Whatever superficial differences between rural and urban personality may still exist, they are being reduced. In modern society, urban values and attitudes, style of dress, manner, and even humor are being diffused throughout the nation by rapid communication. Few rural people in the United States now live more than an hour's automobile journey from some large city. "Expanded social contacts, commercial machine farming, rapid communication, and the movement of rural and city people to and fro make the survival of distinctive traits impossible" (3, p. 13).

Municipal Corruption

After examining municipal politics in many American cities at the turn of the twentieth century, Lincoln Steffens concluded that an open and blatant corruption was the operating norm—in terms of boss rule, graft, bribery, election frauds, and underworld tribute. The local political machine (which included the police force) formed a connecting link between certain business interests, on the one hand, and organized crime, on the other (25).

Later studies have shown that corruption continues, but with less blatancy, with quieter and more efficient organization (1). No longer do the new bosses boast, as Richard Croker, head of Tammany Hall in New York City, did to Steffens, "I work for my pocket all the time." In recent years the big city machines have ceased being the front men of "reaction and privilege," have successfully captured liberal slogans and programs such as social welfare, city planning, and better working conditions. Today, they actively seek the vote of organized labor (24).

Of course, "municipal corruption" is not only a term of moral disapprobation, but it is also one that is difficult to delimit in application. In one sense, all politics is corrupt. A political organization out of power must promise, a political organization in power must dispense, special privileges; otherwise, power cannot be taken away from a political organization that dispenses special privileges, and power cannot be kept from a political organization that promises special privileges. More than any other factor, in modern American society at least, the widest possible appeal to the greatest number of special-interest groups determines who shall wield political power.

Some would thus argue that corruption, properly speaking, occurs only in the case of strictly illegal transactions, such as buying votes, selling franchises and political appointments, accepting kickbacks on municipal construction, and accepting "protection money" from organized gambling, dope, and prostitution. Others insist upon the American political ideal that any departure from serving the people as a whole, any seeking and dispensing of special favors, is a mark of corruption.

Nevertheless, ideals ever tower above performance, and they do so from unavoidable necessity as much as from duplicity. When slumps

occur, for example, few would contend that starving families should be denied home relief. Those in political office enlist faithful voters at the polls by disbursing tax moneys for home relief. Even if—granted the impossible—they wished it otherwise, they would still be buying votes. Is this corruption?

When the term "corruption" is made to include more than legally defined criminal acts, it almost dissolves in the mists of universality. All of us, from time to time, compromise personal and group ideals in order to secure personal and group advantage. That peculiarly honest man, Lincoln Steffens, said that after a lifetime of research he had finally located the ultimate source of corruption—himself.

Why municipal corruption continues. In both narrow and broad connotations of the term, corruption has not abated since Steffens's "muckraking" disclosures. Why? First, the sheer size of the modern city, with its complex machinery of government, enables those who govern to keep their actions hidden from those who are governed. The government of a city is not and cannot be in the hands of the people, at least in the same way that local government is controlled by the farmers of a New England rural township. The farmers gather in town meeting to vote for issues they all know and for men they all know. In part because they can, they watch closely what those men do. There is no need or place for specialist reformers, as unknown to the electorate as are the politicians, to inform them periodically through sensational "investigations."

By himself or with others similarly unorganized, however, the citizen of megalopolis can not find out what is going on, say, in an extension of the municipal sewerage system. Only trained engineers and architects can begin to understand the technical details involved; only those on the "inside" politically are granted a view of the negotiations, deals, compromises, promises, and threats that must run through business corporations, lawyers, city council, mayor, and probably boss. In relation to the size of a city—and thus in relation to the size and unwieldiness of the machinery necessary to run it—the citizen is denied knowledge of what is going on, and he is unable to exert any direct control over the course of action to be taken. Perhaps more often than not, he feels powerless, apathetic, and disinterested.

Second, the folkways of consumption in megalopolis chisel away against the censorship of morals which is often legalized by state legislatures under pressure from the rural vote outside of megalopolis. Whether majority or minority, there is still a sufficient number of urbanites who want beer during prohibition, who want the charms of the prostitute in any period of time, or who want to place a bet away from the race track to make fabulous fortunes for those who will supply such bootleg services. There is also a sufficient number of civic officials and

enforcement officers who can be bribed to ensure the efficient organization of such services.

Third, because there is in megalopolis so much occupational specialization, geographic-residential segregation, heterogeneity of background and interests, and social isolation, each man's attention and concern turn more completely inward than they do in community. Either by himself, or through his membership in a specific organization, each man has one or more compelling goals he seeks through municipal government, such as the businessman's contract, the teacher's salary increase, the bus company's franchise, the street peddler's license, the unemployed worker's home relief, and the reform group's settlement house. Because of the citizen's lack of information about the total operation of municipal government and because his interest is centered upon his "selfish" goal, the political machine which can deliver on its specific promises will be supported at the polls by people who have a vested interest in turning a deaf ear to any accusations against the machine.

The limits of corruption. The history of corruption in any one American metropolis has never been one-directional; it has been more cyclic than linear. The sense of community may be atrophied, but it is not a corpse. Periodically, some reform organization captures mass revulsion at publicized excess, and "the rascals are turned out." Nevertheless, the professionals, who make government a lifetime job and who know how to keep the machine running, in time again infiltrate as the "better-element" amateurs exhaust their indignation, as they return to country club, business, Florida vacation, and cultural discussion group.

Even so, like much else, municipal government is a matter of shades of gray rather than of black and white. Some reformers primarily use reform in the interest of their own careers, while many bosses have accompanied their looting with an honest concern for the city's needy, and according to their own lights they have governed well. Further, the residue of community kept feebly alive in megalopolis serves as a periodic check to the scope of malfeasance.

It would be indeed easy to exaggerate the problem. Perhaps the majority in the American city have never sold their vote, bribed an official, fixed a jury, or consciously betrayed their city's charter. As a boy, Steffens once voiced his indignation at the way the world is run to an old man, who replied, "This railroad, for instance. It's a crook in politics, but—there's some of us keeps it going straight enough to carry freight and passengers."

Corruption transcends community. Our central theme has been the movement of American society away from community. Even corruption has traveled the same road. At one time organized crime, like business, was a matter of local production and distribution. In the early spring of 1951, the Senate Crime Investigating Committee, headed by Senator

Estes Kefauver, proved that "big crime," like big business, is now organized horizontally.

There are two central administrations, one in Chicago, the other in New York. These syndicates, whose operations center mainly in gambling, have infiltrated every large city in the United States; between them, they have divided up spheres of influence. The take is considerable. "In all, the committee estimated 'conservatively,' $20 billion changes hands every year in the U.S. in the big business of illegal gambling" (26, p. 24).

Enough civic officials and enforcement officers have been sufficiently bribed to make this twin tentacular network possible; so do enough citizens demand the bootleg service. But the syndicates cannot be eliminated by cleaning up a city; they are nationwide, and they operate outside of specific location. A number of city mayors and state governors have declared they are helpless to stop them. Popular sentiment is now building for the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Bureau of Internal Revenue to assume full responsibility. These, likewise, are extracommunity organizations.

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CHAPTER 12 *The Division of Labor*

> Our modern industrial economy, based on impersonality, interchangeability and speed, has worn away the old protective securities without creating new ones. It has failed to develop an organizational framework of its own within which self-realization on a large scale is possible. Freedom in industrial society, as a result, has a negative rather than a positive connotation. It means a release from external restraints rather than a deep and abiding sense of self-control and purpose.
>
> —ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.

THE UNIVERSAL BASIS OF STRATIFICATION

The division of labor is an arrangement found in all societies whereby people perform different tasks at the same time, and exchange their economic surpluses in a formal or informal way. The division of labor is not only universal, it is also the common basis for stratification, by which people are ranked in higher and lower positions. In all societies, some people obey while others are obeyed; some people defer while others are deferred to. Social classes include other criteria than the division of labor—a matter discussed in Chap. 14—but the division of labor is of primary importance in this connection.

Necessity of Stratification

Stratification is universal because it is necessary. All group activity must be organized, which means that authority to direct this or that operation must be either assumed or delegated. Society, and the groups which make up society, reward those with the responsibility of directing others, and of supervising an operation through to completion, with authority, respect, fame, and/or wealth. Those who do not direct others but merely work at some routine task are rewarded when they do their job better than the others with whom they cooperate and compete—with at least appreciation, and in most cases with money or some other material reward.

Nevertheless, although stratification and the division of labor are universal, in preliterate society they are rudimentary. A social organization based solely upon primary-group relationships neither permits nor requires a wide range of inequality or of political and economic specialization. Within the family or kin group, or at most within the village,

economic self-sufficiency is the rule. Techniques are relatively few and simple, there is little trade, and goods and services are produced and distributed within a narrow geographic radius. Economic functions are divided according to age and sex; otherwise, there is little specialization. All men and all women are expected to be reasonably proficient in the tasks suitable to each sex. There is no opportunity for each to do only *one* thing and trade with others for those things he does not produce. Preliterates frequently organize a single task, such as a hunting party or a ceremonial feast, but many cooperate to do several things together. Each does not specialize in one part of the common task. Since each individual's status and the tasks he performs are governed by tradition, there is relatively little need for direct supervision, and thus relatively little need for either authority or social inequality.

It is the division of labor in modern industrial society that *must* be elaborately stratified. The assembly line and the corporate organization which controls it require thousands of men to perform different specialties in order to produce and distribute a single pair of shoes. A line of command is necessary to ensure that the many perform their individual tasks in a vast integrated operation that the majority cannot even visualize. Although current political ideology denies this, the fact remains that modern industrial society creates a greater *range* of social inequality than the world has ever known (4, p. 33).

THE FORMAL INTEGRATION OF FUNCTION

In America's Past

Up to the middle of the nineteenth century, a consistent way of life had persisted in America with little change. The majority of the gainfully employed were free landholders or farm workers; in 1790, over 90 per cent of the employed were thus occupied. The majority lived on isolated farms or in small agricultural villages. They owned their own land, tools, and buildings. They directed their own operations and were virtually self-sufficient, selling only a small part of their total production in order to buy the few things they did not make for themselves. There was, to be sure, a division of labor. But that of which the majority were aware was within the family, and it was supervised by the male head of the household.

The enlarged division of labor included professional men, businessmen, and artisans as well as farmers. These various specialists depended upon money exchange to procure things they did not produce. Nevertheless, specialists of a hundred years ago differed from those of today in three ways. First, most of them were self-employed; second, each

specialist completed a total operation by himself; and third, specialized economic functions were integrated through a free competitive market, not, as is now the case, through a combination of the market and administrative control.

The market was *local*, which meant that both economic and political problems were largely local. Individual careers were relatively unaffected by impersonal and distant economic forces. The majority could weather hard times because they were self-sufficient farmers, and new land was either free or cheap. Unemployed artisans could usually migrate and find work. Local markets were little affected by distant conditions, and therefore local markets were not uniformly affected by slumps.

The period of transition. In 1860, the output of mill, shop, and mine for the first time exceeded in value that of the farm (3, p. 101). The decade 1850 to 1860 saw the railroads multiply their trackage and thereby vastly expand market and communication areas. New agricultural implements, such as the McCormick reaper, increased agricultural production and released thousands of young Americans from the farms to take industrial jobs in the burgeoning cities. In 1830, $45 million was invested in a total of 795 American cotton mills; by 1860, $98 million was invested in 1,091 cotton mills (2, pp. 241–242).

The size and complexity of productive organizations grew apace. As late as 1850 most manufacturing was carried on in homes and in shops owned and run by one man. From that time to the Civil War, single ownership and partnership were the rule. "The business corporation chartered by the state slowly made its way into industry, first by special charter and then by means of general incorporation, although not until after the Civil War did the joint-stock corporation become universal. By 1900, two-thirds of all manufacturing was done by corporations" (2, p. 352). The rise of great industrial combinations, or trusts, did not occur until after the Civil War.

Machine industry concentrated many persons in one place, expanded production, and made possible the nationwide market. The machine was accompanied by new administrative techniques which permitted the integration of many tasks into a total enterprise. Productive and distributive organizations depended in large measure for their expansion upon improved roads and the railroad, and upon an improved postal service, the telegraph, and later the telephone, teletype, and radio. Filing and accounting systems developed which enabled larger organizations to keep track of larger numbers of employees. At the same time, the drive to competitive advantage fostered rationalization, the assembly-line technique, a new kind of specialization in which single and repetitive operations were integrated into the expanding enterprise.

Industry. The effect of the new economic order upon social life was most dramatically evidenced in industry.° In early America, each family manufactured most of its own durable goods—furniture, shoes, and the like. Later, several families divided skilled jobs among themselves. This arrangement was followed by one in which one man made the job assignments. Then small workshops appeared, owned and supervised by one man or by two or more partners, where hired men who left their homes worked together but where each worker performed all the operations required to complete a chair, a hat, or a pair of shoes. In the final stage of the sequence, the hired worker does not complete a full operation. He works at one stage of a vast assembly line of persons and machines and repeats one simple operation. Hundreds of men may handle the same chair, hat, or pair of shoes.

Ownership and control followed the drift of the division of labor in production. At first, each family owned its own tools and materials; later, materials were supplied by the owner-manager who also owned the tools and machines. Finally, local managers no longer own or control the enterprise. Those who own are unidentified stockholders. Those who ultimately control are the key managers operating from some distant city for whom the local factory is only one in a horizontal chain of factories.

The same trend toward increasing size, complexity, and impersonality was followed by the market and worker-management relationships. The market shifted from family consumption to local community and then to the nation and the world. At first, family cooperation and "worker-management relationships" were one. Then, hired workers were the personal friends of their immediate supervisor, and they had the opportunity to meet and talk with the owner-manager. Now, the hired worker is isolated in his job, disciplined and controlled by punctuality, the machine, and remote administrative decree. He has no contact whatsoever with management; there are many intermediaries between him and the door of even the plant superintendent's office.

Business. Much less obvious, but nonetheless real, is the atomized specialization and formal integration taking place in business. It is less obvious because business is not dominated by the machine. Nevertheless, in business as in industry, mass-production methods are the order of the day.

Except that the assembly line is lacking, clerical operations in big business are organized in much the same way as industrial operations. The hired worker in a business office no more completes an operation

° Adapted largely from 23, pp. 64–65. Although this book deals with the shoe industry alone, its findings are more or less generally applicable.

than the hired worker in a factory; instead, he performs a repetitive task which is one small part of each operation. The repetitive task of a comptometer operator, for example, depends upon the repetitive tasks of file clerks, stenographers, accountants, and messengers, before and after her task is performed. "The typist's pool of a large insurance company, check-sorting and check-clearing operations in a big bank, the



FIG. 18. Mass production is not primarily a matter of machinery. Its distinctive mark is planned production, planned flow of materials and parts, and the planned reduction of each job to a few simple repetitive movements, combining hand and tool and *perhaps* automatic machine. The stage of planning the assembly line, pictured above, might take several months and tons of blueprints. But after the planners were satisfied that they had achieved maximum efficiency *before* production started, the finished product would start coming off the assembly line in a few days. (From Kaiser-Frazer Corporation.)

sorting and filling of orders in a mail-order house, and the thousands of other operations in business and government offices do not differ in nature from the automobile assembly line, however much they may differ in appearance" (6, p. 22).

At the top of the business hierarchy, the same process is in evidence. Though integrated by mutual dependence, ownership and management are becoming different specialties. The owners of big business are absentee stockholders who have less control over management than do the union leaders who have become virtually the employment managers of industry. "Many stockholders have such a feeling of frustration that

they do not bother even to sign and return proxies. To 'get out the vote' for a quorum at the annual meetings of stockholders is difficult" (11, p. 37). Though a stockholder may be interested in the enterprise, he cannot find out what is going on.

Owen D. Young, of the General Electric Company, has declared that in the modern business organization of great size "'we have completely divorced ownership from responsibility. Now ownership has little or no relation to the conduct of the business'" (12, p. 5). Management today is not only separated from ownership, but the managers themselves comprise a formally integrated team of specialists—president, board of directors, office managers, technical consultants, engineers, and local expediters and superintendents.

Agriculture. The Russian collective farm has pushed atomized specialization or mass production far beyond that achieved by American agriculture. Under the direction of administrators, Russian agricultural specialists work together at their appointed and atomized tasks. Only in the vast fruit farms of California, the "factories in the fields," and in a few fully mechanized cotton plantations in the Mississippi delta, has anything remotely comparable appeared in America.

Nevertheless, certain portents of mass production can be seen in areas where agriculture seemingly retains the old pattern of self-sufficiency and independent specialization. The farmer in northern New England, for example, still owns his own place and directs his own operations. But because he now specializes in one product, milk, he finds himself part of a figurative assembly line. His fodder is shipped in from the Middle West. He often buys his calves from a breeding specialist, or from time to time calls in an artificial-insemination specialist. Government inspectors set hygienic standards for his barn and the health of his milk cows. He no longer processes his own milk but takes it to a station where employees of a milk combine test it for bacteria and butter-fat content and bottle it by machine. He no longer sells his milk directly to the consumer but through one of several large distributive corporations.

Art and literature. Of all areas of economic endeavor, art and literature have most successfully resisted the modern trend. Artistic and scientific output is censored by state bureaucrats in Russia, and standards of treatment are imposed by state bureaucrats. Compared with the Russian industrial worker and agriculturist, however, the Russian artist is an independent specialist. Compared with Russian artists, American artists are free-lance entrepreneurs. Even in modern America, nevertheless, certain mass-production trends have appeared.

Schools of art take on the trappings of academic life, teachers being required not only to have mastered their craft but often to have accumulated certain degrees. The growing field of commercial art is a veritable

assembly line. *Time* has pioneered a new form of group journalism in which writers on specialized topics pool their efforts, receive no by-line, and strive to attain the same uniform style. In the production of novels and "trade" books, publishers now hire research specialists to assess the market for various types of themes and treatment, and then advise the writers with whom they have contracts to meet the market requirements. Various book "clubs," with thousands of readers, enable a few critic-specialists in some degree to control aesthetic standards. Speeches, books, and articles by famous people are mostly ghostwritten, sometimes by individuals but more often by business houses who hire teams of experts to produce on order the kinds of items required. Hollywood's specialty in mass art is produced on an assembly line, from story idea to writing, from production to editing, and then in distribution.

Other fields. Mass production has begun to invade other fields. Inventors are now hired by large corporations to work for them in teams. At the present time, medical as well as industrial research is carried on in this way. With the spread of group medical plans and the rise of large hospitals, the practice of medicine becomes a series of specialized fields. Often, groups of specialists work together in one clinic, each group reviewing one "part" of the patient.

Sociological research travels the same road. Until recently, most sociologists were individual workers who devised entire systems of thought to be applied to all social phenomena. Such men as Auguste Comte, Max Weber, Vilfredo Pareto, William Graham Sumner, and, more recently, Robert M. MacIver were independent specialists. The modern trend is to break down sociological research into narrow segments, such as the population trends of specific countries and audience reactions to specific types of radio programs, and also to organize administrators, writers, statisticians, interviewers, and IBM machine operators into research teams. Examples of this trend are the Columbia Bureau of Applied Research and the army's United States Strategic Bombing Survey which studied the feelings and attitudes of Hiroshima's survivors (13).

The New Concept of Freedom

It is the radical shift in the division of labor which, more than anything else, is drastically revising our concept of freedom. Freedom for the late eighteenth-century American meant freedom from outside interference so that he could pursue his own economic bent. Freedom today is coming to mean protection from want, fear, and insecurity. Since the majority are no longer economically independent as they once were, they feel impelled to relieve themselves of a sense of personal responsibility; they implore government to prevent the impersonal forces that they cannot control from injuring them. The majority of Americans no

longer demand personal economic independence; to the bureaucratic employee. such a demand is meaningless. The "imposition of freedom may easily be a severe form of coercion, involving boredom, frustration, or persistent worry" (1, p. 192). In America, as in all modern industrial



FIG. 19. What we do for a living. (Redrawn from chart prepared by Dun and Bradstreet. Inc., 1950, for *Trends in the U.S. Labor Force, 1940–1950.*)

nations, the majority supplicate the central government to protect them from freedom, in the older sense of the term.

Group as well as individual necessity places limits on freedom (in the older sense) in modern society. When the job of each becomes tied to the welfare of all, independent decisions made by individuals or small groups can prove disastrous. If tugboat operators go on strike in New York City, for example, the health and the very lives of thousands, who depend in part upon shipping for food and other necessities, may be

endangered. The definition of "the public interest" presently involves the Federal government in almost every area of economic activity.

BUREAUCRACY IN MODERN AMERICA: THE STRUCTURE

Definition and Scope

Mass-production methods require bureaucracy, but mass production and bureaucracy are not synonymous. A bureaucracy is a power-wielding organization with a hierarchy of ranks, the statuses and functions of which are planned in advance and in which the official activities of personnel in each rank are supervised by the next higher rank, up to the apex of control. Mass production is a new development, whereas some early societies have been to some extent bureaucratically organized. Ancient Egypt and ancient China, for example, were ruled by governmental bureaucracies. Nevertheless, all bureaucracies in the past were limited in size and scope. They were solely governmental, never economic, and they were manned by a tiny minority of the population. The social life of the majority, encompassed as it was by kinship group and village, was remote from bureaucratic control.

Both in scope and in character, modern bureaucracy is qualitatively different from all previous bureaucracies. Vast corporate structures are necessary to distribute and promote as well as to produce an unprecedented volume of goods and services. And only the modern means of communication and record keeping have made possible an intertwined system of control and management that formally integrates the work of thousands of personnel. Never in the past was position within a series of interlocking bureaucracies the normal life of the majority, as it is today.

The citizen is closely regulated by town, county, state, and national governmental bureaucracies. The consumer is the ultimate target of industrial, business, advertising, radio-chain, and other productive, distributive, and promotive bureaucracies. The industrial worker bargains with one bureaucracy, the organization which employs him, through another bureaucracy, his union. Even Christianity tends to bureaucratization—a man helps his neighbor not by binding his wounds and feeding him but by contributing money to a charitable bureaucracy.

Position in the economic scheme is of major importance, for job and self are closely identified. The steady trend has been away from self-employment toward bureaucratic employment. In 1940, about 73 per cent of all workers were reported as employees; in 1949, over 78 per cent. And most of those who are self-employed today are not entrepreneurs in the older sense. The "independent" retail merchant buys from bureaucracies;

his "fair-trade" prices may be set by trade organizations. The "owner" of an automobile agency exhibits in his showroom according to the regulations imposed by a manufacturing corporation. The "independent" farmer is controlled in large measure by the bureaucratic distributors of his produce and by the Federal government. Professional practices are regulated by the state and by professional societies.

Level 1—the Policy Makers

The policy makers comprise the apex of managerial control. Here will be found boards of directors, civil-service-bureau chiefs and their assistants, union leaders, the military high command, and university presidents and trustees. It is here that goals are set for the entire organization and the master plans for attaining those goals laid down. Decision making is largely based upon two key considerations.

The first of these is a norm of operational efficiency. For an industry, it is increased production and lowered costs; for a business corporation, it is increased profits and the capture of markets. An army seeks to maintain or augment the political power of the nation that it represents. A union strives to organize more workers in order to make its demands for higher wages, fewer hours, and further inroads on managerial control more effective.

The second main consideration is the degree of cooperation which can be secured from the third level, workers and followers. The second level, the functionaries, are securely attached to the policy makers by their own interests in advancement, and can usually be depended upon to cooperate. The third level, however, often seeks ends which are out of line with those of the policy makers. The extent to which these are taken into account will differ in terms of how powerful the policy makers are and how much vested legitimacy the total society gives their decisions.

Polar examples are military organizations and labor unions. A military high command makes decisions almost entirely in terms of the physical disposition of men and matériel. This they can do because of the rigidity of command and because the total society, particularly in times of national crisis, affords them carte blanche in getting a job done which the total society has come to regard as necessary to the welfare of all. A union, on the other hand, is a special-interest bloc, and union policy makers justify their authority by producing results for the rank and file at the expense of another special-interest bloc, management (16). As one union policy maker justified his continued demand for a 15-cent raise and his rejection of the 10-cent raise offered by company representatives, "We can't settle for less now. If we did the membership would fire us" (22). At least in capitalist-democratic nations, where the unions are not directly associated with the authority of the state, union policy

makers must carefully assess the wishes of the general public and of their own membership.

Nevertheless, even in a rigid hierarchy, with vested legitimate authority, followers and workers cannot be totally ignored. Workers in Russia are at least promised that their privation is a temporary condition, that ultimately their standard of living will be improved. The high commands of all armies are concerned with the problem of morale. When not under direct orders, enlisted men are permitted a greater range of liberties than are civilians, and efforts are made to keep the casualty rate of any military unit below the danger point of insubordination. Policy makers in any organization, in other words, take into account what the traffic will bear at the third level.

Level 2—the Functionaries

At this level are the technical experts and lesser managers, the executives, office managers and their assistants, labor organizers and shop stewards on the factory floor, field and noncommissioned officers, and college deans and professors. Either directly or through higher mediaries, functionaries maintain close relations with policy makers. Theirs is the task of supervising to completion the decisions made by the policy makers or expediting those decisions with a highly responsible technical assignment. Through various ranks, they are closely supervised themselves. Resentment against supervision is rarely as outspoken at this level as it is at the third level. Advancement here rests more upon securing the favorable personal attention of superiors than it does at the third level, where sheer technical performance is more easily assessed and where personal relations with superiors are not nearly so close.

This level represents a greater spread in rank than the smaller one above it and the larger one below it—from plant superintendent to foreman, from colonel to sergeant, from dean to instructor and laboratory assistant. It is typically the last man in this chain of command who deals directly with personnel at the third level, and his position is both difficult and crucial to the effectiveness of the entire organization. He is a liaison person who must see that the final operations, the orders which he receives indirectly, are carried through by those at the bottom of the hierarchy.

At the same time, he has the responsibility of securing some measure of cooperation from workers and followers; he must assess their willingness to carry through new orders, and must pass their complaints to higher functionaries. Ideally he must be a "natural leader" with skills and traits of personality which those under him can respect, while at the same time the higher functionaries must be able to depend upon his loyalty to them.

"Neither fish nor fowl" is the rueful complaint many such men have made of their complex role (26).

Level 3—Workers and Followers

This level represents the broad mass in any organization which does its detailed work—clerks, union members, industrial workers, enlisted men, and college students. They perform the easily learned "labor" roles, from skilled through semiskilled to unskilled assignments. They supervise no one else and are permitted to make few if any decisions.

Those Outside—the General Public

Outside the given organization lies the general public, toward which the efforts of the entire organization are directed by policy makers and functionaries. These efforts are rationalized in the officially expressed



FIG. 20. The structure of modern bureaucracy.



FIG. 21. Modern bureaucracy: numbers and initiative.

purpose of the organization, such as "bringing better service to the community," "defending our nation against its enemies," "raising the standard of living for all America," or "building democracy with education."

Bureaucratic organizations in capitalistic-democratic society not only compete for favorable attention with others of their own kind (two automobile companies, two political parties, or two universities) but also with those which they occasionally or continuously oppose (labor union versus corporation, legislature versus government bureau, or industry versus "the government"). Under extreme forms of state socialism, where all hierarchies are included within the master state hierarchy, such competition is not permitted. No single organization has sufficient freedom to address the general public, and would have little reason for doing so even if it could.

Some of the relationships which have been described are stated in diagrammatic form in Figs. 20 and 21.

The structure of many organizations is much more complex than Fig. 20 indicates. Some organizations are so vast and extended that they contain a number of suborganizations, each with policy makers, functionaries, and workers. In cases such as these, the policy makers of the sub-

organization occupy the functionary level of the *inclusive* organization. The chiefs of the various bureaus within the Department of Agriculture are one example; factory managers who work for a corporation which operates a chain of factories are another.

The above discussion of bureaucratic levels must not be totally identified with social status. The same person *usually* occupies a position at the same level of different organizations, such as the factory worker who is also a union member (level 3 in both cases). But it sometimes happens that a man who is a factory worker (level 3) at the same time is grand sachem of a local chapter of a national fraternal order (level 1 of the suborganization, level 2 of the inclusive organization). Nevertheless, there is a general tendency for status within an economic organization to determine status in other organizations.

BUREAUCRACY IN MODERN AMERICA: THE PROBLEMS

Personality Manipulation

For many centuries the majority of the gainfully employed handled tools or things to gain their livelihood. Within the kin group or village the farmer and artisan ideally treated all those with whom he was associated as ends in themselves rather than as means to private or undisclosed ends. Far different is the main job function of today's white-collar bureaucrat. As salesman, office worker, clerk, executive, advertising man, or publicity writer, he promotes favorable responses from people outside the organization. Under the dispensation of the success philosophy, he manipulates others *within* the organization for private career purposes.

A few decades ago, when bureaucratic employment began to overtake self-employment and employment in small-scale enterprise, ideological as well as structural changes appeared. As the new bureaucracies expanded, they created new ranks and new jobs and they demanded new skills. Expansion occurred so swiftly that a vast army of restless, job-shifting personnel was both required and created. New ideological rationalizations were imposed upon the structural changes that bureaucracy had wrought, the greatest of which was individual success, the supreme American value. Nevertheless, the new idolization of success was not a complete break with the past. At one time in America, the tradition of mutual obligation within the farm family and village had streamed parallel with the tradition of frontier self-help and individualism. The new bureaucracy destroyed the former tradition, and it adapted the latter to its own purposes. Modern success, like modern bureaucratic employment, is atomized; it tends to be cut off from family, lineage, and neighborhood. And the primary means to achieve success has become personality manipulation.

Inferior with superior. Success in the modern world depends as much upon skill in handling other people as it does upon any other technical competence. Even engineers, whose chief job techniques are clearly of the "old-fashioned" kind, must also have some skill in personality manipulation, because engineers now work for a bureaucracy and represent a bureaucracy in "outside contacts." Using another person to further personal ends requires that one guess his personality wants and needs and adjust one's overt responses to supply them. With his superior, the inferior's most effective technique is frequently voluntary submission. The inferior may wear the mask of bluff fellowship, if he infers that this is what his superior wants, but in any case the personality of the inferior dances to the tune played by that of his superior.

For career purposes, the inferior allows his superior to invade his ego. He consults, he defers, and he flatters. He may raise some straw objection to the issue at hand, in order to allow his superior to state a positive position, and then agree wholeheartedly with him. In any case, the inferior will act as if the personal friendship of his superior were important to him, and so far as possible he will try to disguise his own intent of promotion. Modern folk speech is rich with indications of what much of that friendship is—"contacts," "yes man," "the fair-haired boy," "polishing the apple," "you've got to sell yourself first," and "it isn't what you know, it's who you know."

Charm of manner and skill in handling people—both within and without the employing organization—have become more important means to success than they ever were in the past. Nevertheless, modern bureaucracy has by no means eliminated hard work, fortitude, and technical ability from the consideration of who shall be advanced and who shall remain in his present position.

Equal with equal. Effectively handling one's equals within an organization is a delicate task. All are competing for favorable attention from their superiors. The person who competes in this way too blatantly will be criticized by his peers, and his work will be disparaged. In any organization, equals have a set of techniques ready to make miserable the life of the obvious bootlicker. Consequently, the effective manipulator not only affects cameraderie with his equals but also takes care not to discuss his ambitions to freely, and he refrains from praising his superior in too lush a fashion.

Superior with inferior. The literature for executives devotes many pages to the methods for handling inferiors with whom they have personal relationships. The importance of "managing" the personalities of others is stressed. Certain techniques advised are similar to those used by inferiors—tact, the development of personal charm, and the willingness to take the point of view of the other person. It has been said of one steel magnate that "his smile was worth a block of stock."

There are also specialized techniques. The overt expression of authoritarianism and paternalism is decried. In all relations and situations not directly concerned with the transaction of daily business, it is advised that the fact of superior position be disguised. One such book suggests that the bandleader's boss might beat the drum in the company band. The American executive is advised to be "democratic," to be a "regular fellow."

Psychic tensions. Personal relationships within an organization tend to be status-adulterated friendships which are not, like real friendships, a matter of free choice. Most people within an organization can no more choose their job associates than they can choose their relatives. All too often an individual finds himself in a job situation where the circumstances are not favorable for the development of genuine personal relationships.

Modern society has not developed sanctions of approval for using one's associates in an obvious, crude fashion. For most people, the intent of manipulation must be in part hidden from the self. This becomes impossible where a status-adulterated friendship resists transference to some semblance of real friendship. Tension is dammed up, in some cases neurosis aggravated. The self may be afflicted with a secret sense of working at cross-purposes.

What else could occur if one feigns an interest in another's ideas when one has no interest, defers when one wishes to aggress, participates when impelled to withdraw? In the case of real friendship, of course, it is often necessary to dissemble in such ways, but the sole purpose is to preserve a cherished relationship. If too much tension arises in consequence, the voluntary relationship is terminated. A status-adulterated friendship may not be so terminated, at least by the bureaucratic inferior.

Those who manipulate others and who are aware of allowing others to manipulate them, in personal relations, are constantly shifting the roles they play. They have difficulty in deciding what their personalities stand for since they must be ready to express new opinions, ideas, and points of view at a moment's notice. The important consideration becomes not the genuineness of self-expression, but its potential effect on others. A large number of people today are thus confused as to what they are. The widespread popularity of such books as Harry Emerson Fosdick's *On Being a Real Person* is provocative of thought in this context.

Communication

Old and new. The only effective lines of communication within the older society were direct and intimate, maintained by the family and village. Problems were defined by individuals or primary groups, and their solution was sought by individuals or primary groups. The sheer size and complexity of modern bureaucratic organization makes impos-

sible such direct communication. Consensus arrived at through direct participation is no longer the rule, either within an organization or with the general public outside of it.

In one sense, however, the older society possessed less cohesiveness. It was actually a series of localized societies, formally held together by a loose political federation and several small overlapping trade areas; each locality established only tenuous connections with individuals and groups beyond a narrow geographic radius. Nevertheless, despite this lack of formal integration, the various localities were united by moral consensus; the ideas, values, and economic activities of one locality differed very little from those of others.

In modern society, conversely, distant points and peoples are brought within formal contact through bureaucratic organization and the new technical devices of communication. Again, in contrast with the older society, ideas, values, economic activities, and thus moral consensus are widely divergent. Interests, loyalties, identifications, and attitudes tend to splinter along the planes of age grouping, occupational affiliation, regional location, and social class.

Mass society. Whatever formal integration modern society may manifest, the general public—whether made up at the moment of voters, consumers, contributors, or audience—tends to formlessness. "Mass society" is a term sometimes applied to what we have been calling "general public." Louis Wirth (25) has listed six characteristics of mass society. First, it is composed of vast aggregates of men, widely dispersed in space. Second, it is heterogeneous, with great diversity in occupation, interests, morality, standards of living, and power and prestige. Third, it is an aggregate of *anonymous* individuals. Millions of people may laugh at the same radio comedian, may be stirred by the same newsreel of a political speech, but this vast audience will not know one another or be conscious of one another, nor will those who are attempting to communicate with them have any certainty as to the composition of the audience. Fourth, the mass is not an organized group. It has no defined leadership or program of action, and since it is dispersed in space it cannot act concertedly except under powerful and administered stimuli. Fifth, this mass has no common traditions or customs, no uniform institutions and rules, at least to the extent which prevailed before modern bureaucratic organization. Finally, outside of its formal-bureaucratic positions in various organizations, this mass is made up of unattached individuals who are granted and accept only a limited personal involvement and responsibility. In one sense, it is because individual members of the general public are divorced from administered decisions that they can limit their own liability in those decisions. But being divorced from them, they are equally open to manipulation by powerful organizations.

Even within organizations, some of these problems of communication are apparent. Workers and followers, for example, are so far removed from the centers of decision making that they, as well as the general public, are reached only by posters, directives, speeches, and printed announcements and appeals. Personal interaction within most modern organizations is virtually impossible except between personnel who are placed fairly close together within the hierarchy of command.

The worker may remain uncertain whether his union leaders are really taking him out on strike to secure a higher wage for him, as they may claim, or to gain political advantage for themselves. The contributor to a national charity may not have access to the books of the organization, so he must accept on faith the statement of how much of his dollar contribution goes to feed the needy and how much goes to expand that charity's administrative force. The citizen may be informed by his newspaper what various federal agencies are doing, but he cannot find out who made important decisions or how or why they were made. The average voter has little actual control over either of the two political machines he has the political right to help into office. The individual in the general public, or at the bottom rung of an organization, stands alone and uninformed in the face of awesome power.

Effective action in the modern world requires organization, but the constant dilemma is that the individual, whether as member of the general public or as worker or follower within an organization, relinquishes direct control over the organization in direct proportion as it gains size, power, and effectiveness in performing its stated functions. In either role, the individual is faced by many organizations, some overlapping in functions with others, and some organized in opposition to other organizations, but all claiming that individual's loyalty and allegiance.

Impersonality and Responsibility

Where impersonality rules, as it must in modern organizations, the fixing of responsibility is either difficult or impossible. Decisions are made at or near the top of various hierarchies. Who made them and where they were made are frequently unanswered questions for workers, followers, and general public. Sometimes decisions are announced by delegated spokesmen, but at other times it is "the industry" which has decided, or "the government" which has declared. Indeed, critical decisions may be simply unannounced, and the reason given later is that this was "in the public interest."

Where impersonality rules, the sense of personal responsibility is reduced. It probably would be impossible, certainly difficult in the extreme, to explain why each decision was made and to permit public discussion of it while it was in process of negotiation and formation. Moreover, whether he is placed high or low, any individual within an

organization is part of a chain of command, and to be effective the total organization must seek nonquestioning acquiescence to decisions which come down the chain of command. Nevertheless, to the extent that an individual has been divorced from the decision-making process, to that extent will he feel relieved of responsibility.

Various opinion polls have shown that the American public feels very little sense of personal responsibility for the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. The thousands of workers who assembled the original bomb at Oak Ridge were not told what they were putting together. The news of the bombing of Hiroshima was announced in the press as an accomplished fact to a previously uninformed public.

The Place of Initiative

Whether by design or not, bureaucratic organization tends to dry up initiative all along the line. Usually a group, rather than an individual, makes decisions at the top of the given hierarchy. At the functionary level, "passing the buck" is a fairly regular practice, particularly in organizations which operate outside the price system. Labor unions, government agencies, and military organizations are not faced with so much pressure to keep costs down as are business and industry. Technical proficiency and output are more difficult to assess where the functionary level is allowed to grow relatively unchecked. Seniority governs promotion much more than do results. Even more than in industry and business, advancement depends upon favorable attention from superiors. Especially where ritual and regulation have assumed almost "sacred" character is initiative decried.

To the extent that a bureaucracy is highly organized, it must attain a high degree of certainty and predictability in behavior at the lower levels, a strict devotion to regulations. But unpredicted situations, situations which are not covered by present regulations, constantly crop up. "Thus, the very elements which conduce toward efficiency in general produce inefficiency in specific instances" (14, p. 564).

The functionary's life is planned in terms of a "graded career," through promotion by seniority, and by annual increments in salary and pensions, all of which tend to make the protection of his career his primary concern. The longer he remains with an organization the more he has a stake in timidity and conservatism, and the less inclined he becomes to "buck the system." Thus, in times of crisis, when situations arise which the regulations do not cover, inefficiency becomes characteristic of the large organization.

Large organization not only dries up initiative within itself, but it absorbs initiative from the general public as well. The citizen, consumer, follower, and contributor tend to be faced by a series of accomplished facts which they took no direct part in forming.

Latent Structures

The problems discussed thus far are experienced primarily by functionaries and the general public. The two problems which we shall now examine are experienced primarily, although not exclusively, by policy makers. The first of these is the growth of "latent structures" within organizations.

The "manifest structure" of any bureaucratic organization is the official one established by administrative policy. The chart of organization is decreed, the lines of authority set up, and new operating procedures and new goals are announced. But in spite of the official structure, in some cases because of it, various latent structures arise, which were never foreseen by policy makers and which operate behind the official structure.

Sometimes a group of workers come to identify with one another, regard themselves as a team, and increase or slow down production as the foreman or other minor official does or does not meet certain of their expressed demands or unexpressed wishes. Such in-group solidarity often resists the appeals of directing functionaries that workers compete with one another. Functionaries at times organize to sabotage the directives of new or unpopular policy makers—something which often occurs in the Federal civil service and rarely if ever occurs in big business, because in the latter case subordinates are easily discharged.

Those outside the organization, members of the general public or other organizations, frequently secure special favors by "breaking through red tape." Scandals over payments to persons in high government positions for favorable contracts appear in the news from time to time. The excuse sometimes offered is that it takes too long and the outcome is too uncertain if the "proper channels" are used. The political boss and his machine are illegal in municipal government, or at best quasi-legal, having no place in the formally constituted and elected government. It has been argued that the overlapping of functions in the legal municipal government makes those who wish to do business with it create the boss —someone who is always there and who can be relied upon to get the business transacted.

Men who unofficially serve as liaison personnel among large organizations have been called the "new entrepreneurs." They "fix" things between one business and another and between big business and the Federal government. They tread a "well-worn path between big business and the regulatory agencies of the federal government" (15, p. 438).

In any organization of appreciable size, there are unofficial relationships which usurp official power in bypassing the manifest structure. Old sergeants in the army, who have close personal relationships with high-ranking officers, frequently possess more real power than their own junior officers. "There is the official way, and the right way" is a phrase

popular in many organizations. Some college presidents, who spend a great deal of time away from the office making speeches and raising funds, gradually relinquish much day-to-day responsibility to their secretaries. In a few extreme cases, the secretary wields enough power to determine faculty promotions. "Always charm the secretary" is advice given to many young salesmen by their crew managers, the assumption being that secretaries have some control over who gets into the inner office, and in what order, and that they will transmit to their employers their personal reactions to callers.

Program Unification

Up to a certain point, the size of an organization is directly related to the degree of unity achieved, but beyond that point, the confusion of working at cross-purposes is likely to occur. One illustration must suffice, drawn from the largest organization in modern America—the Federal government.

The State Department, interested in building up the separate economies of those nations which have come within the power orbit of the United States, was at year's end, 1949, advocating that American exports of various perishable agricultural products to these countries be reduced. The Department of Agriculture, on the other hand, charged with the responsibility of maintaining the American farmer's income at a high level, was at the very same time announcing that it would subsidize European consumption of American oranges "to reduce price-depressing supplies in this country" (10).

This type of problem tends to occur only in those vast organizations which are extended horizontally as well as vertically, where policy makers of suborganizations serve as functionaries to policy makers in the central hierarchy. In such a situation, independent decisions made in one suborganization often run counter to decisions made in other suborganizations.

THE INDUSTRIAL WORKER

The industrial worker is spared many of the hazards peculiar to the white-collar employee. His job does not require him to manipulate other people; instead, he handles things. His promotion on the job is much less dependent upon "pleasing" his superior than is that of the white-collar man. The shopman's competence can be measured directly by his skill in handling tools, the continuity of the operation of his machine, or the ease and dexterity with which he performs his manual task. He is thus spared much of the white-collar man's compromising of integrity in "getting ahead." Moreover, unlike the white-collar man, he has a strong

union to stand between him and the policy makers of the organization which employs him.

On the other hand, although mass production has come to characterize the entire economy, it reaches its apogee on the factory floor. The industrial worker is also farther removed than the white-collar employee from the *final* product. The white-collar man, at any level, deals with people in conjunction with the final product. He wholesales or retails the final product; he promotes it in some way, such as writing the advertising for it; or as secretary, typist, or filing clerk, he at least handles the routine details connected with the final product, and gains some knowledge of the activities and problems of superiors who direct his operations. Although the white-collar job is atomized, although it is part of a mass-production process, the white-collar man still has some awareness of how he is related to the final product.

The industrial worker is more divorced from the final product than any other type of employee. He has maximum difficulty in relating himself to the total enterprise. At one and the same time his job function is more separated than the white-collar man's from that of work associates in uniform repetitive movements, and he has less social contact with work associates. Isolation of both kinds has created a psychological plight that is more or less general throughout modern society, but it is especially acute for the industrial worker.

The Break in the Skill Hierarchy

In one sense, the industrial worker is the smallest part of a total enterprise, and he is the most replaceable part. More and more the machine robs him of the satisfaction of a skill, and the rationalization of industry separates him from others in the productive process while it formally integrates his job function with the job functions of others. Perhaps his most serious problem, however, is the "break in the skill hierarchy," which is one specific manifestation of both social isolation and isolation from the final product.

Where formerly he progressively learned a series of skills in the hope of becoming a master mechanic or foreman, he is now assigned to the operation of an automatic machine, and training in one operation does not prepare him for a higher level of performance and status. The question of diminishing opportunity to rise upward in the status scale is examined in Chap. 15. For the present, suffice it to say that the industrial worker has less opportunity to make the "American Dream" come true than he did in the past. The situation which now faces him has been analyzed in connection with a local strike which occurred in the shoe industry.

We believe that the break in the skill hierarchy contributed importantly to the outbreak of the strike, to the course it took, and, in particular, to the coming of the union. The hierarchy of crafts which once organized the relations of the workers and provided a way of life for the shoe workers was really an age-grade system. Youngsters served their hard apprenticeship and, as neophytes, learned their task; even more importantly they were taught to respect the skills they had learned and those they looked forward to learning. Above all, they acquired respect and admiration for the older men above them who had acquired the skills and who occupied the proud positions of journeymen and master craftsmen. These youngsters aspired to achieve for themselves a similar high position and respect. Each young man, in direct face-to-face interaction with those above him, imitated and learned a way of life while being highly motivated by the strong desire to escape the irksome limitations of his present low position and to attain the higher place where he would have the satisfaction of making his own decisions and possess the prestige and pay consequent to such great eminence. By the time he had learned how to do the things needed to equip himself for advancement, enough time had passed to mature him sufficiently to act the part of a man. . . .

During this preliminary period he learned that he was a craftsman, with a particular place in the whole system, and that there were responsibilities and obligations he had to learn which would give him certain rights and privileges. Thus, while he internalized this behavior and all its values and their many subtleties and learned what he was as a man, he became an inextricable member of the honorable fraternity of those who made, and knew how to make, shoes. In this system, workers and managers were indissolubly interwoven into a common enterprise, with a common set of values. In this system, the internal personal structure of workers and managers was made up of very much the same apparatus, and their personalities were reinforced by the social system of shoemaking.

In learning to respect the skill of the master craftsman, the apprentice learned to respect himself. He had security in his job, but he had even greater personal security because he had learned how to respect his job. And because he was a member of an age-graded male fraternity made up of other men like himself who had the knowledge and necessary skills to make shoes, he possessed that feeling of absolute freedom and independence and of being autonomous that comes from being in a discipline. He spent his life acquiring virtue, prestige, and respect, learning as he aged and climbed upward, and at the same time teaching those who were younger than he and who aspired to be like him.

Slowly this way of life degenerated and the machine took the virtue and respect from the worker, at the same time breaking the skill hierarchy which dominated his occupation. There was no longer a period for young men to learn to respect those in the age grade above them and in so doing to become self-respecting workers. The "ladder to the stars" was gone and with it much of the structure of the "American Dream."

When the whole age-grade structure of craftsmanship had almost entirely collapsed and the American shoe worker was thereby denied his share of the "American Dream" he and his kind were ready for any mass movement which

would strike at those they charged, in their own minds, with the responsibility for their present unhappy condition. Much of this behavior was not conscious. Much it was feeling rather than thought. . . . It seems certain, however, that American workers, taught from childhood that those who apply themselves to their craft and practice the ethics of the middle class would be rewarded by achievement and success, would rebel and strike back out of sheer frustration when they found out that the "American Dream" no longer was attainable for them and that the hard facts belied the beautiful words they had been taught. It seems even more likely that the effects of the break in the skill hierarchy were potent forces which contributed their full share to the workers' striking and the union's becoming their champion. [23, pp. 87–89]

What the Worker Wants

Many researchers are convinced that labor trouble is naïvely interpreted if the demands usually made by organized labor for better working conditions, shorter hours, and higher wages are accepted at their face value as "what the worker wants." It would seem safe to assume that what the worker wants is what the majority of Americans indicate by their striving behavior that they want—success, prestige, high income, respect, and power. However, these desires are utterly beyond the reach of almost every man on the factory floor. As Warner and Low have hinted in the long passage quoted above, the bitterness of struggle over high wages and shorter hours may be in part an unconscious "striking back" for being denied—not by management but by fate—what can never be attained.

The interview situation. It is safe to infer that the industrial worker wants what most Americans, by their training, are led to want. The difficulty in proceeding from this point is the elusive quality of the verb "want." A naïve sixteen-year-old girl will freely disclose that she wants to become a movie actress. A more sophisticated young woman of the same age, who equally yearns for the wealth and glamour of the Hollywood star, has learned that adults look upon such expressed desires as childish, and she may even refuse to admit to herself how much she wants to become an actress. Psychoanalysts have discovered a swarming cavern of secret desires in even normal people. All of us, perhaps, are possessed by some fantasies and wishes which we would hesitate to disclose even to intimate friends.

It then becomes obvious that in a formal interview the wants expressed may not be what one "really wants." A person will tell an interviewer what he wants in terms of the structured situation. This structured situation, to the person interviewed, is made up of two elements: first, the desire to maintain the respect of the person asking the questions; second, the limitation of expressed wants *to those which have a reasonable chance of being fulfilled within the boundaries of his abilities, his*

present position, and his present relationships with various individuals and groups.

What he says he wants. With the qualifications noted above in mind, what does the industrial worker want when he is interviewed? A number of surveys indicate that job security, the chance to advance, kindly treatment, and the opportunity to feel important all rank consistently high. The majority of applicants at the Nashville Office of the Tennessee Department of Employment Security place security far ahead of any other consideration; beyond the question of how permanent the job is likely to be, other considerations assume the following order: pay, advancement, type of work, supervisor, physical working conditions, job benefits (insurance, pension schemes, and the like), company to be worked for, coworkers, and number of working hours.

As the education of the applicant increases, however, advancement and type of work rank higher, while considerations of supervisor, coworkers, and number of working hours decline—showing a clear relationship between education and ambition. On the other hand, as age increases, pay, supervisor, and working conditions rise in importance, while considerations of advancement and type of work decline—showing that with advancing age comfort and emotional security supersede opportunity to get ahead in the motivation of the industrial worker. As for sex differences, men assign greater value to advancement, type of work, and benefits than do women, who are much more concerned about the personality of their supervisor than are men (21).

In a study of reasons why workers shift to other jobs, a random sample of 450, or about 1 per cent of all manual workers in a middle-sized New England manufacturing center, were interviewed (18). The most noteworthy discovery was that, for the most part, manual workers are not motivated according to classical economic theory. They do not view themselves as selling their labor to the highest bidder in the market. Unlike the middle-class careerist, who thinks in long-range terms, the average manual worker has a "limited occupational horizon." Having less opportunity to get ahead, after he enters the job market he vaguely fumbles around until he finds a "good" job within an extremely narrow range of personal experience. He depends more upon tips from fellow workers than upon the United States Employment Service or private employment agencies to make a shift, and he moves from his present position more because he is dissatisfied with it than to seek a greater opportunity elsewhere. He does not welcome the chore of making new friends and having to walk to work along a different street. The permanency of a job, like the permanency of a marriage, can apparently in large measure be built upon habit.

Only about a third of these workers expressed any real desire for advancement. The researchers believe that the majority have not so much

ceased to be ambitious as they have adjusted to reality. Also, the modern trend in seniority provisions, pension plans, and paid vacations and the fact that most companies upgrade only those workers who have worked for them for a long time reduce the desire to look elsewhere, no matter how widespread conscious frustration may be.

Social relations on the job assume primary importance.

> The worker seems to be at least as much interested in leading an agreeable life on the job as he is in the income which the job yields. It is important to him that the job should not be too arduous from a physical standpoint, that it should have some intrinsic interest, that he should be given fair treatment by the foreman and other people in management, and that he should have pleasant personal relations with other workers in his department. [18, p. 84]

He wants, above all, "fair treatment" in comparison with his work associates.

Interestingly enough, the presence or absence of "compensatory" schemes that management has introduced in recent years—medical care and hospitalization, paid vacations and holidays, recreational programs, and good rest rooms and cafeterias—had no discernible effect on the decision to move from one job to another. Not one worker who had quit a job cited the absence of such programs as the reason.

Industrial Sociology

The new field of industrial sociology has made some valuable analyses of the job as a context of social relations (8, 19, 20, and 24). The central concern of industrial sociology "at the present time is undoubtedly the study of the social structure of industry" (17, p. 384). Industrial sociology has been concerned not so much with bureaucracy, as such, as with what might be called the "informal social structure"—the worker's relations with others on the job and the carry-over of attitudes derived from his personal relations off the job *into* the job.

Roethlisberger's work at the Hawthorne plant of Western Electric may be cited as typical of the sociological orientation (20). At first, his research group had tried to discover relationships between physical job factors and morale. Various work groups, for example, had been subjected to different intensities of illumination; their reactions were studied, but no validated results appeared. Later, girls working on relay assembly of telephones were systematically tested in teams. They were given prepared lunches, they were provided rest periods, their hours of work were reduced; in each case, output increased. But when any and even all of these incentives were eliminated, and hours of work increased to 48, output still increased.

Roethlisberger attributes these uniformities (which were not anticipated by the researchers) to the fact that these girls, even when new

privileges were taken away, still maintained high work morale because they had been made to feel important by being singled out for the experiment. People continued to ask them questions about their health and how they felt about various matters which interested them. In other words, with or without physical privileges, they were made to feel that others were personally concerned about them. The meaning of a change made on the job is more important than the fact of change itself, Roethlisberger avers. Some may regard this as a rediscovery of the Sermon on the Mount; nevertheless, this and other similar research results have revolutionized ideas about what the worker wants and raised the hope that the plight of the modern worker may be alleviated.

The main finding of industrial sociology is that workers, like all other human beings, are primarily motivated by sentiment and loyalty, by the desire to belong and to feel important to other people, rather than by "rational" considerations of wages, hours, efficiency, and physical comfort. Roethlisberger has succinctly phrased the central problem: to the extent that management has achieved technical efficiency, to that extent management has undermined teamwork and spontaneous cooperation.

> The top of the organization is trying to communicate with the bottom in terms of the logical jargon and cold discriminations of the technical specialist, the engineer, the accountant, etc. The bottom of the organization, in turn, is trying to communicate with the top through its own peculiar language of social sentiments and feelings. Neither side understands the other very well. To the bottom the precise language of efficiency, instead of transmitting understanding, sometimes conveys feelings of dismay and insecurity. [20, p. 63]

It must be admitted that thus far sociologists have been much more successful in analyzing this problem than in finding solutions to it. Several inferences may be drawn as to the reasons why. In the first place, industrial sociologists have either been hired by management or they have secured management's cooperation in the conduct of their research. They tend to speak the language of management. The value of high production "itself has probably structured more research in American industrial sociology than perhaps any other single value, frequently causing it to be classified by some as managerial sociology . . ." (9, p. 618). A great deal of "managerial sociology" strongly implies that one way for management to combat unionism is to take an "interest" in their workers. The usual search is for some formula which will adjust the worker to his present position, *as defined by management*. Roethlisberger, for example, makes morale and increased output almost identical. Such a limited focus of attention will hardly solve the problems which face the industrial worker, at least as *he* experiences them.

In the second place, an irreducible clash of interests between man-

agement and worker, within the reality of their present situation, has been glossed over. Many general recommendations which have been made by industrial sociologists assume uninterrupted "good relations." For example, management has been urged to encourage "autonomous groups" or primary-group working teams on the factory floor, as a sovereign means to increase production. But, although some studies report increased output where workers have formed primary-group teams, other studies have disclosed that such teams slow down when a layoff is feared to be imminent owing to a piling up of unsold production. No amount of earnest preaching about the "mutual benefits of cooperation and good will" will dispose of the fact that management treats wages as a cost to be held down while labor treats wages as an income to be increased.

Management and the Worker-Citizen

It is questionable how much management can reduce the worker's social and psychological difficulties so long as management must retain its primary goal of efficient production and reduced costs. From management's point of view, "the individual must adapt his behavior to his place in the structure; he must adapt himself to the needs of the job rather than the job to himself" (8, pp. 6–7). We do not know at present how far it is possible to "combine the productive efficiency of the industrial machine with stable and satisfying social relationships" (17, p. 389). And as we have already seen, it was the industrial system *itself* which created the worker's social and psychological difficulties. It separated the job from home and neighborhood, from family and friends; it divorced the worker from the final product.

Perhaps the sharpest dividing line between the interests of management and of the worker is the uncertain and equivocal legitimacy of management's function. Managerial power today is "illegitimate," in the sense that it has no definite responsibility to society as a whole, nor is it controlled by a principle acceptable to society as a whole. In the earlier days of the industrial revolution, there was such a principle—private property—and management and ownership were unified. As management and ownership continue to split, no new basis of legitimacy appears; both owners and workers feel that arbitrary and unlimited power is wielded over them (5, p. 97). The new industrial enterprise is neither responsible to the state, as is monopoly, nor is it controlled as once it was by the ethics and open market of free enterprise (11, pp. 183–184).

The industrial worker's job, which removes him from ancient primary groups and reduces the intensity of his loyalty to these groups, has thereby made his job more important to him. At the same time, the enterprise rather than the family and neighborhood tends to encompass his life, and in this sense "rules" him as a form of government. But he has little voice in this new form of "government"; the essence of government

is the inclusion of all citizens in a common political body which is an end in itself and which defines the outside limits of the rights and duties of all—something which the industrial enterprise does not and at the present time cannot do.

This problem will remain whether management becomes more paternalistic with its workers or the unions continue to usurp managerial functions. No matter how paternalistic management may become, it has an impersonal objective which must take precedence over all other objectives—the economic performance of the enterprise. It is only during periods of economic boom that management can afford paternalism. On the other hand, if a union "assumes the functions of management it can no longer represent the worker against the enterprise" (7, p. 78).

Whether a new industrial system will ever develop which once again unites the worker and the product, which once again makes the job an exercise of the whole man, as family member, neighbor, and citizen, remains to be seen. No trend toward an organic integration to replace the present formal integration of industry is as yet in evidence. In the meantime, however formalized and separate from the worker the labor unions themselves have become, they remain of vital importance to him. If management is not "legitimate," some opposed power is an absolute essential to maintain the area of freedom which remains. His union gives the worker a niche from which he can move to resist and limit the inroads of managerial control.

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CHAPTER 13 *The Politico-economic Realm*

> The world has never had a good definition of the word liberty, and the American people, just now, are much in want of one. We all declare for liberty, but in using the same word we do not all mean the same thing. With some the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself, and the product of his labor; while with others the same word may mean for some men to do as they please with other men, and the product of other men's labor. Here are two, not only different but incompatible things, called by the same name—liberty. And it follows that each of the things is, by the respective parties, called by two different and incompatible names—liberty and tyranny.
>
> —ABRAHAM LINCOLN

BIG BUSINESS

Since the Civil War, despite occasional political attempts to "bust the trusts," business enterprises have grown in size and power. The control of production and distribution steadily concentrates in fewer and fewer corporations. At the present time, one company, U.S. Steel, produces one-third of this nation's steel. That one company produces more steel than Russia, Britain, and West Germany combined.

In 1941, 74 per cent of all war contracts were assigned to less than one-half of 1 per cent of the nation's manufacturing establishments (11). The total assessed valuation of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company —to take one extreme example—is almost as large as that of the states of Connecticut and Tennessee combined. At the end of 1947, almost half of the United States' net capital assets was controlled by 113 corporations. There were 13 industries in which better than 60 per cent of all manufacturing facilities were owned by three companies in each industry. The big four tobacco companies owned 87.8 per cent of all that industry's manufacturing facilities, and Armour and Swift controlled 54.7 per cent of the nation's meat-packing capital assets (19, p. 53). "Today about 200 of the most powerful manufacturing corporations in the United States own approximately half of the corporate manufacturing assets of the nation (8, p. 5).

Along with the trend toward ever larger business enterprise, the role of small business declines. In 1942 and 1943, one-man firms and those with less than four employees accounted for more than 95 per cent of all business failures (5, p. 45). Attempts to form new small-business units,

other than local retail shops, become increasingly hazardous. Especially in manufacturing has large-scale operation and competition so lowered unit costs of production that millions of dollars are needed to break into most fields, from soap to automobiles. Newcomers require a large initial capital investment—for buildings and equipment, research, and the administration of sales outlets. Kaplan (5) remains optimistic about the future of small business, but assigns it the minor role of such local services as gasoline stations, bakeries, and cleaning and dyeing shops.

It is frequently claimed that new inventions continue to open up new horizons of opportunity. The statement, while true, is more applicable to corporate than to individual opportunity. Television, for example, did not go through the evolution of production followed by the automobile, from Henry Ford's little bicycle shop to the Willow Run assembly line. Television was developed by inventors and engineers hired by the big radio corporations; it was placed in immediate mass production and distributed from its very inception on a nationwide basis. Plastics, electronics, and atomic energy have all had a similar history.

Managerial Enterprise °

Like most large-scale social trends, the development of managerial enterprise was not planned by any individual or group. Several men who led the movement, like J. Ogden Armour, firmly believed in and continued to preach "free enterprise," while at the same time the march of competitive events was forcing him, along with others, to undermine free enterprise (6, pp. 26–27). Modern big business is neither monopoly, as its adversaries insist, nor free enterprise, as its spokesmen claim. Monopolies include governmental agencies or public services regulated by governmental agencies, such as power and light companies, public telephone and telegraph services, and public transportation systems which have been granted a governmental franchise. Monopolies employ about one-sixth of the working force.

Free enterprise, in the sense that scarce articles are exchanged or bought and sold in the market place, is manned by farmers and owners of small businesses such as retail stores and restaurants, by most professional men, by domestic servants, and by speculators. Within this relatively small and dwindling area of the economy, prices result from the pressure of demand and the adequacy of supply, and prices tend to shift from day to day accordingly. Flexibility and mobility are characteristic of this form of capital, which predominated throughout the nineteenth century. Free enterprise now includes about one-third of the country's industry.

Almost all big business today, however, is managerial enterprise,

° This term is borrowed from the title of a book, 6.

which represents large capital investment and policies dominated by continuity of operation rather than by immediate profit taking (6). Managerial enterprise through research and advertising seeks to *create* a demand that will be constant enough to allow planned production *with prices determined in advance.* General Motors, for example, "first posits a reasonable rate of return that it might hope to earn on its capital investment over a period of years, good and bad; then it fixes upon a 'standard' volume that it hopes similarly to average over these same years. It then arrives at a price—a 'standard' price—which will earn that return on that volume of business" (15, p. 88). All organized industry in the United States is administered in a similar way. Managerial enterprise represents about one-half of our total economy, and it is the dynamic half, the one to which the rest of the economy must gear itself.

Managerial enterprise wields tremendous power, but, unlike monopoly, it is competitive. Each radio corporation, for example, competes with other radio corporations, and all of them compete with the automobile manufacturers for the consumer's entertainment dollar. Other industries are faced with a similar situation. Although managerial enterprise is competitive, it *controls* the market as free enterprise never did. Various companies expand from production into distribution, and vice versa, and through research, advertising, and rapid delivery they can predict what can be sold, where, and when. Managerial enterprise has brought us an unparalleled standard of living, since unit costs are low and prices can find ever lower levels from the drive to a greater volume of sales.

BIG GOVERNMENT

Government has steadily grown in power and influence since the birth of the American republic. Today there is no citizen and hardly an organization which operates outside its orbit of power. There is scarcely an activity—whether dialing a phone number, buying and consuming food, going to the movies, boarding a train, fishing, turning a water spigot, caring for children, or speaking in public and writing for a public—that is not more or less supervised and more or less controlled by government.

The Politico-economic Realm Is One

The older distinction between political science and economics has indeed become academic. Agriculture cannot be studied without considering the political activities of the Farm Bureau, the Department of Agriculture, and the Federal government's program to maintain high food prices through the allocation of tax moneys. Modern banking is indissoluble from the regulation of interest on government bonds, from the

policies of the Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board. The Taft-Hartley Act, the National Labor Relations Board, the Wage Stabilization Board—through these and other governmental mechanisms organized management and organized labor cooperate, compete, and conflict. International trade is closely regulated by the State Department and the Tariff Commission. Corporations *and* the Securities Exchange Commission, consumer prices *and* the Office of Price Stabilization *and* the Interstate Commerce Commission *and* the Federal Communications Commission *and* the 48 state utilities commissions must be considered together.

The Federal government's budget for the fiscal year 1950–1951 was over $70 billion, that for 1951–1952 is over $90 billion. Governmental spending is second only to managerial enterprise in its dynamic effect on the economy. The Bureau of the Budget has estimated that the Federal government will actually spend (not merely authorize) $71 billion in the fiscal year July, 1951, to June, 1952, and $92 billion in 1952–1953. In 1950, the total national income—wages, salaries, and business earnings —was $230 billion. Through regulation and fiscal policy, governmental control over the economy has extended farther in the past twenty years than in all previous American history.

Government and the State in History

Although the state is a fairly recent development, there is no society which lacks government. In that area of social life defined as the public interest, government is the supreme agent authorized to regulate conduct. Order in any society is ultimately maintained by legitimized force vested in government, which intervenes when the informal safeguards of conscience, moral norms, and public opinion fail to check conduct defined as antisocial.

Government is rudimentary in preliterate societies. Informal controls suffice, for the most part. There is often no person or group that has a vested authority. In such cases, however, a flagrant case of adultery, a murder, or military attack may raise to temporary authority certain men to determine punishment, interpret customary law, or lead. However, when population grows and spreads over a wider territory, when a more complex division of labor and an impersonal market economy undermine tribal primary-group social relations, then also appear the formal codification of political rules and assumed or delegated political authority. Specialization of tasks, increased wealth, and the end of universal personal relationships within a society make possible, as well as necessary, the growth of centralized political power.

The state arises out of centralized power in government, and some scholars have claimed that war universally brings both centralized power and the state into being. Whether this assertion is valid or not, the fact

remains that war has accelerated the centralization of political power in all times and places. War requires discipline and obedience of the majority and invests the minority with authority and leadership. The rise of all modern states has been at least accompanied by conquest and resistance to conquest. All modern nation-state boundaries, and the shifts that occur from time to time across them, have been formed through either war or the threat of war.

The state arises when centralized political power manages and integrates the defined public interests of all the citizens of a nation, when this power is legitimized in the eyes of the majority of the ruled, and when they come to regard their nation's sovereignty as the supreme collective end in the midst of a permanent condition of war and threat of war. Exactly when the state arose in history, however, is a matter for debate. It has plausibly been argued that the modern nation-state did not appear until the end of the eighteenth century, along with political democracy.° From this point of view, the modern nation-state awaited the full development of three revolutionary ideas.

The state above all. Patriotism or love of country was not new, but the idea of national self-determination, of state sovereignty untrammeled by foreign influence of any kind, and of the citizen's total identification with his country—this idea, that the citizen owed his first and primary loyalty to the nation-state—was new. Not until the end of the eighteenth century in Europe was there a formal integration of economic life and communication efficient and strong enough to weld a binding national consciousness. This national consciousness in part also developed as a substitute for the *mystique* of the no-longer existent universal Church. The nation-state gradually came to rival the universal God as an object of worship (7, pp. 574–575).

Conscription in time of war. Wars had previously been fought by small professional armies in the employ of dynastic monarchs. The French Revolution and Napoleon's decrees forced the citizen into uniform, to fight for national ideals and national glory. Napoleon's France was defeated—it could only have been defeated—by other conscripted armies, and the pattern was set which has persisted to the present day.

It is probably no accident that political democracy and conscription developed together. Not until the late eighteenth-century democratic

° It has also been argued that the outline of the modern nation-state emerged with the Protestant Reformation, which by war and threat of war broke the unity of Christendom and the power of the Church over economic and political affairs. In part, the Reformation was a declaration of national independence and of freedom from universalism and from papal control over princes and people alike. Later, in the first part of the seventeenth century, the Thirty Years' War saw Catholic-Protestant coalitions aligned against Catholic-Protestant coalitions—for the national glory of France, Sweden, and so on. In other words, the choice of the end of the eighteenth century as the point of origin of the modern nation-state is arbitrary.

states were formed was a complete identification between nation and individual citizen achieved; only then, in other words, was the state's demand that *all* must serve legitimized. Conscription awaited the French Revolution, but a British historian has claimed that "totalitarian warfare" was born with American democracy!

> By total war we mean a war in which it is recognized that the combatants are not only the selected "chessmen" called soldiers and sailors but the whole populations of the countries concerned. Where shall we find the beginnings of this new outlook? Perhaps in the treatment meted out at the end of the Revolutionary War by the victorious British-American colonists to those among themselves who had sided with the mother country. These United Empire Loyalists [Tories] were expelled bag and baggage—men, women and children—from their homes after the war was over. The treatment they received is in marked contrast with that meted out, twenty years before, by Great Britain, to the conquered French Canadians, who not only retained their homes but were allowed to preserve their legal system and their religious institutions. This first example of "totalitarianism" is significant, for the victorious American colonists were the first democratized nation of our Western society. [21, pp. 286–287] *

Individual liberty. The other two revolutionary ideas expanded the power of government and tended to merge individual citizen and nation-state. This one, conversely, proclaimed the limits of that merger, and throughout the nineteenth century the citizen was in many ways "more free" than he had been prior to the rise of the nation-state. Particularly in the United States did this idea take precedence over the other two, for worship of the nation-state was a slow development, and even a partial conscription was not attempted until the Civil War.

The feudal system had created fixed classes, and governments and national economies were controlled in uneasy balance between the Church hierarchy and the nobility. Then the rising entrepreneurial or "capitalist" class made common concert with the monarchs of their various countries, first to break the political and economic power of the Church and later to gain greater freedom of economic action from the nobility. Nevertheless, many restrictions survived to check the dynamism of a new and expanding economy. Dynastic wars and dynastic splendor funneled much of the new wealth into what was felt to be burdensome taxation. From time to time, the monarchs imposed price, wage, commodity, and trade restrictions, as the Church and the feudal barons had done during the medieval period. The old landed aristocracy, shorn of most of its hereditary powers and thus deprived of any "real" function except to adorn the courts, remained an economic drain. The rise

* From *A Study of History* by Arnold J. Toynbee, abridged by D. C. Somervell. Copyright 1946 by Oxford University Press, Inc.

of political democracy probably received its strongest impetus from the demand by middle-class entrepreneurs for economic freedom.

Economic factors alone do not channel the stream of history. The new pattern of the nation-state was formed in France, England, and the United States by men who proclaimed revolutionary social ideals. Their vision spanned more than the countinghouse. They saw the nation-state as a means to weld together a common unity and to strike governmental shackles from economic endeavor, but they also asserted a large number of noneconomic rights to be inviolate by any authority. They built checks and balances into state constitutions to protect the individual from majority as well as minority oppression. The founding fathers had an ambivalent attitude toward the majority, and they sought to devise an instrument that would safeguard the citizen against tyranny even from that direction.

The Trend toward State Control in America

The dynamic of the new economy, which at one time undermined state control, at a later time encouraged state control, a statement that may seem paradoxical but actually is not. Variables in social science more often than not change in character with time and attendant circumstances.

Political power inevitably "interferes" in the economy. The infant government of the United States, like all governments, pursued a course of expanding power and sovereignty, a course that required tinkering with the economy. Even Thomas Jefferson—that apostle of agrarianism and laissez-faire advocate of little government, the earlier enemy of Alexander Hamilton's policy of protectionism for manufacturers—later came to support the protection of infant industries with "adequate" tariff provisions. He later supported a balanced national economic order of agriculture, commerce, and industry, all to be centrally directed by the Federal government in the interests of the entire country.

Actually, very few supporters of the ideal of *laissez faire*—complete economic freedom from "governmental interference"—mean what they say, at least in literal terms. The demand when made is not so much for a hands-off policy as it is for a return to some earlier and now completely accepted level of "governmental interference." Most present-day advocates of *laissez faire* do not question the Federal government's issuance of money or handling of the mails, nor do they demand that the national forest preserves be thrown open to "free competition"; most of them do not attack the Pure Food and Drug Act or deny the government's right to collect income taxes and regulate the sale of stocks and bonds. Yet each of these measures was at one time denounced as un-American, as an invasion of American rights and liberties. Each of them at one time had the present status of "socialized medicine."

War. America's wars, along with those of other nation-states, have steadily grown in magnitude and cost. Over three-fourths of the modern American tax dollar goes to pay for past, present, and future wars. In Julius Caesar's time, "the average cost of killing a man in war was 75¢; in World War I, it was $21,000, in World War II $75,000, and the cost is still going up" (20, p. 11). Moreover, the entire nation must now be mobilized for the given war effort. Many "individual rights" are taken away by government during wartime, including much "freedom of speech and the press"; the economy is regulated, from production through distribution to consumption, a great deal more than in peacetime. War not only concentrates more power and control in government but also has that effect in big business. During World War II, for example, the Department of Justice shelved all pending antitrust prosecutions, for industry-wide production allocations and patent pools are necessary for the tight integration that big-scale war production requires. War's insatiable demand for goods of all kinds inevitably makes big business bigger.

Technological change. Power and control have concentrated in government in part through the sheer magnitude of technological change, and the complex and unwieldy management problems which have accompanied such change. One example will suffice. When commercial broadcasting started in the early twenties, the air was free, and stations could broadcast on any wave length. Set owners had the unhappy opportunity to receive a speech, a band concert, and a radio ham's confidences at the same point on their dials. It was the commercial broadcasters themselves who demanded and got limited governmental control of broadcasting from the Federal Communications Commission.

Selfish interests. From the birth of the American republic, "selfish interests" have lobbied to secure privileges that only the government can bestow. The granting of such privileges concentrates power in government, and so does the new civil service machinery which more often than not is set up to administer them. Often, the passage of such legislation only whets the appetite of other selfish interests which are temporarily left out, perhaps even penalized by it.

For example, the present subsidies that government pays to the farmer are said to be an "adjustment" to his losses from paying high prices for manufactured goods. The farmer pays high prices for manufactured goods in part because manufactured goods are "protected" by high tariff rates, and by such "business" legislation as the Webb-Pomerene Act, the Miller-Tydings Act, and the Robinson-Patman Act. The air and shipping lines have their subsidies, and the industrial worker has his social security and legislated minimum wage and government-set wage floors in different industries. Like these others, however, the farmer must pay the price of reduced freedom of action for his special privileges. For his subsidy the farmer must sign agreements with Depart-

ment of Agriculture representatives on what and how much he may grow.

There are selfish interests in as well as outside of government. The legislators of a representative democracy operate on two levels—international affairs and the national welfare, on the one hand, and securing enough for their own local constituents so that the latter will be satisfied and will return them to office, on the other. That is why legislators consistently demand that the budget and taxes be reduced but at the same time resist any effort to strike out specific appropriations. Legislators go along with the "pork-barrel" appropriations of their fellow legislators, so that the latter in turn will acquiesce to their own. Taxes now absorb one-third of America's national income. America may soon approach the critical and economy-crippling tax rate of Great Britain, which drains off more than 40 per cent of the national income annually, cheapens the currency, and speeds inflation along. Up to a certain point, taxation does aid to control inflation by siphoning off purchasing power. But beyond that indeterminate point, workers demand pay increases and farmers demand subsidy increases to offset further taxation, and businessmen pass tax increases along to customers through price rises which increase their gross income and protect net after taxes. Unlimited taxation leads to unlimited inflation.

. . . the Congressional Record contains at least one report of a congressman to his constituents in which he states that in the fiscal year 1951 he secured $80,000,000 of direct appropriations for his district; authorizations of rivers-and-harbors and flood-control projects totaling $681,000,000; electric-power projects totaling $47,000,000; and Rural Electrification Administration loans of $8,851,000. He is working for other rivers-and-harbors and flood-control projects totaling $460,000,000. During his eight years in Congress he says that he has secured for his district direct appropriations of at least $265,000,000. [12, p. 94] *

If the present rate of spending continues for very long, the American people will have to accept a drastically lowered standard of living as one price for their "privileges."

The "welfare state" is popular. The economy has developed ever larger units of production and distribution. Economic reality for the majority is no longer, as it was in the early nineteenth century, ownership and control of one's own farm, business, or craft, but instead a hired status in a large bureaucracy. Security is no longer an individual matter; in large measure, it is no longer an individual responsibility. The specter of mass unemployment has made efforts by the government to prevent it popular with the growing mass of hired workers, regardless of the economists'

* Reprinted from an article which appeared in *The Saturday Evening Post*, Sept. 1, 1951; by permission of the author, Roswell Magill.

quarreling among themselves about the worth and advisability of such action. Also popular is government intervention in areas of living away from the job—public housing (15 agencies deal with it), education, and medical care, and such programs as old-age assistance and aid to dependent children.

There are two major political parties in America and in Great Britain; one in each country has been traditionally "conservative," the other traditionally "liberal." In both countries, however, the conservative parties in recent years—although they continue to attack the "wasteful expenditures" on the record of their opponents—have promised almost exactly the same special-privilege measures as their opponents. Unless they did so, it is doubtful that they could ever reach and hold political office.

It does not matter that the *London Economist* has shown that in 1950 lower-income British families who earned less than $1,400 a year paid out more in taxes than they received in social services. Apparently it does not matter that the upper-income brackets in both countries are presently taxed to the hilt, that a total confiscation of their incomes would squeeze out only a little more revenue, and that future spending *must* depend upon taxes paid by lower-income families. It does not matter, in a word, that what the welfare state hands out must finally be paid for by those who receive, because most taxes are hidden while special privileges are not.

Taxation and State Power

The amount of national wealth appropriated in the form of taxes is the clearest measure of the power of the state. The extent of taxation is



FIG. 22. Not only does the taxpayer pay more, but more of what he pays goes to the Federal government. (Reprinted from *U.S. News & World Report*, an independent weekly news magazine published at Washington. Copyright 1951. United States News Publishing Corporation, Oct. 12, 1951.)

the extent of governmental control. Taxes, and therefore both the cost of government and the concentration of power and control in government, have in recent years increased at a geometric rate. Federal, state, and local taxes in 1951 absorbed about 32 per cent of the national income; taxes scheduled for 1952 would absorb 35 per cent (10). Another measure of power concentration is the constant tendency for the Federal government to take an ever larger slice of *each* tax dollar. As recently as 1912, the Federal government took only 27.6 per cent of each tax dollar, the state governments 14.5 per cent, and local governments 57.9 per cent; in 1947, the Federal government took 75 per cent, and state and local governments together took only 25 per cent.



FIG. 23. A man who earned $3,000 in 1940 had to double his income in 1951 to maintain the same standard of living. A man who earned $25,000 had to triple his income. (Adapted from *Time* chart by R. M. Chapin, Jr., Copyright Time Inc., 1951.)

Possibly the most tangible way that the power to tax augments state power is the legion of government workers required to collect, record, and administer the spending of tax money. The rapid increase in the number of employed government workers over the years 1900 to 1948 is depicted in Fig. 24. In 1950, 6,402,000 people worked in civilian jobs for Federal, state, and local government. As of mid-1951, there were approximately 3½ million military personnel. There were 2 million persons in both categories in 1910; there were approximately 10 million in 1951. At the present time, one out of every six employed persons in the country is paid a governmental salary. Federal government civilian workers in the fiscal year July, 1951, to June, 1952, drew $9.7 billion in salary.

In 1915, the *total* Federal government expenditure was only $719.2 million. By way of contrast, "government outlays for price support and other [agricultural] programs such as conservation totaled about 2½ billion dollars for crops for the year 1948–49 almost all of which was for acquisition of corn, cotton, wheat, and some other crops under the price

support program" (3, p. 1304). Much of this "acquisition" was stored in government warehouses and caves until it rotted; some of it, such as potatoes, was authorized to be destroyed, in order to maintain high prices



FIG. 24. Number of employed government workers (including military personnel), selected years. (Reproduced from Solomon Fabricant, *The Rising Trend of Government Employment*, Occasional Paper No. 29, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1949, p. 4.)

for food by diminishing the supply. Both major parties endorse the price-support program. The votes of government workers and their families and the votes of farmers and their families are considerable in number.

Henry Suburban. In 1948, Henry Suburban, the "typical" middle-class family man earning $3,500 a year, paid approximately $908 in taxes, or a little over one-fourth of his income. Of this total, his Federal, state, and local personal-income tax and his property and social-security taxes

amounted to $450. These are the taxes of which he is aware, and while he may grumble that the government is getting too big, that it is spending too much of his money, he doubtless finds comfort in the thought that the idle rich and the bloated corporations must bear the main burden of taxation—so his Congressman tells Henry in a political broadcast. But Henry and others like him pay most of the income-tax burden; there are many Henrys and few idle rich. The bloated corporations pass on to Henry any increase in corporation income taxes with higher prices for consumers' goods. Henry's wife, during her usual Saturday-afternoon shopping, indirectly or directly pays hundreds of excise and sales taxes. More likely than not, Henry remains unaware that over half of his total yearly tax is hidden in the things that he and his family buy.

Henry is aroused in the morning by his alarm clock (price $6 plus $1.32 tax). Partially awake, he walks across the floor of his $8000 house (annual property tax, $240) and switches on the electricity ($3\frac{1}{3}$¢ tax on each dollar of his monthly bill), which lights the bulb (price 20¢ plus 2¢ tax). On his way to the bathroom Henry turns on the radio (price $30 plus $2.54 tax).

As he shaves—forgetting the taxes that went into the price of his razor and shaving cream—he listens to a radio newscaster reporting that the Federal Government is preparing to increase income taxes and special sales taxes on many of the things he buys. After shaving, Henry finishes up with some bay rum (price $1 plus 22¢ tax).

He dresses quickly, fastens his tie clasp (price $1.50 plus 33¢ tax) and, as he leaves the bedroom, puts on his wrist watch (price $70, tax $15.40—not counting customs duty) and fastens his cuff links (price $3.50 plus 77¢ tax). He hurries downstairs and kisses his wife (marriage license, $2) who gives him his toast from the electric toaster (price $20.50 plus $1.74 tax). She pours his coffee from the pot on the gas stove (price $190, tax $16.16) and gives him his fruit juice from the refrigerator (price $300, tax $25.52).

Henry's wife tells him to buy some talcum powder for the baby (50¢ plus 11¢ tax), a roll of camera film (price 34¢ plus 4¢ tax), and since some friends are coming for dinner, a bottle of liquor (price $4.69 including $2.72 in taxes). A glance out of the window shows it is raining, so he asks his wife to telephone (monthly bill $12; tax $2.05) for a taxi. Too many other people want taxis on a wet morning, so Henry gets out his own car (price $1800, plus $102 Federal tax, plus $38 sales tax, plus state license fee, plus tax of 5¢ a pound on the spare tire, plus 5 per cent on each new part or accessory, plus average state and Federal gasoline tax of $5\frac{1}{2}$¢ per gallon). On the way to the station, Henry lights a cigarette (price per pack, 10¢; plus Federal tax, 7¢; plus state tax, 4¢) with a match (tax $5\frac{1}{2}$¢ per 1000). He boards his train and gives the conductor his ticket (price 85¢, tax 13¢) and sighs (no tax). And Henry has been up only an hour.

Yet, the biggest part of Henry's tax story is still to be told. Take Henry's toast. That started from a loaf of bread and it started on the farm. Just as anyone else who owns property, the farmer had to pay taxes on his land and buildings and machinery, and he also paid most of the taxes Henry pays.

These taxes are just as much a part of the farmer's cost of raising wheat as seed, lime or fertilizer.

The miller, too, had taxes to pay—taxes on his personal property, on his real estate, as well as all the taxes that went into the making of his milling machinery and his flour sacks. Transporting the flour included taxes—railroad taxes, taxes on gasoline and oil, licenses, and so on.

The baker, too, paid taxes—the hidden taxes in the yeast and other ingredients that go into his bread, the hidden taxes in his oven, wrapping machinery and other equipment. Furthermore, he paid taxes on his property, unemployment-compensation and social-security taxes on the wages he paid his employees, as well as his income taxes and other business taxes.

When the bread reached the shelf of the grocery store, the retailer's markup included still more taxes—those that the retailer had to pay. So that there are literally hundreds of taxes which find their way into the price of the loaf of bread which Henry's wife used for his toast, and ultimately the price Henry pays for the bread includes a large share of all these taxes. [12, p. 25] *



FIG. 25. (Reprinted from *U.S. News & World Report*, an independent weekly news magazine published at Washington. Copyright 1951. United States News Publishing Corporation, Oct. 5, 1951.)

War and military expenditures. Where do most of Henry's taxes go and thus speed along the concentration of power and control in government? War—past, present, and future. But Henry's taxes do not quite suffice to pay for war. Mainly to defray that cost the government must continue to borrow. The public debt in 1951 was $255.2 billion, and it has been estimated that it will reach $284 billion by 1954.

Much criticism and much praise has centered about the "welfare activities" of the Federal government. Whatever the merits or demerits of the case, the fact remains that such measures constitute a relatively minor drain on the national income. The Federal budget for the fiscal year 1949–1950 was approximately 76 per cent military, which included national defense, interest on the public debt—itself the result of past military expenditures—veterans' benefits, and international aid. All remain-

* Reprinted from an article which appeared in *The Saturday Evening Post*, Sept. 1, 1951; by permission of the author, Roswell Magill.

ing programs were allocated only 24 per cent, and these included atomic energy (16).

Military expenditures now exceed 80 per cent of government spending. The term "budget"—in the sense of a fixed annual appropriation passed by Congress—hardly has meaning any longer. From month to month new emergency military appropriations are made. The constant threat of Communist military ventures will doubtless push American



FIG. 26. (Reprinted from *U.S. News & World Report*, an independent weekly news magazine published at Washington. Copyright 1951. United States News Publishing Corporation, May 4, 1951.)

military expenditures constantly higher. In any event, for the fiscal year 1951–1952, an almost $108-billion military program was either authorized or under study (22, p. 12).

The sum actually authorized, about $74 billion, would theoretically take the nation's labor force of 62 million people seventeen weeks of working time to pay. That sum is $7 billion more than the annual food bill. "It would provide for all U.S. medical care for eight years, or all U.S. education for a decade" (20, p. 11).

The power orbit of the United States now includes almost the entire non-Soviet world. Some of these areas are conquered provinces, some protectorates, some are allies or associates, and all in some measure depend upon the wealth and might of the United States (1, p. 177). From the end of World War II to 1950, the United States spent $42.6 billion for foreign aid, a sum almost equal to the total expenditures of the Federal government for the six years preceding World War II. During the two-year fiscal period of 1950–1951 and 1951–1952, foreign governments

will receive about $17 billion from the United States, of which $12 billion is for arms and $5 billion for financial assistance. Taxation and war and the threat of war expand the power and control of the American government not only over its own people but over people in foreign lands as well. Foreign elections have been won on the issue of who could get how much from the American taxpayer. Although American generals, foreign-aid officials, and the State Department have shown a genuine unwillingness to "interfere in the internal affairs of our allies," the reality



FIG. 27. President Truman's proposed budget for the fiscal year 1952–1953. Note that of "Where Money Goes" only "Other," or 15 per cent, is a clearly nonmilitary expenditure. (Redrawn from *The New York Times*, Jan. 27, 1952.)

of American wealth and power cannot be denied by even the best intentions of those who administer it abroad.

A Drift toward Socialism?

Whether the United States is drifting toward socialism, or indeed whether the United States is now socialistic, is largely a matter of definition. The vast majority of American citizens are openly hostile to the *term* "socialism." But it has been said that men argue over words, not ideas. Phrased differently, many times in history entire populations have taken a path they failed to see or even denied they were traveling. Are the American people drifting into socialism at the same time that they loudly protest their detestation of it?

> Although 75% of a sample of urban adults represent themselves as opposed to Socialism, within this 75% each of eight types of government activity which might logically be regarded as a specific instance of socialistic practice [since all eight were planks taken from the 1928 national-convention platform of the Socialist party] finds a considerable number who favor it and a number who do not regard the practice as "a step toward Socialism."
>
> Four of these areas, payroll taxes for old age benefits, T.V.A. and flood control, minimum wage laws, and government housing find favor with a majority of those who oppose Socialism in general. Furthermore, in the case of each of these categories fewer than half of those against Socialism regard the measure as socialistic. [9, p. 89]

Certainly a new philosophy of government, a philosophy that is alien to the American political tradition, has in recent years become securely entrenched: government as arbitrator, government as supreme manager of the total economy, government as regulator of individual welfare, and government as redistributor of wealth created by the economy. The original income-tax law was justified as a revenue measure; it is now justified by government and by a majority of the American people as an instrument to secure "a more equitable distribution of income." In part, the steeply graduated income tax and corporate taxes go to provide medical care, education, the national mental-health program, pensions, aid to children and the aged, subsidized housing, and the like. More money is paid out for measures such as these than is paid in the form of corporate dividends. In 1947, governmental "payments based on need were 75 per cent greater than the dividend disbursements of all American corporations" (17, p. 109).

The determination of the majority to use government in order to procure "fair shares" (a British Labour party shibboleth) is an unpublicized world revolution which continues regardless of official democratic, fascistic, or communistic ideology. This trend may be as inevitable as it is universal in modern industrial society. In any event, the search for and the fulfillment of fair shares concentrate more power and control in the hands of all governments.

Are the rich getting richer? The right or wrong of the matter is not our concern. Government *is* power, the use of power and the supplication of power. Now, as always, rich and poor alike endeavor so far as possible to tip the scale in their own favor. Nevertheless, one justification for the present trend—that the "welfare state" redresses the constant tendency for the rich to get richer and the poor to get poorer—is without foundation in fact. The income tax is steeply graduated, so that a man who makes a million dollars pays 85 per cent of that amount to the Federal government. But *before* taxes, the rich received far less of the national income in 1949 than they did in 1935–1936. Detailed comparisons are made in Table 7.

Table 7 The Distribution of Income in the United States *

	PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL INCOME	
	1935–1936	*1949*
Poorest 20%	4.0	4.0
Second 20	8.9	11.0
Third 20	13.7	17.0
Fourth 20	20.4	23.0
Richest 20	53.4	45.0

* Reproduced from 4, p. 515, by permission of *Commentary*. Sources: data from the *American Economic Review*, XL, No. 2 (May 1950), p. 332; and the *Federal Reserve Bulletin* (August 1950), p. 955.

Half of the richest 20 per cent received less than $7,500 in 1949, the other half received that or more. The incomes of the richest 10 per cent came mainly from salaries. "Only a few had an appreciable income from capital: 16 per cent received dividends and interest of $1,000 or more, while 57 per cent received none at all; 4 per cent received rents of more than $1,000. About two in one hundred were retired, and conceivably might qualify as 'idle rich'" (4, p. 517). Control of the economy has concentrated in ever fewer hands, but the wealth stemming from it has not.

The poor are not industrial workers; the poorest 20 per cent are mainly rural Negroes and rural people of both races over 65 years of age. Industrial workers have recently made a greater gain in income than members of any other occupational classification. Measured in dollars of constant purchasing power, industrial workers' average weekly earnings increased 35 per cent between 1936 and 1950 (4, p. 517).

The Communist stereotype of the worker being reduced to starvation in capitalist society is a lie easily called. The worker's standard of living is much higher here than it is in the Soviet Union, and the gap between rich and poor is much narrower. The gap does remain, however, and it remains—perhaps has increasingly become—an effective political weapon.

A journey not completed. If a pronounced trend toward governmental control of the economy defines socialism, then modern America is socialistic. Socialism, however, is most frequently defined as ownership by the state of the means of production. So far, this has occurred in only a few isolated cases, such as the Tennessee Valley Authority in power and light production, and in atomic research and production. Occasionally the Federal government takes over a struck plant, but profits made until management again assumes control revert to the corporation. The American politico-economic scene at present, then, hardly merits the label of socialism.

BIG LABOR

The real story of American labor organization is less than twenty years old. It started with the rise of the CIO, which organizes by entire industry rather than along separate craft lines, as does the older AFL. From 1935 to 1945, union membership in the United States rose from 3.4 to 13.6 million; the previous peak had been 4.961 million, in 1920. As of late 1951, the AFL claimed 8 million members, the CIO 6 million, and independent unions—the largest of which are the United Mine Workers and some of the railroad brotherhoods—claimed 2 million members. Newsmen who cover labor assignments believe that these claims are somewhat padded. A total of 15 million is the more conservative and independent estimate. Since 31 million workers within unionized fields

remain unorganized, the unions have a vast area in which to expand. All the signs point to a further expansion of union membership that may approach that of the decade 1935 to 1945 in scope.



FIG. 28. (Redrawn from *U.S. News & World Report*, an independent weekly news magazine published at Washington. Copyright 1951. The United States News Publishing Corporation, June 22, 1951.)

Organized Labor Becomes Powerful

Labor unions once stood outside the spheres of government and management; they held to the limited objectives of securing more favorable wage rates, hours of labor, and working conditions for their followers. In recent years, however, more ambitious goals and functions have been demanded and secured. Organized labor steadily becomes an integral, if as yet largely unacknowledged, part of both government and industrial management. Haltingly and grudgingly, management incorporates labor as an intrinsic part of the managerial apparatus rather than as individual hired hands. Although the battle is still on, the unions appear to be gaining along these fronts: the vested right in steady employment at a guaranteed annual wage; welfare funds to be administered by the unions in the interests of employees; equal pay for all workers of the same grade and seniority throughout each industry; a share in profits for employees; and, most important of all, the right of labor to participate in management.

Not only does labor, as such, become more powerful, but within the unions power constantly gravitates upward in the hierarchy, exactly as it does in all other modern organizations. Although the membership of union bureaucracy possesses more real power than the comparable third level in either business or government, industry-wide decisions made by the unions must still be administered decisions, with little opportunity for the rank and file to study each issue and make personal desires known and felt. In the incessant battle with management, there is a constant pressure on the membership to go along with the union policy makers in order to ensure ultimate benefits for themselves.

Power Within and Without

Officials in any union are elected by popular vote, but machine politics is as characteristic of unions as it is of popular government. Power has shifted from the locals to the central offices, in part because union funds are held and administered by the central offices. Union policy makers may use funds to strengthen their position in locals where their administration is weak, and they can threaten to expel disruptive elements and thus in many cases deprive them of the right to work. Union policy makers tend to frequent reelection over the years. How much of this job security at the apex of the unions is the result of power, and how much the result of popularity, would be difficult to assess. Ninety-two per cent of organized workers believe their leaders are doing something of benefit for labor (14, p. 36).

Modern unionism also concentrates power and control in industry and government. A union will attempt to establish uniform wage rates in all plants in which the majority of workers are members of that union. In competition with other unions for members and power, it cannot accept lower rates of pay than those secured by other unions, even in different industries. Union competition of this kind tends to equalize wage rates for comparable work throughout a given industry and ultimately narrows the spread between wages paid for similar skills in different industries. But it is the bigger and longer established companies which are in the best position to absorb added wage costs to production. A particular handicap is presented new companies, with limited capital, once they are caught in such a competitive wage spiral. The established corporation, with a quasi-controlled market, can invariably pass on added labor costs either to distributors or to consumers, which a new company is unable to do. The charge has been made that some big corporations welcome "another round" of wage increases that will eliminate newer companies from "free competition."

Modern unionism, in conjunction with the horizontal organization of industry, also undermines local government and, to that extent, concentrates more power in the Federal government. Modern industrial corporations tend to horizontal as well as to vertical organization: a textile company, for example, may contain a dozen separate factories in different parts of the country, as well as a central office, in a city that may be distant from all of these factories, which administers all of them; many textile companies are linked together with their own trade organizations. In most cases it is not local labor which meets with local management, but top labor bureaucrats who meet with top industrial bureaucrats to make agreements which are binding upon an entire industry. Local government becomes impotent to intervene in labor-capital disputes, for

they no longer occur in local communities. It is Washington, today, which intervenes between industry-wide management and industry-wide union organization (2).

INTERESTS ALIEN OR CONVERGENT?

Policy makers in business, government, and labor, as they look across their own boundaries of power, are today as much embroiled in ideological warfare as they were in the recent past. They continue to hurl at one another accusations of vicious plotting against the "American way of life." Nevertheless, while the ideological sniping does not abate, the interests of policy makers in all three types of organizations show more than a little promise of converging.

War and its aftermath have occasioned a rapid shuttling of personnel among military, business, labor, and governmental hierarchies. Former generals and admirals secure managerial posts in business and appointive posts in government (13). Top labor leaders held key positions in the War Labor Board and other wartime agencies. Former lawyers, businessmen, and politicians serve as contact men in Washington between corporation managers seeking lucrative government contracts and the government agencies which award such contracts.

The policy makers of business, labor, and government have a common stake in stability and continued prosperity. The higher one goes in the union hierarchy, the more one finds leaders "who are with the main drift" toward the concentration of power (14, p. 287). The higher spokesmen of both big business and big labor "promise to do what they can to discipline . . . extremists so that the higher spokesmen can get together and solve their mutual problems in the light of harmonious reason" (14, p. 113). David Dubinsky, president of the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, has organized "management-engineering departments" to sit in with management, help form managerial policy, and cooperate in maintaining high prices for management as well as high wages for workers (18, pp. 12–15). At times, big labor and big business have gotten together to defeat the interests of consumers, as in 1938 when the Steel Workers Organizing Committee lobbied in Washington to delay a monopoly investigation of the steel industry "at a time when increased competition might have caused price and wage cuts" (14, p. 228).

The corporations lobby for special privileges from government, for protective tariffs, government contracts, subsidies, and franchises; the right of incorporation itself, as a matter of fact, is derived from government. In the various spending programs at home and abroad, big business has as much a stake in profits as it has a basis for complaint in

higher tax levies. More and more do policy makers from labor, government, and business find themselves cooperating in the determination of hours, wages, pension plans, production schedules, and the like. Friction remains, they frequently stand opposed, but the drift toward mutual interest is creating its own logical necessities, unwanted though these may be.

The Limits of Power Concentration

It is quite true that the average man today has much less economic and political autonomy than he once did in American society and that the constant trend has been in the direction of contracting that autonomy. On the other hand, to the extent that various bureaucracies remain separately organized and pursue divergent goals, to that extent does the average man remain free. So long as various bureaucracies must compete with one another, the average man retains some measure of control over them as well as some measure of self-autonomy. Since consumers have access to many goods and services, they can simply refuse to buy certain goods, or refuse to use certain services, if these are not to their liking. Political parties seek to balance the interests of different voting blocs, else another political party might assume power. Union leaders are in no position to ignore the rank-and-file membership.

Manipulated though they may be, denied access to the inner councils where decisions are made, bombarded by the claim and counterclaim of propaganda, the consumer, citizen, worker, and follower are still wooed, deferred to, and, indirectly, consulted. This competition for the allegiance and support of the average man remains a bastion of political and economic freedom, an absolute difference between our society and others in which a *single* power hierarchy dominates.

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CHAPTER 14 *Class and Caste*

It is their care in all the ages to take the buffet and cushion
the shock.
It is their care that the gear engages; it is their care that the
switches lock.
It is their care that the wheels run truly; it is their care to
embark and entrain,
Tally, transport, and deliver duly the Sons of Mary by land and
main.
. . . . . .
And the Sons of Mary smile and are blessèd—they know the
angels are on their side.
They know in them is the Grace confessèd, and for them are
the Mercies multiplied.
They sit at the Feet—they hear the Word—they see how truly
the Promise runs:
They have cast their burden upon the Lord, and—the Lord
He lays it on Martha's Sons!

—RUDYARD KIPLING

Although Rudyard Kipling was not a sociologist, he recognized the sociological principle that humbler folk—the Sons of Martha—throughout the ages have served the upper classes—the Sons of Mary. All societies are stratified, all societies are divided into upper and lower categories of persons. A system of differential privileges is maintained everywhere, despite variations in social structure and political ideology. These facts have already been discussed in Chap. 12, where it was pointed out that the division of labor is the foundation of stratification, or social-class structure. The foundation of any structure, however, is not the whole. It is with the superstructure of social-class positions, and the way people behave according to their positions, that the present chapter deals.

THE IMPORTANCE AND REALITY OF CLASS

In any society, and particularly in a society as complex as our own, social class is extremely difficult to describe with any degree of exactitude. From one community to another in America, for example, the range of class positions and the way people behave in their positions vary considerably. Social class does not permit a natural classification like the biologist's classification of the animal kingdom; the latter is so securely founded in physical structure that there is universal agreement

about what the divisions are, the number of them, and where they are divided. Despite the difficulties of definition and classification, however, social class *is* real and important. Social class is not a concept imposed by the sociologist upon something which does not exist.

Social Class and Democratic Ideology

The historic ideal that all men are *created* equal upheld the belief that all men are equal in the sight of God and equal in the courts of human law. The founders of the American republic had no notion that men were equal in any literal sense. This notion, however, has become widely accepted in recent decades. Some Americans go so far as to claim that there are no social classes in America. Whatever else may be said for the new democratic ideology, it will not square with the reality of American life. The new democratic ideology is in fact verbally inconsistent. The new ideal of literal equality is contradicted by another widely accepted proposition, that America is the land of equal opportunity. The promise and hope of "equal opportunity" means the opportunity to gain more wealth, power, and prestige than one now possesses; in other words, the opportunity to *surpass* one's competitors.

The family. The contradictory ideals of literal equality and equal opportunity are further complicated by the family. If the division of labor primarily determines class position, the family primarily maintains it. The individual receives his initial class position from the family into which he is born, regardless of what he later does or does not accomplish. Families of high rank devote much of their fortune and energy to ensuring that their children shall continue the family's position intact. Lower-ranking families attempt to start their children on the success ladder at least a few rungs above some other children in the community, through training, by paying for a college education, perhaps by using family influence to secure jobs for their children.

The family is only one institution, although the most important one, which constantly interferes with both literal equality and equal opportunity. Those American spokesmen who have demanded that we must live up to our ideals, that opportunity must be literally equalized for all, would probably lose heart if they were to learn the price of their reform—the end of the family as we now know it. If the social-class positions of family members tended to be quite dissimilar, common and shared family experience would vanish. If *all* positions were thrown open to individual competition, "each family member would tend to find himself in a different social stratum from the others, and the invidious sentiments thus brought into the family circle would prove incompatible with family sentiments" (6, p. 423). It is doubtful, however, that all positions *could* be thrown open to perfect individual competition unless all children were removed from their families at an early age by the state and

raised together under state supervision. Plato made that observation some time ago.

The division of labor. Our complex division of labor also requires some inequality of opportunity, even if not to the extent that we now know. No society could delay training its children for later careers until their skills and abilities had been tested and compared. Particularly do positions of high trust and responsibility in modern society require that training be started, literally, in infancy (see 6, pp. 96–99). It is in middle- and upper-class families that youngsters from early babyhood receive the training appropriate for the positions they will later assume. Habits of thrift, responsibility, industriousness, and self-control are imposed by some families and not by others, before the skills and intelligence quotient of the child are known. Skill and intelligence being equal, it is the child who has been trained for ultimate success who has an important advantage, apart from the money and influence of his family.

Besides ability, skill, and training, many specific job functions also *require* a certain social-class background. A representative of an advertising agency, for example, may need more than literary skill, a college education, and an intuitive sense of good copy. To persuade upper-class executives to sign contracts with his company, he may also need to share their manners, speech, dress, recreational activities, and, above all, social attitudes.

Class as Experienced Reality

Social class may be difficult to define, and it may be denied by political ideology; at the same time, there is nothing that is more real in personal and social experience. It is possibly true that two persons who are placed at opposite poles of our class structure live in worlds more dissimilar than those of two preliterate tribesmen who are separated by three thousand miles. The two hypothetical case histories below describe social-class experience that could have happened, even though neither of these persons actually exists.

Joe Novotnick. A boy born to Czechoslovak parents in a Pennsylvania anthracite town is more likely to die before reaching childhood than a boy born on the other side of the tracks, but Joe manages to survive. His home is a cold shack which lacks the conveniences of running water and electricity. His parents must struggle to keep their many offspring alive, so that they are unable to devote much time or attention to young Joe.

He spends most of his time away from home, in an unsupervised gang. As an American he feels somewhat contemptuous of his immigrant parents, but he soon learns that he is not rated very high by other Americans whose names are more easily spelled. He soon develops habits of aggression and defiance against the police whom he is taught to fear, the Boy Scout troop which does not want him,

and the schoolteachers who do not treat him as they do the nice children in his classes. He quits school as soon as he reaches legal working age, for he has learned, as all American children learn, the importance of money to buy those things they prize. Only through his *own* efforts can Joe secure those commercialized pleasures which male adolescents want, such as candy, movies, a secondhand automobile, flashy clothes, and spending money for taking out girls.

He has a vague notion that he would like to become a big shot, but he has no knowledge of the terrible price he would have to pay for a most improbable success. It is unlikely that he would be willing to pay that price even if he learned what it is: to deny present desires in order to save and become educated, to change both habits and friends and thereby earn the respect and liking of those middle-class persons whose prerogative it is to grant or to withhold. Joe does not pay that price. He marries early, either through choice or because a certain young woman is "in trouble." The stage is thereby set for another cycle of poverty, many children, and slum living conditions.

Gilmore DePew Belding III. This upper-upper-class boy comes from an old-stock American family which has wealth commensurate with lineage. Since aristocracies always hire others to feed, clean, and discipline their children, Gilmore's relationship with his parents is relaxed and gracious, the two hours a day they spend with him being mutually pleasurable. He never goes hungry, nor will he ever fear unemployment. He is sheltered from aggression, vulgarity, and many shatterings of self-confidence. For him many so-called realities of life do not and never will exist.

He attends St. Paul's School and later, of course, Harvard. After marrying a girl from his own set, he immediately steps into a position that was made for him. He has been trained to realize his high place in the world, to invade the personalities of servants, to treat oldsters of his own class with deference and respect, and to ignore most other people whom he does not have to meet socially. He has been trained to be kind with inferiors, except when his privileges or those of his class are threatened. His manner is one of self-assurance and ease. He regards the law and the police as public servants hired to guard him and his. He may or may not have developed a sense of civic duty, an obligation to repay society for his many material and social blessings.

These two men dress differently. Their manners are different. Their friends, interests, and recreational pursuits are all different. Only in the narrow technical sense do they talk the same language, for their active vocabularies as well as their accents are different. Many of the same words they use have different shades of meaning for themselves and

their friends. Granting the virtually impossible, that they should ever meet, each would be unable to understand the other's point of view.

Their temperaments may be similar or dissimilar, but in either case their social roles and social personalities are different. Even if Gilmore owns stock in the mine in which Joe works, they do not enter the same universe of discourse. To Joe, Gilmore is an unidentified part of the hated company; to Gilmore, Joe is part of the faceless working class which has forgotten its proper place. A strike at the mine to one is labor trouble; to the other it is management trouble.

Their loyalities, identifications, and social attitudes are alien, each to the other. Joe favors soaking the rich to build a welfare state; Gilmore violently opposes it, along with what he regards as excessive inheritance and income taxes. Joe looks up, and envies. Gilmore looks down, and deplores. Beyond this each knows little, and cares less, about the other. In a word, they live in mutually insulated worlds of experience.

CLASS AS DEFINITION

American sociology, at the present time, has not succeeded in defining the term "social class" in a way that is acceptable to all students of the subject (9). Nor do social classes, to repeat, comprise a natural classification. The concept probably must continue to be used, as it has in the past, in terms of specific research objectives. A brief review of some attempts to define class will substantiate this claim.

Historicofictive — Marxist

When history has been depicted as the rise and fall of social classes, social class has invariably been viewed in strictly economic terms. The name of Karl Marx more than any other has been associated with this approach to social class. Marx described broad economic strata, in terms of the relationship of each to "the means of production," and these strata he called social classes. There were in his view two main classes, the bourgeoisie (owners of the means of production) and the proletariat (hired industrial workers). All previous history had been the history of class struggle, a condition that would cease, however, when the proletariat organized to overthrow the bourgeoisie in bloody revolt and established an international classless society.

This is a stirring apocalyptic vision, but it is neither history nor sociology. Had Marx been a better historian he would have known that no future ever logically fulfills all of the trends evidenced at any present time. Unanticipated factors always intervene, and his own prediction was no exception. Marx believed that the early factory system and the revolutions of 1848 would continue to isolate the loyalties and interests of owner-managers and manual workers until world-wide revolution

became inevitable. What he could not, or at least did not, foresee was the later evolution of industrialism, with its separation of ownership and managerial functions and its demand for a vast "new middle class" of clerks, lesser managers, and technicians. It was the rise of this unforeseen class, however, that ended the drift toward two isolated camps of capitalists and industrial workers, along with the possibility of social equality, regardless of ideology.

Not only is Marxism more a heretical Book of Revelation than it is an instrument for the study of society but it also obscures the reality of human behavior. The distinctions between classes are more than economic; they are also social, political, attitudinal, and a way and style of life. We are interested in how men believe and behave in terms of social class, but reality is done violence if men are viewed as motivated solely by economic interests and as members of two isolated groups which move ponderously and in unison.

Statistical-indexive

Social class has been simplified in another way, not as Marxian-type groups but as abstract groupings defined with a statistical index. Income levels and occupational classifications have been frequently used in this manner. Such groupings are objective, in the sense that they can readily be distinguished and measured; their use has proved of value. A means is thereby provided for making quick and valid comparisons, throughout an entire population, which could not be otherwise secured.

We can learn *something* about how men think and act by using this approach. For instance, crude but statistically reliable differences in attitudes toward various economic and political issues have been thus established. Different occupational strata rather consistently hold characteristic attitudes. The "large-business" strata tend to oppose and manual workers tend to support governmental efforts to ensure a more "fair" distribution of goods and services (2, especially p. 62). On the other hand, manual workers tend to be more prejudiced against Negroes than do the other "classes" (2, p. 144).

Income distribution in the United States. America's occupational structure and trends were described in Chap. 12. Another way that men commonly measure one another is according to income. In this narrow context, the "class position" of the entire population, on the average, has been steadily rising in recent years. Per capita income has been increasing faster than the dollar has been depreciating. The median wage or salary income of "primary families and individuals" in 1939 was $1,231; in 1944, $2,378; and in 1949, $2,959 (1, p. 27). Figure 29 depicts the recent changes in income distribution in greater detail.

Statistical groupings are not social classes. The importance of statistical groupings is apparent. Nevertheless, social classes are not revealed by their use. Many prostitutes' earnings, for example, are high, but their

class position is extremely low, and so is that of wealthy bookies and racketeers. Their class position is low because they are held in low esteem. *The concept of class must include the evaluation of others*, so that income does not always coincide with social class. Even in less dramatic instances than these, objective index and subjective evaluation at times part company. Ratings of occupational prestige show that medical doctors are ranked high by all people in any community; doctors rank higher than many other occupational groupings whose average incomes are much greater (14).



FIG. 29. Recent percentage changes in family-income distribution.

Subjectivistic

Class has also been viewed as class consciousness; further, classes have been described in terms of the ratings made by the people themselves in a community. In this approach to social class, a person's class position is determined either by his evaluation of himself or by the evaluation of him that others make. It is the former method with which we are now concerned.

The underlying rationale for it is W. I. Thomas's famous dictum: "A situation defined as real is real in its consequences." In other words, it is what a man believes to be true, rather than what some outside observer might declare to be true, which determines his conduct. In the present context, if a man believes he is a member of a certain class, he will act *as if* he were, whether or not others would agree that he belonged.

Various opinion polls taken in recent years all show that when questioned about what class they belong to, about three-fourths of the American people answer, "The middle class." Does this mean that we

are in fact a middle-class nation? If in 1949, when the national average income was higher than it had ever been, only 16.8 per cent of all families and unattached individuals made total incomes of $5,000 or more, it is at once apparent that many who believe they are middle class would not be so regarded by a qualified observer. More important, many who believe they are middle class would not be accepted as social equals by others who also regard themselves as middle class.

Most people assign themselves a higher status than their associates do. Self-assessment of class position does indicate the pronounced middle-class *orientation* of modern America, and its ideological resistance to Marxian "class war." But self-assessment will not describe social classes nor who belongs to which one. The limitation of this approach stems from the fact that Thomas's dictum is a half-truth. Men may in large measure be motivated by what they believe their class position to be; their attitudes and behavior are also determined, however, by their jobs, incomes, places of residence, associations, and how they are regarded and to what extent they are socially accepted by others. Those who have an inflated notion of their own class position are rejected if they force themselves upon their social superiors. A situation defined as real is real in its consequences, *provided* that that definition does not markedly contradict the definitions of associates or desired associates.

Modified-subjectivistic

Under the leadership of W. Lloyd Warner, a number of sociologists have recently been describing the class structures of local communities by combining objective indices with the subjective evaluations of associates, in order to define what may be called "social reputation." One's social reputation is primarily measured by others' evaluations of one's social acceptability in formal organizations and in informal associations and cliques. In the Warner technique, community informants from various class levels rank the reputations of all in the community. To place any individual or family, these rankings are combined with organizational memberships and with other objective indices such as occupation, income, place of residence, and education. Hollingshead (11) and Havighurst and Taba (10) have used a similar procedure. The Warner and Lunt definition of class, however, is based solely upon social reputation: "two or more orders of people who are believed to be, and are accordingly ranked by the members of the community, in socially superior and inferior positions" (19, p. 82).

Criticism. Even though the above approach to social class is sociologically superior to the others previously mentioned, there are a few qualifications to be noted with respect to it. First, it is questionable that all individuals in even one locality can be consistently ranked through combining objective indices and social reputation. A great deal of over-

lapping between the two sets of factors is admitted in Warner's books and those of his associates. While it is claimed that both are combined to define any individual's place, it is not made clear which set of factors takes precedence over the other when they fail to coincide.*

Second, all social mobility—a term defined and discussed below—which does not occur *within* the locality under investigation is ignored, a procedure which tends to exaggerate the rigidity of social class. We are informed, for example, that (high-status) members of Class I do not and may not marry (low-status) members of Class V (20), but we learn nothing about those ambitious members of Class V who refuse to accept local conditions and definitions of proper conduct and who go elsewhere. What jobs do they get and whom do they marry? It is unlikely that the upper-class behavior that Warner and Lunt have described in Yankee City will apply generally outside that area, for they have described only those who remain in Yankee City. Warner and Lunt admit that those upper-class members who remain are the more satisfied, settled, and the less venturesome, and we are led to believe that they are somewhat decadent.



FIG. 30. Three ways of defining social class.

Third, and most important, the use of local informants to rate the social-class position of all in the locality has utility only for small and middle-sized localities where everyone knows everyone else or at least knows about him. In metropolitan areas, the bulk of the population to any one person is a physical aggregate of unknowns. He does not rate their social reputations, nor do they rate his. It is partly for this reason that the six-way class breakdown (discussed later in this chapter) that Warner and his associates have found in middle-sized localities will probably not apply—as they claim it will—to any locality in America.

Toward a Definition of Social Class

A local class structure, in America, is an essentially different phenomenon from broad national strata defined in terms of wealth, occu-

* Warner later left his disciples behind; he abandoned objective criteria in the assignment of class positions. Only social reputation (called Evaluated Participation—E.P.) is now used. The objective criteria, such as wealth, occupation, and place of residence, are called Index of Status Characteristics—I.S.C. The latter are used only to gain a rough approximation of the class structure in a locality when lack of time and funds prevent the full use of E.P. See 21, Chap. 2.

pation, nativity, religion, and education—either singly or in combination. In the latter case, consciousness of similarity and difference, and social acceptance or rejection, do not appear, because even most of those within one such stratum never establish contact of any kind. There can be no one definition, then, but only *a* definition, according to the nature of the problem under investigation. The definition that will fit the class structure of a middle-sized locality, for example, cannot be applied the country over.

An American social class, within a small or middle-sized locality, is a self-conscious group or series of interlocking subgroups. According to these group memberships, individuals and families wield differential power, are accorded differential respect and prestige, and associate formally and informally according to the local scale of superiority and inferiority—a scale which varies somewhat from one locality to another. While American ideology sanctions movement up the class scale, those in upper positions attempt to exclude mobile families and individuals from their own ranks.

An American class, conceived as a broad stratum of ranked superiority and inferiority which cuts across all internal geographic boundaries, is a statistical abstraction, not a group. A *social* class must include both subjective and objective criteria of membership (16); economic and occupational classes do not contain the subjective criterion. For research purposes, however, these classes may at times, in a limited way, be treated *as if* they were social classes, because they tend to be crudely correlated with social-class position *within specific localities.* Warner and his associates, for example, have shown that occupation correlates .91 with social reputation in a specific locality (21, p. 168).

Some Further Definitions

Although social classes mark off social superior and inferior, some mobility, or movement up and down the class scale, does occur within class systems. A *caste,* in contradistinction, is a hereditary stratum of a society into which a person is born and which he may never leave. Social relationships within and among the castes are rigidly fixed by custom and law, and they are sanctioned by religion. Intermarriage between castes is tabooed, segregation is enforced, and occupations tend to be hereditary within them. In actual practice, however theoretically different, class and caste systems do shade into one another. England as well as America has a class system, but the English class system is much more rigid than our own, and social mobility in England is much less extensive. On the other hand, it has been claimed that Negroes in America comprise a caste. Wherever a policy of *group* exclusion, based upon birth, is enforced—such as the Jewish "quota" used by the major-

ity of American medical schools—a quasi-caste element has been injected into the class system.

It is *social mobility*, the possibility of movement within the system, which mainly distinguishes class from caste. *Vertical mobility* signifies movement up or down the class scale. *Horizontal mobility* refers to all other types of movement unassociated with social-class change, such as going from place to place or accepting a job elsewhere with no change in salary or status. *Social status* refers to position in the social-class hierarchy. There are many kinds of statuses, including sex and age, but only social status implies standing higher or lower than others. There are two kinds of social status. *Ascribed status* is acquired at birth, by virtue of being born within a certain family. *Achieved status* refers to all improvements made upon the originally ascribed status by virtue of skill, capability, perseverance, and luck.

Prestige is usually linked closely with social status, but not always. A renegade alcoholic from one of our first families may retain his social (ascribed) status long after he has become a bore and an irritant to all who ever have the misfortune to meet him. A movie actress or prize fighter, on the other hand, may attain a prestige which far surpasses his social status. Jack Dempsey has remained "Jack" all his life. Gene Tunney, who replaced him as heavyweight champion of the world, through his later acquisition of an education, and upper-class wife, and a managerial post in one of our large corporations, became "Mr. Tunney." Nevertheless, although Mr. Tunney achieved a social status which far surpassed Jack's, he never won Jack's prestige.

It is *social distance* which separates one social status from another, a kind of distance which has no necessary connection with physical space. There are several hundred miles, but there is no social distance, between an upper-class woman in Boston and her upper-class friend in Charleston. Conversely, there is maximum social distance between the Boston woman and the maid who dresses her hair. Some of these terms have already been used in this chapter. It is advised that the student briefly retrace his steps if any confusion has resulted.

THE AMERICAN CLASS STRUCTURE

To repeat, we can properly speak of local class structures in America, but not of a national class structure. One reason why a national class structure has failed to appear is that America in the past and in the present, although possibly to a lesser extent, has been an area of intensive vertical mobility and has contained a heterogeneous population. These two conditions have prevented the emergence of homogeneous classes over an extended geographic area, such as are clearly discernible in England.

There are other factors which, so far, at least, have stunted the growth of uniform social classes in America. Lineage, or family history, is one of the dimensions of status in all times and places. In a young country such as ours, upper-class people in the older regions of settlement along the Atlantic seaboard tend to regard *all* Middle Westerners as parvenus. No matter how secure a person's upper-class position may be in Kansas City, his local status will probably receive indifferent recognition in Boston and Philadelphia. To regional location has been added another complicating factor: local communities and cities, in part according to their relative size, have tended to develop specific criteria of status. These local criteria of status differ, in at least some particulars, from those recognized over broader geographic areas. The importance of locality for American social class is shown below.

Landaff, New Hampshire

In this small, almost isolated agricultural village nestled in the northern New England hill country, only two major social classes could be discerned among 72 resident families (13). The upper class is in the majority, composed of dairy farmers and their families whose forebears have long resided in the community. While not wealthy, their descendants by hard work, thrift, and sobriety have either maintained or acquired a debt-free farm property and home.

The lower class contains two subgroupings: first, farm laborers and tenants and factory workers who commute to the nearby town of Lisbon; second, the "floaters," people who work in the woods part of the year and return to build temporary tar-paper shacks—people who are in the community but not of it, pay no taxes, do not attend church, fail to assume civic responsibilities, and are lost to both formal and informal associations.

Correct upper-class behavior in Landaff has little to do with awareness of station. All Landaff residents scorn, at least verbally, pretension of any kind. What distinguishes upper- from lower-class social behavior is a strict and literal morality. While attendance at the one (Methodist) church is not obligatory to upper-class position, a reputation unblemished by sexual immorality, drunkenness, or debt is. Nevertheless, class consciousness, in comparison with the other localities referred to below, is minimal in Landaff.

Elmtown

Elmtown is a Middle Western county seat of some 10,000 population. Occupations and styles of life are much more diverse than they are in Landaff. There is also much more awareness of social class and a wider range of classes, five of which have been delineated (10 and 11).

Upper class. Elmtown's very small upper class—all of whose members are descendants of pioneer American stock and are Protestants—is slightly differentiated into two groupings: first, those of wealth who also possess a "lineage" which extends through the one hundred years of the town's history; second, recent arrivals who own a large business or hold a high managerial post in local industry.

Members of this class control local politics in their own interest and they are the financial mainstay of those churches to which they belong. At the same time, they hold very few public offices and they rarely attend church. They belong to no lodges (fraternal orders), and they do not regard education very highly; only about half of the men and a third of the women graduate from college.

They do, however, place a high evaluation upon leisure and leisure-time activities, which are shared only with class equals. They also maintain an adamant and ritualized social code. Conformity in the appropriate uses of stationery, personal cards, and invitations is required. Publicity is avoided, especially in the society column of the local newspaper. In personal relations they must wear an air of calm detachment and never exhibit curiosity in their own set except with personal friends, although they may ask a few personal questions of those few associates they may have from classes lower than their own.

Upper-middle class. Six to eight per cent of the local population make up the upper-middle class. Four out of five members are descendants of pioneer American stock, and 90 per cent are Protestants. Occupationally, the members are professionals, officials of local industries, the "better" businessmen, and a few leading farmers.

Members of this class are hyperactive in civic affairs. They hold over three-fourths of all positions of leadership in civic organizations. The men are concentrated in the local power organizations, such as Rotary, the Chamber of Commerce, and the country club; the women are active in the prestigious social organizations, such as DAR, WCTU, and the Home and Garden Club. This group dominates the planning and executive boards of the local Protestant churches. Like members of the upper class, these people do not belong to lodges. In proportion to their numbers, however, they hold more college degrees than any other class.

Although they are looked up to as civic leaders by those below them, they are in fact dominated and manipulated by the upper class. They identify themselves with the upper class, but they are not completely accepted by the latter. So far as they are able, they emulate the upper-class style of life, with its leisure and its ritualized social code.

Lower-middle class. Thirty-five to forty per cent of the local population make up the lower-middle class. Three out of five members are descendants of pioneer American stock; although most of these people

are Protestants, a larger proportion than the upper-middle class are Roman Catholics. Occupationally, the members are small businessmen, clergymen, lesser professionals, foremen, skilled tradesmen, and small farm owners.

Members of this class hold two-thirds to three-fourths of all county political offices, and they more actively engage in politics than does any other class. They hold no positions of power, however, and policies are decided by their class superiors. This group comprises the bulk of the membership (not leadership) of churches, associations, and political organizations. They are more avid churchgoers than any other group, and they supply almost all the town's Sunday-school teachers. The women of this class keep alive the church guilds, study groups, missionary societies, and welfare organizations in the town. Unlike those above them in the class hierarchy, they are enthusiastic supporters of lodges and women's auxiliaries. Compared with those above them, their educational attainment is quite modest. One-half of the male heads of families in this group have not attended school beyond the eighth grade.

They resent the two classes above them, feel excluded and left out, but perhaps inconsistently believe that those below them do not "have what it takes" to reach their own level. Their style of life is quite different from that of the two classes above them. They are "good mixers" in popular mass gatherings. They advertise their parties and social events in the society page of the Elmtown *Bugle* more than does any other class. Their wish to appear respectable in the eyes of others is as strong as their desire to earn more money.

Upper-lower class. About 40 per cent of the local population make up the upper-lower class, which contains more Catholics and people of recent foreign origin, and fewer descendants of "pioneer stock," than the lower-middle class. Occupationally, the members are almost exclusively manual workers.

Members of this class are not leaders in civic and community organizations; very few of them, in fact, belong to such organizations. "Religion is either shunned or embraced with enthusiasm." At the same time, this class contains a lower proportion of church members than does the lower-middle class. The few women from this group who belong to a "middle-class" church are more likely to be found at work in the kitchen during a church supper than on a policy board. Many of the religious people in this group belong to salvationist-cult "lower-class" churches. Upper-lower adults comprise the largest part of the membership in such lodges as the Redmen, Eagles, Woodmen, and their women's auxiliaries, but very few of them are members of the Masons or the Knights of Columbus. Their level of educational attainment is much lower than even that of the lower-middle classes.

These people regard themselves, and they are regarded by those

above them, as poor but honest and hard-working folk. They are appreciated with a patronizing tolerance by those in the upper and upper-middle classes. Nevertheless, intimate relationships are restricted within their own class; for the most part they are avoided by people in the lower-middle class, and in turn they even more consciously avoid people in the lower-lower class. Their style of life is somewhat more withdrawn than that of the lower-middle class. They neither strive nor hope for much in the eyes of others. They have little social life. They are proud to exhibit appliances with mail-order-house labels. They can hope to save little and they spend family income as it is earned. Nevertheless, three-fourths of these families own an automobile and over one-third own or are buying a home.

Lower-lower class. About 12 to 15 per cent of the local population make up the lower-lower class, which contains more people of recent foreign origin than any other class; contrary to higher-class opinion, however, three out of five families are of "American" stock which came to the town prior to the Civil War. Occupationally, men of this class are unskilled laborers—when they choose to work, which many of them do not. Over half of the mothers work outside the home.

Members of this class are rigidly excluded, by choice and by the attitudes of those above them, from all civic, fraternal, and church organizations, although they are not as a matter of open policy excluded from the "lower-class" churches.

They are dismissed by the rest of the community as dirty, shiftless, drunken, and dishonest. There is little privacy in their homes, only one in seven of which has bath and toilet facilities. The style of life of these people contrasts sharply with that of any other class in the community. Divorce, desertion, and illegitimacy are frequent, and so is physical violence. While all classes in the community tend to be residentially segregated, the residential segregation of the lower-lower class is absolute.

In summary, Elmtown's class structure is scaled according to several dimensions of status: occupation, income, lineage, power, social reputation, and style of life. While nominally open, the class divisions are actually rather tightly drawn, and movement upward beyond one class level is extremely difficult and extremely rare.

Yankee City

In this old industrial-commercial city in Massachusetts, of some 17,000 population, a class structure very similar to that of Elmtown's was delineated (19 and 20). The outstanding difference between the two structures is a clearer bifurcation of the upper class into upper-upper and lower-upper classes in Yankee City, owing to its location in a region of much older settlement. Lineage, a family home with a history of several generations in residence, and a family burial plot with three-

hundred-year-old tombstones all acquire a special significance and mark off a definitive upper-upper from a lower-upper group. The latter tend to have more money and wield more power than the upper-upper group, but they are recent arrivals in the community and their upper-class antecedents are in some cases rather vague.

The more subtle aspects of status are thus more elaborated here than in the Middle Western community described above. A lower-upper person might buy a home from a now impecunious upper-upper family, and thereby to some extent associate himself with a lineage which was not his. But at the same time the upper-upper reaction throughout the community would tend to acid disparagement. Most of those invited to the old home by the new owner would more likely than not refuse.

Through devices such as "expressing regrets," the upper-uppers discourage further mobility on the part of lower-uppers, but not for long. The dynamic of wealth and power in America is so strong, here as elsewhere, that it will scale every wall of exclusion, except that of race and in some cases religion. Lower-upper children in Yankee City go to the same schools as upper-upper children, and in the social affairs of the "second generation" the line between the two classes is not so heavily drawn. Lower-upper children are welcome in homes to which their own parents are not invited. Since all lower-uppers are Protestant and of old American stock (albeit not of the local tradition), power and wealth open the door for the "second generation." Impecunious "old" families often gain a new lease on financial life by arranging a marriage with a wealthy "new" family.

Not only is status more elaborated in Yankee City than in Elmtown but also the class levels of the two communities are not strictly comparable. It is questionable, for instance, that the Elmtown upper class would be recognized as such by the Yankee City upper class. One wing of the latter is wealthier and possesses more power; the other wing is an old and secure hereditary aristocracy, alongside of which Elmtown's upper class appears pretentious. Occupationally, at least, the Elmtown upper class is comparable with the Yankee City upper-middle class.

The Metropolitan Area

In large American cities, the concept of class as a series of *groups*—each aware of how itself and other class groups are ranked by the entire locality—breaks down. The metropolitan area is not organized as a community; in it, separated social worlds pile up close to one another. Chicago's Gold Coast, for example, a world of expensive apartments and apartment hotels, abuts the rooming-house district, but each pursues its own isolated way of life without reference to the other. Statuses differ *within* each district, but they are defined without reference to the other

district (22). In New York City, there is one cross street which, near Park Avenue, divides imposing ornate apartment hotels, complete with liveried doormen, on one side, from a teeming jungle of slum dwellings, dirty children, and pushcart peddlers on the other side. Each side of the street ignores the presence of the other; each lives in social if not in physical isolation.

A somewhat similar phenomenon at times occurs in rural-farm areas. The wealthy outsiders who own summer homes in Litchfield County, Connecticut, attend no town meetings, belong to no local organizations, and ignore and are ignored by the permanent farm residents. The local farm population is itself stratified, in a way similar to Landaff's, but it is doubtful that a local class structure could be described which would include both summer residents and permanent farm residents (15). Nevertheless, both farmer and wealthy outsider in Litchfield County are quite conscious that they live among others who are different in attitudes and style of life. Each group, at the very least, constantly passes judgment on the other.

What is almost peculiar about large cities is the *degree* to which each individual assesses himself and his associates independently of most others with whom he shares physical space. This fact was well brought out in a study of New York City residents who were in the "middle skill occupations." "Individuals operate for the most part in small groups within the total society, and the total population may have little relevance for them" (12, p. 24). They do not strive in terms of any class structure but rather in terms of their friends and their job associates, the only people who provide the standard of judgment recognized.

It is the urbanite "whose conceptualization of a reference group may be different from its actual character, who is not affected by all aspects of the culture nor by all references in the environment" (12, p. 80). Within the large city's ethnic, occupational, and financial divisions, subgroupings arise which in some cases emphasize "character" above all else, in other cases emphasize intellectual attainment above money, and vice versa. A great deal of striving for status in the modern world, particularly in large cities, is not oriented in terms of any conceivable total class structure, a fact that is especially apparent in artistic, intellectual, academic, theatrical, sporting, and professional circles.

Striving is tridimensional. An obscure scholar may spend a lifetime studying a single Greek verb form, and he may die happy in the knowledge that six other equally obscure and impoverished scholars have understood and cited his work. A nod of appreciation from Martha Graham may mean more to a young devotee of modern dance than an opportunity to marry into the four hundred. Many medical doctors have renounced the opportunity of a lucrative practice, along with an upper-

or near upper-class position, in order to engage in a form of medical research that will secure them the acclaim of their professional colleagues. A city boss may glory in his tremendous power and remain undisturbed about his being unwelcome in upper-class homes. There are, then, three dimensions of striving and achievement. One is *social class*—social reputation within an entire locality. Another is *occupational success and prestige*—professional reputation among other professionals. The third is *economic or political power.* The three dimensions in general tend to coincide, but they do not necessarily coincide in any particular case.

Awareness of class not uniform. An indeterminate number of people live and strive with little if any orientation toward social class, as such. And many participants in a local class structure who recognize its existence do not see it in its entirety. People tend to exaggerate the differences between their own class and other classes near them, while they tend to minimize the differences, or are unaware of the differences, between social classes far removed from them (5, p. 65). In other words, the upper-upper and lower-upper classes are acutely aware of the differences between them, while both tend to lump the middle and lower classes together as "the lower classes." Conversely, the upper-lower class sharply distinguishes between itself and the lower-lower class while tending to view all above it, middle as well as upper class, as "big shots."

Warner and Lunt warn that one would be in error to suppose that all residents of Yankee City are equally aware of class differences. If the delineation of a class structure (based upon "social reputation") in this old and stable small city grossly oversimplifies reality, any attempt to delineate a class structure in a metropolitan area would grossly distort reality. As one moves from the small, homogeneous community to the large metropolitan area, the number of statuses which one individual may attain or hold within different and nonoverlapping groups constantly increases, and the local or reputed total national "class structure" becomes increasingly blurred.

For example, what has come to be known as café society lies outside any conceivable local or national class structure. It is a group without roots, constantly adding and dropping members, which circulates from one point to another of the New York–Palm Beach–Hollywood triangle. Fabulously wealthy, it inquires only into bank account, personal charm, and ability to amuse. It includes members of local upper classes, royalty divested of crown, entertainers, ex-gangsters, and panders. It rides the publicity skyrocket of blatant sexual immorality and casual divorce. More than any other segment of the population, it lives up to the code of "conspicuous consumption," a way of life of free spending and vulgar ostentation which Thorstein Veblen mistakenly assumed was appropriate upper-class behavior (17). It is not so much a part of the social order as it is an excrescence upon it.

DOES AMERICA HAVE A CASTE SYSTEM?

Caste is a system of stratification in which mobility—at least ideally—may not occur. A person's ascribed status is his lifetime status. Birth determines one's occupation, place of residence, style of life, personal associates, and the group from among whom one must find a mate. A caste system always includes the notion of pollution, the notion that physical or even some forms of social contact with lower-caste persons are degrading to higher-caste persons. The caste system is also protected by law and sanctified by religion.

Caste in India

The classic example of caste, and also the oldest, is the ancient social system of Hindu India. Scholars have assigned various origins to it, such as culture conflict between the Aryans to the north and the peoples to the south whom they invaded thousands of years ago, or the differences in color between the lighter invaders and the darker native population. One Hindu sociologist has rejected these explanations, has claimed that the division of labor was the basis of Indian caste: the conquerors permanently assigned the meaner employments to their subjects, a situation which was soon regulated and sanctified by religious precepts. For various reasons, India for centuries was spared any great disruptive political and economic change, and thus was enabled to crystallize what Sumner called the "strain toward consistency in the mores." Chandrasekhar further claims that the West might have developed a similar caste system had not the guilds of the medieval period been demolished by the industrial revolution (3).

Whatever the origin of caste may have been, it turns out that even the Indian caste system never fully realized the caste ideal. Since each caste was assigned one occupation, in order to have maintained intact both the caste system and the economy, each caste would have had to replace itself in each generation through reproduction, replace itself exactly and no more. However, the birth rate in each caste and the demand for the occupational skill of each caste never remained in perfect balance. The birth rate of the various castes shifted from time to time, and so did the demand for their occupational skills. Hence all mobility, for individuals and for entire castes, could not in actual practice be denied. In history, consequently, various castes and subcastes grouped and regrouped, and rose and fell in the social scheme.

Nevertheless, the caste principle itself was not undermined until industrialism came to the coastal cities. Western education, modern democratic conceptions of equality, the empirical and scientific outlook, and most particularly the dynamic of a developing capitalist economy all

demanded a fluidity of movement, a differentiation of function, that have placed some highest-caste Brahmans in almost all occupations, from priestcraft (the hereditary function) to medicine and even clerical jobs in business offices. Likewise, some Sudras (traditionally peasants) have become Sanskrit scholars and even priests.

The industrialized city can pay little heed to the elaborate forms of approach and avoidance demanded by a caste system. The Brahman who is supposed to be made "unclean" if the shadow of a low-caste person falls upon him, who is then supposed to retire for a long and ceremonial bath, can hardly thus acknowledge every shadow he encounters on the crowded street and in the busy office. Although the old caste principles are still for the most part enforced in the rural interior, to the extent that India becomes Westernized, caste must be modified.

"Caste" in America

It has been claimed that American Negroes comprise a caste. There is, to be sure, more than a little justification for such a view, since many close parallels between social life in traditional India and in modern America can be drawn. Racial intermarriage is forbidden by law in many states. The opportunity to enter many lines of work is either closed or restricted in the experience of the modern Negro. Although white Southerners welcome the Negro's physical intimacy when he prepares and serves their food and cares for their children, in any situation in which the specter of social equality might arise the magical notion of pollution appears: the Negro's "smell" or "appearance" is so distasteful that the races must not eat together, must not be taught or worship together, must enter separate doors in railroad stations, and must use separate lavatories and drinking fountains. Various devices of physical segregation employed by whites in other regions of the country differ more in degree than in kind.

Race relations are dynamic. The resemblance between traditional India and modern America is, however, more superficial than otherwise. It is doubtful that such a term as "caste" properly describes present social relations between American whites and Negroes. Inferior *racial* status is not acceptable to perhaps the majority of modern American Negroes, who at least strive to enter new occupations and endeavor to sell their labor in the most advantageous market. Rivalry, striving, expressed dissatisfaction, the constant threat to use political action to wrest further advantages—none of these is characteristic of a caste system. A caste system, moreover, is rooted in the mores and sanctified by religion. The Negro's inferior place in modern America is part of the mores, but it is contrary to our dominant political ideology and religious precepts. A true caste system is consistently supported by a total religious-social context (4).

It is in the rural South that the elaborate forms of approach, avoidance, and deference, which separate the races and define the certain place of each, have remained almost unchanged with the passing of the last few decades (7). But as the Negro in increasing numbers migrates to the urban industrial North, and from the rural South to the newly urban industrial South, modifications of race relations follow, especially in those periods when Negro labor is in demand. On the crowded city street, in the noisy factory where men must rub elbows, it is physically impossible for the Negro to admit his "place" by tipping his hat and physically impossible for the white man to demand that he do so. In other and more fundamental ways a swift revision of racial status is taking place—educational opportunity; greater opportunity, at least for some, to improve their occupational status; and the concentration of numbers in cities, which facilitates the use of political action.

While the Deep South "lags" behind the rest of the country, it is there that the greatest *gains* have been made in recent years. A number of states have passed antilynching laws. In almost all counties of the formerly "solid white" states of Georgia and Alabama, Negroes may now vote, according to new laws (18). At no time in the history of the world has a recently enslaved people risen so far, and been permitted to rise so far by the former master class, as has the American Negro in the last eighty-five years. The obvious difficulty in assessing such gains, of course, is the lack of any scientific norm against which they can be measured, the given norm being either the impatient demands of the "liberal" or the alarm expressed by the "reactionary." In any event, it would appear that America does not possess a caste system. The dynamics of the present scene escape the confines of any such rigid concept.

The Negro class structure. Caste status is something which changes slowly if at all, but since the Negro's status has changed swiftly, we have on this count questioned that America has a caste system. Caste status is also something which is uniform within a caste (all have the same rights and duties, and all share the same style of life), but on this count also the status of the American Negro fails to define a caste system.

Alongside the white class structure in whatever locality they live, American Negroes have erected class structures of their own. In rural areas of Virginia and North Carolina, three distinct Negro classes have tended to emerge, which rather strikingly parallel the three classes in Landaff. "The well-to-do landowners with family traditions constitute an upper class and are differentiated from small-holders and tenants with stable family life. The latter, who form a middle class, are differentiated from the unstable farm laborers and loggers and laborers in turpentine mills at the bottom of the social pyramid" (8, p. 279).

In the Northern metropolis, the Negro class structure tends to be somewhat less extensive than the white class structure alongside of it. There tend to be three rather than six classes in the Negro urban hierarchy (8, Chap. XII). "Lineage," obviously, can play little part; the range of skin color is given some consideration; but the most important criteria are occupation and education. On these last two counts, so far as white and Negro class structures are comparable, the white upper-middle class equates the Negro upper class, the lower-middle the middle, and the lower-lower white social class the lower Negro class.

Between themselves and their social inferiors (albeit racial equals), the Negro upper and middle classes diligently strive to preserve social distance. Whatever the surrounding white world may believe, they at least are insistent that Negroes are not "all alike," as the following incident discloses: "As the Old Settlers Club met in a house on South Parkway in Chicago, their meeting was disturbed by the laughter and gaiety of Negroes entering a theater and ballroom across the street. One member remarked to the group: 'Listen to that barbarism. The riffraff that has come to Chicago is destroying all that we have built up'" (8, p. 284).

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CHAPTER 15 *Class in America*

> It may be that the sheer struggle for existence will be put an end to, but will that effect the end desired? There will still be the fact that some are weak and some are strong. . . . The greater talents of some will bring them greater rewards. The unsuccessful will continue to envy the successful.
>
> —SOMERSET MAUGHAM

> I spent the summer working in the office of the plant. I could have worked in the plant, and earned ten dollars a week more, but you don't make good connections in the plant, and besides you get your hands dirty. —AN AMERICAN COLLEGE BOY

It was pointed out in the previous chapter that there is no national class structure in the United States because the number of classes and the criteria of status vary somewhat from one locality to another. Thus the "dimensions of status" discussed below, which are all of the criteria to be found in America, must not be assumed to be given equal weight in all localities. Further, each criterion, in any locality, is seldom employed except in combination with other criteria. For instance, Protestant religious affiliation in general confers higher status than does Catholic; on the other hand, most Negroes are Protestant, and their racial status (and thus their total social-class status) is far below that of most Catholics. These two qualifications should be kept in mind as we proceed.

THE DIMENSIONS OF STATUS IN AMERICA: ASCRIBED

Very few of the dimensions listed below under the headings of "ascribed" and "achieved" are exclusively one or the other. Most of the dimensions listed under each heading are simply more a matter of one than of the other.

Family

Regardless of age and sex differences, the newborn child's class status is the same as that of the adults in his family. It is the institution of marriage, not that of the family, which sometimes affords the opportunity to achieve status, even though research has shown that in the vast majority of cases marriage unites social-class equals. Because our society remains male-dominated for the most part, because the husband confers his name

upon his wife rather than the reverse, because, in a word, a wife's social status tends to approximate that of her husband, marriage serves women as a more effective means of vertical mobility than it serves men.

Residence

Place. Status is in part expressed by residential area. In any locality there are "best," "good," and "poor" residential sections. Every local class structure tends to segregate geographically. Residential location in part determines friends, membership in cliques and more formal associations, and even future mate, since marriage in most cases unites two people who live close to each other. Although "moving into a better section" is often a means of vertical mobility for adults, place of residence is part of the child's and adolescent's ascribed status.

Type of dwelling. An old home, retained within a family for generations, in some circles may confer more status than a more expensive and newer dwelling. The most important single characteristic which distinguishes "class" of dwelling unit, however, is the amount of living space, within and outside the home. In general, lower-class families are crowded together inside, and their dwelling units are piled close together. Conversely, one of the hallmarks of gracious living is a large number of rooms which permit both privacy and functional differentiation, including a library, an informal sitting room, a playroom, and the like. Moreover, such dwelling units are seclusive, separated by wide stretches of lawn and garden. In city apartments, of course, only the indoors aspect of gracious living can be put into practice.

Nativity and Race

Provided factors other than nativity are held constant, among the white groupings in this country the grouping with British antecedents ranks first. Next in order are the "older immigrants" and their descendants, representing such Northern and Western European stocks as German, Scandinavian, and Dutch. The last in order are the "new immigrants" and their descendants, those with Southern and Eastern European antecedents. The racial groupings rank from Caucasian through Mongolian to Negro.

The dimension of nativity rarely stands alone, however, but usually in combination with others. The Oakies and Arkies who fled the Western dust bowl in the great depression were some of the "oldest" and "purest" Anglo-Saxons left in the country. But when these impoverished farm families arrived in California they were accused of being dirty, animal-like, immoral, and a menace to the community—exactly the same epithets that had been hurled at the Chinese when they went to California in the 1850's and 1860's.

Religion

Again, when other factors are held constant, religious affiliation is ranked Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish, in that order. Nevertheless, many old Catholic families possess a much higher status than Anglo-Saxon Protestant families who have recently acquired great wealth. While Jewish identification is usually held in comparatively low esteem, some pre-Civil War Southern Jewish families are accorded a high social reputation in their communities.

Within Protestantism itself, there are many status levels. Doctrinal disputes have long since ceased to separate Protestants as effectively as social-class differences, both local and national. In every community of appreciable size there are "better," "good," and "poor" Protestant churches. While a Methodist church in one or another locality may outrank an Episcopal church, when income, occupation, and educational attainment are combined, the following national picture emerges:

> Protestant denominations in their total outreach touch nearly all sections of the population. But each denomination tends also to be associated with a particular social status. Such demnominations as the Congregational, Episcopal, and Presbyterian are generally associated with the middle and upper classes; the Methodist, Baptist, and Disciples of Christ denominations are more typically associated with the middle classes. [21, p. 89]

The pentecostal and holiness sects, such as Seventh-Day Adventists and Jehovah's Witnesses, are for the most part made up of lower-class congregations.

Style of Life

This dimension of status, so difficult to put into words with any precision, is nonetheless real. Style of life is the most subtle and yet perhaps the most important dimension of social-class status. It is also the most pervasive and uniform, so that more legitimately than on any other basis, nation-wide classes can be thus distinguished.

Style of life is almost completely ascribed, since it is largely composed of habits instilled during childhood. Very few can ever successfully imitate the "manner born" of those whose ascribed status was superior to theirs. The subtle hints of status carried in manner, manners, dress, speech, and social attitudes inform fairly accurately where any individual "belongs" because of where he was born.

Upper class. Members of the upper class may not strive in an obvious way, for they are going nowhere—they are already there. Although class "rules" govern conduct, a firm independence of judgment among even peers is on certain occasions expected and respected. The upper-class ideal is one of icy reserve with strangers and quiet self-sufficiency within intimate circles. Nervousness and loquacity are inadmissible. In the very

teeth of disaster, whether the maid has tripped and sent cocktail glasses shattering on the guests or whether the trust fund which serves as major source of income has been liquidated, ideally neither embarrassment nor fear is betrayed.

Given a reasonable basis of choice, old things are preferred to new things. Wealth must never be ostentatiously displayed, for there must be no interest in arousing the envy of those who have less. Elin Anderson tells the story of an upper-class woman in Burlington, Vermont, who expressed surprise at her maid's new fur coat. The maid had bought one the previous season while she herself had been wearing the same fur coat for seven seasons. The maid's reply, to the effect that people knew her mistress for what she was while they knew her only for what she had, showed her sharp awareness of the more subtle aspects of status (2). "Fashionable" as well as new clothing is treated with indifference, at least within secure upper-class circles. The old ladies of Boston's Beacon Hill cling jealously to their Victorian headgear; for them, the "latest thing" has no attraction.

Morality is upheld, but not by the community at large so much as by extended family and social circle, and not so much in terms of middle-class respectability as in terms of good form, family loyalty, and stability. Within older regions of settlement, a sense of *noblesse oblige* has not entirely disappeared—repaying society's privileges by volunteering to go to war in some cases, assuming a responsibility for local affairs in others. Where lineage of family and home are more recent, there is more likely to be unrelieved hedonism and self-interest.

The "proper" attitude toward lower-class people, strangers, family lawyer, and servants is preserved. An elaborate ritual of invitations, entertaining, house furnishing, appropriate dress, and the uses of stationery and introductions must become part of subliminal conduct. At the same time, the proper occasions for relaxing these rules with intimates must be known. Leisure-time activities are everywhere part of the ritual, and preferably they are not imitated by the lower classes. The upper class has introduced almost every form of recreation presently enjoyed by their social inferiors—baseball, golf, tennis, archery, and even roller skating. The upper class has tended to adopt recreational forms which, because of expense, are presently denied lower-class imitation—cricket in Philadelphia, polo on Long Island, and yachting along the Atlantic seaboard. The ideal is to spend as little time as possible in business (the farther in the past that a family has made its fortune, the more secure are the descendants), in order to devote more time to leisured pursuits.

At this level, educational attainment carries little prestige. It is not so much a college degree as having attended the proper schools which counts. Neither do clever talk and intellectuality elicit any particular

respect. The arts may be patronized, but most acceptably within an antiquarian-historical interest. Conservatism in all things is expected, particularly in politics. The outspoken revulsion which many Union League members felt for President Roosevelt centered in the charge that he had "betrayed his class" by seeking social change to benefit the "forgotten man." The lower orders should be helped, but always in terms of dispensing charity, at a distance, and not to such an extent that the present distribution of wealth should be disturbed. Conservatism is a generalized upper-class attitude. Active joining, of either causes or organizations, is not expected behavior. Enthusiasm *for* anything, as a matter of fact, is usually under control.

A secure upper class is not likely to be snobbish, in the popular sense. Its members do not have to be. Much of what is interpreted as snobbishness is the mere desire to choose their own friends, and these are from among the group that they have known from childhood, with whom they have played and gone to school, and with whom they are at home. In Christopher Morley's novel *Kitty Foyle*, the daughter of a lower-class family of Irish descent is wooed by Wynnewood Strafford, who lives in Philadelphia's "best" residential section, the Main Line. His relatives and friends are not exactly pleased, but they regard his conduct as his own business, and they make a real effort to get to know Kitty. The effort fails, for she is too acutely aware of the vast social distance which separates her from them. Their well-bred accent, their kindly self-assurance, their unexpressed distaste for "nice new clothes," and their effortless ease all reduce her to gutter profanity, covertly expressed, a form of aggression really aimed at herself (12).

Middle class. The middle-class style of life is governed by one supreme hope and activity—striving for success, upward movement, getting ahead. Middle-class life is dedicated to manipulating people and the symbols of success. A member of the middle class cannot afford the characteristic upper-class attitude of independence, for his success depends upon the approval of others, particularly the approval of occupational superiors who can either help or hinder. His future may hinge on an invitation to dinner as well as on a written recommendation, so he tends to live in the eyes of others and to adapt his personal responses to meet their approval.

Tangible evidences of arrival are important, such as a college degree, a new automobile, a new house, and membership or leadership in church, civic affair, or formal organization. Where fate is so much controlled by making a good impression, being "democratic" is a requirement, especially for males. It is the middle class which joins and actively participates in causes and organizations. Formerly, America's middle class preserved morality as a good in itself; today's middle-class morality is much more solely a matter of reputation.

Tending to mortgage the present for the future, the middle class makes a fetish of cleanliness, regularity, and respectability, in large measure to ensure that those who are in a position to endanger that future will not do so. Education is respected as a present accomplishment, but it is regarded primarily as a means to improve status. It is for the most part in large cities that intellectuality is prized, and only by people of this class. Liberalism, joining *avant-garde* movements, and vocal and partisan interest in art and letters serve much the same purpose in large cities that respectability, narrowly conceived, does in smaller communities.

Middle-class people are vulnerable and insecure, economically and psychologically. They strive more than any other class, but with a greater probability of frustration. In this class, economic insecurity is a collective as well as an individual experience. Leisured members of the upper class have trust funds and annuities; the managerial group have retirement and delayed-salary provisions in their contracts, to avoid the virtual confiscation of present income-tax levies in the upper brackets. The state and Federal governments care for the indigent at the very bottom, and industrial workers organize various forms of collective security. People in the middle class are not protected like the upper and lower classes. They are taxed by the state to care for others, and they will not or cannot organize with the middle-class competitors who surround them.

Psychological insecurity is reflected by the various schemes of self-improvement which absorb so much of the energy and income of this class. Lectures and courses are eagerly attended, magazines and books are eagerly read, in search of the key to correct manners, proper and grammatical speech, child care, political opinion, and how to win friends and influence people.

Although snobbishness—the immediate dismissal of another person for not having the proper status qualifications, regardless of his personal qualities—is more intensively practiced here than in the upper class, respect for the rights and accomplishments of other persons is more developed in the middle class than in any other. This is an important characteristic of our middle class, which more than any other represents the American way of life, and upon which the future largely depends.

Lower class. The lower-class style of life is much less uniform than the other two we have discussed. The upper-lower class live quite differently from the lower-lower. The upper-lower style of life resembles that of the middle class in many ways—in the accents on respectability, money, material possessions, and getting ahead. Nevertheless, the perceptions and uses of all these are somewhat different, and somewhat more literal, in the upper-lower class. For instance, in most circles of this class the demand for respectability is met by keeping out of debt, avoiding overt sexual immorality, never being observed drunk on the street,

and the like; and obvious egocentricity, seclusiveness, and raucous profanity (at least when male expressed) are likely to go unchallenged, which would not be the case in most middle-class circles.

The extremes of new fashions are more readily adopted, especially by upper-lower youth. Getting ahead does not have the subtle overtones which motivate the middle class. Success is defined by upper-lower class people almost solely in terms of money and expensive possessions. Matters of good taste and refinement, the knowledge that the most imposing piece of furniture is not universally regarded as the best, for the most part are unknown to members of this class.

There is little manipulation of others to get ahead. An upper-lower-class male manipulates tools, not people, and he depends more upon his own skill, endurance, and luck than upon the good will of others to get the things he wants. The bulk of organized labor is to be found in this class. Psychologically and economically, these people are much more secure than are the middle class.

The lower lower-class person shares one trait with the aristocrat. He is not a striver. Unlike the aristocrat, however, he is usually resigned to lowly station. Unlike the middle-class person, he lives for the present; he does not mortgage the present for the future. He sedulously avoids work, responsibility, and the consequences of tomorrow. His life is drunkenness, momentary hedonism, sexual license, violence, and street scenes.

There is in America no equivalent of the London Cockney's "place." *Everyone*, except the numerically small upper class, is supposed to strive for success. The American ethos of upward mobility is such that those at the bottom regard themselves as failures and are regarded as failures by others. At the same time, the American ethos contains the idea that all men are equal. From this dichotomy comes the complex attitude of shame and resentment so characteristic of the American lower-lower class.

The upper class is either unaware of their existence or ignores them. The upper-lower class and the middle class view them as the pale outside the boundary of themselves which they have either fortunately escaped or been secured against.

There is greater social distance between both wings of the lower class and the middle class than there is between middle and upper classes. The style of life of those at or near the bottom of the scale is almost completely a matter of ascription. It is the unusual individual from the very bottom who, because of capability and opportunity to absorb a middle-class scale of values, strikes out for and achieves middle-class status. On the other hand, at least the surface characteristics of upper-class conduct are within the bounds of possible achievement for many middle-class persons.

THE DIMENSIONS OF STATUS IN AMERICA: ACHIEVED

Wealth

Most status dimensions, it will be recalled, combine ascription and achievement, in varying degrees. Although accumulated family wealth is part of ascribed status in some cases, in America—with its high rate of social mobility and its dynamic economy—more wealth in every generation has been achieved than has been ascribed, or transmitted.

The importance of wealth for class position has been exaggerated by the man on the street, but it has also been unduly minimized by a number of students of social class. It is true that wealth will not guarantee social acceptance in the "best circles" and that a time lag, sometimes of two or three generations, is interposed between achieved wealth and social acceptance. It is also true that there are Hollywood millionaires who are not welcomed in certain Los Angeles clubs and that the Yankee City lower-upper class is more wealthy than the upper-upper class, which acquired its money in the more distant past.

On the other hand, in a national quasi-capitalist economy such as ours, wealth will *ultimately* unlock almost every door: over several generations of retained wealth only a nonwhite racial status, in all cases, and a non-Christian religious status, in some cases, will bar entrance to upper-class circles. Conversely, an upper-class family which loses enough of its money so that it is no longer able to maintain the upper-class style of life is not likely to retain its class status indefinitely.

Wealth is sincerely appreciated at every class level. Members of the upper class do not flaunt money and possessions, but they are not unaware that lineage requires a rather expensive picture frame. Members of the middle class more openly strive to achieve money and possessions, and members of the lower class orient many of their activities (or at least their unfulfilled fantasies) in terms of wealth and possessions—witness the popularity of give-away radio programs.

Occupation and Talent

High occupational status is at least as much ascribed to as it is achieved by members of the upper class. However, occupational status in America is much more typically a matter of achievement, in which individual ability and talent in large measure govern competition. Occupational and income statuses are, generally speaking, closely related to each other and also to the wielding of power. Nevertheless, occupation, income, and power do not always rise and fall together evenly, nor do they always evenly apply to social acceptance or social reputation.

The physician has an occupational status which exceeds his income status. This disparity is even more acute in the case of the college pro-

fessor; one of the social dilemmas he is sometimes posed is being invited to homes where the scale of entertainment leaves him unable to reciprocate. The professional man generally possesses a relatively high occupational status and social reputation, but his income is relatively low and he is relatively devoid of economic and political power. The ward heeler who dominates his little section of a city wields vastly more power, although neither his occupational status nor his social reputation will compare with that of the professional man.

In Table 8, the scale of urban occupations is presented, first in terms of power, and second in terms of social reputation:

Table 8 The Scale of Urban Occupations

POWER	SOCIAL REPUTATION *
I. Owners and managers of large firms, plus the top managerial class emerging in government and labor	I. Professionals and proprietors of large businesses
II. Independent small businessmen, labor organizers, lesser managers, lesser politicians, and civil servants	II. Clerks and kindred workers
III. Professionals	III. Skilled workers
IV. Subprofessionals: nurses, schoolteachers, technicians, and the like	IV. Proprietors of small businesses
V. Factory foremen and the bulk of white-collar workers—salesmen, office personnel, the army of minor functionaries in industry, business, government, and labor	V. Semiskilled workers
VI. Manual workers	VI. Unskilled laborers and domestic servants

* Second column adapted from 26, p. 134.

The occupational status of farmers is left unconsidered in Table 8, because "farmers" comprise a loose category that runs all the way from the top (gentleman farmers plus the owners and managers of the citrus-fruit corporations on the West Coast) to the bottom (farm laborers and tenants). One further complication is the so-called leisure class, that group which stands near or at the top of local class structures. Its members have no occupational position whatsoever, but their social position is secure so long as they maintain their hereditary wealth.

Education

Formal training is the most frequently used and most sought after dimension of achieved status. It has a double attractiveness. First, the

highly specialized modern job world demands trained personnel. Second, in many circles diplomas and degrees carry social prestige, and to "have no education" is tantamount to being incorrectly dressed. The broad middle class most highly prizes formal training, for occupational and social reasons.

Morality

In rural areas and in areas of older settlement, a strict conformity to morality—particularly in sexual behavior and the use of alcohol—is generally required for both upper- and middle-class status. In large cities and in newer areas of settlement, these demands are considerably relaxed. Even in small communities in older areas of settlement, at least unmarried males are not held to strict moral observance with women from a class lower than their own. Intricate clashes between class demand and conventional morality frequently occur. In Lillian Smith's novel *Strange Fruit*, it is the upper-class white boy's pastor who advises him to continue to have sexual relations with his attractive mulatto mistress, if he must, but under no conditions to marry the girl.

Clique and Formal Association

Membership in clique and formal association is almost equally a matter of ascribed and of achieved status. Clique membership, to whatever extent ascribed or achieved, is the most important mark of social acceptance in modern American society. The clique is an intimate, informal, nonkin group of small but varying size, which has no officers, stated purposes, or regular meeting time. It is held together by common interests and by mutual acceptance of social equality. The very lack of rigid structure in the clique makes it peculiarly adapted to a mobile society. The clique expands and contracts, accepts new and throws off old members, as the social acceptability of individuals waxes and wanes.

Cliques are the hub of upper-class social life, at any age level. Cliques form much of middle- and lower-class social life during adolescence—especially in the preparatory and high school. For adult members of the middle class, clique activity falls between upper-class frequency and lower-class cessation. Having little leisure and less status to maintain, adults at the bottom of the scale tend to limit their primary-group relationships to family and personal friends.

As we have already seen, the joining of voluntary associations or formal organizations is a typically middle-class enterprise, typically used, with whatever other combination of motives, to enhance social status. At both ends of the social-class scale, membership in voluntary associations falls off sharply. Type of organization also varies with class level. Upper-class people for the most part restrict such memberships to

"favorite charities" and recreational associations—yachting club, polo club, and the like. It is in the upper reaches of the middle class that leadership in the power organizations of the locality is sought—politics, Rotary, and the Chamber of Commerce. The entire middle class is active in church work, and the lower reaches of it join such fraternal orders as the Masons and the Knights of Columbus. The Elks, Odd Fellows, and Woodmen attract workingmen, for the most part. People at the very bottom are without organizational memberships of any kind.

As much as social class, locality size determines the amount of organizational activity, which is at the maximum in the middle range of size—in large towns and small cities. Organizational activity falls off in metropolitan and in rural-farm areas.

SOCIAL MOBILITY IN AMERICA

The Past

If there is any one single activity and faith which most characterizes the American way, it is individual success, getting ahead—in technical terminology, vertical mobility. All historical societies have to some extent fostered vertical mobility, even those which sanctioned permanent castes and hereditary estates (23). But only in America has personal success become both a common accomplishment and an ideology preached to all.

The North American continent from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries presented something unique in human experience —a vast area of unparalleled economic opportunity for the ordinary man who possessed strength, vision, courage, and ability. Land was virtually free for the taking, and an abundance of natural resources was thrown open to the rugged peoples of predominantly Anglo-Saxon heritage who brought with them the Protestant ethic—a world view which included individual responsibility, paying one's debts, faith in God and monogamous marriage, and, most important of all, hard work and thrift. These values were nurtured by a physical environment which encouraged individual initiative and expansion, which permitted the sloughing off of such Old World restraints as centralized government and special privilege vested in hereditary classes.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, a new era was emerging. Cities were increasing in number and size. The output of factories equaled that of farm and mine. New forms of business incorporation were supplanting the individual entrepreneur. Nevertheless, although the units of production and distribution were getting larger and power was concentrating in fewer hands, mobility was by no means curtailed. Mobility continued at a high rate throughout the nineteenth century, for three reasons.

First, technological progress did not abate; it accelerated, and continuously opened up new opportunities. To cite one example, the introduction of the McCormick reaper to the Western plains boomed farm production and released thousands of young farm workers to go to the cities and take part in the expansion of industry. The new factories, and the new corporate business enterprises, constantly expanded long hierarchies of personnel and every year added thousands of new job categories.

Second, as the spread of income between rich and poor widened in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and as great fortunes made their appearance, differential fertility in some measure modified the new imbalance. The birth rate of the new rich, of the new owners and managers, was far too low for them to replace themselves. The filling of high occupational positions in large part depended upon recruitment from those in lower positions.

Third, millions of immigrants—whose rate of entry reached a peak around the turn of the century—took jobs at the bottom of the scale, thus enabling previous immigrant groups to rise not only individually but also on a quasi-group basis. When it is recalled that between 1820 and 1920 over 38 million immigrants came from Europe to these shores—the greatest mass migration in the history of the world—then the scope of flux, change, and mobility opened up is in part explained.

The Present: Evidence of Diminishing Mobility

The available evidence does not permit a definite answer to the question: is vertical mobility expanding or contracting in the United States of today? Nevertheless, it appears probable that the opportunity to rise *is* diminishing. At the very least, a formidable argument could be presented in support of such a thesis.

We have already reviewed, in Chaps. 12 and 13, the decline of small business and the steady concentration of power and control. Even though the opportunity to rise in large organizations has not been curtailed (may, as a matter of fact, have been expanded), what *has* been curtailed is the probability of starting from the bottom and ultimately reaching success in the classic sense of capitalistic ownership and control. In other words, success in modern America tends to be limited to movement from lower to higher employee status. Further, several new developments interfere with opportunity to improve employee status.

Immigration. The immigration-restriction acts of 1921 and 1924 and the quota act of 1927 have almost ended immigration from overseas. Americans must now compete among themselves without the former collective opportunity to rise on the shoulders of recent immigrants—assuming, of course, that the present economy could absorb more immigrants than it now does. Connected with the virtual cessation of immigration

was the passing of the geographical frontier and the closing of free and cheap land to settlement. These three factors, combined in turn with the rise of a bureaucratic economy, have led to a steady increase in the proportion of the employed who work for others rather than for themselves. In nonagricultural pursuits, 88 per cent of the gainfully employed in the United States of 1930 were so classified; this proportion has continued to increase. The trend toward employee status does not necessarily mean that vertical mobility per se has been reduced, but it does signify a waning of one part of the American dream—economic independence.

Restrictive practices. Mobility has been checked by the banyan-tree growth of restrictive practices in business, industry, and the professions. Almost all occupational groupings in modern America solemnly intone their faith in free enterprise, while they engage in undermining free enterprise as rapidly and efficiently as they can. Ambivalence takes the form of free enterprise for others, quasi-socialistic protection from competition for myself.

Farmers demand subsidies and other governmental aids, which hinder if not prevent newcomers from competing in the sale of protected crops; subsidies are paid only if so many acres of potatoes or peanuts or whatever were under cultivation at some *previous* period of time. In the guise of the public interest, business seeks safety codes, patent laws, and fair-trade legislation, to outlaw the more efficient methods used by their competitors and to prevent newcomers from entering the field.

Labor unions have been the chief advocates of restrictions on immigration, to spare the American workman from competition for his labor. They have wrested control over hiring practices and secured seniority clauses in labor contracts, which reduce at least the horizontal mobility of labor. Some unions have set prohibitive entrance fees for new members; where the closed shop is enforced, he who does not have a union card cannot work. In some cases, unions have forced upon management so-called featherbedding practices, which require several men to do what one man could do.

Many professional societies have raised their educational and other entrance standards, in order to protect those already in from "too much" further competition (1). Virtually every occupational grouping flouts in action its vocal faith in capitalism—from the giant corporations which lobby to increase "protective" tariffs against cheaper foreign imports to the organized barbers in a small city who set "fair" prices on haircuts and restrict further competition through a municipal code which requires expensive graduation from a "barber college."

Industry and agriculture. Perhaps the clearest indications of diminishing mobility are apparent in industry, some of which evidence was presented in Chaps. 12 and 13. Unfortunately we do not have comparable data for the past, yet whatever possibility once existed of rising from the

factory floor to become a foreman, and thence to become a part of management or even a capitalist—this possibility is *now* gone. Upgrading on the factory floor itself occurs less frequently today than formerly, because each supervisor has more men under him in today's larger factory. An investigation of one factory revealed that in one and three-fourths years there was one chance in 424 for any one factory worker to be made a foreman (18).

The recent union organization of American foremen indicates their willingness to identify their lot with labor rather than with management. This is a realistic assessment for, as industry expands its ranks, the foreman's job tends to become a dead end to the man whose training has been limited to work in the shop. The modern trend is to bring in college and business-school graduates—accountants, designers, chemical engineers, and the like—to fill the lesser managerial and technological posts beyond the foreman level.

Agriculture has belatedly started the cycle of concentrated capital and large corporate enterprise which now fully characterizes business and industry. Particularly in the Far West has the corporate-agricultural form been developed, the "factories in the fields" with their stockholders, managers, foremen, technicians, and hired workers. As the proportion of farm owners declines, that of tenants rises. While 25 per cent of all farmers were tenants in 1880, the proportion had grown to 42 per cent by 1935 (10).

The "welfare state." One modern trend appears on the surface to contradict any claim that opportunity has declined—the trend toward leveling of income, goods, and services throughout the population, largely through the intervention of the Federal government. Income levels have recently been moving upward, but the rising spiral of income-tax levies, especially in the upper brackets, has reduced the spread of income after taxes. In other words, not the rich but the poor have been getting richer in the past two decades.

Mounting taxes imposed by the Federal government have in part gone to defray its expanded welfare program, including pensions, aid to education, mental hygiene, medical care, old-age assistance, and health and diet programs. Leaders of various pressure groups are organizing, lobbying, and threatening to wrest more and more for their followers from the national income. Certainly any Marxist picture of a securely entrenched capitalist class grinding the faces of the poor, and manipulating government to its own advantage, must not include the recent national elections, during which both major parties pledged to redistribute the national income downward. It would, nevertheless, be an error to view this leveling process as an increase in social mobility.

Through legislation, a higher minimum wage may be secured throughout the country, but this does not reduce the social distance between the

floor sweeper and the factory superintendent or, indeed, between the floor sweeper and the top union leadership which lobbied for that higher minimum wage. Income, the means of securing goods and services, comprises only one dimension of status, and in the long run, with so many aggregates seeking more for themselves, there is much canceling out of mutual effort.

The hierarchy of classes and of the division of labor are little modified by such means. As a matter of fact, the addition of new administrative bodies to handle the new programs extends rather than contracts stratification. However well advised they may be on other grounds, various social-security programs may also in the long run prove restrictive of mobility. The more that is secured by way of administered privilege, the more independence of action must be sacrificed; at the same time, not seeking a change in job or situation becomes in many cases a personal advantage.

The Present: Contrary Evidence

The preservation of the American dream never depended upon the achievement of riches and power by the majority, but only upon the opportunity of a representative few to reach the top. In other words, our essential ideology may remain unchallenged so long as some opportunity to climb remains, which is the case. Even rising to the top has by no means ceased.

> Taussig and Joslyn disclosed such success in their unique study of American business leaders. There are approximately 25,000 executives of "big business" in the United States, officers of concerns grossing over $500,000 annually. Of these the investigators studied a sample of 7,371. It was revealed that 44 percent of them came from homes with fathers who had attained positions as major executives, large owners, or professionals, 11 percent from homes of manual laborers, 44 per cent from homes of farmers, clerks, salesmen, minor business executives, or small proprietors. It was found that not more than 31 percent of the fathers of the business leaders examined had been big-business executives in their generation. While this shows considerable inbreeding, even in the field where access to capital and command of complex business techniques are essential, over two-thirds of those who emerge as business leaders had made their way from homes where no such eminence had been achieved. [8, p. 227] °

The study to which the above material refers was published in 1932. Business leaders of that day who had risen from distant ranks had started the long climb under the prevailing conditions of life in the late nine-

° Reprinted from *Ballots and the Democratic Class Struggle* by Dewey Anderson and Percy E. Davidson with the permission of the authors and of the publishers, Stanford University Press.

teenth century. "Inbreeding" has become much more prevalent. A much larger proportion of today's business leaders started out at the top (5).

Although mobility occurs most frequently at the middle, some mobility occurs at the bottom. In a survey of a small California city, San Jose, data were collected on the occupations of fathers and their adult sons. It was found that 20 per cent of professional men and 20 per cent of business proprietors were the sons of skilled, semiskilled, or unskilled fathers. Farther down the scale, 18 per cent of white-collar clerical workers were the sons of semiskilled and unskilled fathers; and 10 per cent of the skilled artisans were the sons of unskilled fathers (6).

Mobility occurs most frequently at the middle, especially within the section of it that has been called the "new middle class," comprising the white-collar workers attached to large private enterprise and government—technicians, subprofessionals, salesmen, office workers, and clerks. The grouping of white-collar employees has expanded much faster than any other in recent decades, and it is likely to continue to do so in the future (9, p. 183).

Nevertheless, even though middle-class opportunity is now largely bureaucratic status, opportunity in small-business ownership has by no means entirely disappeared (20). In a nationwide survey of a sample of urban-employed fathers and sons, it was found that 17 per cent of the white-collar fathers had sons who were in large business houses and the professions. Although none of the unskilled fathers had sons in big business, 6 per cent of them had professional sons.

> The findings as they have been considered so far tend to lend reality to the claim that America is a land where extensive upward mobility can and does occur, since somewhat over a third of urban fathers beget sons who achieve higher occupational status than they themselves enjoy, but it is probably only a person given to looking at the rosy side of phenomena who could feel any particular elation over the fact. It is equally as correct, but does not make one feel as good, to say that nearly two-thirds of white American males have sons whose occupational status is either the same as or no better than their own. [5, p. 201]

The difficulty in attempting to interpret properly any of these valuable studies is that none of them is complete, being limited in time or geographic or occupational area covered. Studies undertaken of father-and-son occupations at any one time are subject to the vagaries of temporary economic conditions, such as boom, depression, war, or preparation for war. There is not sufficient historic data to answer with complete finality the most important question of all: is mobility tending to increase or decrease in modern America? Nevertheless, for reasons listed in the first part of this section and for those listed below, it appears likely that the long-time trend in mobility is downward.

The Future

Technology. A drastic reduction in mobility does not appear probable, at least in the *near* future. The American economy, although concentrating control in fewer hands, shows no signs of the unceasing contraction which so many economists confidently predicted in the depression period of the thirties. New technological advances continue to open up new fields of endeavor and new job classifications. At the very least, *small* average gains in status will remain for many a definite probability for some time.

Education. The expansion of public education has accompanied the demands of industry and business for a growing white-collar class. In 1940, of the almost 30 million in the ages between five and seventeen, 25½ million were in school. The majority of American youth now enter high school, and a steadily increasing number complete high school (4). Should the educational trend continue in its present direction, a college degree will at some time in the future become the normal expectation for a majority of American youth. While the population of the United States multiplied approximately three and a half times between 1870 and 1948, college enrollments multiplied over forty times, rising from 60,000 to almost 2½ million. President Truman's Commission on Higher Education has advocated a further doubling of college enrollments in the next twelve years. In the light of recent developments, it can almost be safely predicted that the Federal government will continue to aid the expansion of college-training programs beyond the boom in GI education.

Nevertheless, education does not create new job opportunities; it merely prepares the young to assume positions which the economy has already established. The primary motivation for college attendance is the hope of improving financial and occupational status. But only about 5 per cent of the jobs in the entire labor force require or attract college graduates (13).

> If we look at the professions, the employment picture is . . . dark. On the basis of the proposed increase in graduates we could expect 7 million people with college diplomas looking for jobs in the professions by the Nineteen Sixties—a horde of would-be professional workers about four times as great as the number of professional jobs filled by college graduates in 1940. [13]

The overflow of high-school and college graduates is already being felt, reflected in the higher pay for craftsmen than for educated clerical and kindred workers and in the lower pay for schoolteachers than for factory workers or tradesmen. That is, should mobility in the future remain at present levels, a much greater number are likely to experience frustration because a great many more will have been trained for high-salaried and high-status positions. Gustave Le Bon, Pitirim Sorokin, Hans Gerth, and others have warned that a democratic society can educate too

many, when the *purpose* of education is not so much "democratic participation" as the hope of advancement. It was the educated German products of the depression, those whose aspirations were most thwarted, who stood in the vanguard of revolution and who most enthusiastically embraced the Nazi cause. On January 1, 1933, the manual workers of Germany were underrepresented in the party by 14.8 per cent, the peasantry by 8.5 per cent; but the white-collar employees were overrepresented by 8.6 per cent (11, p. 528).

Differential fertility. Historically, the fact that the upper classes had fewer children than the lower classes—both proportionally and in absolute numbers—resulted in a considerable opportunity to rise on the part of the gifted, capable members of the lower classes. Nevertheless, even continued differential fertility would not signify unlimited opportunity.

> The students of population have discovered that people in the professional and managerial classes fall short by 20 per cent of reproducing their numbers. That is, every five such people in one generation will produce only four in the following generation. If we should assume that all the children of upper and upper-middle class parents manage to retain or to better these positions (an assumption which is, of course, not true), there would still be opportunity for people from below to rise and fill one in five of the upper and upper-middle class positions. This is a rather limited opportunity, since one-fifth of the upper and upper-middle positions is only 2 or 3 per cent of the total number of positions in our society and all of the lower and lower-middle classes, some 85 or 90 per cent of the population, may be candidates for these few higher positions. [25, pp. 153–154]

The above passage is, if anything, optimistic in tone, since at the time it was written, 1944, the present leveling off of the ages-old inverse relationship between social class and fertility had scarcely begun. In Chap. 10 we noted that the birth rate in the higher-income brackets now approximates the birth rate in the lower-income brackets much more closely than ever before. It was further noted, however, that the ancient imbalance between upper- and lower-class fertility would probably be resumed in the near future. Still, for some time to come, many lower-class people are going to be denied opportunities that would have been theirs had the upper-class birth rate never—even temporarily—approached their own.

Toward a More Rigidly Stratified Society?

The answer to this question is a guarded and tentative "yes." Should present-day trends continue uninterrupted in pace and direction—an assumption, and nothing more—mobility would decline and the lines of occupational and social-class status be more heavily drawn.

Mobility: amount and kind. The *amount* of mobility now taking place may offer little basis for comparison with that which occurred at an earlier time. In Chap. 12, we learned that the large organizations which dominate

the modern economy are arranged in a hierarchy of three levels, and that as time passes *the number of different positions at each of these levels tends to increase*, particularly at the functionary level. Simply by multiplying the number of positions at each level, an organization creates new opportunities for upward mobility that in one sense remain more apparent than real.

A functionary in the federal civil service, for example, in a ten-year period may triple his salary, achieve a much "higher rating"—and remain a functionary. In the old-fashioned retail store, there were the owner and a number of more or less undifferentiated clerks. In the modern department store, there are hundreds of gradations of clerks; a man may go from "bottom" to "top"—and remain a clerk. Such a clerk may finally achieve the grandiloquent title of Sales Manager of Infants' Wear—and manage no one. The modern economy contains thousands of "personnel managers" whose sole task is to copy background information about other employees from one sheet of paper to another.

The *amount* of opportunity to start a small retail store today is probably not much less than it was fifty years ago; however, becoming a small retail-store proprietor today does not represent the *kind* of mobility that it once did. At one time, a small businessman was a man of importance and prominence; he took his place in an economy which was for the most part run by men like himself. As we have seen, the modern small businessman is directly controlled in various ways by organizations which tower over him and reduce his comparative size in the economy.

The planned economy. The world of the nineteenth century—the world of liberal economics, of freedom to move over the face of the earth, of freedom from control and supervision by government—is apparently drawing to a close (3). The drift of the present, in the realm of government as well as in the division of labor, points to a probable reduction of mobility in the future. Among other factors, recurrent world-wide depression and world-wide war periodically block mobility. Depression and war are circular problems. To solve them, governments must interfere with and at least in large measure control the national economy; at the same time, the disrupting effect of depression and war upon individual careers creates a mass demand for government-guaranteed security by means of *more* governmental control.

Although not evenly paced, today in both Britain and in America the steady march toward concentration of power and control in the name of mass security continues, for security can be obtained in no other way. To the extent that government promises security, to that extent must government control and "interfere." In various guises, national planning has become the order of the day. The immediate effect of planning—control by a central power hierarchy to ensure that machinery and men produce and distribute according to a predetermined national schedule—

in reducing mobility is hardly discernible. Gradually, however, each man gains a vested interest in remaining where he has a protected position. Ultimately, when "each has his prescribed place in a vast system, effort devoted to anything but the performance of an allotted task is futile and dangerous" (16, p. 169). As the planned economy becomes more efficient and all-embracing, only a little horizontal and vertical mobility will disrupt the central control of men and materials in time and place. Sooner or later, mobility must either be limited by decree or prohibited.

The most all-embracing, if not the most efficient, planned economy in the modern world is that of Soviet Russia. The postrevolutionary period, before "planning" was well organized, was one of considerable vertical mobility. As older classes were disenfranchised and wiped out, others arose. Soon, however, the succession of production targets set by the various five-year plans interfered with movement from place to place and from one occupation to another. Since 1940, mobility has been drastically reduced in Russia. Membership in the peasant class, for example, is now strictly hereditary, and no worker may leave a collective farm except by order or granted request. Likewise, factory workers may not become farmers; the latter, however, may be transferred into the nonparty Bolshevik grouping *provided* they have performed in such a way as to merit recognition by a party bureaucrat. What mobility remains, in other words, no longer depends upon initiative and capability so much as upon the special favor of a highly placed governmental functionary (24).

Large-scale prediction, in the social sciences, is hazardous. Unforeseen events can always combine with present trends in unforeseen ways. The present American "welfare state" may very well prove at some future time, however, to have been a harbinger of a planned economy. One political party is associated with the term welfare state, yet most of the programs which have been launched with that slogan, or similar ones, would doubtless have already appeared no matter what party happened to hold office. When masses congregate in large cities, when the job of each becomes formally integrated with the jobs of all, when each can no longer personally review the actions of others which directly affect his life and welfare, then traffic regulations, pure-food-and-drug legislation, the overseeing and extension of control over working conditions, and the wielding of greater power from more remote sources—these and many more "interferences" become inevitable.

When the majority are no longer self-employed but work for others, and these others increasingly become large, depersonalized industrial, business, and governmental bureaucracies, then old definitions of property and individual responsibility become somewhat bloodless and ghostlike. There has been no "plot against the American way of life." The economic base of traditional democracy has simply been undermined by impersonal forces that no individual or group was empowered to control or stop. For

example, as our population continues to age, the demand for medical treatment rises. At the same time, medical science continues to discover new drugs and develop new techniques of diagnosis and treatment; in other words, the cost of medical care rises along with demand. The opponents of "socialized medicine" raise many pertinent issues, such as the possibility of medical inefficiency when doctors become bureaucrats as well as practitioners. On the other hand, it has been estimated that 97 million Americans, or two out of every three in the population, cannot themselves defray the costs of serious illness (22).

Bureaucracy and responsibility. Whatever mobility may continue to take place in modern America, it takes on a different character when bureaucracy dominates the occupational sphere. There is and must be restriction of physical movement, of the right to come and go, and of the desire to improvise and change—else the formally defined relationships of individual and individual, group and group, become disrupted (17, p. 182). Regardless of the present tempo of mobility, bureaucracy demands conformity, loyalty to superiors and to the impersonal requirements of the job, and the avoidance of *personal* responsibility as the price to be paid for mobility. Initiative is particularly curtailed in the middle ranks of modern bureaucratic structures (cf. 7 and 19).

In the middle occupational strata, the right to initiate and make decisions has been curtailed. The diminution of responsibility among industrial workers has taken a somewhat different tack. Industrial workers are protected against the consequences of personal irresponsibility. With regard to legal trends in the adjudication of the Workmen's Compensation Act, "the more recent and better rule is to allow an award for injury resulting from horseplay, *even to aggressors,* where the injury is a by-product of associating men in close contacts, thus realistically recognizing the strains and fatigue from human and mechanical impacts" (15, p. 530, italics added). Violation of an employer's rule against drinking "is not necessarily fatal to an award . . ." (15, p. 620).

Security and success. Success remains the predominant value of modern America. Although for the most part true, this statement must be modified to account for certain mass shifts in attitude which are taking place, not the least of which is a growing importance attached to security. As security has come to be more and more appreciated, so also has individual acquisitiveness declined in popular favor. For at least two hundred years before the present day, in Western society the profit taker was regarded as a public benefactor. That any personal competitive advantage taken and retained ultimately benefited the public was a proposition accepted as given in the nature of things.

Particularly since the great depression, workers no longer derive pride and a sense of security from the profit statements of their companies. Instead, they lean more upon government and their unions to wrest from

management what they believe is their fair share of production. To outstrip one's fellows in production is an act no longer universally acclaimed. To pass on a large fortune to one's heirs is coming to be regarded as antisocial, and governments continue to announce their intention of stripping hereditary fortunes.

Righteousness, hard work, and thrift were all welded together in the old Protestant ethic, and profit taking was the just reward. Today, even the corporations appear uneasy over *their* "fair share" of production, and hire public-relations experts to draw cartoons and write assuring advertising copy to the effect that the profits of X Company comprise only an infinitesimal amount of the shares going to labor and the consumer. The *London Economist* continues to worry over the possibility that in the struggle to divide what we produce we will produce less to divide, but even this eventuality is not likely to revive a sagging philosophy of acquisitiveness.

On the basis of scanty evidence, it might be safe to hazard the possibility that the young today, the children of war and depression, are developing new emphases within the American tradition of striving for success and new modifications of the ideal of social mobility. In a summarization of essays written by sixteen-year-old boys about their plans for the future, a desire for security was stated to have far outstripped the hope of adventure. These boys will be content with modest achievements. They show a "surprising" lack of enthusiasm and aggressive drives so long regarded as peculiarly American (14, pp. 29–30). The following statement is from an extensive study of the college-graduating class of 1949, in which a group of researchers visited campuses all over the country.

> It is what they don't want rather than what they do that the men of '49 know best. And what they don't want is risk. . . . they seem, to a stranger from another generation, somehow curiously old before their time. Above all else security has become the great goal.
>
> Security, of course, can mean many things. In '49's case it is bound up in people. Spiritually, it means working *for* people, in the sense of service, of justifying one's place in the community. Materially, it is simply working *under* them. The class of '49 want to work for somebody else—preferably somebody big. No longer is small business the promised land. As for the idea of going into business for oneself, the idea is so seldom expressed as to seem an anachronism. [27, p. 85] °

If such a shift in attitude is actually taking place, it will ramify out into many modifications of the American way. Such a development might be accompanied by some compensations—perhaps a reduction of the tension and sense of personal inferiority which so often result from a wide gap between Napoleonic aspiration and modest achievement.

° Reprinted from the June, 1949, issue of *Fortune* magazine by special permission of the editors.

To repeat, what the future holds in store remains at best an uncertainty. However, should present trends continue substantially as they have in the past three decades, the future in all probability will see a reduction of mobility and a more rigid stratification of the entire class system. Very likely the "masses" will continue to derive greater material benefits from the "welfare state," but they will not thereby increase their opportunities to rise occupationally and socially.

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CHAPTER 16 *America's Minorities*

> Martin was, like most inhabitants of Elk Mills before the Slavo-Italian immigration, a Typical Pure-bred Anglo-Saxon American, which means that he was a union of German, French, Scotch, Irish, perhaps a little Spanish, conceivably a little of the strains lumped together as "Jewish," and a great deal of English, which is itself a combination of Primitive Britain, Celt, Phoenician, Roman, German, Dane, and Swede.
>
> —SINCLAIR LEWIS

Race, the subject to which we now turn, is as controversial as any discussed in this book. An atmosphere of partisanship clings to what has been spoken and written about it. Perhaps nowhere else is the scientific ideal of dispassionate observation and recording less in evidence. Any interpretation of facts available in this area is especially prone to bias.

It is, for example, a fact that the median intelligence quotient (IQ) of American Negroes is lower than that of American whites, a fact consistently recorded from one study to another. Some accept this fact at its face value, others quite plausibly insist that the cultural backgrounds of the two groupings are so markedly different that the slight average difference in scores can be explained away. It is not unfair to say that the *purpose* of either interpretation is more ideological than scientific. Those who accept at face value the score differences apparently seek to rationalize present social inequalities among various groupings. Those who deny any validity to the score differences are social reformers who seek to promote a greater measure of social equality than now prevails.

No one is neutral on this subject. Everyone is faced in one ideological direction or the other. However, every effort has been made to present here nothing but evidence and to assess that evidence without intruding moral judgments. The student is asked to discount his own biases in a similar fashion.

RACE A BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON

Technically defined, race is a biological phenomenon. As such, it merits only passing attention in a sociology textbook. What makes race sociologically important is not biology but the social attitudes that universally arise between human groupings which are physically different in appearance.

Race consciousness is universal, but it did not appear in acute form until about the sixteenth century, and it was not until approximately the middle of the nineteenth century that the idea of racial superiority and inferiority took secure hold of the popular imagination. Out of mass veneration for popularized "science" came the new rationalizations for racial prejudice. While "an earlier man might have referred to God's will, the modern man refers to supposedly self-evident natural facts, and speaks of the inherent differences between races . . ." (26, p. 68). To the late-nineteenth-century man in the street, it was an easy step from "survival of the fittest" to a belief in racial superiority. Much of the physical anthropology and racial biology of the period attempted to prove it.

The trend in academic and intellectual circles today is in the opposite direction. Not only is every effort made to prove the "equality" of all races, but the very concept of race is in some quarters denied (see, for example, 33). There are several reasons for this new drift of opinion, not the least of which is liberal revulsion against the racist nonsense recently propagated by German "scholars" under Hitler's regime. Nevertheless—and disregarding the question of intellectual honesty—it is difficult to imagine what social reform could possibly result from denying the reality of race. There are very obvious differences in physical appearance among at least three major human types—the Caucasoid (white), Mongoloid (yellow and red), and Negroid (black). Were the term "race" to disappear magically, some *new* term would be employed, in both scientific and popular circles, to distinguish at least these three major groupings from one another.

There can be no denial of the biological reality of race. *A race is a large, biological human grouping, with a number of distinctive inherited characteristics which vary within a certain range.*

The Origin and Formation of Races

Two opposing theories have been used to explain the origin of modern races. One is the *polygenetic*, which assumes that there were three or more independent lines of evolutionary development from three distinct subhuman forms. The other, the *monogenetic* theory, assumes that all present varieties represent offshoots from one original subhuman form. Perhaps this controversy will never be altogether resolved, owing to gaps in the chain of evidence, yet most modern authorities feel that what evidence is available makes the monogenetic theory the more plausible.

In the formation of any racial strain, four processes combined to emphasize certain physical characteristics at the expense of others. The first of these was *heredity*. During prehistoric times, in certain areas "pools of genes" were formed which, on the average, emphasized a number of physical characteristics. The second was *variation*, which arose in two ways: first, from the recurrent combinations of certain genes present in

a local population and the diminishing frequency in the appearance of others; second, from the introduction of new genic factors, or mutations.

The third was *selection,* which also occurred in two ways: first, environmentally, an example of which is the survival value of dark skin pigment under tropical conditions; second, through social selection, the more frequent mating being between individuals who possessed aesthetically preferred physical attributes. Finally there was *geographic isolation* and its concomitant, inbreeding. The aborigines of Australia, for example, were historically much more "pure" than the Negro in any part of the world. For thousands of years they did not migrate and received no in-migrants. Consequently, the racial physical type of the native Australian varied little about norms for skin color, stature, hair form, nose shape, and the like.*

Race Differences

Physical. Several techniques have been developed for measuring racial physical differences. Besides skin pigment, which is the most obvious difference, there is the cephalic index, or ratio of head length to width. Northern European whites and Negroes tend to be dolichocephalic; on the average, their heads are longer than they are wide. Southern European whites and Mongoloid stock tend to be brachycephalic; they have "round" heads.

Two other important indices are nose and hair shape. The nasal index varies from low-bridged and wide (Negro) to high-bridged and narrow (white). Hair form varies from kinky (Negro) to straight (Mongolian), with the Caucasian (white) hair form intermediate between them. Other group-hereditary traits have been identified. The Negro is least hairy, the white most hairy, with the Mongoloid between the two extremes. The Mongoloid jaw also is intermediate between the white, which juts least, and the Negro, which juts most.

There are two qualifications which should, however, be kept in mind. Race was defined in such a way as to include *variation* within a certain range. Thus, while European whites are on the average taller than the Japanese, many individual Japanese are much taller than many Europeans. Again, thousands of people who are classified as Negroes have a lighter skin pigment than some Southern Europeans who are classified as white.

When several racial characteristics are *combined,* only a few individuals in any population can be found who clearly possess all of them. Tallness, blondness, and dolichocephaly, for example, are considered to be characteristic of the white "race," and it is in the Scandinavian countries

* The processes of race formation have not been completed; they are continuous. They have been discussed in the past tense because modern racial differences were determined thousands of years ago. The processes of race formation are continuous, but they are slow.

that all of these characteristics are most pronounced. Yet one Swedish anthropologist found that only 11 per cent of the recruits in the Swedish army possessed all of these traits in combination (15, p. 24).

Physiological function appears little if at all affected by race, at least when race is isolated from other factors. Minor average differences in glandular activity, basal metabolism, and sense perception have been established for different racial groupings in their own regional environments. But when representatives of any race migrate to an area with a markedly different climate and tempo of life, their physiological function comes to approach that of the native population, regardless of the latter's race (15).

Behavior. That some races have kinkier hair or rounder heads than others are facts without intrinsic significance. The earnest search for indices to measure racial physical differences has usually been combined with efforts to prove racial superiority and inferiority. Either by statement or by implication such racial physical differences have been assumed to indicate differences in *behavior.*

The available evidence at the very least demonstrates that "typical" Negro, Japanese, and white-American social behavior is primarily the result of history, training, and experience. By way of illustration, the belief held by some people that immorality is a typically Negro *racial* trait is obviously fallacious. Such a belief ignores the fact that most Negroes are to be found at the bottom of the socioeconomic scale and that their immorality resembles that of whites who occupy a similar position. Moreover, most upper-class Negroes are if anything more puritanical than any comparable segment of the white population.

Negro faculty members and their families, living on the campus of a Southern Negro college staffed by a Negro and white faculty, have been described as being horrified at the "radical" beliefs and lax standards of their white neighbors. The latter are evidently in revolt against white "middle-class respectability," evidenced by their willingness to associate with Negroes on an equalitarian basis. But the local Negroes have worked too long and struggled too hard for an insecure status to jeopardize it by failing to dress for dinner, by sitting on the floor, or by engaging in familiar conversation with adult members of the opposite sex.

> It is interesting to reflect that the Negro college professor here described would get along much better with the majority of racially-prejudiced middle-class whites, than he does with this work-camp liberal, at least in every area but race. Their prejudices would jibe nicely in every other sphere, and that is the real prerequisite for social compatibility. [8, p. 432]

The behavior of any race or nationality changes in time, and much more rapidly than could be accounted for by any claim of group biological change. In the Elizabethan period, the English were among the most

musical people in Europe, yet today they are "the most notoriously unmusical people of our age" (1, p. 63). So-called primitive peoples have quickly adopted many of the white man's ways. The Swedes, a few centuries ago the scourge of Europe, have been "pacifist" throughout two recent world wars. The Chinese and the extremely dark Egyptians had achieved great civilizations at a time when Adolf Hitler's blond Nordics, dressed in animal skins, were hitting one another over the head with clubs.

A number of rude facts intrude on any attempt to explain social behavior on racial grounds. The matter is not entirely closed. There *are* group-genetic physical differences, and it may be that certain populations have a greater biological propensity for behaving in certain ways rather than others. Nevertheless, the existence of such a relationship has not been proved. The human species is universally so plastic, and has a range of capabilities which differs so slightly if at all from one population to another, that it is at least probable that the racial factor can safely be ignored in the study of social behavior. The racial factor per se can be ignored, but not the *meaning* that race has for various peoples, a totally different matter.

The Question of Equality

Are the races equal? It all depends on what is implied. Obviously Negroes are socially inferior to whites, both in Africa and in America. They are regarded and treated as such. The answer is much less certain when the question is rephrased. Are the races equal in native intelligence and potential ability?

Attempts to measure. It was believed at one time that the development of standardized intelligence quotient (IQ) tests would settle this question about the potential ability of various races and immigrant stocks. A summary of the available studies of intelligence, of both adults and children, has disclosed that the median IQ of Jews, English and Scotch, and Swedes and Norwegians slightly exceeds the native-white American norm of 100. Other racial and nationality groupings compare as follows: Japanese, 99; Chinese, 97; Italians, 85; Mexicans, 85; American Negroes, 84; and American Indians, 78 (16, p. 255).

That these scores measure "real" differences is still being debated. IQ-test comparisons of Southern white and Northern Negro recruits in World War I, for example, disclosed that the Negroes from Pennsylvania, New York, Illinois, and Ohio scored higher than the whites from Mississippi, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Georgia (15, p. 182). All that this proves is that Northern schools are better than Southern schools, for white recruits from each of these states outscored, on the average, Negro recruits from the same state. Whatever interpretation is made, we do know that certain races and national stocks maintain fairly consistent average IQ

scores, and that fairly consistent average *differences* are maintained between one grouping and another.

An unanswerable question? The main difficulty in attempting to interpret such scores is the virtual impossibility of discounting variations in background and motivation. Hopi children have been taught not to compete with their companions, so that the object of such tests is lost on them. Most of these tests have been administered by whites. In one study, two groups of Negro and white children were tested first by a Negro psychologist, then by a white. There was an improvement of six points in each group when the test was administered by the psychologist of the same race (16, p. 259).

On the other hand, it has been dubiously claimed that a language handicap may prevent bilingual children from doing as well as they otherwise would. Children who have learned some other language prior to English are said to have more difficulty in understanding spoken directions and in accurately reading directions. This explanation has some plausibility, yet Negro children speak only English, and Japanese children who are bilingual do much better on IQ tests.

In any event, social-class position is a more important factor than race or nationality. One study has reported an average IQ of 116 for the children of professional men and of 95 for the children of day laborers, with other occupational groupings falling somewhere in between (16, p. 264). Other investigators have presented similar findings. Most authorities do not, however, assume any genetic superiority of the upper classes; they acknowledge only a superior home environment.

Besides the advantages of grammatical speech, books, and the encouragement of intellectual curiosity in the home, upper-class children are treated better than lower-class children by schoolmates, school administrators, and teachers. Lower-class children are not so much encouraged, either at home or in school, to perform well in test situations. Most important of all, they are not assured, as are upper-class children, of status, prestige, and income rewards for success in the type of competition which the IQ-test situation represents.

All racial and nationality groupings with median IQ's lower than the native-American norm are at or near the bottom of the socioeconomic scale. When upper-class and lower-class samples from the native-white American grouping are compared with similar-class samples from other groupings, the average racial or nationality difference is diminished. It does not, however, entirely disappear.

Testing situations and sampling procedures have been utilized to eliminate some of the factors enumerated, but in no case have two groupings been tested when *all* pertinent environmental differences have been eliminated. They never could be. A Negro child who lives in a ten-room house, whose father is a physician earning $12,000 a year, does

not have the same social-class position, certainly does not live in the same home environment, as a child whose background is "similar" except that he and his parents happen to be white.

To conclude, then, average differences in IQ performance consistently hold up from one grouping to another. There *may* be a "racial" factor involved, as some have claimed. On the other hand, environmental differences will clearly account for most of the disparity between such scores. Many investigators claim that environment will explain all of it. This assertion is impossible to prove, although it could conceivably be true. Incidentally, the questioning of group hereditary factors in the transmission of intelligence does not dispose of the fact that some individual family lines *within* a racial grouping or immigrant stock possess more potentiality for developing intelligence than do others.

The constant racist bias. Peculiarly enough, "liberal" investigators of this problem have shown almost as much racist bias as the racists themselves—in reverse. The racists, those who claim that intelligence tests or other measures prove one race to be superior to another, either state or imply that members of an average low-scoring grouping are unable to meet the competition for positions of responsibility and high income. This argument is easily dispelled.

Even assuming the reality of measured group differences in intelligence, it still remains true that approximately 40 per cent of American Negroes exceed the native-white American median. An individual Negro, in other words, has a probability of possessing superior intelligence almost equal to that of an individual white (14). Individual Negroes can and do perform well the exacting tasks demanded of the engineer, banker, and physician. There is, then, no *scientific* basis for categorically denying Negroes access to any occupation or profession.

But the "liberals" apparently feel that *average* Negro and *average* white intelligence *must* be assumed to be equal, else their cause is irretrievably lost. It is difficult to see why this must be the case. Citizenship in democratic society is not granted upon the basis of intelligence, average or otherwise, but upon common humanity. A supreme tenet of democratic ideology, which all liberals espouse, is that an individual should be assessed in terms of his personal qualifications without regard to his antecedents. By their willingness to debate the issue on the basis of total differences between groupings as defined by the racists, the liberals may be in danger of "giving aid and comfort to the enemy."

Some Racial Fallacies

We have already questioned two popular notions—a supposed constant relationship between race and social behavior and the existence of significant differences in ability among races. There are many others, only a few of which are examined below.

There are pure races. Sinclair Lewis described the protagonist of his novel *Arrowsmith* as a pure Anglo-Saxon American, which means that he was part Scot, Roman, Phoenician, and French, among other mixed strains. The primary requirement for the continuance of a pure strain, geographic isolation for many centuries, has occurred only in tiny forgotten pockets of the modern world, and in no such case has a great civilization resulted.

Man has continuously migrated, tribes and nations have marched and countermarched over the face of the globe, peoples have mated with strangers after conquering or being conquered, so that hybridization has become well-nigh universal. It naturally follows that nationality and race are not synonymous. French, German, Italian, and British nationals represent an admixture of group hereditary strains that is surpassed only by American nationals. So far we have fortunately been spared any claim of an American race! The population of the United States is more hybridized than any other large population in history.

Not only are the American white strains hybridized, but the large Negro racial minority is quite "impure." Illicit matings between white males and Negro females from slave days to the present have, it has been estimated, left us with an American Negro population only some 25 per cent of whom are without white genes.

The concept of race is not precise, and it cannot be made so. Physical anthropologists have "found" anywhere from 3 to 30 races, depending upon how much variation in physical characteristics is taken into account. Five subraces have been described within the Caucasian race: Nordic, Alpine, Mediterranean, Armenoid, and Hindi. In general, these vary from tall, blond, and longheaded to short, dark, and roundheaded, but intermixture has been so constant that a tremendous range of variation can be found within as well as between any of them.

Some races stand lower on the scale of evolution than do others. Man evolved from some subhuman form. Whether this protohuman closely resembled the modern gorilla and chimpanzee is not known. Some racists assume that this is the case, and go on to claim that the modern Negro, in turn, more closely resembles the gorilla and chimpanzee than does the white. By this argument is the Negro consigned a low place on the scale of evolution.

But the kinky hair, thick lips, and sparse body hair, which more or less characterize the Negro, are nonanthropoid attributes. On all these counts the white man more closely resembles the ape in appearance, since he too is thin lipped, straight haired, and relatively hairy. On the other hand, the Negro's broad nose and dark pigmentation are anthropoid characteristics. The Mongolian peoples have extremely straight hair, and on this count resemble the modern apes; on the other hand, their slant eyes are less anthropoid than the straight ones of whites and Negroes.

Modern races, in terms of biological evolution, "all . . . stand at about equal distances from their common ancestor" (18, p. 49).

Racial intermixture leads to degeneration. The belief that racial intermixture results in gross abnormalities is a superstition. As a matter of fact, hybrid vigor, or heterosis, often results from the crossing of racial stocks which are radically different in physical appearance. Boas's investigation proved that the half-breed American Indian is taller and more fertile than the parental Indian and white stocks (1, p. 114). The Hottentot and white types are extreme physical opposites, yet such crossings have also resulted in an increase of height and fertility over the parental stocks (1, p. 124).

The crossing of diverse racial strains serves to prevent the manifestation of recessive defects which might be peculiar to one or the other in a local population. It has not been proved that heterosis continues beyond the first generation resulting from a racial cross, but on the other hand there is no evidence that physical and mental peculiarities unknown in either parental stock appear in succeeding generations. A perfect blending of racial characteristics does not, however, result. The genetic factors undergo repeated segregation and recombination, giving rise to endless variety in a mixed population (11, p. 335).

RACE AN AMERICAN SOCIAL PROBLEM

As we have seen, racial differences in sheerly biological terms present no problem. It is the attitudes and sentiments attached to physical differences which are important sociologically, which in large measure determine social superiority and inferiority, and which in like measure determine the course of social action.

On the average, American Negroes are *socially* inferior to whites—in terms of status, income, education, and occupation—but their social inferiority can more plausibly be explained as the result of racial attitudes held by the white majority than the Negroes' *biological* inferiority. Treatment of an entire race as socially inferior does not, however, in itself constitute a social problem.

What Is a Social Problem?

A social problem is a set of conditions which are defined as morally wrong by the majority or a substantial minority within a society. Social problems do not arise out of conditions alone. Prostitution was no social problem in ancient Greece, where the earnings of priestess-prostitutes built and maintained the religious temples. Poverty was no problem in the Middle Ages, even though by modern standards the standard of living at that time was incredibly low—poverty was simply accepted as inevitable. War was no problem in the old Comanche culture, which

defined war as man's natural state. Until recently, the Hindu caste system was no problem; the several castes accepted their hereditary status as fixed from the beginning of time, and their religion sanctioned their acceptance of hereditary status.

Had slavery in America never been challenged, slavery would never have become a social problem. Where slavery in America assumed the character of a social institution, "race consciousness tended to disappear and the slaves tended to identify themselves with the master's family and the slave order" (9, p. 530). Treatment of a racial minority as socially inferior does not become a social problem until that treatment is questioned by many in the majority, and the minority seeks to take advantage of the new drift in opinion to secure new rights. The American Negro's race consciousness arose in a series of conflict situations (9, p. 530).

Racial prejudice and discrimination have become major American social problems because of a growing conviction that they are morally wrong. We do not know what proportion of the white majority feels this way, but at the very least the expression of this attitude, especially in the past twenty years, has become insistent. The logical cleavage in American ideology thus becomes publicized. Opposed to both negative racial attitude and practice stand Christianity (equality in the sight of God) and democracy (the universal dignity of all men and their equality before the law).

The Negro

When the reconstruction period ended in 1876, the legal emancipation of the Negro was in fact soon denied him. Since that time the American Negro has lived under legal, economic, and social limitations which are especially severe in the Deep South but which differ more in degree than in kind in the North and West. These limitations have taken the form of segregation and discrimination.

Segregation. Segregation refers to categoric spatial separation. North and South, the Negro lives in restricted areas. In the South he must ride in special rail coaches and in the rear of trolley and bus; in the South he must attend Negro schools, must use separate public lavatories, restaurants, churches, drinking fountains, and must enter a railroad station through a door marked, "Colored." In the nation's capital, a dog cemetery will not accept the pets of Negroes for burial. "In announcing this policy, the owner stated that he assumed the dogs would not object, but he was afraid his white customers would" (17, p. 19).

Discrimination. Discrimination refers to categoric unequal treatment. By legal and illegal means, the Negro is effectively barred from voting in most Southern states. Everywhere he is for the most part occupationally limited to agriculture, domestic service, and the lowest-paid jobs in industry. Despite the principle of "separate but equal" facilities ac-

cepted by the Supreme Court, segregated schools and colleges are vastly inferior to those provided for whites. The Southern states appropriate much less money for Negro than for white education. The Negro is treated with flagrant discrimination by the police and by courts of law (24, Vol. I). Throughout the years of depression and prosperity the Negro rate of unemployment has been more than three times that of the white (24, Vol. I). The Negro, in other words, is the "last to be hired and the first to be fired."

The Negro's "place." Particularly in rural and nonindustrial areas of the South, an elaborate code of "racial etiquette" is enforced (7). By act and manner the Negro is required to affirm his social inequality. A servile, placatory, shuffling, begging demeanor meets with white approval. An "uppity nigger" is one who expects to be first served in a store if he arrived before a white customer, who paints his house when several nearby "white" houses are unpainted, who goes to the front rather than the rear door of a white home, and who fails to tip his cap.

The Negro's formal status is more "equal" in the North than in the South. He is not expected to observe caste etiquette. Politically he is much better off. He can vote on equal terms and has been able to secure many benefits through organized action. There are no Jim Crow railway coaches, or sections in theaters, or seats on streetcar and bus. Public-school systems have no official policy of segregation. Special laws against discrimination have been passed, such as the Pennsylvania statute of 1935 which forbids such treatment in public places, whether publicly or privately owned.

Nevertheless, the range of economic opportunity open to the Negro is almost as narrow, and he is as generally treated as a second-class citizen, in the North as in the South. Housing segregation is, if anything, even more vigorously enforced. By custom if not by law, intimate social relationships, especially intermarriage, invoke severe condemnation. Unofficial segregation in public education is by no means unknown in the North. School districts are sometimes "gerrymandered" in such a way that all Negro children in a given area attend one school which has no white pupils.

It has been argued that in some ways the Negro is psychologically more secure in the South than in the North (9, p. 300, especially footnote 44). At the very least in the South he has a more exact knowledge of how his "place" is defined. For example, the Negro traveler in the South must eat in a segregated restaurant, but he has the assurance that he *can* get a meal. The Negro traveler in the Northern town has the *legal right* to eat in any public place, but he may be told that "all tables are filled" or the waitress may fail to take his order because she is "busy." It is the difference between knowing which doors are shut and never knowing when an open door will be slammed in one's face.

There has probably been a tendency in liberal circles to exaggerate the social disabilities facing the Negro in the South as contrasted with those in other regions of the country. In the past decade the Negro has been subjected to more physical violence in the North than in the South; at least more has been called to public attention.

The Negro's "place" changes. The Negro's "place," however, is fluid rather than fixed, and in the past two decades, the country over, it has been moving in the direction that liberals desire. The number of Negroes enrolled in college was 28 times greater in 1950 than in 1900; over the same fifty years, the number of *all* college students was 11 times greater. From the summer of 1945 to the summer of 1947, 52 Negroes had been appointed to the faculties of Northern "white" universities (9, p. 490). In July, 1951, Supreme Commander General Matthew Ridgway ordered that within six months all Negro combat and service units in the Far East Command be abolished and their men moved into units side by side with white troops (32). The proportion of Negro businessmen and professional men has been rising, though their clientele is, for the most part, colored. Virginia has recently revoked its Jim Crow regulation which enforced segregation in public vehicles. In Georgia, many counties now permit Negro participation in the "white Democratic primaries."

These changes are more the result of continued urbanization and industrialization than of political action. Where masses of people are congregated and rub elbows in the daily round of activities, racial etiquette is undermined in the South, and other discriminations become more difficult to apply anywhere. Logical contradictions become painfully apparent. When the urgency of war compels Southern mill officials to hire Negroes, when white and colored must work side by side, the "White" and "Colored" entrance signs are soon removed.

The Oriental

There are many reasons why people leave their homeland to live in an alien country, but the main one is the hope of economic betterment. The push of adversity at home and the pull of opportunity from a distant land have promoted American immigration from the arrival of the Pilgrim fathers to that of peoples displaced by World War II. The Chinese were no exception.

There was no Chinese immigration until the decade 1851 to 1860, when 41,397 Chinese arrived to take advantage of the boom on the West Coast. White gold seekers and entrepreneurs were personally disinterested in domestic service and manual labor, and Chinese immigrants had an opportunity to earn wages fabulous in comparison with their homeland standards.

At first the Chinese were welcomed and hailed as "our best citizens"; but when the Union Pacific Railroad was completed, and the gold boom

had died, white and Chinese found themselves competing for the same jobs. Peculiarly enough, it was at this time that the Chinese were "discovered" to be thieving, dirty, dangerous, and inscrutable. Mainly in answer to agitation from the West Coast, Asiatics were barred from entry into the United States by Federal laws of 1882 and 1917.

Although Negroes have been more segregated and discriminated against than Orientals, the latter have received similar treatment. By law, some Western states prohibit white-Oriental intermarriage. Alien land laws in California, Oregon, and Washington forbid "aliens ineligible for citizenship" (foreign-born Chinese and Japanese) to own or to lease land. These laws work a particular hardship on the Japanese, the majority of whom are agriculturists. The West Coast Oriental, like the Northern Negro, is often uncertain that his patronage of swimming pool and dance hall is desired. The American-born Oriental is often denied access to occupations and professions for which his training or education has prepared him.

There are more Japanese than Chinese in America, and their occupational and economic status on the average is much higher; in part for these two reasons, the Japanese have felt more discrimination than the Chinese. Japan's "sneak" military attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, brought more than discrimination to the Japanese in America. It aroused race hatred against American-born Japanese, who are American citizens, as well as against Japanese aliens, who are denied the right of American citizenship.

By the first week of February, 1942, the California State Personnel Board "voted unanimously to bar from future civil service positions all 'descendants of nationals with whom the United States is at war'" (30, pp. 6–7). In March, 1942, the Western Defense Command proclaimed that the Japanese on the West Coast were a menace to the national safety. Japanese property owners were ordered to liquidate their holdings promptly; these forced sales permitted widespread fraud, cheating, and conspiracy. A series of orders removed all Japanese, 112,000 in number, alien *and* citizen, from the West Coast states and from a southern area of Arizona; they were removed to camps, called relocation centers, under the guard of military police.

These measures were taken because of feared Japanese espionage and sabotage. At that time, there was no foreknowledge that no Japanese-American, either in Hawaii or on the mainland, would ever be convicted of either charge (21). Through 1943 and 1944, those Nisei (second-generation Japanese, American citizens) who had been cleared by FBI investigation were permitted to settle outside the West Coast. By 1945, return to the West Coast was allowed. The camps were closed at the end of 1945.

There are some who believe that the United States established a

dangerous precedent, however necessary "relocation" may have been in terms of military necessity. For the first time in the country's history American citizens were denied, by official Federal decree, the Bill of Rights because of their race. There were some who disagreed with Westbrook Pegler that " 'the Japanese in California should be under armed guard to the last man and woman right now and to hell with habeas corpus until the danger is over' " (30, p. 19). When race hatred is fired with patriotism, it waxes hot indeed.

The Mexican

Mexicans possess both Spanish and Indian "blood," but the impoverished Mexicans of the Southwest and West Coast are predominantly of Indian origin—hence their inclusion in a discussion of racial problems. Most of them are farm laborers, and to some extent because of prejudice very few of them hold anything but unskilled and low-pay jobs. They are residentially segregated in many Southwestern communities, even though not legally. Their children in many places attend segregated schools.* They are barred from many public places, such as roller-skating rinks, swimming pools, dance halls, and restaurants. "Spanish-Americans" are excluded from all "Anglo-American" social gatherings (22, pp. 124–125). The easy victory of the Mexican War has not been forgotten. The "greasers," their language and their way of life, are disparaged with contempt.

Race riots in Los Angeles in 1943, with zoot-suited young Mexican *pachucos* the target, were as bloody as the more famous Negro race riots in Chicago and Detroit. Mexicans receive about equal treatment with Negroes at the hands of the police and the courts (28, p. 194).

The American Indian

The American Indian has a peculiar status, and white attitudes toward him are equally complex. He is a citizen and he can vote, but he remains a ward of the government. He can contract debts, but he is not under the same compulsion as his white neighbor to pay his debts. He receives free medical care, often land and buildings, and even seed and farm machinery—all from the Great White Father. His status in many ways is close to that of a child, albeit a sometimes abused child. The 100,000 members of Indian tribes in Arizona and New Mexico cannot receive social-security benefits of any kind (12, p. 446).

Historically, he was regarded as a menace and as "dirty." Then, with the breaking of Indian military power and the establishment of stable reservations, the Indian, *as an abstract type,* came to be idealized as the

* On March 21, 1945, Judge Paul J. McCormick ruled that educational segregation of Mexican children was without sanction in California law and was a violation of the "equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (22, p. 282).

Noble Red Man. While the "half-breed" has remained an object of contempt, a "trace" of Indian "blood" is readily and proudly admitted by the white American—whatever else race prejudice may be, it is surely a tangled skein of logical contradictions. Vice-President Curtis was proud of his remote Indian ancestry, and in a classic story Will Rogers once declared that his ancestors did not come over on the *Mayflower*—they met the boat when it landed.

In and around the reservations, however, Indians are held to be socially inferior to the white man (23). On the average, they *have* failed to "better themselves." Part of their failure to achieve "American" standards stems from earlier and hurried efforts of the Indian Office to make them all over in the image of the Protestant agricultural middle class. The fact that Indians possessed no unified culture—there were hundreds of different tribes, with small or great variations in language, native economy, and religion—was disregarded. So the migratory hunters and warriors of the plains, who had no concept of private land and who believed food and other necessities were designed for immediate consumption and for any other member of the tribe who was in need, did not become hard-working, close-fisted Middle Western farmers when they were *given* land and homes and farm machinery. They became beggars (23). The old and the new were in too raw contrast for the immediate integration which the Indian Office demanded.

The appointment of John Collier as Commissioner of Indian Affairs, in 1933, ushered in a new policy—to preserve the old way of life so far as possible and more slowly to encourage its integration with the dominant white culture. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 allowed more autonomy to the tribes in the regulation of their own affairs.

By no means, however, has the American Indian "problem" been solved. The history of Indian education is one mark of failure. From the very beginning of reservation life, education has been a sore spot to Indians and administrators alike. Exactly what Indian education is supposed to accomplish has never been settled. At first the classical curriculum was taught; alien to the children's present and future as it was, it was soon abandoned. Then "vocational training" was introduced, but very few Indians have a vocation, the vast majority are wards of the government, and there is little place for the trained mechanic on the reservation. At present, most Indian pupils receive a watered-down version of the subjects taught in white schools, with special emphasis upon "citizenship" and some attention paid to tribal history and problems.

At first, white teachers lived with their young charges on the reservations, but oldsters jeered at what children daily reported was going on in school and the children were encouraged to rebel. Then boarding schools away from the reservations were provided, but parents and children protested what they believed to be harsh treatment and continued

attacks on tribal life. In the early twenties, Indian children were experimentally sent to neighborhood schools along with white children. Complaints were made about their language difficulties and "dirty habits"; they were said to be "backward" and to retard the white children in their classes. Since 1930, most Indian children have again attended segregated boarding schools, or public schools with Indian pupils only—but many are allowed to remain illiterate. At present, for example, there are 12,000 Navaho children in school, but the United States government has failed to supply educational facilities for 12,000 others (31, p. 52).

Creed and Deed

We have already said that the racial problem in America stems from a cleavage between Christian-democratic ideology, on the one hand, and prejudice, segregation, and discrimination invoked upon racial minorities, on the other. This point of view was first vigorously espoused by Gunnar Myrdal: "The Negro is a 'problem' to the average American because of the palpable conflict between the status actually awarded him and [the average American's] ideals" (24, Vol. I, p. 23). Myrdal's hypothesis, which is now thoroughly entrenched in sociological literature, is fairly valid, but it requires a certain amount of qualification.

No attempt has ever been made to investigate the *extent* of this supposed inner moral struggle. The "ideal" of white supremacy, as a matter of fact, has streamed parallel with that of equalitarianism, in Western and more particularly in American history. Equalitarianism, like other values, varies according to social class, education, regional location, and many other factors. Moreover, white Americans, like all other people, utilize the mechanism of compartmentalization to protect themselves from the consequences of becoming aware that some of their values are in conflict with others. Deeply religious persons have joined lynching mobs, using religious precepts to justify their conduct, which may be illogical to some other people but not to them. The problem as Myrdal has defined it is not being questioned; what is being questioned is the extent to which it is personally experienced.

It is at least probable that the race problem is experienced more acutely by various racial minorities than it is by the white majority. The problem has been described by white liberal intellectuals, and their speeches, books, and articles have if anything been more responsible for keeping it in the public eye than have the conditions under which racial minorities live. Despite liberal propaganda of the race problem, that an appreciable number of people within the white majority feel personally guilty about it has not as yet been proved.

All societies are stratified in many ways, and some parts of any population are looked upon and treated as somewhat different from others. Race is only one status grouping to which discrimination can and does

attach; there are also sex, age, religion, nativity, social class, and occupation. Discrimination is especially apparent in large societies, even though the intensity with which discrimination attaches to any *one* status grouping does vary. For example, although race is not stressed in Brazil, religious and social-class differences are stressed much more than in this country. It has been suggested that race plays a minor role in Brazil because class and occupational competition is reduced to a minimum, and there is thus no "need" for racial discrimination to check such competition (29).

NONRACIAL AND RACIAL MINORITIES

The term "minority" is not an easy one to define. The American racial stocks discussed above are minorities, but not all minorities are racial. Religion and ethnic grouping, as well as race, distinguish majority from minorities.

A few students have employed the concept of *deprivation* to distinguish minorities. Thus an American Communist would be a member of a political minority, and a member of the equally small National Woman's party would not, since the former (but not the latter) is often deprived of the right to speak in public, to hold a job, and to campaign in elections. The difficulty with using deprivation as a dividing line, however, is that all of us are faced by one kind of deprivation or another. Children are deprived of many rights that adults possess, and adults are deprived of many rights granted to children. Females, who make up over half the population, may not ordinarily wear men's clothes, and they meet sexual discrimination in the job world. Many private schools, residential areas, and social organizations are restricted along social-class lines. Clearly, deprivation, per se, does not distinguish majority from minorities.

Conventionally, the majority is defined as the white, Protestant, native-born segment of the population—with antecedents who are Anglo-Saxon or from Germany, the low countries, and Scandinavia. There are thus racial, religious, and ethnic minorities. An *ethnic group* is a foreign-stock segment of the population which preserves in some degree a distinctive way of life, in language, mannerism, habit, loyalty, and the like. As most sociologists use the term, however, an individual might be classified as belonging to an ethnic group even though his attitudes and behavior were indistinguishable from those of the majority.

A person may be a member of a distinctive ethnic group even though his parents and grandparents were born in this country, provided he either identifies himself with that segment of the population or is so identified by others. The essence of "minority-group membership" has today become not so much observable differences in appearance and be-

havior (which in most cases are rapidly modified in the direction of majority appearance and behavior from one generation to the next), as it is the extent to which one's group-identified forebears are held to be socially unacceptable by the majority or other minorities.

Brief History of Immigration

Most American minorities are not racial. All minorities added together—nonwhites, Catholics, Jews—comprise at least one-third of the total population, which alone would indicate that the majority concept is more than statistical. The majority is defined as such not so much because of its numbers (nor, indeed, for the "purity" of its inheritance) as because it represents a continuity of tradition. The ancestors of the "majority" were the first white settlers of America. *They got here first*, and are held in their own and others' eyes to be those who founded our basic American institutions.

First period. The colonial period in American history spanned the years 1607 to 1800. The first census was taken in 1790, and the immigration record was not begun until 1819. The records, therefore, are meager and inadequate; nevertheless, we are still fairly certain that the colonial population was homogeneous. Over 90 per cent of the 1790 population—it was estimated by a committee of population experts in 1932—was from Northern and Western Europe, and 64 per cent was from the British Isles (13, p. 12).

Second period. The period of the "formation of the character of the republic" spanned the years 1800 to 1882, a period that is also known as that of the "old immigration." The vast majority of immigrants continued to arrive from England and other countries in Northern and Western Europe, and they secured our institutional foundations.

Third period. Although it was not until the turn of the twentieth century that European immigration from South and East exceeded that from North and West, the period 1882 to 1921 is known as that of the "new immigration." Immigration from Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy reached its peak from 1901 to 1910, when almost a million immigrants a year were arriving on our shores from Europe, the bulk of whom came from these three countries.

Modern period. In 1921, the first European quota act was passed, and since that time immigration has dwindled to a trickle. The law of 1929, which still regulates immigration from Europe, permits a total of 150,000 a year to enter. Since 1930, only 29 per cent of the quotas have been utilized. Instead of a total of 2,616,000 immigrants provided for by the quota system, only 560,000 actually arrived in the fiscal years 1930 to 1946 (2, p. 261). In the four lowest years of the depression, 1932 to

1935, there was a *net loss* of immigrants. A greater number of them left America to return to their native lands than arrived here (5, p. 15).

Since 1820, over 38 million people have migrated to this country. About 85 per cent of this total came from Europe; 11 per cent from Canada, Mexico, and other American countries; 2 per cent from Asia; and 1 per cent from other parts of the world (5, p. 5).

Immigration Legislation

Not until 1882 was any restriction placed upon free movement in and out of the country. The economy by that time had changed from agricultural to industrial, and resentment of alien competition for jobs was mounting. The majority grouping by that time had also become aware that the immigrants were no longer, as once they had been, people like themselves. The wording of the new restriction laws and the public and legislative debates which preceded them clearly indicate that hostility toward peoples of different customs, language, and religion was the motivating force behind that legislation. Similar but veiled arguments were voiced in intellectual circles, to the effect that American society could no longer absorb millions of alien peoples and maintain her national unity and "character."

In 1882, Congress suspended all immigration of Chinese laborers for ten years. In 1917, the "barred-zone law" excluded *all* Asiatics except the Japanese, who were excluded by a law of 1924. Several *qualitative* acts of exclusion were also passed—barring criminals, illiterates, radicals, those with infectious diseases, and any person "likely to become a public charge."

The first law to provide a quota system was the temporary act of 1921, which deliberately favored the "older immigration." The number of any nationality that could be admitted in any year from Europe was limited to 3 per cent of the foreign-born of such nationality residing here in 1910. This law rode the wave of antiforeign hysteria. War veterans and labor unions were bitter on the subject of aliens. Economic and political conditions in Europe were such that millions were pressing for entry into the United States. The League of Nations had just been turned down in the Senate. A national witch hunt bayed at the heels of suspected radicals and subversives, and the Ku Klux Klan was riding at night and burning crosses. The 1921 law, however, was designed not so much to keep out foreigners as such, but those foreigners who were held to be "undesirable"; the 1921 law endorsed what our official ideology denies—the belief in racial and ethnic superiority.

Another temporary law, that of 1924, limited until 1929 the annual quota of any European nationality to 2 per cent of the number of foreign-born persons of that nationality living here at the time of the 1890 census. The "older immigration" was thus even more favored.

The present law. On July 1, 1929, the law under which we now control immigration became operative. It provides that total immigration from Europe shall be limited to 150,000 a year. Other quota regions are permitted a total of about 3,500. Except that the minimum for any quota country is set at 100, the number which may be admitted from any one country is determined by the relative contribution of that country to the white American population of 1920. This is known as the "national-origins" provision, and it has been extremely difficult to administer.

The chief obstacle has been that no one knows anything accurate about the descent of the American population. Few people except those of recent arrival are of unmixed national origin. It is not known to what extent intermarriage occurred in the past or what the birth rate of various nationalities has been. The census of 1790 was one basis used to compute national origin, but nationality was not recorded in that census, so that "national origin" was determined on the basis of family names appended to the original schedules. All "English" names were added to estimate the total English segment of the 1790 population, and the fact that non-English peoples then, as now, tended to Anglicize the spelling of their names was ignored (13, p. 10). For example, Paul Revere was French. He was born Rivoire, but his name was added to the "English" total.

Population experts have repeatedly complained that Northern and Western European estimates, especially English, were grossly exaggerated. The method may have been faulty, but the intent was clear. The quota currently allotted Southern and Eastern Europe is only about 24,000, while Northern and Western Europe is allotted about 126,000, over half of which goes to England and Northern Ireland. Every year most of the total quota remains unfilled, since the real economic pressure to migrate is felt in Southern and Eastern Europe. While 70.8 per cent of the total immigration came from Southern and Eastern Europe in the years between 1901 and 1910, from 1941 to 1947 only 9.5 per cent of it came from that area (2, p. 40).

Immigration and World War II. Since the end of World War II, the question has been debated whether to admit the victims of Nazi tyranny and other peoples displaced by war, either outside the quota provisions or such a number as would use up only part of the total unused quotas of the past few years. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948 authorized the admission of 205,000 DP's by June 30, 1950. By April, 1950, however, only 140,000 had been admitted, owing to various restrictions contained within the law (25), such as the requirement that 30 per cent must be agriculturists, and that 50 per cent of the German and Austrian persons must be "expellees" of "German ethnic origin." President Truman called this bill discriminatory against Jews and Catholics.

On April 5, 1950, the Kilgore-Ferguson DP Bill was passed by the

Senate. It increased the number to be allowed admission to 344,000 and dropped various discriminatory clauses, except the requirement that a citizen or American organization must guarantee that a job and housing are available. It also added a clause barring Communists (4).

The delay in taking even hesitant action illustrates the moral conflict between our official democratic and our "racist" ideology. Approximately 60 per cent of the refugees who arrived here from 1933 to 1944 were Jewish (6), and the history of recent legislative activity clearly shows that America's late start in helping to solve the plight of the displaced persons was to some degree attributable to anti-Semitism. Ironically, however, assailing the Nazis for their treatment of German Jews was part of our most fervent war propaganda.

Those refugees who have already arrived here have received an uncertain welcome, mainly because of feared economic competition. The "new immigration" at the turn of the century was accused of taking industrial jobs away from Americans. The refugees, in contrast, are on the average highly educated, well to do, and in business or the professions. Resentment against them has been expressed mainly by their potential colleagues. By 1943, for example, licensing examinations were, in effect, closed to alien physicians in all states except New York and Massachusetts (6, p. 267). Some county and state medical societies deny membership to foreign physicians who are already licensed. Similar open or tacit antagonism has been encountered in the legal and teaching professions.

Present Numbers and Distribution: Races

Negroes. Our largest racial minority is concentrated within a rectangle which can be drawn from Florida to New York City, from New York to Chicago, and from Chicago to Texas. Recent decades have seen a migratory movement to Northern cities and a much slighter shift westward. According to the preliminary count of the 1950 census, between 1940 and 1950 the Negro population in the South gained by 3.1 per cent; the Northeast, by 44.2 per cent; the North Central region, by 50.2 per cent; and the West, by 237.4 per cent. Nevertheless, the bulk of the nation's Negro population still remains in the South. The regional distribution in 1950 was as follows: South, 68.6 per cent; Northeast, 13.2 per cent; North Central region, 14.3 per cent; West, 3.9 per cent (3, p. 8, adapted from Table 1). What shift in population has taken place accompanied both world wars, when the Negro's industrial services were in great demand.

From 1790 to 1930, while the number of Negroes steadily increased, their *proportion* of the total population as steadily diminished. Thus, Negroes comprised 19.3 per cent of the population in 1790, but only 9.7 in 1930. In 1940, the trend was reversed for the first time; Negroes were 9.8 per cent of the total population, and they numbered 12,865,518. The 1950 preliminary count is 9.9 per cent and 14,894,000 in number. It is expected

that the proportion of Negroes will continue to increase but never approach that of 1790.

In recent years, the proportion of Negroes has increased for two reasons. First, legislation has almost stopped white immigration; as one result, the proportion of Negroes in the population is raised regardless of any increase in numbers. Second, there *has* been a slight real increase of Negro over white numbers. Negro death rates have always been higher than white, but in the past thirty years the racial gap has been narrowed; particularly have an improved standard of living and medical care arrested the Negro infant and maternal death rates. The Negro birth rate is presently higher than the white, but only because the bulk of the Negro population, unlike the white, remains in rural-farm areas; only by this fact does the Negro birth rate exceed the white, since the Negro net reproduction rate in urban areas is no higher than the white. If the urbanward trend of Negro migration continues, as seems probable, the proportion of Negroes in the population will not long continue to rise.

Other races. American Indians comprised 0.3 per cent of the entire population in 1940—333,969 in number, according to the census. As of 1949, they were estimated to number 450,000 (12, p. 446). Since the 1920 census count was 244,437, it would appear that this American is not vanishing, Zane Grey to the contrary notwithstanding. Although reservations are to be found in all parts of the country, they are concentrated in the West, especially in the Southwest.

Since Mexicans have not been separately classified in the census since 1930, at present it is not known how many there are in the country. They are, however, our most rapidly growing minority. From 1910 to 1920 their numbers doubled, and from 1920 to 1930 they doubled again to a total of 1,422,533, or 1.2 per cent of the population. From 1930 to 1938 their numbers doubled once more, according to a National Resources Planning Board estimate (28, p. 176). Almost all Mexicans now living here are concentrated in the states near Mexico—New Mexico, Texas, Arizona, California, and Colorado.

Orientals are concentrated in the Far West, and they comprise a minute fraction of the population. There were 77,504 Chinese in 1940—less than 0.1 per cent of the total population. There were 126,947 Japanese, 0.1 per cent; and 45,563 Filipinos. According to preliminary counts of the 1950 census, 89.7 per cent of the United States population at that time was white, a gain over the 1940 proportion, which was 89.4 per cent. In the same decade, Negroes increased from 9.8 to 9.9 per cent of the population. Indians, Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos together retained the same proportion—0.4 per cent. Any decrease in the proportion of white population in the future will unquestionably be slight, if indeed it should occur at all. This statement assumes that our prolific Mexican population will continue to be classified as white by the census.

Present Numbers and Distribution: Ethnic Groups

The census inquires into neither religion nor extended nativity. The foreign-born and the native-born of foreign or mixed parentage (one parent native-born, the other foreign-born) are counted. But a person whose four grandparents were, say, Polish immigrants, and both of whose parents were of Polish extraction, is counted as "native-born of native parents," exactly as a member of the Sons of the American Revolution would be. Sociologists have surveyed local areas to discover to what extent ethnic "inbreeding" continues after the second generation, but such research is not sufficiently representative to afford an accurate estimate of the size of various ethnic groups within the total population.

At their face value, census figures inform of an imminent disappearance of our ethnic groups, owing to a rapid increase in the average age of the foreign-born because of the drastic reduction of immigration. In 1940, the median age of the total population stood at 29 years, that of the foreign-born at 51 years. In 1920, the foreign-born white population was 13.0 per cent of the total; 8.7 per cent in 1940; and 6.7 per cent in 1950, according to preliminary counts. The native-white population of foreign or mixed parentage likewise declined, from 21.1 per cent in 1930 to 17.5 per cent in 1940 (2, p. 170).

We can take the distribution of the foreign-born as a fairly accurate indicator of ethnic-group distribution. Historically, the heaviest concentration has been in the North and East, a situation which has been modified but not radically changed. In 1950, over 50 per cent of the foreign-born population resided in the Northeast and over 75 per cent in the Northeast and North Central regions combined (3, p. 12, adapted from Table 3).

Of the European ethnic groups of recent arrival, six are preponderant in the present population: Italians, Jews, Poles, Czechs and Slovaks, Hungarians, and Yugoslavs (28, p. 17). There are approximately 6 million Italians and their children in the United States today; they comprise the largest segment of the "new immigrant" stock.

Since 1882, the foreign-born and their children have tended to concentrate in cities. In 1940, 80 per cent of the foreign-born and 74.0 per cent of the native-born of foreign or mixed parentage, but only 55.1 per cent of the native-born of native parentage, were urban residents (2, p. 174). This contrast has aroused nativists and racists to complain that while "our Anglo-Saxon forefathers" were rugged pioneers who took to the soil and built this country, these new arrivals pile up in city slums and become public charges during economic slumps. What is overlooked is the fact that *every* immigrant follows the path of economic opportunity. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century, opportunity was on the land. By 1890 the frontier was gone, and industrial jobs in cities represented

the new opportunity. Had the Italians or Poles gotten here first, they would have settled on the land and become "our rugged pioneer forefathers."

The ethnic group loses solidarity. Ethnic groups tend to lose much of their internal cohesiveness in time. Third-generation Americans resent hyphenated (such as Italian-American) status. They read American magazines, attend American schools, wear American clothes, speak the latest American radio slang, and become American bop addicts. By and large, they want to break identification with a foreign country and seek identification with the groups and ways of life which carry status and prestige in the only country they have personally known.

The rising rate of intermarriage is the most dramatic proof that the walls of the sacred society are crumbling. Of all our ethnic groups, perhaps the French-Canadians most tenaciously cling to an old way of life, a foreign language, and a voluntarily separated social world. Yet a study of intermarriage in Woonsocket, Rhode Island, showed that 8.8 per cent of second-generation French-Canadians and 35.0 per cent of the third generation married other than French-Canadians (34).

Intermarriage can run high in rural-farm districts, as well. In a study of a Connecticut farming area, 26 of 45 second-generation Finnish children who had married were found to have chosen non-Finnish mates (35, p. 27). Most intermarriages, even in the third and fourth generations, however, remain within the religious faith of the parents. In any event, it appears quite likely that ethnic-group identification will become increasingly vague with the passing of future decades.*

The Jewish "ethnic group." American Jews represent a possible qualification to the last statement. Jewish-Gentile intermarriage in America is relatively infrequent, much less frequent than it was in pre-Nazi Germany. Between 1906 and 1930, in Germany, there were 89,000 marriages in which both partners were Jews, but there were also 33,000 marriages in which one party was Jewish (20, p. 246). On the other hand, when all available evidence is pooled, "no one has demonstrated a tendency toward Jewish intermarriage in America or Canada above 5 per cent" (10, p. 284).

Jewish classification is difficult. The Jews are not a race. Historically there has been too much intermixture with the peoples among whom they have settled to substantiate such a claim. Jews in Africa are colored, and those in China resemble other Chinese. Neither are the Jews in the strictest sense a homogeneous ethnic group. The way of life of Spanish Jews is quite different from that of East Russian Jews. It has sometimes been claimed that only religion separates Jew from non-Jew, yet for centuries

* For a dissenting opinion, see 19. Professor Marcson argues that intermarriage is not necessarily an indication that the ethnic group is losing either its solidarity or its identity.

those Jews who have accepted some other faith have still remained Jews in the eyes of others. A Jew is then someone who considers himself or is considered by others to be Jewish.

However classified, there is no way of knowing with any accuracy how many Jews there are in America. The census does not inquire about religion, and foreign-born Jews are listed under country of origin. In a summary of many local population studies it was estimated that there were more than 4 million but less than 5 million in 1948 (27, p. 188). Three-fourths of the Jewish population lives in five large cities—New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Detroit; half of it is in New York, which in 1948 contained an estimated 2 million (27).

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PART THREE

Some Social Institutions

CHAPTER 17 *The Family: A Comparative View*

> I am sick of all this talk of choosing and choosing. . . . If a man is healthy and does not drink, and has a good little handful of stock, and a good temper, and is a good Christian what great difference can it make to a woman which man she takes?
>
> —JAMES G. LEYBURN, QUOTING AN OLD BOER WOMAN

> Night and day you are the one
> Only you beneath the moon and under the sun.
> Whether near to me or far,
> It's no matter, darling, where you are,
> I think of you night and day.
>
> —COLE PORTER

The social sciences must deal with a great range of irregularity in units that bear the same name. No part of such a unit can be properly described—in a real sense, it cannot even be "seen"—unless some knowledge about that unit's range of irregularity is acquired. One such unit is the social institution of the family. It is an almost impossible task, for example, to learn something about the modern American family unless its distinctive characteristics are taken into account. A knowledge of these characteristics, in turn, requires a background of knowledge about the family in other times and places. It is for this reason that the marriage and family customs of societies outside our own tradition are here examined before those of modern America are discussed in any detail.

UNIVERSAL FEATURES OF FAMILY STRUCTURE

Although the family is an extremely varied social institution, it does possess a solid core of universal features. What is universal in the human family stems from two facts. First, as we have previously noted, man's problem of survival is much more a group than it is an individual matter. Care of children, and the sexual activity which precedes their birth, is in all times and places a matter of public control. Second, man is one species, and the peculiarities of his biology impose certain limits on the range of variation in his behavior.

Public Control

All societies approve of certain forms of sexual activity and disapprove of others, even though what is specifically approved and disapproved

may vary from one society to another. All societies charge adults with the responsibility of raising children, and these adults are usually, although not necessarily, the biological parents of the given child. In other words, the institutions of marriage and the family are to be found in all societies.

Marriage is a formal and durable sexual union of one or more men with one or more women within a set of designated rights and duties. The relationship of man and wife is a matter of public control to the extent that the inclusive group—kin group, village, tribe, or state—has defined their rights and duties prior to the time of marriage. Unlike a family, however, a marriage is universally dissolved, its rights and duties cease, with the death of either partner. Nowhere is divorce approved in principle, but usually some provision is made for dissolution of the union during the lifetime of the partners, for certain stated causes.

A marriage is always and everywhere joined in a public ceremonial, or *marriage rite*. This rite is usually an elaborate affair, followed by a public celebration, but in some cases it is quite simple—such as the winding of a blade of grass around the joined fingers of man and woman by an elder kinsman of one of them. Elaborate or simple, it has the same essential purpose—the seeking and affirmation of public approval. In complex civilizations, the marriage rite has come under either state or ecclesiastical control or both. Among most preliterate peoples, it merely binds a private contract, made by two original families, with the approval of tribe or village.

The *family* is the institutionalized social group charged with the activity of population replacement. Unlike a marriage, a family involves more than two persons in a series of relationships which endure, in time, beyond the death of any of the individuals who make it up at any moment in time. It is sometimes mistakenly assumed that the family and the basic conjugal unit of husband, wife, and offspring are synonymous; only in modern society is this tendency in evidence. This and other matters about the forms of the family are discussed later in the chapter.

Biological Bases

Extended mating. There is no clearly defined mating season in any race of man. The human male, from puberty to senescence, is impelled to seek sexual intercourse without regard for season of the year or any other cycle of time. The human female's responsiveness is perhaps somewhat more variable, within the menstrual cycle, but in comparison with the females of most other species, she is capable of responding at all times. Thus the basis is laid for a more or less continuous sexual union.

Dependence of mother and child. The physiology of the adult female makes her periodically helpless. During her long periods of pregnancy and nursing, others must supply some of her needs. She requires some permanent social arrangement to ensure her survival and that of her off-

spring. Her child is even more dependent. What John Fiske has called the "prolonged period of human infancy" requires a permanent social and economic association among certain adults (not necessarily the biological father and mother alone) to ensure the child's survival and ultimately that of the society. Further, the human infant is born with only rudimentary instincts. Even under primitive conditions, he needs about twelve years of care and training in order to master the techniques and tools required for sheer body maintenance, if nothing more.

Male dominance. Another biological basis for the human family is the male's dominance. He is spared the female's physiological incapacities, and he is stronger than she. The female's mother role and periodic helplessness have forced upon him the tasks of defense and procuring food, shelter, and other necessities for his dependents. While there are some deviations from this pattern, under the rigors of life prevailing among most peoples the male gains a social importance which transcends that of the female. In practically all societies, the family is governed by men; even in the so-called matriarchies, the woman's "rule" is usually vested in her brother or other male relative within her line of descent (15, p. 138).

Some anthropologists have pointed to the large number of known matrilineal societies and have denied the universality of male dominance. The crucial question, nevertheless, is not whether descent is reckoned through the male or female line but whether males or females control economic activities. Female "dominance" is most likely to occur among nonmigratory agricultural peoples who have preserved peaceful relations with their neighbors for decades, such as the Hopi and Zuñi Indians of the American Southwest. Here the hunting and defense functions of the male have long been reduced to a minimum, and the possibility has arisen for control of the fields to revert to the women, through whom descent is reckoned. In all cases, economic control is crucial to the balance of power between the sexes.

Perhaps the term "balance of power" is an oversimplification. The universal separation of the sexes in social functions and division of labor makes hazardous any simple statement of sexual dominance or compliance. In most societies, women control the household activities, men the outside economic pursuits. Yet in Hopi and Zuñi, where women hold title to the fields also, the tribal religious rituals confer the highest measure of prestige known in those respective societies, and these are for the most part male prerogatives. Further, the official cultural definitions of power and control are frequently a mask for a different situation known to the men and women of a given society. Among the Alor of the Netherlands East Indies, the men are officially considered dominant, but the women work in the fields and can, in part, control their mates by withholding food. On the other hand, "the weight of male-controlled finances and the complex affinal exchanges succeed in throwing the balance on the side

In the family. The proposition that instinct can be used to explain the family is even more dubious. Modern experience has shown that the desire for offspring is not constant, even in women. With birth-control devices readily available, many married women today remain voluntarily childless. By definition, an instinct must be invariable. On the other hand, there *is* a connection between women's physiology and their behavior. Women differ in the amount and duration of menstrual flow. They also differ in the extent to which they love babies, anticipate having babies, and devote time to caring for them. One study has reported a positive correlation between menstrual flow and maternal behavior (14). Infant care is a basic physiological expression of women's nature, whatever the failure of desire for offspring to measure up to "instinct," technically defined.

There is more variation from one society to another in paternal than in maternal responsibility. As the man has no innate tendency to remain with a particular woman, neither has he such a tendency to care for his own offspring. Paternal behavior is clearly a product of the mores. All societies exert more formal pressure on men than on women to assume responsibility for children. Curiously enough, while in all societies the woman cares for her own children, in some societies the man assumes responsibility for children who are not his. The father may even be a stranger or visitor in the household. In such cases his children are provided for by the mother's brothers, he performing a like service for his sister's children. But even though the father role is frequently altogether social rather than biological, no society considers a woman and her offspring to be a complete social unit (18, p. 213). Masculine care and protection are everywhere viewed as essential, and these duties are usually assigned to the biological father. Virtually without exception, group sentiment is such that men are led to desire many children and to take pride in them.

There is no need to use "instinct" in order to explain either marriage or the family. Man everywhere, and perhaps always, has lived in groups, and these have controlled sexual behavior and required the maintenance and care of resultant offspring. Under conditions prevailing in most societies, it is safe to say that individual choice hardly exists. Attaining basic social satisfactions requires close conformity to the rules. In some societies, the economy is so integrated with the acceptance of marital and familial responsibilities that a bachelor can barely survive.

One final word of caution. Although the mores dictate sexual and familial behavior, it does not necessarily follow that those mores are uniformly experienced as a tragic imprisonment of organic impulse. Any given institutional structure is in a delicate state of balance between permitted organic and impulse expression, on the one hand, and arbitrary restriction of individual desire, on the other. To some indeterminate

degree, during the socialization process the developing person comes to identify himself with the mores; imposed self-control becomes, in part, his *self*-expression. It is only a seeming contradiction that the person may come to regard the enveloping control system as alien and restrictive, may even violate some part of that system, and at the same time come to accept the control system as part of his self, his own attitudes and values and settled convictions.

Economic Organization

The family always exerts control over property, including rules for its inheritance by various members. The economic activities of husband and wife center in the family—in some cases the conjugal unit of themselves and their children, in other cases the separate kinship group of each. Universally, there is some familial division of labor according to which the various family members work together to produce for the family. There are, nevertheless, striking differences of degree. The modern American family is a polar type, in that individuals are hired out of it to work for large impersonal organizations that operate almost independently of any given individual's family alliance. For the most part, the modern American family has retained only activities of economic consumption and has renounced economic production.

BASIC FORMS OF MARITAL RELATIONS

What the "original" form of marriage was is a matter for sheer conjecture. On this score, at least, the distant past reveals nothing. Neither will a knowledge of the most primitive contemporary societies help to solve the mystery. Peoples of very low economic and social development practice either monogamy or polygamy or both, and the same is true of peoples with complex cultures.

There are only two basic forms of marriage, polygamy and monogamy. Very simply, the first means plural mating, and the second means union of one man and one woman. Polygamy is further divisible into polyandry (the marriage of one woman to two or more men) and polygyny (the marriage of one man to two or more women).

Polyandry

Polyandry is found nowhere in the higher reaches of civilization, and it is extremely rare among preliterate peoples. Polyandry is practiced by certain Eskimo tribes, by the Nayars of Malabar, and by a few other peoples. There are two subforms—the fraternal, in which the husbands are brothers, and the nonfraternal, in which they are not.

The fraternal type is more common, and it is usually a modification of monogamy. The younger brothers share the oldest brother's wife. All

of them are husbands of the woman, but the oldest brother retains primary control. Paternity in such a system is socially rather than biologically determined. Among the Todas of southern India, for example, fatherhood was established by a "bow" ceremony. All children born until the mother performed this ceremony with another husband were reckoned to belong to the previous man with whom she had been joined. So highly formalized did this custom become that a child born years after a ceremonial father had died considered him to be his father, provided the child's mother had failed in the meantime to change his social father by means of the ceremony.

Polygyny

The custom of one man's taking two or more wives is much more common than polyandry. The Eskimo hunters are polygynous, as are pastoral peoples in Asia and agricultural tribes in Asia, Africa, and America. Attempts to explain polygyny have not been altogether successful. It has been said to be practiced by certain Eskimo tribes because the rigors of the chase ruthlessly cut down the number of available men; polyandry among other Eskimo tribes has also been explained as a result of the same physical environment—a woman so close to the margin of subsistence must have more than one husband to care for herself and her children.

On logical grounds, however, we might assume that—owing to universal male dominance and the lack of a mating season—the human male has a "natural" tendency to collect as many females as he can. Where he fails to do so, he is hedged in mainly by personal circumstances or group rules. Those with economic power in monogamous cultures—upper-class males—have either been permitted access to more than one woman or clandestinely sought them more frequently than males lacking such power. In the Western tradition, polygyny long remained a prerogative of aristocracy, as it is today in China, Egypt, and elsewhere, especially throughout the Mohammedan world.

The male's drive to sex variety is heightened in many polygynous societies by taboos against sex relations during a woman's pregnancy, menstrual, or weaning periods. Another possible utilitarian explanation of polygyny is its economic advantage, under certain circumstances. Where women ordinarily do most of the work—as in many African agricultural villages—a plural household enables a man to become wealthy; the cost of maintaining several wives is compensated by their economic contribution.

Among polygynous peoples a man's worth is partly measured by the number of his wives, and religious and social attitudes stress the desirability of many children. The Tanala of Madagascar worship their

ancestors, so that the more children a man has the oftener and longer his name will be repeated in family prayers at such time as he shall pass to his reward. It must be admitted that such explanations as these tend to become circular—the presence of a fully developed polygynous system is used to explain the motives which prompt men to marry more than one wife. Why one society in its history developed a monogamous, and another a polygynous, system is in the final analysis inexplicable. One thing is certain, however, and that is that motives do differ in the two systems.

Owing to the strength of the monogamous sentiment in our own society, one should beware of attributing to the women in a polygynous system emotional reactions which would be inevitable in a woman born and raised where monogamy was sanctioned by tradition, religion, and law. Plural wives do not inevitably feel degraded. African women often urge their husbands to take another wife in order to lighten their burden of labor in household and field. In order to placate his desire for offspring, a childless first wife may encourage her husband to marry, especially where he has the right to divorce a barren wife if he so chooses.

The plasticity of human nature is further manifested by the evidence that "normal" jealousy is a cultural product. Groups of men can live in peace with one woman, and groups of women with one man. Jealousy is universal, but its form of expression is variable. The Navaho have an extended notion of jealousy. A man is supposed to be faithful to his wife, *or wives*, and any adulterous act is most reprehensible. Among the Narrinyeri, a wife's jealousy tends to be aroused only if the husband's next choice is a wife older than herself, for the wives' prestige is ranked according to age, the oldest wife lording it over all others (20, p. 247). The previous wife is relatively unconcerned by sexual competition with a younger, more attractive woman. Conversely, in modern America, jealousy is inevitably tied up with fears of sexual dismissal and resentment of the mate's or lover's sexual preference for someone else.

That polygyny is "natural" for many peoples does not mean that polygyny could be transferred to American society. Cultures are intricate interwoven patterns which, though constantly being elaborated in the loom of time, cannot be ripped to shreds to be designed anew. The Mormon system of polygyny failed for many reasons, but even more important than outside intervention was the fact that these people had been brought up in strictly Protestant-monogamous families before migrating to Utah, and they had continued to be surrounded by an alien monogamous world. The Mormons could not adjust their expectations of themselves and their mates to polygyny, even though their new religion gave it supernatural sanction (10).

Monogamy

Monogamy is almost everywhere the most frequent form of marriage, even where other forms are permitted or even preferred. This does not mean that the extremely strict monogamous relation that has come down in our own tradition is the universal rule where "monogamy" is found, but rather that most matings are with single partners, owing to custom, to poverty, or to the nonavailability of members of the opposite sex.



FIG. 31. Approximate frequencies throughout the world of the three basic forms of matrimony.

In the classical or Greco-Roman culture, of which ours is a continuation, monogamy was always the most approved form of marriage. The Greco-Roman family was traditionally one of strong male domination; property ownership and religious authority centered in the husband and father, or patriarch. Filial piety and loyalty, essential to such a system, were held aloft as supreme virtues. This consistent tradition was marked by great stability, certainty of fatherhood, and a strong sense of rights to property and title. Monogamy accompanied the desire to strengthen the paternal relationship and to narrow the range of property inheritance in advanced civilizations. The definitive, contractual rights in property under a capitalistic economy alone would make multiple matings, with separate sets of children within the conjugal unit, virtually unworkable.

Women usually occupied a position of distinct inferiority. They were regarded as needing protection and permanent tutelage, first from the father and then from the husband. It was questioned whether they had souls or were capable of moral distinctions. Girls were married without their consent, according to the interests of the father. Adultery by a wife was an affront to the magisterial role of the patriarch and an unforgivable religious sin as well as a legal crime. It is obvious that there was a need, in this type of family with its emphasis upon continuation of the father's name and title in property, for the "double standard," for demands on female chastity never made on the male. The male's adulteries never incurred the danger of bringing illegitimate offspring *into* the legitimate patriarchal household.

This authoritarian pattern has been moving in the direction of equalitarianism for centuries, but more swiftly in the past few decades. The subject will be discussed more fully in the next chapter.

VARIATIONS IN MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

What primarily distinguishes preliterate from modern marriage is the relative lack of control by the mating pair in the former case. Those who marry have little choice in the matter; both the preliminaries and the act of marriage are a *group* affair, with individual choice reduced to a minimum. Marriages are arranged on the basis of economic interest, with both original families seeking to gain by a transaction that is free from ecclesiastical or state supervision. In all but a few cases, the primary loyalty of each of the mates remains attached to the kinship group within which each was born, rather than being transferred to the new conjugal unit as among ourselves.

Restrictions on Potential Mates

All peoples prohibit matings between individuals sharing certain blood or affinal relationships. There are also universal pressures to marry within the tribe, the race, or the social class. The first set of rules is known as exogamy (literally, marriage outside), and the second, endogamy (marriage within). The rules are universal, but the range of variation is wide.

Exogamy. The term "exogamy" is essentially covered by the incest taboo. The marriage of parents with their own children is without any exception tabooed. Almost as universally banned is the marriage of brother to sister. Interesting exceptions to the latter prohibition occurred in the royal families of the Egyptian Ptolemies, ancient Hawaii, and the Incas of Peru. This special dispensation maintained intact a royal line of descent in societies which had not developed a system of intermarriage with foreign royalty. Close blood relationship is typically, how-

ever, a bar to marriage for all people in all times and places. Frequently first cousins may not marry. In 29 states in this country at the present time, such marriages are illegal.

Alliance or affinity, as well as blood relationship, has been included within exogamous rules. The Roman Catholic Church prohibits the marriage of a widower with his sister-in-law; until 1907, such marriages were illegal in England. The Eastern Orthodox Church forbids the marriage of two brothers to two sisters. Among some peoples, marriage between persons belonging to the same village or other territorial group is banned, or at least discouraged. In the Chinese interior, peasant families arrange marriages between young persons from different villages, since childhood acquaintances might "fall in love" prior to marriage, which in turn might lead them to disobey their elders after they marry (23, p. 115).

Speculation has long been rife as to the origin of exogamy. Some have claimed that early man observed and then sought to prevent the adverse hereditary effects of inbreeding. But if the hereditary stock contains no recessive defects, inbreeding perpetuates sound qualities. Sir Marc A. Ruffer studied the Egyptian royal mummies of several dynasties and claims to have found no degeneration whatsoever in individuals who sprang from brother-sister unions for a period of over two hundred years.

Westermarck advanced the theory that the fundamental cause of exogamous proscriptions is "a remarkable absence of erotic feelings between persons living very closely from childhood." Sexual indifference, he claimed, is "combined with the positive feeling of aversion when the act is thought of" (22, p. 80). But we still must account for the frequent violation of the taboo, which would indicate that those reared closely together do not uniformly develop a repugnance for incest. The "positive feeling of aversion," while undoubtedly experienced by the vast majority of mankind everywhere, is felt only by socialized human beings who have been taught such taboos. As a matter of fact, Sigmund Freud declared that man universally possesses a secret desire to mate with the parent of the opposite sex. Neither Westermarck's nor Freud's point of view, however, is clearly demonstrable by accepted scientific method.

The explanation of exogamous rules must have recourse to inference for which unequivocal data are lacking. Recall the previous statement that marriage functions not so much to permit sexual relations as to control and channelize them. No household or kin group could long survive where open competition for sexual favors within the group was rife. It may be assumed that it was the necessity to prevent such competition which led to incest taboos, and that the taboos, in turn, fostered the general attitude that incest is a horrible violation of human nature.

Credence is lent this idea by the fact that the incest taboo among many peoples is extended beyond blood relationship to include all affinal kin, *if* they customarily share close residence. In the ancient Roman tribal society, where several degrees of kinsmen lived in one household, the range of prohibited marriage was extensive; later, when households were contracted to contain only close kinsmen, the prohibited range of marriage was likewise contracted. The legal trend in modern American society to permit the marriage of cousins has followed the contraction of the effective family unit.

Cross-cousin marriage, the union of children born to a brother and a sister, is encouraged among many peoples. Parallel-cousin marriage, the union of children born to two brothers or two sisters, is equally often discouraged. In all such cases, descent is reckoned through either father or mother but not both. There is also matrilocal or patrilocal residence—the household contains either mothers, daughters, sisters, and the children and husbands of the women; or fathers, sons, brothers, and the children and wives of the men. In other words, a married brother and his sister raise their children (cross cousins) in different households, while two brothers or two sisters raise their children (parallel cousins) in the same household. It is not the degree of blood relationship which prohibits marriage between cousins in such societies, but the discouragement of all sexual intimacies between children of the opposite sex who have been brought up in the same household. The nomadic Arabs are one of the few peoples who practice parallel-cousin marriage—the marriage of the children of two brothers. But here the future married pair have not been brought up together, because the separate conjugal units disperse widely in distant migrations, to come together only on rare occasions.

Endogamy. The most typical endogamous rules are enforced by tribe, race, religion, and social class. Where there is little social contact between different tribes, marriages with out-group members do not take place. Isolation usually takes care of the matter, but some tribes which traffic with other tribes for mutual economic advantage frequently prohibit out-tribe marriage.

Interracial marriage is nowhere encouraged. Several states in this country have made the marriage of whites and Negroes illegal; *miscegenation* in those states will bring a long prison term if it is brought to the attention of the courts. The racial laws of Hitler's Germany declared "Aryan"-Jewish intermarriage to be a criminal act. In civilized countries, repugnance for such out-group marriages extends beyond race to include national stocks who possess certain distinctive cultural characteristics.

Several attitude studies have disclosed that the American people consistently rank those they would admit to close kinship by marriage in

the following order: Protestants originating from Northern and Western Europe; Catholics originating from Southern and Eastern Europe; and, finally, various colored peoples. It is not only the white-Protestant majority who indicate this scale of preference, but also native-born Jews and native-born Negroes—except that these two minorities rank their own group first (3 and 11). There are apparently widespread endogamous attitudes, hardly "rules," which have given the peoples associated in the American tradition with the founding of its national institutions a clear preference above all others.

Religious endogamy is not so strong in the modern West as once it was, although orthodox Jews still incur the risk of banishment from their sacred society if they marry gentiles. Marriages between Christians and Jews were prohibited by the early Church, and the Council of Trent later declared void all matrimonial unions between Catholics and non-Catholics. The Church no longer takes such a stand, although religious intermarriage now receives only a grudging ecclesiastical recognition. The various Protestant sects in the United States now make no real effort to prevent intermarriage among themselves. The present trend in this country is in the direction of an increase in mixed marriages across the three main religious groupings of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish. Religious tolerance or indifference, depending upon one's verbal preference, is growing.

Class endogamy is frequent throughout the world. In the old Polynesian society, marriages between nobles and commoners were severely deprecated. Until 445 B.C., plebeians and patricians in Rome were forbidden to marry. As in the case of religious endogamy, however, class endogamy has tended to wane in the modern world. Of all modern nations only England has retained a fairly strict class endogamy through and beyond the industrial revolution.

Marriage in modern America is perhaps more free of economic and social-status considerations than marriage in any other culture. This situation is supported by our ideology of social equalitarianism and our faith that romantic love will conquer all. Family, friends, and associates, nevertheless, often attempt to control courtship with endogamous considerations in mind. The Lynds report that middle-class mothers in Muncie, Indiana, actively encourage friendships of their children with the "right people" of the opposite sex and deftly ward off the attentions of those who are not (16, Chap. X, "Marriage"). Willard Waller has reported that young women at one of our state universities frequently invite the attentions of young men who are campus leaders and athletes without regard for their background, but they tend to look for different qualifications when marriage rather than "dating" becomes of paramount importance (21).

Such behavior perhaps should not be treated with unconsidered ridicule. Since ours is a class-structured society, albeit more mobile than most, one is more likely to find a person of similar tastes, outlook, and sympathies within one's own class than outside of it. Particularly for a woman, marrying "beneath herself" often ushers in a comparative state of tragic poverty. Hollywood's answer to all problems is possibly best left untransferred from the screen into the home.

Throughout the modern West, nevertheless, endogamous attitudes have relaxed and softened. The machine age, the concentration of peoples in cities, the modern division of labor which operates with little or no consideration for family and background, the rise of individualism which sets persons free from family and community controls—all of these afford a wider area of choice making in the field of *personal* relationships, if nowhere else. Mass society has blurred class, ethnic, regional, and other distinctions. About the only "rule" of endogamy left in modern American culture is that which prohibits miscegenation. It remains to be seen whether further urbanization, mechanization, individualism, and mobility will force a relaxation of our customs and statutes barring racial intermarriage.

Size of the Family Group

Conjugal. The traditional family of Western history, stemming from ancient Israel, through ancient Greece and Rome, and down to recent decades, has been the extended conjugal family. Like its emergent offshoot, the restricted conjugal family, this older family stressed each new marital relationship ("cleaving to one flesh," "forsaking all others"). But unlike the restricted conjugal family, the extended conjugal family typically contained three generations in one household, whose relations with one another were integrated within a family-centered economy. It is true that more distant kinsmen—cousins, aunts, uncles, nephews, and nieces—rarely lived and worked together. But they tended to live close by and often visited and held family reunions, and they very frequently aided one another, at least in time of crisis. They preserved a widened sense of family solidarity.

Within the past few decades, a new subform of the conjugal family has appeared. It is the restricted conjugal family, made up of husband, wife, and their offspring—comparatively few in number. The residence of the new family is usually isolated not only from distant kinsmen but also from parents and grandparents. It is the smallest family grouping in history. This new family will be discussed in the next chapter.

Consanguineal. The family organization of most preliterate peoples is based upon blood relationship. While the conjugal family of either subtype stresses the husband-wife relationship, that relationship in a consanguineal system is granted only secondary importance. The newly

married person continues to owe his primary loyalty to his own kin group. Whether residence is matrilocal or patrilocal, whether man or woman has gone to live in the mate's household, he or she will continue to be controlled from his or her point of origin. He or she will often maintain economic duties there, and will certainly return frequently for religious and other family rituals.

This system has many advantages. It is not a husband and wife from different families who cooperate in key activities, after having been brought up apart, but a brother and sister who have been trained from infancy to habits of mutual adaptation. In the typically large household, children are surrounded by, and attach their loyalty to, a large number of relatives—aunts and uncles being modified parents, cousins modified brothers and sisters. Children do not form an exclusionary attachment for father and mother, only to leave both at maturity, a sequence of events which often occurs in conjugal systems.

In this largest of intimate primary groups, the individual maintains lifelong rather than discontinuous relationships with several other kinsmen, so that many emotional shocks peculiar to conjugal systems are successfully avoided. Even though family relationships are close and continuous, the death of a member of the household causes much less bereavement than in a conjugal family. The survivors are more emotionally attached to a permanent group than to any one person. Divorce is a relatively easy matter to the mates and to their children. One mate returns to his or her kinship group, the other remains in the present household. The children will always remain where they were born. If descent is patrilineal, they will remain in the father's kin's household; if descent is matrilineal, in the mother's. Only one parent leaves the household, and aunts or uncles remain to assume either the maternal or the paternal relationship.

Although the consanguineal family is a more stable unit than the conjugal, it must not be assumed to be superior in any absolute sense. Since any family form is always closely integrated with its attendant institutions, the functional adequacy of that family form can only be assessed in relation to the total social structure. Our high standard of living is in part the result of the restricted conjugal family. Modern bureaucratic capitalism is geared to the restricted conjugal family, which virtually frees the individual from family ties. They developed together, in fact.

This relationship works both ways. Foreign industrial and commercial enterprises have been hampered in those parts of the Near East where familism remains strong, for trust is strictly confined within the family (1, p. 514). The collapse of the Nationalist government to Communist armies in China has been in part attributed to the corruption of

Chinese officials who, trained to honesty and integrity only within the family, were unable to apply the impersonalized integrity which a complex politico-economic order demands.

While the consanguineal family maximizes social stability, it minimizes dynamic change. The most contemptuous epithet which a Zuñi Indian can apply to a fellow tribesman is the accusation that he wishes to become a "leader of his people"! Rapid change, what we call "progress," is possible only where dynamic leaders, inventors, and visionaries are permitted to exercise their individualized talents. Significantly enough, within a given society great peaks of civilization have been scaled only during those periods when familism—of either extended-conjugal or consanguineal type—has been weakened relative to what it had been in previous epochs.

Division of Labor

A true division of labor requires that individuals of the same age and sex, who provide one another with commodities or services, do different things at the same time. Males and females in all human and even in some animal societies, have different and complementary tasks and duties. In all human societies, the same individual, of either sex, will have somewhat different duties as he passes from one age category to another.

In most preliterate societies, all mature members are expected to be proficient at duties common to their sex. While the Andaman Islander men are hunting, the women are cutting and carrying firewood, scouring the forest for fruits and seeds, or making baskets or other objects. Women do the family cooking, but men do the ceremonial "common cooking" of the village (4).

Specialization within each sexual division does not usually occur to any great extent among preliterate peoples. Each family or kinship group or village produces and distributes most of its needed goods and services. Only as a matter of personal preference will one man spend more time making canoes than hunting. The requirement of self-sufficiency within small groups prevents any extreme specialization, as the history of the American frontier attests.

A complex division of labor is usually accompanied by an advanced technology. No preliterate tribe maintains anything comparable to our highly developed specialization, in which a man performs one minute task and depends upon trade to acquire those things he does not make or sell, or finds his place in a vast organization which hires him to contribute one small part to a vast whole. Only in advanced civilizations do many persons *organize* a single job, such as a thousand factory workers doing different things to produce one pair of shoes.

Premarital Relations

Sex expression. Many preliterate peoples permit a degree of sexual freedom prior to marriage which we would regard as license. The Trobrianders are an extreme example (17). "Chastity" is a concept alien to these people. Long before they have reached puberty, children are expected to have indulged in a variety of sexual practices, there having been little if any attempt to "protect" them from acquiring a full knowledge of adult sex behavior. As children grow up, they are normally expected to have a number of love affairs which are fully consummated; one of these liaisons usually develops into a permanent attachment which results in marriage. If a visiting party should arrive in a village from another district, the unmarried girls are expected to bring food to the visitors and later to sleep with them. At mortuary vigils, girls of a visiting party are supposed to comfort the young men of the bereaved village.

Then is the claim made above, that all peoples control sex, false? Not at all. The Trobrianders control sex, but with certain distinctive emphases. Incest taboos, particularly between brother and sister, are severely enforced. It is considered highly improper for any grown or married person to mingle with the young unmarried. Love-making is a private affair, and public displays of affection are in extreme bad taste. A couple involved in a more or less permanent liaison must not eat together, an act that is highly shocking to the Trobriand mind. Strangely enough, as in many societies which permit premarital intercourse, premarital motherhood is considered reprehensible. Even more strange in our logic is the Trobriand attitude toward adultery, when it is placed alongside their permissive attitude toward premarital intercourse. Adultery is unmentionable in polite conversation, is nearly unknown, and public opinion falls harshly upon the offenders.

It is generally true that an emphasis upon premarital chastity accompanies advanced civilization. But the strength of prohibition by no means always indicates the extent of "progress." The Veddahs of Ceylon and the Semang of the Malay Peninsula possess an extremely simple technology and social system, but they also cherish premarital chastity even more than do modern Americans.

Securing a mate. Preliterate marriages are usually arranged by the respective families, and initiative in the unmarried is reduced to a minimum. More often than not, preliterate marriage is an open economic transaction. Marriage by purchase is very common in Africa, where a "bride price" is paid the woman's family for the services she will render her husband's family. The implications of the "bride price," however, are frequently misunderstood by outsiders. The bride does not become

a chattel of either her husband or his family. The arrangement is in fact designed to protect the woman and her consanguineal group.

Particularly in East Africa will this payment be made in cattle, and the number exchanged will be determined by the woman's worth on the marriage market. Far from being degrading, this transaction ensures her of good treatment by her husband and his family. The cattle "paid" are actually held in escrow by her kin group. If she is ill treated, and is deemed justified in leaving to return to her original household, according to native law the cattle fully revert to her kin group. If she is ruled at fault, the cattle must be returned to her husband's kin group.

Why this payment is made can be explained by the function it serves, that of socially cementing the marriage and the two contracting families. But it is doubtful that such a consideration looms large in the native mind. More to the point is the loss to a woman's family of a "herd girl" when she marries, and a consequent gain for a man's family. Preliterates rarely believe in letting the other fellow get something for nothing. Whatever conscious motives may be entertained, however, the fact remains that the bride price is admirably adapted to maintain cohesion within marriage and between families. Wife purchase is, in fact, the most common way to secure a wife, being practiced in many parts of Asia and the Americas as well as Africa.

It was long believed that capture and stealing were at one time commonly employed. This view is no longer accepted. Such practices are known to occur in some tribes, but never very often. Breakdown of relations between tribes, and perhaps incessant warfare, would result if they occurred often. Some time ago, Machiavelli observed that a ruler can get away with a great deal but that he had better leave alone the property and women of his subjects. Also, if one society were clearly master of another, successive preying of women would eliminate the weaker in short order and thus eliminate the source of mates.

Although one method of securing a mate usually predominates, there are some tribes in which several methods are concurrently used. Among the Crow Indians a wife might be secured by purchase, by inheritance of a brother's widow (a custom known as the levirate), by arranging to exchange a sister for another man's sister, or by capture from a neighboring tribe. There were even love alliances, although such are extremely rare among preliterate peoples.

Sex Freedom after Marriage

Although there are many exceptions, married men in preliterate societies are usually permitted to seek sexual adventure. The Netsilik Eskimo husband is expected to pursue any available adult female. The Comanche warrior gained prestige from his successful adulteries. A

man lends his wife to a male guest in some societies. Sex is still controlled, however, since the husband is the only recognized initiator. Were such an arrangement made without his knowledge and consent he might divorce his wife, kill either wife or lover or both, or demand restitution in economic goods.

The degree of sex freedom granted women after marriage is generally related to their economic and social importance. Woman's status is notably high among the garden agriculturists, where there is most frequently matrilocal residence and ownership of house and land by the women and their male kinsmen, and where considerable authority over a woman's children is exercised by her brothers. The family system of the Zuñi Indians fairly closely follows this generalized description. A Zuñi woman who becomes irked with her husband frequently invites the attentions of some other man around the campfire, a man who may become her husband if she decides to go through the easy process of divorcing her previous husband (2, pp. 67–68). Among the Trobrianders, whose system is very similar, women possess as much sexual freedom after marriage as their husbands, although, as we have already noted, adultery is discouraged.

However severe or lax specific restrictions may be, there is no known society which fails to control sexual behavior. Promiscuity is *encouraged* nowhere. Incest taboos are universal. While some peoples permit certain practices we prohibit, they will invariably prohibit other practices we permit. Long periods of continence are imposed in some societies upon the married of either or both sexes. Intercourse during menstruation and pregnancy is discouraged in all cultures, although these observances are probably more honored by preliterates than by ourselves. In some societies, a woman may not resume intercourse until her child is weaned. The Azande of Africa may not copulate prior to pottery making, nor are the Hopi Indians permitted to do so before salt expeditions or antelope hunting. A period of continence precedes both warfare and hunting in many societies (9, p. 31). Such taboos tend to be based upon magical notions that sexual indulgence reduces the male's skill and strength.

It nevertheless remains true that most preliterate societies permit much more sexual expression than does Western society, even today. This fact has led in some circles to a vulgarization of the "cultural-relativity" concept. The argument runs that only "puritanic superstition" and "narrow-minded reaction" prevent us from enjoying a similar sexual freedom. But cultural relativity does not mean that moral absolutes have no real existence. "Cultural relativity means, on the contrary, that the appropriateness of any positive or negative custom must be evalu-

ated with regard to how this habit fits with other group habits" (12, p. 41).

A culture preserves an integration between its social structure and its moral rules, so that the easy adoption of alien practices and attitudes is impossible. Illegitimacy, for example, is or is not a serious problem depending upon where it occurs. The certainty of biological paternity is of relatively little importance to those preliterates who subordinate the conjugal to the consanguineal unit. This is especially true where descent is reckoned through the mother's line. Where descent is reckoned through the father's line, a child is an economic asset to his kin group rather than to his wife's; he may even hesitate to marry a woman who has not already borne a child to him or to someone else. Finally, whether the kin group is matrilineal or patrilineal, an illegitimate child does not interfere with property inheritance, since property is held by the kin group and not by individuals.

A conjugal family system such as ours, on the other hand, does make illegitimacy a serious problem. Despite recent efforts to liberalize the laws of illegitimacy, in order to spare innocent children, in all states of the union—including Arizona and North Dakota which have "abolished" illegitimacy—children born of an adulterous union may not live in the father's legitimate household. Where residence, descent, and inheritance are provided within a small isolated conjugal unit, the presence of an illegitimate child clearly endangers that unit. The laws of all our states attach the illegitimate child to the mother, in part to ensure that the present or future legitimate patrilineal line of descent will not be invaded. "The minimum obligation upon the father is the duty of support, enforced only in a desultory and limited manner because otherwise it would defeat the principle of paternal nonattachment to the illegitimate child" (6, pp. 226–227). The extent to which an illegitimate birth endangers the family determines the amount of social condemnation and legal action required. In our society, illegitimacy resulting from simple fornication is less harshly dealt with than illegitimacy resulting from adultery (5).

Since illegitimacy has remained a more serious problem in our society than in most others, it has been more necessary to ensure that it does not occur by restricting sexual "freedom." Only recently have contraceptives come into common use, and thus only recently have the means been afforded to separate illicit sexuality from its ancient consequence—illegitimate offspring. In time it is quite possible that sex license will become, if not sanctioned, more tolerated, because it may cease to be regarded as a threat to the legitimate family. If such a shift in attitude should take place, the repercussions on the family as we know it would be virtually incalculable.

Duration and Dissolution of Marriage

Divorce is almost universally recognized, even though no society approves of it in principle. Everywhere the ideal marriage unites the mates for life. Confusion has arisen on this score, since some societies permit trial marriages. In such cases, however, temporary unions are recognized as a sort of steppingstone to the final union, which is expected to be permanent.

Among preliterates. Divorce is easily arranged among the Netsilik Eskimos, so long as there are no children. Netsilik women have been known to go through seven or eight trial marriages before finally accepting a permanent mate. The Yahgan women of Tierra del Fuego frequently had many husbands, one at a time, before settling down. A marriage was not considered permanent until children were born, to unite the parents in common care for them.

The pygmies of the Ituri forest rather casually arrange divorce. The woman usually makes the decision, and she simply packs up her personal belongings and moves out. She takes her children with her—an act unusual in a patrilineal-consanguineal system—and they will be considered members of her own kinship group until she remarries. The Ruwalla Bedawin desert nomads feel that a man should divorce his wife as soon as they become disagreeable to each other. A man may divorce his wife by merely telling her that he is doing so. Interestingly enough, a divorced woman may be remarried three times by her former husband.

Divorce is usually more easily obtained in simple than in advanced societies, but not always. Among some of the "lowest savages," such as the Veddahs of Ceylon, the Australian aborigines, and the Andamanese, the marriage tie is almost indissoluble. The bond may be dissolved by either or both parties on minor pretext among other peoples with a more complex social organization.

In advanced civilizations. Divorce has generally been more difficult to obtain in advanced civilizations than in preliterate societies, and for the same reason that illegitimacy is a more severe problem. Advanced civilizations have usually been accompanied by the conjugal family system. Those characteristics of the consanguinal system which make divorce a relatively simple matter are lacking. Particularly in the restricted conjugal family unit does divorce set both husband and wife adrift, for by contracting a marriage each has cut himself off from his original family. Allocation of the children is frequently contested, and whether they remain with father or with mother, they are deprived of either paternal or maternal care.

Nevertheless, in our own historical tradition there has been considerable variation in the handling of divorce. The early Christian Church reacted vehemently to the easy divorce and other immoralities of the

surrounding, and disintegrating, Roman world. The early Christians did not, however, attack the *right* of divorce. They followed the Roman law and viewed marriage as a civil contract subject to dissolution for adequate grounds. The early Church actually took little interest in such matters. Marriage remained a private contract between families, and there was no provision for a religious ceremony. A priestly benediction and bride mass were then added, to take place after the civil ceremony. Priestly authority and the sacramental view of marriage gradually increased until at the Council of Trent, in 1563, the Church asserted her monopoly of the marriage ceremony.

The movement to establish Church control was slow, owing to an inherent contradiction in Christian tradition. Early asceticism had led to disparagement of all sexual matters, even legitimate unions. Woman was looked upon as unclean by the Church fathers. St. Bernard called her "the organ of the devil." St. Jerome described a woman who remarried as a "sow seeking again her wallowing place." It was through woman that Adam had sinned and fallen from grace, so that all men came to be born in sin. Marriage was to be tolerated only as an alternative to greater evil. "It is better to marry than to burn," St. Paul had declared.

Had the majority of communicants followed the high ideal of avoiding all sexual experience, the birth rate would have dropped so far that it is doubtful the new Church could have survived for more than two or three generations. Such a cavalier attitude toward survival is almost unique in history. It stemmed in this instance from the belief in the imminent return of the Saviour, and therefore any such mundane matter as group survival was of small moment. The passage of the decades, and then centuries, placed the Second Coming ever farther in the future. The rising temporal power of the Church, as it took over the defaulted structure of the Empire, forced attention upon the institutional instruments of survival—marriage and the family. The ascetic principle was maintained by restricting it to specialized groups, the holy orders. For the mass of communicants, marriage and the family were sanctified. What was once inherently sinful became holy and worthy of Divine approval.

For both laity and clergy, during that early period when the clergy were permitted to marry, the Church had required monogamy. Having made marriage a sacrament, the Church took the further position that it was indissoluble. This view the Church has maintained down to the present day. From the very first, however, the Church permitted separation without divorce, and annulment, for certain causes.

Although Martin Luther declared marriage to be a civil contract, the theological view of marriage continued to be the rule among Protestants until well into the nineteenth century. Only after the French Revolution did the secular view of marriage as a civil contract begin to gain favor.

Only recently has this view become the prevailing one in Protestant countries. All Western peoples have by now made state authorization of marriage obligatory, so that divorce is the dissolution of a civil contract. Annulment of marriage, for a variety of reasons, is now provided in law.

Nevertheless, the sacramental character of marriage has been modified rather than abolished. Marriage is the only civil contract in our law which is not terminable by mutual consent of the contracting parties. The law declares priests and ministers to be civil officers for the performance of the marriage ceremony, yet the religious ideals and customs of previous centuries still prevail in the social regulation of the modern family. In custom and usage, and to some extent in law, this civil contract is considered *morally binding* to a degree exceeding that of any other form of contract.

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CHAPTER 18 *The Changing American Family*

> And the king was much moved, and went up to the chamber over the gate, and wept: and as he went, thus he said, O my son Absalom, my son, my son Absalom! would God I had died for thee, O Absalom, my son, my son!
>
> —OLD TESTAMENT

> The more things change, the more they remain the same.
>
> —FRENCH PROVERB

The phrase "modern American family" refers at best to an omnibus abstraction. There are wide variations within the modern family according to race, region, social class, and ethnic group. At the same time, every conceivable subtype of the modern American family has been subjected to the same disharmonic forces of recent social change. These forces have by no means been uniform in effect; they have been *sufficiently* uniform in effect, however, to justify the macroscopic description which follows.

THE RESTRICTED CONJUGAL FAMILY

Structure

By structure of the family is meant its formal patterning of rights, duties, and living arrangements and its defined statuses of age, sex, and kinship. The structure of the modern American family represents in some respects a continuation of the earlier extended conjugal family and in other respects its partial dissolution. The outstanding unique characteristic of the modern family is its well-nigh complete isolation of the conjugal unit from previous generations, from following generations, and from extended lines of kin (9). Husband, wife, and children, if any, make up the typical household. Ours is a restricted conjugal family form, and for that very reason its emotional ties are uniquely close. In most societies, the individual spreads his identification and loyalty thin over a large household and an extended line of kinsmen. In our society, the individual contracts his identification and loyalty within a small household; each other family member becomes of critical importance to him. In combination with other factors, this raises severe problems of adjustment.

The restricted conjugal family does not provide its members with a

definitive script of behavior. Questions of who owes whom what tend in large measure to be worked out on a bargaining basis. The hazards are many in any system which fosters close affection and identification, while at the same time the rules governing conduct remain vague. The chief reason for the vagueness of the rules is that traditional functions, which formerly integrated the activities of the various family members, are in process of being undermined by specialized outside agencies. No more dramatic social development has occurred in the last few decades than the inroads made upon the ages-old functions of the family by the outside world.

Functions

Economic. The family is no longer at the center; it is now at the periphery of economic activities. The members do not work together, as they did at one time in farm household or household industry. They are no longer held together by the division of labor. Today, the employed family member typically hires out as an *individual* to some vast and impersonal business or industrial bureaucracy. The interests and point of view of the family's productive members are thus to some extent individualized, to some extent withdrawn from the rest of the family, which serves to undermine the family's solidarity.

Nevertheless, the old pattern has been more changed than destroyed. Work outside the home may no longer be oriented about family production, but it is still oriented about the consuming habits of the family unit. While work within the home has been curtailed—owing to labor-saving devices of all kinds as well as to special goods and services such as laundries, cleaning and dyeing establishments, bakeries, and canned and frozen foods—the homemaker has at least gained the opportunity to extend other activities, such as experimentation with home furnishings, landscaping, improving the family diet, and participation in the leisure-time pursuits of small children.

The family's status remains principally dependent upon the occupational status of the husband and father. The male head's employment is the chief determinant of place of residence. Even when employed outside the home, the wife and mother tends to regard her home duties as of greater importance; family decisions are made with the husband's career taking precedence over her own. The male head retains primary economic responsibility toward the rest of his family, and thus retains some measure of authority.

Religious. In contrast with economic functions, religious functions have been much more drastically curtailed. Only in isolated rural districts do family prayers, reading of the Bible aloud, and grace before meals find a place. The family exhibits a secularism which has invaded

all our institutions. The Church, the outside agency dealing with the religious realm, has not so much supplanted as it has failed to support religious activities within the home.

Protection. Public opinion and the family feud once sufficed to prevent or avenge aggression against family members—an obligation for the most part now assumed by the police, the courts, and even the sovereign state. The obligations of caring for the sick, the aged, and the indigent have been increasingly assumed by hospitals, homes for the aged, public and private charities, and the state. Although protection as care has been increasingly assumed by public agencies, protection as care to some extent remains a family function, as protection from aggression does not.

Recreation. In the old family, recreation fostered a close solidarity. Reading aloud, visiting, family reunions, church socials, husking bees, barn raisings—these either brought together the entire family through three generations or included the family within a small group of lifelong neighbors and friends. Modern recreation, in contrast, is not designed for family-wide participation. Whether in the form of movies, sports events, plays, golf, tennis, bridge, or dinner parties, it is designed for couple or individual participation.

Today's restricted living space partly explains this shift, but more important is the specialization of recreation interests according to age groupings. People not only leave the home to seek commercialized recreation, but they tend to leave as single adults or married couples, as adolescents or children, rather than as a family unit. That such devices as the automobile and the radio have "brought families closer together" is at best a dubious claim. The family automobile typically serves parents or adolescent children at different times in their separate pursuits. Radio and television programs are carefully tailored according to sex interests (sports, "soap operas") or age interests (puppet shows, Tom Mix, swing music, and the Court of Human Relations).

Education. If education is the totality of experience, then the home remains an important educational agency. By modern convention, however, education is considered to be preparation for the adult career. Education in the latter sense is now taught by hired functionaries, not parents; it is acquired in state-supported schools, not the home.

The waning of the family's educative function is closely allied with new economic developments. The family at one time was equipped to train children because the economy was family centered; farm and home duties remained the lifelong career of the majority. The modern youth, on the other hand, more often than not enters a vocation different from that followed by any other member of his family. The modern home is not equipped to train children for their adult careers, because the special-

ized division of labor requires specialized training, which only the specialized agency of the school can supply.

Functions Lost or Modified?

Despite all the far-reaching changes which have overtaken the family, its traditional functions have been more modified than lost. If all of the functions mentioned above were in fact *totally* provided outside the home, it is doubtful that the family could survive. Moreover, certain *unique* functions remain solely within the family. It was pointed out in the last chapter that the primary universal function of the family is the creation of new members of society—their reproduction, maintenance, status ascription, and socialization. As always, reproduction remains, and maintenance and socialization are still carried on chiefly within the family.

Since our society places so much emphasis upon achieved status, of the fourfold primary function of the family, status ascription has been most weakened. Nevertheless, even in a mobile society, achieved status on the average does not deviate very much from that ascribed to the individual by his family of orientation, for two reasons. First, training for adult economic and social statuses must begin before any child has indicated what talent and capability he possesses, and thus children of superior ascribed status have an initial advantage in striving to achieve. Second, each family endeavors to start its own offspring in the competition for achieved status as far ahead of all others as possible, so that the family, in one sense, is the enemy of the American ideal of "equality of opportunity."

Nevertheless, granted that the family's functions have been more modified than lost, it remains true that some indeterminate limit of modification cannot be exceeded. Respect for institutional and group rules—upon which the perpetuation of any institution depends—is based upon the integration of the individual's life activities with those of the group. Beyond a certain point, the breakdown of that integration spells disaster for the given institution. It is too soon to toll the bell of doom for the family, however, precisely because that point has not been reached.

It may never be reached. That the drift of social change will continue uninterrupted in its present direction is by no means certain. Over the centuries, no permanent direction of change has ever been maintained. At some time in the future, the present forces of change may reach out in an unforeseen direction, permitting the family to regain its old strength and renew its old functions. Even if those forces undermining the family should continue in their accustomed path, the family is so deeply embedded in sentiment and personality structure itself that it can be expected to resist them for some incalculable time to come.

THE FORCES OF CHANGE

The phrase "changing American family" can almost be restated as the "changing status of the American woman." At least in our society, changes in women's status have been much more radical than those taking place in men's status, and the changes in women's status have been more closely associated with most of the other changes taking place throughout our family system.

Democratic Ideals

That all *men* are created equal was a belief asserted by our forefathers. American women had to wait until they had achieved some measure of economic independence before their demands for political privilege were achieved. Nevertheless, the early republic so fixed the ideals of political freedom and liberty in the American tradition that opposition to women's later demands for economic independence was thereby undermined. In the 1830's, De Tocqueville, the French commentator on American manners and customs, described the despotic power of father over children as breaking down "under the steady impact of democratic opinions and customs." In Horace Greeley's term, the ninteenth century later became the "stammering century," a time of intellectual and reform ferment, a seeking of salvation in deviant ways as Calvinism waned and newly produced wealth softened the rigors of the struggle for existence. The nineteenth century saw a quickening of the continuous American vision—the free and self-governing individual, as Lincoln described it.

If any movement can be said to have a determinable point of origin, the feminist movement in the United States is a hundred years old. The first Women's Rights Convention was held at Seneca Falls, New York, in 1848. Feminism demanded equalitarian rights for a minority long deprived of political franchise and control of property. Subsidiary demands were made for equal education, access to jobs without discrimination, and a single moral and marital standard (8).

It was a cause directed *against* men, who were accused of having botched the job of governing and maintaining peace and justice. The heat of battle, and the opposition of Victorian society, made the feminists disregard the biological and social differences between the sexes. They were in no mood to recognize that liberty and equality, if literally applied, would invite chaos. The modern women's movement has tempered these earlier demands with the acknowledgment that "equality" for women would mean loss of privilege, a matter discussed in the next chapter.

Industrialism

So far as any one factor can legitimately be conceived as operating by itself, possibly the most far-reaching changes which overtook the tradi-

tional family stemmed from the industrial revolution. The factory system, which hired individuals out of the family, was probably the basic event of the modern era. It affected woman's status in two ways. First, commercial goods and services sold to the housewife undermined her traditional tasks. Second, increasing opportunity for independent employment outside the home diversified her range of choices. Both these developments reduced the economic value of the woman in the home.

Women were compelled or induced to seek work in factory, shop, restaurant, store, office, and school. The number of women fifteen years of age and over employed in gainful occupations in this country increased



FIG. 32. The working woman.

from approximately 3.7 million in 1890 to 18.5 million in August, 1945. From this peak, only a slight recession has recently occurred; in January, 1951, women comprised 29.9 per cent of the *total* working force, as compared with 30 per cent in 1945 (12). It is quite probable that the proportion of women in the total working force will stabilize at around one-third.

Married women made up over one-third of the *female* working force in 1940, but there were more married than single women working in April, 1948. At the later time, of 17.2 million women in the labor force, 48.3 per cent were married and 34.6 per cent were single (the remainder divorced or widowed), as compared with the 13.84 million in 1940, of whom 36.4 per cent were married and 48.5 per cent single (11). The fact should be kept in mind, however, that although the majority of women who work are married, the majority of married women do not work. Only 22 per cent of all married women were working in 1947, as compared with 15 per cent in 1940. In other words, not only do the majority of women continue to marry—the trend, in fact, has been steadily upward since 1890—but of those who marry, the majority continue to make the home their sole career.

The career woman, certainly, remains in the minority. The majority of married women who work do so because of economic necessity. In

memberships of various groups encourage the development of highly particular group values. Thus a lack of uniformity and of generalized conformity tends to prevail in urban social relations.

The opportunity for self-expression, as it has come to be called, is most available in the metropolitan center. Here religious orthodoxy and personal-social restraint crumble. The force of small-town gossip, which keeps many in line who otherwise might fly off on an individualized tangent, is absent. In a relative, almost literal, sense the individual is freed from control of his reputation by relatives, friends, and neighbors.

It is here that families are smallest and home ties weakest. The family cottage gives way to the apartment house and apartment hotel. The home—as the place where the interests and activities of husband, wife, and children center—is well-nigh dissolved, if it does not disappear altogether. Our traditional family, to which we pay allegiance in song, legend, and sentimental reminiscence, is that of the farm and the village. There are those who insist that we are faced with a "cultural lag," that our "anachronistic" traditional family must "catch up" with a host of urban trends. But it is virtually inconceivable what this "adjustment" could be and retain anything with which we associate the family. Any special pleading, however, in either the "liberal" or the "conservative" direction, is not likely to affect the future course of the family in any appreciable degree.

Mobility

Whatever else a stable family system may require, it is psychologically dependent upon a continuity of experience within the life span of the individual and between him and preceding and following generations. Horizontal mobility is movement in space or occupational change without a shift in social status. Vertical mobility is movement up or down the social-class ladder. Either form of mobility is inimical to continuity of life experience. Where both forms flourish, extreme individualism and idiosyncratic behavior are to be found.

Horizontal. Between 1920 and 1934, more than 46 million Americans moved from country to city or from city to country. During World War II, it has been estimated, 30 million Americans changed residence. Restless moving on is a pioneer tradition, but in the present century the accelerating pace of technological invention and the major crises of depression and war have made us an uprooted people rather than a people seeking a new place to put down old roots.

If horizontal mobility affects only one member of a family, he is removed from the circle of identification, loyalty, and control. If his mobility is continuous, he becomes a social and spiritual nomad, living at the surface, making brief contact with a succession of strangers. He becomes emotionally maladjusted, or he develops habits of self-dependence and

self-indulgence which ill fit him for assuming or resuming family duties.

If an entire family is mobile, it loses its sense of community. Cut off from the friendship, advice, and support of other families, it tends to function in a social vacuum. It is lost to such stabilizing influences as church membership, organizational affiliations, and a host of services, one of which is a family doctor–patient relationship. Children in a mobile family must make new acquaintances in new schools and tend, in consequence, to a nervous discontent or habits of withdrawal and self-sufficiency. Neither constitutes the best preparation for later marriage.

Vertical. Movement up or down the class ladder is even more disruptive. Vertical mobility drives a wedge between the individual and his family. The successful individual moves *beyond* his family of orientation. Success not only brings a higher salary and occupational status; success also requires living in a "better" neighborhood, joining a "better" church, and meeting "better" people.

The folk saying, "he travels fastest who travels alone," takes on a special significance. Whether he wills it or not, the upwardly mobile person is cut off from much of his past and is insecurely attached to his present. Vertical mobility is a source of much guilt feeling. The family of orientation which insists that its children "succeed" often fails to be reconciled to a limited sharing in the fruits of that success, with the consequence that successful children are often made to feel that in some mysterious way they have betrayed their parents and siblings. As for the family of procreation, vertical mobility frequently spreads divisiveness between husband and wife and fosters an ambivalence on the part of both toward their children, a point elaborated upon below.

To the extent that social status is determined by personal achievement rather than by ascription at birth, the family structure is weakened. In fact, in a completely open class system, where every status was thrown open to competition, the family could hardly survive.

THE MODERN FAMILY: DESIGN FOR MATURE LIVING

The home of the changing family is small. It is also designed for the mature, not for those at either end of the age scale. Despite the vocal interest taken in the young child today—leading some child-guidance authorities to speak confidently of "the age of the child-centered home"—he does not have the secure and integral place in the family that once was his. The old, today, have scarcely any place at all.

Size of Family

Ours is the smallest family unit in all history, and it constantly diminishes. When the first federal census was taken, in 1790, the average American family contained 5.7 persons; in 1900, 4.7; in 1940, 3.8; and in 1950,

3.6. Further, the proportion of marriages which fail to become families (no progeny born to the union) is increasing. In 1790, the proportion of "families" containing only two persons was less than one-tenth; in 1940, over one-fourth; and in 1950, almost one-third (2, p. 3). At the other extreme, the proportion of households containing six or more people has declined steadily, from over half in 1790 to one-tenth in 1950.

The decline in family size has not, of course, been uniform. In 1950, the average size of urban families was 3.4 persons; rural-nonfarm families, 3.7; and farm families, 4.° In terms of regional comparison, families are largest in the Southeast; in terms of social-class comparison, families tend to be larger as socioeconomic status declines. Although Catholic families



FIG. 33. Fewer people gather about the table.

are currently larger than Protestant, on the average, the higher Catholic birth rate is dropping faster than the lower Protestant birth rate. In the next few decades, very likely, this religious disparity will be almost if not completely eliminated.

Contraception. In the United States, it has been estimated, more than $250 million a year is realized through the manufacture and sale of contraceptive devices. They are the unquestionable *means* by which family size is being reduced. But they are not the real "cause." Fairly reliable birth-control devices and methods have been known throughout Western history. What is new is a widespread motivation to use them, a new emphasis upon success, and an unprecedented standard of living that is now available to the masses provided they limit the number of their children.

Children: declining importance and increasing expense. Children now have less social importance than formerly, and they have become an economic liability rather than an asset. A child at one time served well three predominant interests of his parents. While quite young he worked on the farm, or in the factory during the earlier days of the industrial revolution, and thus added to family income. He provided his parents with economic security during their old age. Finally, he preserved the family name into the future, a form of this-worldly immortality in a society where

° A "family," in the present context, "is defined as a group of two or more persons related to each other and living together; all such persons living together are regarded as one family" (2, p. 2).

the family was much less separated from the individual ego than it is now.

Children are now a severe economic liability. Basing their estimate on a family income of $2,500 during the deflationary period of the depression, Dublin and Lotka figured that parents spent between $9,180 and $10,485 in raising a child through the age of eighteen, *before* he went to college (4). Our present attitudes of social protection deny parents economic benefit from their children. Also, our child-labor laws in part reflect the economy's inability to absorb into its labor force succeeding generations of adolescents in their late teens.

But there are two sides to the shield. Birth control, the immediate means of reducing family size, has aided the release of more married women into the labor force. For the majority of married women who remain in the home, planned parenthood has afforded one means for improving the child's physical care and for elevating artistic and aesthetic standards in the family and community.

Child Rearing

Social life in modern America tends toward *formal* integration and toward equalization by the state of the sharing of goods and services among all social classes. Many traditional parental responsibilities are now assumed by various agencies, such as the nursery school, kindergarten, and district nurse, and the quality of child care is more evenly assured through such programs as public health, public recreation, and free midday lunches in the schools.

Clear advances have been made in physical welfare and formal education. No such obvious gains have been made in the psychological and informal-educational fields. At one time, particularly in the large rural household, children learned early the give and take of mutual adjustment. While parents were then more authoritarian and much less emotionally "close" to their children, they subjected them to a consistent regimen of expectation and discipline which stood them in good stead for the assumption of later responsibilities. Children early became members of a functioning economic unit, were progressively inducted into a round of activities and duties which made relatively easy the transitions from child to adolescent, from adolescent to adult.

The family's income is now independent of *collective* family behavior, a serious handicap in any effort to train children for the progressive assumption of adult roles. The activities and interests of today's child, once he joins a play group, tend to isolation from the adult world. Adult recreation does not include the child to the extent that it once did. At adolescence the child now gives his allegiance to the isolated "youth culture."

Child psychologists insist that however good or bad any child-training practice may be in itself, consistency of practice within one generation, and between generations, is highly desirable. But in a period of rapid

dren need love, but the all-enveloping hot-house atmosphere described as normal in the women's magazines is something alien to most societies, and certainly something absent from the life experience of previous generations in our own society.

In some circles, the use of physical punishment has come to be regarded as barbaric. What has steadily supplanted it is the threat to withdraw love from a child who persists in getting into trouble. Mamma won't like you if you don't eat your spinach, or stop dribbling your milk, or get down from that davenport. This kind of threat is aimed at a child whose personality has been absorbed by his parents, particularly by his mother, and who has been trained to need her approval and affection desperately. And to the extent that his parents feel ambivalent toward him, for all their sacrifices, will they feel morally justified in so threatening him.

He learns to stabilize his relations with others on a basis of emotional dependence, propitiation, and obedience. But, particularly in the case of the male child, he soon discovers that in his play-group—which may be denied him until he has reached school age—he is made to feel a shame and inadequacy in using familiar techniques.

He also learns that he is involved in competition with others, as an individual with his contemporaries, and as a representative of his family with other families. His parents measure his arithmetic grades against those of the boy across the street. He may take piano lessons with the day in mind when Mrs. Smythe's pupils will exhibit their talents before the parents of the community. His parents prod him along the path of achievement because everything that is theirs is used in the struggle to improve the family's standing.

Effective competition, however, demands a certain degree of independence, firmness of purpose, perhaps even aggressiveness. These traits his parents now demand he show, not with them, but outside the home. A conflict tends to arise between his initial adjustment of love and submission, and his later roles of independent action and goals of personal achievement. In this conflict between love and success there is no real choice, however, for he must be successful outside the home in order to secure "love" within it. Unquestionably, much of the emotional insecurity and self-defeating striving in the modern adult world can be traced to this combination of imperious and contradictory pressures.

The father, as his son's mediator of the outside male world, is the one who tends to make an early demand for behavior outside the home which is inconsistent with the child's earlier training. This may, incidentally, be one source of the so-called Oedipus complex (love for the mother and hatred for the father). Childhood for the modern middle-class boy presents many more emotional hazards, on the average, than it does for the girl. Love, obedience, and propitiation are more consistent with what is expected of the girl in later childhood and adolescence. The conflict between love and success is typically delayed for the girl until early maturity.

The above description represents a combination of social forces and psychological pressures to which *in some degree* a growing proportion of modern families are subjected. It is not meant to represent concrete reality

for all—not even for all middle-class children and their parents. There are two qualifications to be noted. First, owing to variations in parental insight and wisdom, in ambivalence toward their children, and in making success the supreme value, there are likewise variations in childhood experience. Second, since ours is a period of rapid social change, it is unlikely that the pressures described will indefinitely continue to operate in exactly the same way and with the same intensity.

While the types of social conditioning which are conducive to personality conflict can be legitimately described in abstraction, it must not be assumed that any such description will totally explain any concrete individual case of personality conflict. A great deal of valuable research, as yet too new to be assessed accurately, has opened the question whether hereditary and physiological factors play an important part. The following statement appears to be supported by present knowledge: social conditioning determines the *rate* of personality conflict, or its corollary, personality stability; on the other hand, some *individuals* develop severe conflicts under less environmental pressure than do others, and other individuals are apparently capable of developing fairly stable personalities under conditions of great stress.

The Place of the Aged

The aged, today, are not usually considered an intrinsic part of the family. An investigation of modern textbooks on the family showed the family concept to be limited to marriage and the rearing of children, limited to the life cycle from courtship to the time that children leave home (1). In many such books the position is taken that the family should not be burdened with responsibility for the aged.

In the traditional family, old age was no social problem. The aged *gradually* relinquished activity and control in the home or on the farm. Food and space were abundant, and in a large household containing many people the aged could continue, until bedridden, to perform some useful activity. Community and religious sanctions were so uncompromising that any alternative to aged parents living with their married children was unthinkable.

But the modern job world is neither rural nor agricultural. The aged can no longer continue to be productive—a drive which is inherent in the Protestant ethic—with only a gradual decrease in work activity. In some lines of endeavor men are now considered old at forty, and they are haunted by the constant fear of being discarded. The dependency of the aged increases as industry shortens the years of economic productivity and medical science prolongs the life span. Further, the value complex has so shifted that young people no longer feel an unequivocal sense of obligation toward aging parents (5). Government agencies are

expanding their security programs on the assumption that a growing number of persons will be unwilling to assume such responsibility. Meanwhile, the number entering homes for the aged mounts year by year.

This value change results in part from new pressures placed upon adult children. No longer resident on the family holding, they have typically moved to a city far from the parental home. They live in a small apartment, where space is restricted and where there is no productive work their parents can do. The costs of maintenance are paid with money, not by direct production on the home site, and the costs are heavy. Recreational activities no longer unite a family but have become highly specialized according to narrow age groupings.

Married children are caught between their own self-interests and a set of obligations stemming from a fading tradition. Their parents are made to feel unwanted if they are placed in a home for the aged; if a common home is established, the two generations trample upon one another's toes psychologically. The old continue to regard their grown children as wards and subordinates. Their children, in turn, expect the old people to accept a reversal of roles, and to become *their* subordinates —in a household so small that old and young can hardly secure momentary privacy.

The percentage of people sixty-five years of age and older in the United States in 1900 was 4.1; in 1930, 5.4; and in 1950, 8.2. By projecting present population trends, it has been estimated that there will be 26 million by 1980. A serious problem looms on the horizon, and not merely the matter of physical maintenance. Several studies have indicated that aged parents have tended to absorb the same new values as their children. They wish to be independent of their children, not to "be a burden." But two-thirds of all persons over sixty-five are at present unable to support themselves, the majority receiving some form of state or private-agency aid. Such movements as the Townsend Plan will bear watching. As the aged increase in number, as the older pattern of familial responsibility continues to wane, the aged will undoubtedly turn more and more to political activity in order to reclaim a birthright they feel is presently denied them.

DIVERSITY AND THE GENERAL PATTERN

It was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter that there are variations within the "modern American family" according to race, region, social class, and ethnic group. Variations of this kind persist, and they are important. Nevertheless, with the passage of time in the modern era such variations tend to diminish and to approach the "middle-class" pattern.

Example of a Polish Village

In a comparison of sex and family behavior in a Polish industrial village in the United States with that of the "middle-class" pattern, several interesting contrasts were obtained. In the Polish peasant tradition, mutual respect for status rather than "love" governs family relationships. Polish parents in the village do not attempt to "get close" to their children, but neither are they able to command the respect that parents receive in the home country. In the village, the typically large band of brothers and sisters organize to outwit the heavy-handed physical authority wielded by their parents. Parents lose control of their children in an American village where parish and community no longer support parental authority, as once they did in Poland, and where children absorb a garbled version outside the home of a culture which remains an almost alien experience to their immigrant parents. By middle-class standards, the approach of these children to their families and associates is direct, crude, and stripped of sensibility.

The local Polish-American boy does not possess the romantic concept of love; for the girl, romance is a fantasy of movies and fiction that is untransferred to the world of reality. Physical exploitation is widespread, and the tone of courtship and marital relations lacks the ecstatic "oneness" which typically precipitates middle-class marriage. Nevertheless, given certain conditions, the absence of such a feeling state ensures institutional stability. Divorce and desertion are extremely rare. Before and after marriage, attacks and unreflective self-assertions, which would elicit a "hurt response" and the necessity for a redefinition of the situation in a middle-class relationship, do not bring significant changes locally. Precisely because the pair are not "one," each can endure insults, vulgarities, and aggressions on the part of the other.

Some gains are made. There is no ceaseless seeking out of the other's motivation, no rigid set of personal expectations to which the other must conform, with the feeling of betrayal if the other does not conform. Conflict is concrete, specific, limited in time and area of interaction, and while violent, it rarely cumulates. It typically subsides, through sheer lack of further momentum, with no new definition of the situation. The local married couple—the whole family, for that matter—are spared the price that middle-class people must pay for their more idealized relationships: a quivering sensitivity, a psychic defenselessness against real or supposed attacks on the ego by those who are loved (6).

Nevertheless, the family pattern is changing. The second-generation family of procreation is much smaller than that of the first generation. New England Poles succeed in raising their living standards rapidly in the second and third generations. At first it is only the exterior manifestations of status which motivate them, such as possession of an auto-

mobile, home ownership, and a bank account. Then appears the desire to send children to college. Then, more gradually, are absorbed the middle-class standards of respectability, impulse restriction, and respect for the wishes of others. The social personality of third-generation Polish children is, on the average, much less distinguishable from that of unhyphenated native-American middle-class youngsters than was that of their parents.

PSYCHOLOGICAL SECURITY IN THE FAMILY

Urbanism, industrialism, mobility, and the decline of religious orthodoxy were the factors discussed above as undermining the traditional family. These same factors have led to a loneliness and insecurity that have, paradoxically, heightened rather than diminished the attractiveness of marriage and the family for most Americans. Proportionally, more Americans are married than the citizens of any other country in the world.

Habit

The organism is born into a group, and the person remains a member of various groups throughout his life. Only through others can he become and remain a person. Something more is required—the formation of an interlocking series of habits with others. By "emotional security" is meant in large measure the reduction of the unknown, the unexpected, and the disruptive to a minimum; it is therefore largely upon habit that emotional security is founded.

Conditioned to family experience as children, the majority of adults are left with a sense of personal incompletion if they fail to establish another home at a later time. The give-and-take of marriage and family life affords a stability which can be found nowhere else, at least for this majority.

Within the home, each does certain things and performs certain tasks in the same way and at the same time every day. To these recurrent events, other members of the household adjust their life rhythms. Every morning Mother calls the children many times to get them ready for school, and the accustomed argument over who gets into the bathroom first ensues. Father walks the dog after supper while Mother does the dishes. The family unit attunes its ear to the clatter of Father's tending the furnace at ten o'clock every night. The interplay of family jokes becomes habitized, so that all can share and appreciate a special and unique communication. Even Sister's incessant preening and Junior's undiscouraged attempts to secure the family automobile five nights out of seven can serve to build a sense of permanence. The good-night kiss may lack

the fire of youthful romance, but it too proves that appropriate things have their established place.

The sudden dissolution of mutually adjusted habits drives many of the recently divorced to distraction, even though they "knew" they could not possibly live with this other person another day (10). Educated persons, engrossed in the world of ideas, often overlook the extent to which their lives are constructed of familiar sights, places, persons, even noises, smells, and physical objects. Aldous Huxley once said that while it never occurs in literature, in life the loss of an old cigarette case can cause more anguish than the absence of a new mistress. He may have been correct.

Intimacy

Habit and intimacy are almost synonymous. The desire for intimacy is the desire to share the innermost secret places of the self with another whose appreciation and support can be depended upon. Until two people have adjusted their mutual habits in a regulated life together, it is questionable that they can "know" each other as completely as this, that their motivations, dreams, and aspirations can be understood by each other.

The young in America have a fierce hunger for an intimate relationship, as defined. Our cities are crowded with young people who feel that no one cares and no one understands. Most other institutional relationships tend more and more to impersonality, to a treatment of the person as a statistic or a replaceable part. For many, marriage remains a haven from this experience.

The Aging Organism

The modern emphasis upon individualistic values—frequent change of residence, swift automobiles, speedy romance, hectic amusement, and the chasing after success—is peculiarly fitted to the young. All of the advantages many moderns have come to believe that the single life has over marriage and the family—freedom in sexual adventure; more opportunity for achievement and success, at least for men; release from responsibility toward others; and the opportunity to "go one's own way" —in time pall, to be replaced by a querulous combination of fear and boredom.

To paraphrase the Lynds, much of modern American life is lived *at* the future. But as the organism ages, less and less of that future remains. The aging organism must conserve energy rather than expend it recklessly. Even in those cases where the sloughing off of tradition appears easy and safe, such as urbanites who are successful and independently wealthy, the life of freedom and adventure disintegrates along with the tissues. Common to members of both sexes in middle age is a sense of

frustration, of having failed to realize their youthful dreams, of uncertainty about what the lost years might have meant. If ever a person needs the comfort of another, or others, by his side, it is when he faces the stark terror of growing old and ceasing to be.

However disrupted the modern family may have become, the vast majority marry and produce children. They also remain married and raise those children to adulthood. The majority find an indispensable companionship in mutual responsibility, habit, and sharing their life with others.

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CHAPTER 19 *Courtship and Marriage in America*

M. Wilt thou have this Woman to thy wedded wife, to live together after God's ordinance in the holy estate of Matrimony? Wilt thou love her, comfort her, honour, and keep her in sickness and in health; and, forsaking all others, keep thee only unto her, so long as ye both shall live?

The Man shall answer,
I will.

Then shall the Minister say unto the Woman,
N. Wilt thou have this Man to thy wedded husband, to live together after God's ordinance in the holy estate of Matrimony? Wilt thou obey him, and serve him, love, honour, and keep him in sickness and in health; and, forsaking all others, keep thee only unto him, so long as ye both shall live?

The Woman shall answer,
I will.

—FROM THE FORM OF SOLEMNIZATION OF MATRIMONY, ACCORDING TO THE USES OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH

COURTSHIP

The traditional formal rules governing courtship have broken down. No longer do a young couple have, as they did in our traditional family, secure reference points for orienting themselves—home, neighborhood, and church—all closely integrated in such a way as to demand, at least, feminine virtue and male restraint. At one time, a young man's attendance at Wednesday-night prayer meeting with the same young woman for two consecutive weeks meant something. If any lingering doubt remained in the young man's mind, some male relative of the girl's was quite likely to remind him in no uncertain terms that this was the case.

There was little opportunity for exploitation in a milieu in which a man lived out his entire life, where every step of courtship involvement was carefully blueprinted in advance, and where adults not only worried about the recreational activities of the young but also participated in them. Even in our larger cities, prior to World War I, a semblance of the formal mores of courtship was retained, particularly in middle-class circles. The neighborhood had not disappeared, mobility was not so intense, larger housing units permitted a young woman to entertain a

young man in her home, and adults were still enforcing relatively strict moral standards.

This era has also passed. Young people today, cut off from home and community ties, meet strangers of the opposite sex on large college campuses and in our large cities. Anonymity, horizontal and vertical mobility, the partial dissolution of old primary groups—by such means are young people thrown together to work out individualized definitions of the situation which they face. The automobile and the prohibition era and its aftermath have afforded increased opportunities for exploitation and for thrill seeking, the partial satisfaction of sexual desires freed of moral and social responsibility.

The Rating-dating Complex

In the past few decades, a new pattern of man-woman behavior has appeared among the young unmarried, the "rating-dating complex" (28, pp. 230–235). Rating-dating is not true courtship, for it is not understood to be a prelude to marriage. In Waller's terminology, it is "aim-inhibited courtship." It is one manifestation of a new philosophy of hedonism. It is the long period of premarital dalliance, irresponsibility, and experimentation heralded in much of our literature and most of our movies.

The rating-dating complex includes romantic-love idealization, but the means and ends involved are chiefly competitive. In the virtually isolated "youth culture," adolescents rate one another according to such criteria as physical appearance, dancing ability, possession of or access to an automobile, popularity with the opposite sex, and clique memberships. Within each town or on each campus, both sexes have a more or less precise knowledge of just where each person falls on this rating scale. Invitations are extended or accepted with a clear notion of whether or not the particular date will lower or enhance prestige.

The rating-dating complex, which is uncontrolled by the adult world, tends to mutual ignorance of the partners' true motives, and promotes exploitation and the fear of exploitation. The emphasis upon rating and competitive success spreads feelings of insecurity and inferiority. A study of 1,501 high-school children living in Michigan and Georgia revealed that over one-fourth of the boys and one-third of the girls felt that they were failures in dating. Almost one-third of both sexes stated that they were afraid (30).

The rating-dating complex operates to sort out casual partners, but the history of any given couple may transcend the limited objectives of the game. Particularly in early maturity, emotional involvement may start them on the road to true courtship. In some cases, the way to courtship is cleared soon after dating begins. The young today do not give prestige dating, with the exploitation and personality manipulation that

it implies, their complete allegiance. Romantic love remains the supreme ideal in a total view of the opposite sex, and such involvement in most cases ultimately breaks down calculating attitudes. More important, there is one value development in modern courtship which constantly resists and checks exploitative attitudes and behavior—what Émile Durkheim called the "cult of personality."

The Cult of Personality

The moral rules which once governed personal relationships more completely than they now do have in modern society partly been supplanted by respect for, and deference to, the individual personalities of associates. The cult of personality, which builds and requires a subtle awareness of the point of view and the wishes of others, is early absorbed by the middle-class child in his family. He must at least overtly defer to the individual differences in others in order to gain personal ends, including the regard of those who accept this value. The sanction applied is the reputation for being a boor. The cult serves as a reference point in personal relations, as a guide in an ever widening undefined social area.

The cult of personality is more than a mere technique for social adjustment. Upon thorough internalization, it can afford many personal satisfactions. What is a "perfect understanding" between lovers or married people? It is a mutual willingness to try to become what each infers the other would like him to be, within the outside limits of what each must remain. By no means an impulsive process, this is a slow realization of how conformity to the inferred means of delighting the other may be made an integral part of the personality.

Limitations. The cult is moralistic, but not in the traditional sense. Its morality is respect for the other person's autonomy, not respect for a set of impersonal rules. Thus, so long as both partners have an equally exact knowledge of the factors operating in the situation, traditional immorality does not violate the new morality. The new morality is shown in a kind of criticism that is frequently heard today: "Why didn't he pick on somebody who knew the score, instead of an innocent kid like that." Such criticism implies that fornication is "all right" provided both parties have a thorough understanding that the relationship is limited to mutual and momentary gratification.

Exploitation and fraud in some measure are controlled by the cult of personality. Nevertheless, the cult is inferior to impersonal rules as a means of social control. It can never be clearly structured or strongly sanctioned; it enforces respect for *unique* relationships, but these can be uniquely defined and redefined.

Modern courtship practices have created particular liabilities for women. The cult of personality, in most male circles, is understood to be in abeyance where lower-class women are concerned (see 12, p. 232, for

example). And it remains literally true that most middle-class young men do not know what they want from a woman *of their own class*—a source of immediate sex gratification or an ideal of pure womanhood with whom they may someday settle down in a relationship combining the new romantic love and the old traditionalism. Imperious desire, combined with the need to delay marriage in order to protect his career prospects, often leads the middle-class male to violate the cult of personality, to indicate vaguely that marriage *might* ensue after a sex relationship is agreed upon.*

Exploitation in courtship is hiding a motive from the partner which, were he to learn what it is, would lead him to break off the relationship. A younger woman may exploit an older man for economic gain, a woman may exploit a man in her own age grouping for entertainment and prestige purposes, but no exploitation of hers equals in disruptive power that of the male who swears love with the unexpressed purpose of gratification without responsibility. His persuasions are supported not only by the chaos of isolated youth-grouping relationships but also by new "advanced" philosophies of "living your own life," "standing above petty prejudice and outmoded morality," and a vulgar neo-Freudianism which holds "inhibitions" to be "unhealthy." Even today, however, in most circles a woman lessens her value on the marriage market by becoming "emancipated." The cult of personality only too often proves a thin reed in this storm of clashing purposes.

MARRIAGE

There are two factors which are most closely associated with the changing character of American marriage—and, indeed, with the rising divorce rate. First, whereas women at one time had only one role *in* the home, they now have a number of roles *in* and *out of* the home. Second, modern marriage has increasingly come to be based upon romantic love.

Home versus Career: New Roles for Women †

Marriage still comes first. The modern woman has the opportunity to work outside of the home, and she thus has the opportunity to gain

* The median age at marriage has declined since 1890: "the estimated median age at first marriage for men who had ever been married at the time of the 1890 census was 26.1 years; it dropped to . . . 22.7 years for 1949" (8, p. 517). What is obscured in the above comparison is the probability that low-income and lower-class males have been responsible for the drop in median age at first marriage for *all* males. As of 1947, for example, of husbands married less than five years, "those with less than $2,000 income were about 23 years old at first marriage, whereas those with $2,000 to $2,999 were about 24, those with $3,000 to $4,999 were about 26, and those with $5,000 or more were about 30 years old at first marriage" (8, p. 527). Early marriage penalizes the American male's career prospects.

† Much of what follows has been adapted from 9.

an unprecedented independence. On the other hand, being as yet so close to this new development, it is possible that we have tended to exaggerate its revolutionary significance. The majority of women marry and remain for most of their lives within the home. Moreover, in the value system of most women, marriage and family still come first. Single women, for the most part, do not prepare seriously for a career. One typical investigation showed that an entering class of freshmen in a women's college expressed little feeling for any job as a career; 90 per cent of them hoped to marry within five to ten years after graduation (29).

Nor does the modern woman possess an unequivocal notion of how independent she wishes to be once she does marry. Fully three-fourths of a "homogeneous" sample of 147 middle-class girls endorsed inconsistent ideas about what they wanted from their future husbands. On the one hand, they would require "equality" in education, outside work, jurisdiction over family property, and community activities. On the other hand, they favored traditional subordination as wife and mother and were willing to grant economic responsibility to their future husbands (25).

The conflict between love and success, which was described in the previous chapter as characteristic in the experience of the middle-class boy, is in lesser degree characteristic in the experience of the middle-class young woman. The latter is often subjected to contrary expectations on the part of family and friends. In early maturity she is supposed to acquire firmness of purpose and high standards of personal achievement, while at the same time she may be advised to continue to be "soft and feminine." Certain "old-fashioned" traits are still appropriate if she marries and remains in the home; on the other hand, for one reason or another she may not marry, and in that case newer traits of efficiency and competitive zeal are appropriate for work outside the home.

A basic contradiction in orientation was discovered within personal documents secured from 153 women college seniors. Their associates had enjoined them to adopt "proper" feminine attitudes toward love, family, and men and had warned them that men "don't like intellectual [*i.e.*, intellectually *superior*] women." At the same time, parents and school authorities encouraged them to secure high grades and to prepare for a career. The investigator felt that those girls who followed the middle of the road made the best adjustment possible at that time (14).

New roles in the home. Whatever the ambivalence between love and success, between marriage and career, most women hope for and achieve marriage as their supreme goal; most married women do not work outside of the home. At the same time, within the home there are now available three roles, where formerly there was only one. The *wife and*

tion, has not been altogether denied by sexual revolution. That sex is a dubious means of organizing political interest was clearly shown in the recent disavowal of the National Woman's party, the direct descendant of the nineteenth-century feminist movement. The National Woman's party has, for the most part, come to represent wealthy, educated women in middle age who are fighting the battle of a century ago—for literal equality with men. Each year, since 1923, this party has introduced into Congress a Constitutional amendment, H.R. 49, designed to enforce equality of *all* rights, regardless of sex, including equal property rights and the right to administer estates.

Organizations made up of working and middle-class women have consistently opposed H.R. 49. It was pointed out at the 1948 hearings on the bill that women cannot work so long or under such arduous conditions as men. Particular needs were outlined, such as alimony in case of divorce, aid in the care of minor children for widows and divorcees, and protection against sex crimes. What does "equality" mean in the case of military service? Since only one sex requires special maternity-leave provisions in labor contracts, should both sexes be "equally" deprived of seniority rights when they stay away from the factory to have a baby?

A CIO representative pleaded that women who have the double burden of earning a living and providing for a home and children would find such equality the most vicious discrimination. As an alternative to H.R. 49, H.R. 2007 was submitted, the key provision of which stated that there shall be no distinctions on the basis of sex in national policy "except such as are reasonably justified by differences in physical structure, biological, or *social* function" (11, italics added). Although H.R. 49 has been consistently endorsed by both major parties, it has remained perpetually in committee. If it is ever passed it will undoubtedly be greatly modified along the lines of H.R. 2007.

Women at work. As in the political realm, so in the economic realm, has tradition been more modified than changed. Most women have worked, are now working, or will work in some paid position at some time during their lives. But at any one time the majority of women do not work, and those who do work do so *discontinuously* as a rule. Most, especially urban, women work after leaving school and prior to marriage. With marriage, or soon after, most of these in turn leave the job market. After the birth of their first child, very few remain in gainful employment. Some never work again; others do, after long or short periods of time. Those who are still fairly young when divorced or widowed tend to return to the job market.

Of those who work, the majority continue to be employed in "women's work," or in new fields which pay little and do not confer much prestige. Three-fourths of all working women in 1940 were concentrated in only

23 occupations, in most of which they comprised a clear majority of the total employed. Almost half of the employed women worked in service industries, such as domestic service, laundries, hotels, and beauty shops (the number of "cosmeticians" doubled between 1930 and 1940). One-fifth were in manufacturing industries. Almost one-fifth were in clerical and kindred occupations—typists, stenographers, and clerks. A much smaller proportion were employed in professional-service fields such as nursing, teaching, library work, and social work. Women, however, practically preempt these latter fields: women comprised over 90 per cent of all librarians in 1940, and 75.7 per cent of all teachers. The greatest single gain women have made since 1940 has been in the clerical-and-kindred category. In 1940, women constituted 52.6 per cent of the clerical workers of both sexes; by January, 1951, 63.6 per cent (31). Well over one-fourth of all working *women* are presently in that category.

Most significantly, recent decades have not seen a steady gain in the high-ranking professions or in business administration. From April, 1940, to January, 1951, the proportion of all women employed as professional or semiprofessional workers dropped from 13.3 to 10.5 per cent. From 1928 to 1945–1946, the proportion of women superintendents of education was reduced from 15 to 13 per cent. Women comprised a little more than 2 per cent of American lawyers in 1940, and the proportion of women law students actually declined during World War II. In engineering, architecture, medicine, and chemistry, the number of women is infinitestimal, and no marked trends are evidenced. While, in 1902, 8.45 per cent of the *Who's Who in America* listings were women, the proportion was only 6.24 per cent in 1930–1931 (20).

Women are not paid so well as men, even for comparable work. The average earnings of *all* working women are less than the average earnings of male unskilled laborers. In most cities, women receive smaller salaries than men for teaching the same grades. Male executives of social-work agencies in 1941 were paid an average of $1,000 to $2,000 more a year than were women. The sex gap in rates of pay is wider between college graduates than industrial workers. A much smaller proportion of working women are self-employed than are men.

Prejudice against the working woman has waned however, *provided* she remains in "women's work," serves as an assistant to some man, or performs domestic service. Women continue to face a determined opposition when striking out for administrative positions or for any post which demands trust and responsibility. There is more than traditional prejudice at work here.

The majority of women place marriage and home first. One administrator has complained, "You can't trust them. They're always getting married, and I won't waste my time training a female executive."

In any event, the supreme importance of marriage and home for most women lends a certain indecisiveness to both planning a career and plunging ahead to give the career the last ounce of energy which, in the higher reaches of competition, it demands. The widespread knowledge of this fact has led women as well as men to depreciate the career woman, which goes far toward setting a "woman's ceiling" in the job world. It has been claimed that a woman in competition with men must be twice as good as they to secure favorable attention. This handicap, in turn, lends an increased attractiveness to the economic and emotional security of home and husband. The "career woman" remains a statistical abnormality.

Romantic Love

A modern obsession. Song, story, motion picture, and—startlingly enough—modern advertising all pay allegiance to romantic love as the ultimate culmination of emotional experience. This theme pervades every sphere of American life; it has become a national obsession. Romantic love may be viewed in various ways. The God-centered nineteenth century exalted the religious experience of conversion. A national culture, recently emerged from that century, has shifted much emotive expression from the sacred to the secular realm. One example is the number of sacred symbols that pop up in the love ballads of the twentieth century—"worshiping at your shrine," "you smile and the angels sing," "heaven can wait," and "the mate that fate had me created for."

The function of "love" in modern society is peculiarly complex. In the past, personal relations tended to be rigidly defined and to involve entire personalities. With the decline of the traditional family, family relationships could no longer be held together with shared and integrated functions. The improvisation of total *emotional* involvement with others, or modern "love" in courtship, marriage, and family relations, appeared. When the old script which clearly outlined proper conduct was blurred, when the rights and obligations of husband and wife became more a matter to be settled by bargaining in each marriage, the answer of the culture was to jazz the tempo of romantic love.

The concept of romantic love prepares its followers for a spiritualized idealization of the loved one which comes like a bolt out of the blue, a state of grace in which one moons about, is unable to eat and meet one's daily obligations, and loses interest in whatever else remains in the universe. This concept has sometimes been traced back to the medieval troubadors. But only in recent decades has the idea emerged that romance is culminated, and maintained, in *marriage.*

It is important to note that while romantic love is defined as a unique experience, it is purely cultural in origin and expression. People fall romantically in love because they have been trained to do so. Occa-

sionally this exclusionary ecstasy is experienced by individuals in other societies, but they are usually regarded as abnormal.

The concept of romantic love is indirectly connected with what was previously termed the "cult of personality," but with one essential difference. Although the cult of personality does not rest upon respect for a set of impersonal rules, the most secure basis of moral norms, it does demand respect for *another* person, to some extent regardless of what may occur in the relationship. Romantic love, on the other hand, is an almost anarchic element, for it is founded in the drive to hedonism—it is *my* love, *my* personal experience, *my* unique relationship which take the center of the stage. And once the love object no longer fulfills the lover's romantic ideal, the concept lends no support to a continuation of the relationship. It may be regarded as a fairly efficient means for getting people married. Particularly in the case of the male does it undermine the dam of placing the career first. But romantic love remains the poorest possible basis for maintaining a marriage, for three reasons.

A poor basis for marriage. First, romantic love is a highly stylized drama built around beauty and charm. Every movie addict knows that in a romantic conflict the heroine must ultimately choose the more handsome of the two contenders for her affections. But most men are not handsome and dashing, most women neither beautiful nor charming. Since in most cases like perforce marries like, continued comparisons between mate and ideal rarely lead to contentment, at least on this score. The romantic-love myth also requires suitable luxurious surroundings for its fulfillment. But the majority are poor. In a study already cited, half of the boys expressed anxiety over lacking the material possessions which give status in dating relations (30, p. 283). According to the letter of the myth, marriage continues whatever was established during courtship.

Second, a successful marriage, in the sense of a perfect understanding—where each infers what roles the other wishes him to play and then makes those roles an integral part of his personality—is a rare thing indeed. When achieved, it results from patience, forbearance, and the expenditure of foresight and energy. It takes time. The concept of romantic love teaches that marriage is made on the day of the ceremony.

Third, every marriage, over the years, inevitably finds a lower level of habitual sexual-emotional expression. The romantic concept of love does not prepare the married to meet this experience. Frequently they are left dissatisfied and unable to work out new and more prosaic bases for adjustment. It is no exaggeration to say that on this score our culture is simply out of joint. According to remaining convention, the married are supposed to remain together, and love each other, through the years. But these are the same persons who were previously trained to seek romance constantly and to forsake all else with each new revelation.

however, factors other than urbanism and industrialism are more destructive of traditional family rules. The Far West has retained a high rate of mobility and a late-nineteenth-century frontier psychology, which arose among men who were cut off from family ties. Even though the East is more urban and industrial than the West, it is also older and more stable and conservative.

Legal grounds. The legal grounds for divorce are no help in explaining it. Divorce is granted in New York State only on the grounds of adultery, so that in New York courts all divorce actions are "caused" by adultery. Regardless of the extent to which it may be a cause of divorce, adultery is the most serious marital offense in our law. Adultery is legal grounds for divorce in every state of the union. Approximately one-fourth of all divorces in this country today are granted for this formal cause.

Cruelty is the most frequently claimed charge, found in almost half of all divorce petitions. Cruelty is more (or less) than bodily violence. In what is known as mental cruelty, "words may result in bodily harm without a threat to inflict blows" (21, p. 428). The various states are more concerned with protecting wives than husbands, and men are required to prove much more cruelty than women who so petition. That many more women than men seek and are granted divorce is probably not unconnected with this fact.

The law of divorce is based on the assumption that one party is innocent and the other guilty. If both parties admit wanting a divorce, they are guilty of "collusion," and no divorce can be granted. The law may take its official stand, but judges and attorneys busily grind out thousands of divorces every day, and they wink at the abundant evidence that in almost all cases both parties want out. It is virtually impossible for an estranged couple to tell the truth, as they see it, and thereby get a divorce. What is presented in court is a speech rehearsed by the complainant under the tutelage of his lawyer, which, as often as not, has little bearing upon what has happened in the marriage. For this reason, the legal grounds for divorce do not help to explain it.

It is even questionable that surveys conducted among the divorced would in every case disclose the "real" reason. Many couples who seek divorce are but dimly if at all aware of what has happened to their marriage. They are bewildered, resentful, unhappy, and often unable to untangle verbally the process of estrangement which has occurred. In such cases, each entered marriage with lofty expectations of what the mate must be or become, expectations which stemmed from subconscious desires and yearnings of early childhood, expectations which each was unable to fulfill owing to his own psychological limitations. Frequently the mate is supposed to be a prop to an ego that is basically dissatisfied with itself (23). When two people lean not upon each other but each upon a secret ideal that the other does not measure up to, then

both may become equally disappointed; in such a case, neither might have insight into the reason why.

Sexual maladjustment? The most popular explanation of today's high divorce rate is unsatisfactory sexual relations. There is, to be sure, a great deal of dissatisfaction with the mate as a sex partner, largely because modern people *expect* a great deal of erotic-romantic gratification in marriage. But this dissatisfaction cannot correctly be viewed as a cause of divorce, at the very least not a cause of divorce that works in isolation. Usually those who claim that sexual maladjustment is the cause of modern divorce are also the people who claim that the Victorian woman was frigid; if the latter assertion is correct, why did sexual maladjustment fail to cause a high divorce rate in the Victorian period?

It is, then, not so much the failure of marriage to provide perfect erotic satisfaction as the search for perfect erotic satisfaction in marriage that is connected with today's high divorce rate. Eroticism may make for "happy marriage" in specific cases, but eroticism as search and as philosophy is the enemy of marriage *as a social institution.* Wilhelm Reich has pointed out that chastity and faithfulness, on the one hand, and the affirmation of romantic eroticism, on the other, are incompatible (22, p. 145). If eroticism were in fact the most important basis for preserving marriage, then obviously few marriages would endure beyond that brief period that has been called the "erotic euphoria of the honeymoon."

Only one real attempt has ever been made to compare self-ratings of sex satisfaction with self-ratings of marital happiness. The results were indecisive (27). Marriages do vary in terms of sexual compatibility. Could other adjustive factors be held constant in this most subtle and intimate of all relationships, on the average the more sexually compatible marriage would undoubtedly prove the happier, and the less likely *under modern conditions* to find its way into the divorce court. But other adjustive factors cannot be held constant. They combine in different ways and at different intensities from one marriage to another.

The basic cause. The basic cause of the mounting divorce rate, by logical assumption, is the growing dissatisfaction not with marriage as such but with marriages already formed. This growing dissatisfaction, in turn, can be inferred to result from a contradiction between new personal values and the *institution* of marriage.

As an institution, marriage preserves a minimum number of obligations that must be met in a certain way regardless of the emotional tone of the husband-wife relationship. Except in the leisure class, the wife must prepare and serve her husband's meals, handle his laundry, and do the household shopping. The husband has a number of household tasks to perform, and he must also support his wife, pay for her clothing, and assume other financial obligations commensurate with his income. Both are expected to present a solid front to the world and to go out visit-

ing together; each must strive to preserve the other's reputation, which is irretrievably bound to his own. It is considered bad taste to invite one mate, instead of both, to certain social functions. Husband and wife, in most circles, are discouraged from forming friendships with members of the opposite sex, except where both are included. Marriage, in a word, very seriously interferes with "personal freedom" and "living one's own life."

Much of modern divorce may be characterized as "romantic divorce." The obligations of marriage and the restrictions on personal freedom may have declined in recent decades, but a growing number of adults find intolerable the obligations and restrictions that remain. A person who takes seriously his cultural training to expect an effortless, timeless ecstasy in his marriage may find his obligations and responsibilities unbearable when his mate no longer fulfills his romantic ideal. So the ideal is often maintained intact by seeking another love object.

Of those who had been divorced in the five years preceding the 1948 survey by the Census Bureau, three-fourths had by that time remarried. On the other hand, only about one-half of the men and one-fourth of the women who had lost their mates by death had remarried.

> The above is clear evidence that divorced persons remarry much more quickly than the widowed. The fact that such a high proportion remarry so quickly makes one suspect that students of the family have discounted too heavily the notion of the man on the street that most divorces take place so that one or both parties may be free to marry a person already selected. [15, p. 626]

The attempt to base marriage upon the search for personal happiness and little more may have failed to raise the general level of happiness in marriage. Here is surely no place for dogmatic assertion, for the very concept of "happiness" remains elusive to all the philosophers of every age. Dogmatism is not absent, however, in many presentations of a point of view different from the one being developed here. Thus one investigator has claimed that the modern high divorce rate does not signify incompatibility and unhappiness, but greater congeniality and happiness, owing to the fact that those who now remain married do so on the basis of individual choice and not compulsion. Divorce, it is further asserted, occurs only in those marriages which have ceased in fact to be marriages (17).

Nevertheless, other observers have claimed to find a high level of "happiness" where marriage continues to be ruled by convention and "compulsion." There was reported to be a general lack of friction and irritability between mates in the Piedmont South. The sharing of field and barn work, and of farming interests, was said to make for a spirit of cooperation and an absence of sexual antagonisms. Where work ab-

sorbs most of the marriage partners' time, there is little opportunity to contemplate or argue over individual rights and privileges. "None of the wives appeared to be neurotic; none claimed to be misunderstood" (10, p. 169). Here there was found a "theoretic acceptance of rightness of male dominance by both sexes."

Various schools of psychotherapy have recently been pointing out that a child derives valuable psychological security from a knowledge of absolute limits to his own freedom. "Freedom" for the individual has value, or even meaning, only within a set of recognized and accepted restrictions. As has already been stated, the socialized human being balances his internalized version of social controls with his organic and individualistic cravings. Individual differences determine at what point the balance shall be struck, but in the modern situation many are faced with little support from the culture in finding that point of compromise.

The divorce rate does not begin to measure the amount of dissatisfaction and wistful longing for escape that is generated by the knowledge that the back door of divorce is swinging wider. No advice to restrict divorce legislation is implied; to do so would be to mistake effect for cause. Yet it may be that the Victorian, with all his "repressions," had the better of the argument. His marriage and family were supported by a no-nonsense set of community, family, and religious exactions. He was not at the same time enjoined to uphold an institution and impelled to "develop his own personality"; that is, to fulfill his private cravings at the expense of that institutional structure.

THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY

There appears to be general consensus among investigators of the modern family—sociologists, clinical psychologists, child-welfare workers, and others—that we are faced by extreme crisis and that only some rational reordering of social and individual factors can reduce present confusion. The family has generally come to be regarded as swiftly passing from "institution to companionship," from an organized group governed by rules to a "democratic" mutual adjustment in which "free" individuals seek to satisfy their own emotional and ego needs (3). Of the many new efforts to find individual salvation in the midst of collective disruption, only a few will be examined here.

Predicting Success in Marriage

Most notable has been the development of scales for predicting "happiness" in marriage, the search for premarital factors of personality traits and experiences which will correlate with later self-ratings of marital adjustment. The designers of such scales hope that they can be sufficiently validated so that those planning to marry can determine whether or not

the prospective mate is the right one. The two best-known studies in this field reach approximately the same conclusions (2 and 27).

In both studies, the most critical specific factor associated with self-rating of marital satisfaction was happiness assigned to parents by their married children. Also, in both studies, lack of conflict with parents and happiness as children were found to be important.

On the other hand, many factors commonly believed to be crucial were dismissed. It was asserted that religious background has little effect, mixed marriages having about an equal probability of success as marriages that are not. However, Burgess and Cottrell do state that on this score there may be a selective factor operating in their sample: those who marry across religious lines may be more determined to make their marriage successful.

Differences in age of husband and wife were discovered to be unimportant, as well as presence or absence of children. Many popular notions about sex were dismissed. Apparently whether or not young girls receive full instruction about the facts of sex early in life, or whether they receive such instruction within or outside the home, has no significance. Terman and his associates claim that the frequency and intensity of sexual relations and self-ratings of sexual satisfaction in marriage affect general assessments of marital happiness hardly at all.

In both studies, "exterior" factors such as income, in-law relationships, and the like were found to be of minor importance compared with personality factors. Terman and his associates insist that what is important is what *goes into* a marriage: the personality structure of an individual largely determines whether he has the *capacity* to make a happy marriage. In other words, some persons are happily married almost regardless of what they experience in marriage, while others are likewise inevitably unhappy.

The most important general factor. The most important general factor is briefly mentioned in one study and completely ignored, except by tacit inclusion, in the other: happily married people are those who live according to convention and tradition. Thus Burgess and Cottrell point out that those courtships which are approved by the parents of both participants are more likely to result in a happy marriage than those in which unsupervised romance dominates. Further, those male occupations with the least spatial mobility are associated with a greater degree of marital adjustment.

Even though the connection goes unrecognized by Terman and his associates, their summary characterizations of "happy" husbands and wives almost perfectly fit the Victorian ideal of proper conduct (27, pp. 145–146 and 155). "Happy" husbands are stable, do not gamble but save their money, are methodical rather than impulsive, are willing to assume responsibility, and are conservative in sexual, moral, and religious matters. "Happy" wives are kindly, cooperative, churchgoing, and not given to

rivalry and domination. They are methodical, painstaking, conservative and conventional, and they are willing to accept subordinate roles.

The "unhappy" wives, and particularly the divorced ones in Terman's sample, are emancipated and career women. They are self-sufficient, egocentric, competitive, on the lookout for romance, and given to radical opinions in politics and religion. The one element which does not fit the Victorian pattern is the willingness of "happy" husbands to treat their wives as equals. We may assume, then, tentatively and with due caution, that happy marriages tend to be those in which the husband is willing to forgo many of the privileges of the traditional husband and the wife is willing to accept many of the duties and obligations of the traditional wife.

If happiness in marriage is something founded in a fading tradition, then the outlook for the future is indeed black. Yet the correlates of adjustment stated in these studies may apply only to the narrow segment of time which is the present, and not to the future. When a larger proportion of the married than at present have had an "emancipated" childhood, it may be that other factors will be associated with marital happiness. Terman is very much aware of the limitations of his study: "In another age and another culture the correlates of marital happiness may be radically different from those we have discovered."

In the last analysis, however, it seems likely that in any epoch those who are the most conventional, in relation to their fellows, will build the happiest marriages. Since marriage is one of the most conventional of all relationships, any other discovery would indeed be startling. In any event, the value of such studies has been vigorously contested on the grounds of sampling bias, testing method, and choice of items for inclusion. The fact that one factor may remain hidden, the unwillingness of the conventional to *admit* that something is wrong with their marriage, may invalidate the whole procedure (4). Further, the sample used in each study was drawn from the urban middle class, and it is not known how precisely the findings will apply to the general population. Such studies are to be regarded as suggestive, not conclusive.

Counseling

A new profession, marriage counseling, has arisen in recent years to take care of the needs of those who marry in an epoch which does not clearly define appropriate marital behavior. The value of such services is at least open to question. For one thing, any one marriage is an emergent situation, the traits and backgrounds of two persons *combining* in virtually unpredictable ways when they meet, together, situations which neither they nor others can predict with any certainty. On the other hand, modern marriage is fraught with so many more unknowns than ever before that any advice young people seek is not to be dismissed out of hand.

It remains difficult to assess properly the value of such services. Those

who seek them are likely to be those who are most seriously considering their future obligations, and thus any study which claims to show that those who have been counseled make a better marital adjustment than those who have not been counseled must discount a probable selective bias in the first grouping.

It might be added that this field is presently so crowded with quacks and charlatans (many of whom, incidentally, are themselves divorced) that any young couple would do well to investigate the practitioner under consideration. Very frequently, older persons who have maintained a personal relationship with young people over the years—parents, clergyman, and family doctor—and who have a thorough knowledge not only of personal traits but also of friends, neighborhood, and family are in a much better position to offer advice than an "expert" who bases his diagnosis on a single interview or the results of a few tests.

The Women's Movement Today

Unplanned emergent forces much more determine the course of social change than does conscious design. Although it is true that specific marriages can in some measure be consciously planned and controlled, any reduction of the general stresses and strains which impinge upon all marriages must depend upon the drift of forces over which any individual or group has little control.

The modern women's movement has shifted far from its original call to revolution, the call to displace men in government and business. A number of women work, and carry on political activity, but gainful employment and politics remain—for the majority of women in all classes—subservient to marriage and the home. The minority of women who are gainfully employed today are no closer to "equality" with men than they were thirty years ago. When the terrible urgency of war was smashing many long-preserved icons, there was little progress reported in accustoming "either men or women to the idea that women should be placed in positions of power over men, even when the relative natures of jobs indicated it" (24, p. 161).

Drawing a moral, in either direction, must be avoided. There are some who are appalled at women's growing independence; there are others who are equally appalled at what they regard as women's continued subservience. At one pole stand those who exhort women to return to traditional role, value, and practice as the only means of saving civilization. At the other stands the embattled lady who calls housewifery a "brain-dribbling, spirit-stifling vocation." However, she issues no new call to arms, but instead resigns herself to women's conservatism—there is little prospect for a housewife's rebellion, she avers (26). In contrast, our concern is not with what should be, but with what is.

One thing is certain. So many changes have taken place throughout modern society that it would be impossible, by act of will or legislature, to revive the family of a few decades ago. For example, not only do many married women work outside the home but also the old male prejudice against being married to a working wife is on the wane. The majority of married men, on the average, now gain as much from their wives' outside employment as they lose from competition with other women. At least one study has shown no significant difference in *mutual* adjustment between those marriages in which the wife is gainfully employed and those in which she is not (18).

While the available evidence seems to indicate that stable marriage, today as yesterday, unites those who accept marriage as an institution, who are relatively conservative and who take their obligations seriously, it does not follow that all of these obligations will or must be defined as they were yesterday. Mutuality, the respect for others in personal relations, the control of egotism and arbitrary demand—these are the bases of the cult of personality. Partnership appears to be the keynote of modern marriage. The young today, of either sex, expect it from the mate; men are now more willing than they once were to adjust a mutually interlocking system of habits rather than to impose their own set of habits upon their wives.

The term "equal partnership" has been avoided, for an equal partnership in marriage is as impossible to attain as it is to define. Any real attempt to establish "equality" in a small primary group, where different functions and responsibilities must be assumed, degenerates into chaos. If parents retain responsibility for properly training their children, those children cannot become the "equal" of their parents. If husbands are primarily responsible for family support, husband and wife cannot "equally" determine where they shall live.

The majority of modern women leaders tend to be married and to have one or two children. They are no longer so militant as they once were, and they are much more inclined to accept the reality of biological and social differences between the sexes. They continue to endorse more opportunity for women in the job world, but they do not hold such opportunity above the traditional feminine role of housewife and mother. The dominant keynote of the Women's Bureau Conference of 1948 was that we should "start looking ahead and see if we can't work as men and women, as American people, to a world as a whole, rather than women against men, men against women."

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CHAPTER 20 *Religion*

> Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. —JESUS

> The Son of God is crucified; that is not shameful because it is shameful. And the Son of God died; that is credible because it is absurd. And He rose from the dead; that is quite certain because it is impossible. —TERTULLIAN

The institution of religion is universal throughout the world. It is found in all societies, past and present. Religious beliefs and practices are, however, far from being uniform. Less than one-third of all modern votaries of religion are followers of Christianity. The closest rival of Christianity for men's religious allegiance is Mohammedanism, which claims one-sixth of the world's worshipers.

Since there is even less accurate knowledge about the distribution of the major faiths throughout the world than about the number of people, the above proportions are only crude approximations. Only estimates are available, and these vary from one source to another. For example, the

Table 9 Estimated Numbers and Distribution of the Major Religious Faiths *

Religion	*Estimated world total*	*Where concentrated*
Christian total	619,393,281	Europe, North and South America
Roman Catholic	322,225,796	Europe, South and North America
Protestant	159,537,499	Europe, North America, Africa
Eastern Orthodox	127,629,986	Europe
Mohammedan	315,699,347	Near East, North Africa
Confucian	300,289,500	Asia
Hindu	255,715,506	Asia
Buddhist	150,300,000	Asia
Primitive	125,150,000	Africa, Asia
Taoist	50,053,000	Asia
Shinto	25,000,000	Japan
Jewish	11,268,800	North America, Europe

* Adapted from 12, p. 667. Permission of Golenpaul Associates.

source cited in Table 9 lists less than 160 million Protestants, while another source lists 207 million (13, p. 446). For purposes of comparison, however, the estimates offered in the table are worth consideration.

THE UNIVERSALITY OF RELIGION

The universality of religion is not to be found in the forms of religious belief and practice, for there is an endless diversity of such forms. The Tanala of Madagascar worship their ancestors; orthodox Hindus worship the cow; and the Murngin worshiped a water hole. Some religions promise a life after death, others do not. God is one in some religions, and the gods are many in other religions; in either event, the divine principle may be kindly and beneficent or retaliatory and punishing—in the Christian tradition, God has been both.

Religious practices are as diverse as religious beliefs. Christianity has abjured "the things of the flesh," while at Paphos, in Cyprus, all women were compelled as part of their religious duty to prostitute themselves in the sanctuary of Aphrodite before they could marry (10, p. 28). At one time and place the divine principle is approached through solitary meditation, at another through a mass orgy of whirling, dancing, and sexual license. Some religions possess a rich dogma and an elaborate ritual, mediated and controlled by a professional class of shamans, witch doctors, or priests. Other religions are simple cults, with little ritual and less dogma and without professional mediators between worshiper and divine authority.

Definition in Terms of Function °

The universality of religion is not based upon the forms of belief and practice, but upon the social functions which religion universally fulfills. Sociologically defined, a religion is a system of beliefs and symbolic practices and objects, governed by faith rather than by knowledge, which relates man to an unseen supernatural realm beyond the known and beyond the controllable. Religion is "the attempt to bring the relative, the temporary, the painful things in life into relation with what is conceived to be permanent, absolute, and cosmically optimistic" (21, p. 5). Religion has three universal functions: to rationalize and make bearable individual suffering in the known world; to enhance self-importance; and to knit the social values of a society into a cohesive whole.

Explain individual suffering. Man has never lived by knowledge alone. Man is an emotional as well as a rational creature. When human hopes are blighted, when all that has been planned and striven for is swept away, man universally wants something more than the bare awareness of fact. When a beloved friend or relative dies, man seeks to assuage his grief in ritualistic exchanges of condolence, perhaps to find comfort in the thought of reunion in another world with the departed comrade.

° This section has been adapted in part from 8, Chap. XIX.

There can be no "rational" substitute for the belief that some unseen but benevolent force moves in mysterious ways to make even personal loss or sorrow meaningful and ultimately optimistic.

The things for which men strive in this world are in some measure always denied them. The self can bear only so much frustration. Faith feeds on subjective need, so that religious goals especially compensate those who find their worldly lot unbearable. In one particular, every man's lot approaches the unbearable. Of all earth's creatures, only man has a foreknowledge of his own death; every man, however unbowed his head and unbent his knee, goes down to final defeat. Millions have discovered that only through *submission* to unseen powers have they been able to accept this knowledge.

The self writ large. Religion expands the self to infinite proportions. Religious belief relates the self to cosmic design; not only the universe becomes grand and luminous, but the self along with it. Through unity with the infinite, in whatever way and however defined, the self is ennobled, made majestic and triumphant. The religious view of self and universe contrasts sharply with the self-damaging and self-demeaning "promise" a famous literary atheist holds out to those who will forsake their religion:

> [Man] will realize that in all likelihood meaning and purpose, which are human concepts, have no connection whatsoever with the charatcer of the universe itself but only with the nature of his mental processes which tend to make him construe the universe as an extension of himself. Instead of torturing himself with the insoluble problems of whether the universe has plan or purpose or is good or evil, he will tend to adopt the more heroic philosophy of conceiving of the earth as an accidental collision of atoms and of man as one of its fortuitous excrescences battling to make an intolerable existence more tolerable. [5, pp. xii–xiii]

Man, you are a pustule that has arisen by chance upon the body of an inferior planet, says the atheist. Man, you are the noblest work of God and you will be united with Him, says the theist. It is not surprising that the former philosophy has enticed few to its cold and hopeless embrace.

Ultimate source of social cohesion. "The solidarity of individuals is the unity of allegiance to a common body of moral rules, or values" (14, p. 389). The primary requirement of society is moral obligation, the common possession of social values by which individuals control the actions of self and others and through which society is perpetuated. These social values are never rationally or scientifically demonstrated; they are presented and accepted as beyond question, or even examination. Social values are either moral norms or abstract sentiments. Among the moral norms of our own society are the following: children should obey their parents, should not lie or cheat; married people should be sexually faithful; young men should

be prepared to defend their country. Among the abstract sentiments are "do unto others" and "free enterprise."

The efficiency of such social values in controlling behavior and maintaining social cohesion does not depend upon their social function being understood by the average man. On the contrary, social values are more effective if they are not examined nor their purpose understood; they are more effective when they are merely accepted as beyond question. Religion, in any society, is the foundation upon which the social values rest. Religion trains to habits of acceptance on faith, and religion includes within its creed the dominant social values of the given society. Divine authority is thus the ultimate source of social cohesion in every society.

Sacred Objects and Religious Ritual

The universality of religion is explained by the three social functions it serves. The functions of religion are also universally *supported* by sacred objects and rituals. They are so essential that they were included in the above definition of religion.

Sacred objects. Mental habits of unquestioning acceptance on faith are enforced by every religion with sacred objects. From the "objective" point of view—that of controlling behavior in the interest of the entire group—it does not matter which objects are singled out from the "profane" (this worldly) realm to become "sacred" (symbolized as holy). Sacred objects have included the cross, wine, fire, the sun, cows, trees, rivers, owls, and flags. Such objects are not sacred because of what they *are* in a demonstrable and scientific sense but because of the reverential attitude which men adopt toward them. The imagination and perhaps the faith of most men are not sufficiently developed to visualize the intangible and supernatural world without them. Sacred objects *symbolize* the supernatural world; they represent in tangible form the intangible realm of gods and spirits or subjective states of mind, such as peace, nirvana, or salvation.

Sacred objects are apparently a social necessity. It is religious belief which so indoctrinates man that he renounces nonsocial actions. It is the unseen world which justifies and requires man's acceptance of limitations upon his own imperious wants and desires. But this unseen world must be made *real* to him, and so one or more objects in the tangible world are accepted as representations of the supernatural world. A common acceptance of sacred objects, as well as of religious beliefs, serves to hold society together in cohesive bonds.

Ritual the stabilizer. Rituals are religious practices, and they usually include viewing or handling sacred objects. Rituals are most often, although not necessarily, collective religious practices. Most praying, feasting, fasting, singing, dancing, partaking of communion, kneeling, immersion, and the like take place within an organized group—in modern

society, a church congregation. All religions provide frequent ritual contact with other communicants, a form of group intrastimulation which supports and renews religious beliefs. Equally important, ritual is a prescribed rhythmical sequence of actions. On cue one rises, bows, kneels, sings, comes forward, and so on. These actions become habits. Habitual action in the viewing and handling of sacred objects drives deep the attitudes of reverence and awe.

Some scholars have believed religious ritual to be more important than religious belief itself in maintaining religious attitudes. Judaism survived persecution amid other faiths with a not-too-different dogma and set of beliefs. The survival of Judaism has been attributed to the insistence of the Pharisees that almost every act should be ritualized with separate Jewish emphasis. They did not stress dogma, about which disputes can arise, but ritual, which can become unreflective habit. Before the Jew could break his fast "he had to put on the *tephillin*, the phylacteries, and recite the morning service. When he ate he had to be scrupulous as to the nature of food, for only that which was *kosher*, ritually correct, was not defiling" (4, p. 23). The left shoe had to be removed first upon retiring. "Meaningless" acts such as these helped Judaism to survive within gentile societies throughout Europe.

Catholicism has been said to have had greater success than Protestantism in retaining its intellectuals under the bombardment of religious faith by modern science. Catholicism stresses the ritual of the mass rather than the appeal to the rational faculties. When an "emotional response is associated with a certain form of ritual, the repetition of the ritual arouses the same ecstasy which accompanied it at an earlier time" of unquestioning faith (7, p. 569). Because Protestantism utilizes ritual much less, "no psychological mechanism is established which will serve to hold its members to the church once the intellectual grounds for belief are shattered by the use of the scientific method or for any other reason" (7, p. 570).

Religious Integration

Cultures are not rag bags of unrelated odds and ends. They are more or less consistently "patterned," each institution finding its place within a functioning whole. Within any society, religion and all other institutions are integrated; the themes and emphases of each tend to be similar. It is true that religion is less integrated with its attendant institutions in modern society than in most others, a matter to be discussed in the next chapter. Nevertheless, there tends to be a congruence, a togetherness, among institutions wherever studied.

Conception of the supernatural. The conception of the supernatural is usually a reflection of life as it is lived on earth, a reflection of cultural themes and emphases.

The Zuñi attribute to their gods the same characteristics which they themselves possess. Life in Zuñi is calm and benevolent and filled with a richness of ritual and ceremonial behavior. Therefore, the Zuñi think of their gods as being similar. The people of Zuñi are interested in group activity and this characteristic is also attributed to the gods, who, although supernaturals, are still participating members of the Zuñi society and protectors of the Zuñi welfare. [9, p. 66]

Where life is harsh, unpleasant, and dangerous, as it is for desert peoples and the Eskimo, a god or gods of wrath and vengeance are held in awe and supplicated in a humble fashion. Where life is bounteous and easy, as it was in old Hawaii, the gods are genial and friendly; there is no need to beg them to preserve their worshipers from starvation and disaster.

The gods of ascetic peoples, who fight unceasing war against the temptations of the flesh, are also ascetic. That the ancient Romans worshiped Priapus, the god representative of the male sex organs, is indicative of their "liberal" attitudes. A society like the ancient Aztec or Hindu Indian, with a rigid caste principle, develops a religious ethic such as the Hindu dharma—doing one's duty within one's hereditary position and never attempting to step outside of it. The Hindu conception of transmigration holds out the promise of a higher caste position in the next world, provided one's dharma is fulfilled in this.

Christianity arose in a society where the conjugal family of husband, wife, and children was stronger than the consanguineal family, or extended kin group. This worldly family was perhaps not unconnected with the concept of God as Father, whose Son came to earth to redeem mankind and whose worshipers have frequently referred to one another as brother and sister. Among the Tanala of Madagascar, an ancestor-worshiping people with a consanguineal family system, on the other hand, it is the joint family head of the extended kin group who is worshiped above all others.

The words of prayers, and the verses of hymns, mirror life on earth. Negro spirituals were written by and for slaves. "Swing Low, Sweet Chariot" is typical of the resigned, weary, helpless outlook of a people torn from their homeland and physically unable to better their miserable lot. Some of the white Protestant hymns, such as "Rock of Ages," also strike the note of soul-and-body weariness, express supplication for peace and rest, and plead for rescue from toil and pain. But the white Protestant tradition contains many themes, for equally typical is "Onward Christian Soldiers," the ringing battle cry of a confident, free, muscle-flexing, dominant army of world changers. No Negro spiritual has—it could hardly have—such a martial air.

Protestantism and modern capitalism. Not only do religious practice and belief reflect other social institutions, but other institutions reflect

religious practice and belief. This was Max Weber's essential thesis in his tracing of a relationship between the "Protestant ethic" and the "spirit of capitalism." Catholicism, according to Weber, was not conducive to the development of modern capitalism, and modern capitalism did not make its first appearance in Catholic countries. Through ritual and confession, through saints and clergy who mediated between him and God, the Catholic communicant, then as now, could secure forgiveness for his sins. By following a procedure laid down by an organization, the Church, the Catholic was assured of salvation. The Catholic was steeped in a traditionalism which militated against any attempt to "change the world."

The Protestant ethic, on the other hand, exaggerated individualism. The Protestant Reformation destroyed the hierarchy of saints and the clerical hierarchy in this world which had formerly stood between the communicant and his God. Extreme antiritualism even weakened the bonds between the Protestant and his associates. He faced the Deity alone, leading to what Weber called an "inner isolation" of the individual. The Protestant could not receive absolution; he could not be forgiven for *particular* sins. He made of his conduct a coherent system in which self-indulgence and human weakness had to be avoided at all costs. Protestantism fostered self-discipline in the *impersonal* service of one's daily labor, cut off from charitable sympathy with others, for the damned were outside the pale, and no one could be certain who they were.

Particularly in the Calvinist branches of Protestantism, the theological emphases upon an absolute transcendental God *beyond* finite understanding and the doctrine of predestination,* created an overwhelming "religious interest" in the search for "signs of grace." Since the Protestant's command was to establish the Kingdom of God in *this* world, and since the command gradually came to be identified with one's "calling" (essentially, one's job), the further transition was made to the acceptance of worldly *individual success* as a sign of grace, as God's indication that one was "predestinated unto everlasting life." But worldly success could not be flaunted in self-indulgence or ostentatious spending, for one worked not for one's self but for the greater glory of God; in economic terms, this injunction meant saving and capital accumulation.

The Protestant ethic, then, was one factor which stimulated the rise of modern bureaucratic capitalism, with its emphases upon individual responsibility, self-discipline, impersonal devotion to one's task, hard work as an end in itself, and saving instead of self-indulgent spending. By degrees, acquisition ceased being a "necessary evil," as it was and still is in the Catholic view.

* As stated in the Westminster Confession of 1647, "natural man" is "dead in sin," and by God's decree "some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death." Neither a man's "faith" nor his "good works" could affect the outcome (20, pp. 99–100).

Some scholars have quarreled with Weber's interpretation, in whole or in part. Yet Weber's statistics indicate that there was something about Protestantism which must be taken into account in any explanation of the rise of modern capitalism. Modern capitalism developed in Northern and Western Europe, in Protestant countries and in those with a mixed religious population. In every country, the rising capitalist class of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was largely Protestant, and in every case they were *at that time* much less wealthy than the Catholics, in their own or surrounding countries. In ownership and mastery of the new economic system, however, the Protestants shortly outstripped the Catholics (20).

RELIGION AND SCIENCE

The Controversy

It was inevitable that modern science and religion should clash. Religion is more than a body of dogma, faith, and ritual in connection with unseen forces and personages; it is also an explanation of the universe and a way of interpreting the natural order. Like most sacred books, the Bible contains an account of the creation of the world and stories of miracles which violate the knowledge of sensory perception. Christianity, like most religions, is dominated by the theme of "moral determination." Events on earth are supposed to be governed by good and evil act and intention, such as the destruction of Sodom for its collective wickedness.

The outlook of science is one of observation and test, with sensory discrimination or instruments. While what lies outside the area of observation and test may go unquestioned, it must at least be ignored. A physical scientist will pay no attention to a reported miracle, unless to explain its physical basis; a social scientist will study a reported miracle not to determine whether it did or did not happen but to explain why it was believed to happen. Although a scientist may not dispute the idea that an earthquake is caused by failure to obey the Ten Commandments, by the very fact of explaining the earthquake in terms of geologic stress he is *indirectly* denying moral determinism.

By studying only that which can be observed and tested, by a progressive translation of scientific theory into working technology, science has stripped the supernatural realm of much concrete and dramatic detail. A plague, proved to be transmitted by infected rats, no longer remains a visitation of God's wrath, and the serum which stops the plague will probably not be interpreted as God's blessing, since men devised it and men administer it. A successful crop will not elicit very fervent prayers of thanksgiving for God's bounty when man-made rain and man-made fertilizer can be used with predictable results. A hysterical man is no

longer "possessed by the devil"; even the half-educated can use such glib terms as "compulsion neurosis" and "inferiority complex." The sociologist and psychologist do not attack the notion of warfare between good and evil for possession of men's souls, but they do use completely nontheological concepts to explain human behavior. Where science forges ahead, the supernatural recedes, becomes more vague and "symbolic."

The controversy in history. Against such attacks, always more indirect than direct, religion in the modern West has fought a rear-guard action. Galileo, in the middle of the seventeenth century, was forced by the Church to recant his defense of the Copernican theory that the earth, along with the other planets, revolves about the sun; he was made to accept publicly the medieval religious cosmology, which placed the earth at the center of the universe. When the evidence of the rocks and fossils cast doubt upon the Biblical account of an earth a few thousand years old, that evidence was denied. Perhaps no development in modern science has stirred religious circles to such determined and acrimonious defense as the nineteenth-century theory of organic evolution, which made man an extension of other animal forms. The theory of evolution denies, at least by indirection, the doctrine of creation. By contesting man's uniqueness, it contracted his conception of himself, exactly as had the Copernican cosmology contracted man's conception of his planet. The theory of evolution was, for a time, violently and officially repudiated by both Protestant and Catholic Church.

In recent decades, however, following upon each major controversy, organized religion has either capitulated or ceased to publicize opposition. Giordano Bruno was burned at the stake in 1600 for repeating the heresy of a sun-centered universe, but in 1882 the Catholic Church issued a decree permitting Bruno's ideas to be taught. The famous Scopes trial in Tennessee saw an aroused Protestant fundamentalism at bay, fighting desperately and hopelessly to prevent the teaching of the theory of organic evolution in the public schools. The major Protestant denominations accept the doctrine today, and the Catholic Church no longer contests the teaching of certain parts of it.

Attempted modern compromise. Theologians today publicly challenge the evidence or theories of science with much less frequency and vehemence than they did even fifty years ago. The Catholic Church has compromised from time to time, but the official view has been little shaken. The official view is still that any scientific formulation which Church dogma will not support is simply in error. The Protestant denominations have shown a great deal more willingness to compromise. The line of noncompromise is drawn, however—it must be drawn to preserve religion—at that point where the reality of the supernatural realm may be questioned.

So nebulous and stripped of compelling attention has the supernatural become that those with a scientific orientation who seek to compromise with *religion* do not feel impelled to question the existence of the supernatural. They merely assume that it does not exist. The agnostic of a generation ago *fought* religion. The modern agnostic usually treats religion as a harmless diversion of which he can well afford to be tolerant. The modern agnostic may go so far as to grant religion a place in the scheme of things, but a place subordinate to science, where the emphasis upon the supernatural is dropped in favor of making man's adjustment to *this* world more efficient and comfortable.

> Religion has, thus far, been the most powerful agency in stirring and directing the collective will of mankind. Therefore, we may probably contend with safety that the function of a liberalized religion, divested of its archaic supernaturalism, would be to serve as the public propaganda adjunct of social science and esthetics. [1, p. 706]

Again:

> There are those who feel that we can get along without religion. But they reckon not with the value of religious experience. The need is greater at one time than another, and is felt more keenly by one person than another. There is much strain in modern life. Our hospitals are filled to overflowing with the mentally sick. Perhaps one reason is the failure of religion to help where the strain of life seems to be increasing. Unfortunately, religious faith is generally coupled with a specific creed, and the shattering of the latter by new knowledge means for many persons the shattering of their faith as well. They fail to see that religious experience is independent of particular beliefs and that they may reorganize their beliefs in the light of the new knowledge. The church also has a responsibility for this situation, since it lags greatly in adjusting its creed to new facts and viewpoints. [13, p. 453]

An alternative hypothesis is that religion has failed "to help where the strain of life seems to be increasing" precisely because for an increasing number of people religion is no longer "coupled with a specific creed," precisely because they *have* reorganized "their beliefs in the light of the new knowledge." In the history of the world, there has never been a religion which lacked a "specific creed," there has never been a religion which was "independent of particular beliefs."

Such a vague approach to religion, and such a narrowly *instrumental* view of religion as a deliberate means to secure adjustment in this world, will not support a vigorous faith. In the eyes of those who pass anti-religious moral judgments, of course, religion should not be fervent; it should adjust its creed to "new viewpoints." Bishop Sheen, most definitely not a seeker of compromise, has declared that when the devil appears he "will write books on the new idea of God to suit the way people live."

Religion Is Nonscientific

In the arena of struggle for men's loyalties, it was perhaps inevitable that religion and science should engage in controversy. Viewed analytically, however, they need not do so. Science deals with either what is known or is potentially knowable, based upon sensory discrimination. It cannot admit, within its own purview, anything which is not reducible to test, measure, or at least empirical validation. *However, anything which lies outside the narrow area of investigation that science has marked out is not and cannot be proved nonexistent.* Any claim to the contrary would be itself unscientific.

> We cannot disprove any doctrine as to ultimate existence without involving ourselves in some other doctrine of a metaphysical character, that is, of assumptions beyond the physically actual. For the assumption that there is nothing beyond the physical is in itself essentially metaphysical. It is a postulate, not an empirically known fact. [6, p. 63]

Religion is not unscientific; it is nonscientific. Religion deals with a supernatural world which lies outside the range of scientific observation and analysis. The supernatural world is unquestionably more important than that with which science deals, even from a nonreligious or sociological point of view. Man and society have been proved capable of surviving without science. That man and society can survive without religion is unproved.

Scientific truth is that which is known by the evidence of the senses. Religious truth is that which is known by revelation, by faith. Any attempt to "reconcile" the two, with any likelihood of success, can only plead for mutual respect across the barrier. Any reconciliation which attempted to combine them could only undermine both.

Religion and the Sociology of Religion

The scientific study of religion would have been both theoretically and physically impossible in the medieval period. Any study of the world and its works was carried on within the confines of dogmatic religious assumption. It was not so much that unquestioned revealed truth was imposed as that it permeated the very intellectual atmosphere. One religion could not have been compared with another; there was no conceivable purpose in doing so, nor was there any point of view which could be applied to such a venture.

Objectivity and faith. To study religion from the "outside looking in," objectively, is possible only in an age of skepticism. The formula of God's relationship to man is banished. The formula becomes man's relationship to God, or the gods. The objective point of view both proves a secular attitude toward religion and fosters such an attitude.

The sharpest conflict between religion and science comes when religion itself is subjected to scientific analysis. Dependent as it is upon subjective faith, religion withers like a leaf before a flame when the scientific attitude is brought to bear on it. Thus the man who goes to church not with the idea of worshiping but with the idea of analyzing the causes of the behavior he observes will not find himself in tune with the occasion. He is similar to a man who goes to a football game not with the intention of watching the play but with the intention of watching the strange cries and antics of the crowd. If everyone in the crowd took the same attitude there would be no enthusiasm, no spirit of the thing. Systematic analysis is the opposite of crowd enthusiasm. [8, p. 536] *

The limits of the sociology of religion. The religious formula is God's relationship to man; the formula of the sociology of religion is man's relationship to God. Religion explains society in terms of assumed divine intervention. Sociology explains religion as the result of physical, social, and psychological processes. Sociology cannot explain religion in any terms except those of human social interaction.

Not all religious experience, however, is explainable in sociological terms. The mystics and prophets—who in the religious view of truth achieve the highest grasp of religious experience—seek to *escape* the "corrupting influence" of human social interaction or try to teach their fellow men how to avoid it. Priests and ministers, while they may strive for this ultimate communion with God, freed of all worldly concern, by the role they must play within a religious organization are "impelled toward the identification of the divine with a church, a man, a sacred text, a state, or some other concrete form" (15, p. 595). By his bureaucratic role, the ecclesiastic is forced to arrange compromises with the "intellectual and social necessities in the world."

> It is in the figure of the ecclesiastic and his works that religion may be most readily seen as a historical phenomenon properly lending itself to sociological analysis. The ecclesiastic attempts to identify the city of man with the city of God, and, since the socially conditioned can never be recreated in the image of the metaphysically unconditioned, this attempt is bound to fail. With regard to this failure, sociology can tell us how a theological creed became the ideological weapon of a certain class; it can describe the role religious institutions have played in social conflict; it can analyze how, and to what degree, ideal values became subordinate to material ends. In other words, sociology can and does relate the drama of *the defeat of the religious intention.* [15, p. 595]

The sociology of religion, because of its scientific orientation, must treat religion *as if* it were totally explainable in terms of cultural emphasis, group conflict, and social function. But the possible implication—that the sociological view is all that religion is—is false. As Cohen has

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phrased it, the belief that the knowledge of the senses exhausts reality is itself a metaphysical postulate that can be neither proved nor disproved.

By explaining not only religious organization but also religious experience in no other terms than those of social forces, by examining religion as merely another institution taking its equal place among many others, the sociology of religion probably, and in an unwarranted way, makes religion subordinate to science. This qualification should be kept in mind.

RELIGION AND POLITICS

The Church is not only a promoter and guardian of religious beliefs and practices but also a this-worldly organization actively engaged in political activity. Down through the ages the Church has swung, back and forth, between proclaiming social revolution and blessing the *status quo*. At least in theological interpretation, Christ's political teaching itself was somewhat ambiguous. Christ preached a doctrine of opposition to social injustice in this world, but He also preached self-denial, pacifism, and a universal love for those that hate you. The wealthy and long-established churches have usually emphasized the latter in such a way as to promote acquiescence and quietism, acceptance of the given power structure. But during periods of bitter social unrest, heresies and sects have arisen to challenge the conservative Church and to proclaim the ethical-prophetic, radical phase of Christ's teachings (21, p. 37).

The Church as Follower

Throughout most of its history, then, the Church has been follower rather than innovator in the issues of this world. Any organized church is in part an economic institution; it owns property and invests its contributions and endowments, the bulk of which in most cases comes from the propertied classes. In proportion to its success as an economic institution, an organized church tends to become an instrument of conservative social control. It has a vested interest in worldly things as they are, and it has a tendency to promote those doctrines which will support its vested interest. Also, its very existence depends upon attracting and holding large numbers of adherents. In any society, in any period of time, the majority are more conservative than revolutionary in outlook, and the established churches depend upon majority support for survival. It is only the rebellious sects which can "afford" to appeal to now this, now that, minority.

The Catholic Church. The entire Catholic hierarchy officially supports the social and political doctrines laid down by the administrative head, the Pope. Papal pronouncements have been sufficiently elastic in recent

years, however, so that "labor" and "conservative" priests can often be found in the same community. Yet in a much more literal sense, the Catholic Church, as compared with the Protestant, speaks with one voice. The Catholic Church has sought a basis of cooperation with political leadership in each country where it has a large membership in a way not open to the diversified Protestant Church. For various reasons, then, the Catholic Church historically has tended to reach an accord with national political institutions while the Protestant Church has reached its accord with the dominant economic *class*, which has no organization and is dispersed in space.

There have been many exceptions. The Catholic Church from time to time has covertly or openly opposed vested national political power, particularly when political power has contested that of the Church. Protestant spokesmen, even interdenominational conferences, in recent years have championed the cause of labor and attacked the evils of capitalism. But in the first case, the Church is *forced* to fight for survival. In the second, the Church belatedly is swept along by a towering wave of discontent to be cast up on a shore of already established social change. In other words, in the affairs of this world the Church follows much more than it leads.

On February 11, 1929, Mussolini signed the famous concordat with Pope Pius XI. Among other provisions, this treaty deprived the state of any supervision of ecclesiastical property. In both elementary and secondary schools, Catholic religious instruction was to be made compulsory. On the other hand, the oath of allegiance to the King and government was to be taken by all bishops, who were to swear that they would take no action prejudicial to the state and ensure that this was likewise binding on their clergy. The dynamic of fascism—everything for the state, nothing outside of the state—soon made the concordat completely unworkable. Diplomatic exchanges fired back and forth, mostly centering about the fascist determination to possess not only the mind and body but the soul of Italian youth as well. In an encyclical, Pope Pius XI later rejected fascism (*Non Abbiamo Bisogno*).

The Protestant Church. Compared with the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, administrators within the various Protestant denominations have little control over their more or less autonomous congregations. It is true that a greater range of political activity and affiliation is permitted to local religious leaders within the Protestant Church than would be the case if religious authority were more centralized than it is. On the other hand, the vesting of primary authority in local lay administrators rather than in a clerical hierarchy has perhaps more frequently than not meant that sermons are in accord with the opinions of well-to-do deacons and church councilors.

Within recent years, there has been more criticism of the American economic and political scene than in the past, by at least some Protestant ministers. The "social gospel" is the application of Jesus' teachings calling attention to injustice, poverty, corruption, and cutthroat competition. The social gospel is at times interpreted with a quasi-socialist tinge. But it has followed, it has not led, agitation to modify our economic and political institutions. Interest in the social gospel also appears largely confined to the large cities and most particularly to the younger intellectual ministers. In any event, organized unionism, mass demands for a "fair deal," and the ferment of quasi-socialist doctrine and organization antedated the Church's hesitant interest in the social gospel. It was "a response to a changed environment in which new material powers and new ideologies were challenging the power of the churches" (21, p. 142).

The Church and Totalitarianism

The Church faces the possibility of destruction in some parts of the world not only by direct onslaught but also through an invitation to cooperate in drawing tighter the hangman's noose. The Catholic hierarchy in Hungary, threatened with being outlawed, "compromised" with Communist boss Matyas Rakosi. Periodic agreements were reached on the spheres of influence of Church and State, but what had been given with one hand was taken away with the other.

> Rakosi said that monks and nuns could work with priests in villages, teach in the Communist-run schools, or become itinerants. But as organized orders they were through. Furthermore, they would not be allowed to wear habits. . . .
>
> Jesuit Horvath broke in: "How can you make such an offer? And how can you expect monks to teach against their principles, from Communist textbooks?" Answered Rakosi: "I made you an offer. Take it or leave it. If you leave it, you openly admit you refuse to educate Hungarian youth, the right to which you demand." [17, p. 64] *

When the last holdouts among Hungary's Catholic bishops finally took the oath of allegiance to the "Hungarian People's Republic" in August, 1951, official Church resistance to Communism died in Hungary.

At first the new Chinese Communist government promised "freedom of religious belief" to the Protestant missionaries in China, which meant that they too were required to "cooperate." A mission church which failed to do so was confiscated for nonpayment of impossible tax levies. Missionaries were forbidden to travel. Chinese Protestant ministers were "invited" to report to a commissar each week on their progress in the study of Communist doctrine. Church premises were frequently "borrowed" by the government at the time for service to begin (18). Then

* Courtesy of *Time*, Copyright Time Inc., 1950.

the noose was drawn taut. All Christian missions, schools, and hospitals supported by Americans were taken under direct Communist control (19, p. 54).

THE NEW RELIGION: THE NATION-STATE

The Sentiments Never Die

It was the Italian sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto, who laid down the dictum that the sentiments never die. He meant that, in every age, man's thought and behavior are more nonrational than rational; man's thought and behavior disclose emotional longings which change only their external appearance in time, never their essential meaning. Thus, doctrines such as progress and liberal democracy are and can be only thinly disguised "religions" in a secular age. They, also, call forth emotionalized devotion, not dispassionate observation and assessment. They, also, preserve transcendental, not empirical, ends.

Other men have independently reached Pareto's conclusions. An American historian has said that the eighteenth-century philosophers looked upon themselves as the great destroyers of the medieval myth. They called themselves rationalists and ridiculed the idea that the earth had been made in six days, *but* they viewed the world as a beautifully articulated machine made for man by Supreme Being. They denounced the Church and the Bible, *but* they worshiped the authority of nature and reason. They scoffed at the Garden of Eden, *but* they depicted primitive man as living in a golden age of Roman virtue. They denied the Biblical miracles, *but* they proclaimed their faith in human progress and human perfectibility. And so "the *Philosophes* demolished the Heavenly City of St. Augustine only to rebuild it with more up-to-date materials" (3, p. 31). It is quite possible that Koheleth, the author of Ecclesiastes, had intimations of the same idea when he said that there is nothing new under the sun.

The religious continuities in our mental habits, described below, occurred outside of the Church. Yet they, too, prove the immortality of the religious sentiments.

The Nation-State

Since at least the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the nation-state has been religiously venerated. It is true that in previous epochs nationalism, or love for one's country and the belief that it is superior to all other countries, had been fused with religion. "Wars of religion" have always included nationalist ambitions, and the Protestant Reformation was a nationalistic as well as a religious movement. But only since the late eighteenth century has religion been superseded by nationalism as "the chief factor in human group relationships" (2, p. 7).

This partial displacement of God by the nation-state as an object of worship has occurred in two dimensions: first, the reduction of God to national or regional boundaries; second, the direct substitution of the nation-state for God.

God reduced. Most of the modern Western nations have followed the first course. When Mussolini was courting Catholic support for Italian nationalism, a move which culminated in the signing of the concordat, he said:

> I maintain that the Imperial and Latin tradition of Rome is represented today by Catholicism. . . . I am very disturbed when I see national churches being formed, because I think of the millions and millions of men who will no longer look towards Italy and Rome. For this reason I advance this hypothesis, that if the Vatican should definitely renounce its temporal ambitions—and I think it is already on that road—Italy ought to be able to furnish it with the necessary material help for the schools, churches, hospitals, etc., that a temporal power has at its disposal. Because of the increase of Catholicism in the world, the addition of four hundred millions of men who from all quarters of the globe look towards Rome, is a source of pride and special interest to us Italians. [quoted in 2, p. 71]

The underlying theme of this statement is the reduction of religion to the service of the state, to the power and glory of the state. Other nations of the West—France, Great Britain, the United States—have not gone nearly so far as this in either practice or principle, but the difference is one more of degree than of kind.

The nation-state has become the arch rival of the Church as the supreme repository of moral norms. The state is beyond good and evil—*Deutschland über alles;* my country, may she always be in the right, but my country, right or wrong. Its interests are supreme over those of any other organization or group. All means toward its greater glory and power are justified. What inside the nation would be murder, lying, and stealing are transformed into patriotic duty when nationalism dictates that soldiers shall kill, diplomats lie, and citizens confiscate those things owned and controlled by other nations. When war comes, God is identified with the nation-state. He is reduced to nation size, and He blesses the power aims of the nation.

> The cult of nationalism has its high priests, its rituals, and its theology no less than other cults. . . . The patriot has learned reverence for the land of his ancestors—for merrie England, America the beautiful, *la Patrie*, or *das Vaterland*. This involves both ancestor worship and territorial fetichism. . . . Living political leaders are judged by the degree to which they appear to come up to or fall short of the traditional standards set by the departed figures of national myths and legend.
>
> Similarly, the patriot worships the land of his nation—the hallowed soil, watered by the blood of heroes, the towns and countryside, the cities and

villages, the mountains, rivers, lakes, and valleys, the rocks and rills and templed hills which are the physical symbols of the nation. The national flag is everywhere a peculiarly sacred symbol, always to be respected and never to be defiled. [16, pp. 287–288]

The religious exaltation of patriotism is inculcated by family, school, Sunday school, Boy Scouts, Hitler *Jugend*, and Young Communists' League. In the elementary-school history textbooks, figures such as Abraham Lincoln, Alfred the Great, and Marshal Foch shine with the transcendental radiance of demigods. The new means of mass communication —newspaper, radio, television, and newsreel—reach everybody, so that their use to reinforce patriotic sentiments is quite effective.

All societies are ethnocentric, all societies believe themselves to be superior to any other, and all peoples regard themselves as the chosen people. Since ethnocentrism is universal, it is probably necessary for social cohesion and even for survival. But ethnocentrism may be attached to many groups of varying size. Prior to the rise of the modern nation-state—approximately during the latter half of the eighteenth century—ethnocentrism was attached primarily to smaller units, such as the city-state. Even within the Roman Empire, made up as it was of many diverse peoples subjugated by conquest, ethnocentrism remained for the most part a local product. Not until fairly recently has the nation-state become the supreme expression of ethnocentrism, an event which awaited the breakdown of localism and regionalism through the formal integration of a national economy and the destruction of even partial isolation by devices of mass communication.

Throughout the medieval epoch, the Church was the political superior of the nation. The universalism of the Church was based upon much more than religious ideology and doctrine; it was also based upon political strength. Popes could make and break emperors and princes because the peoples of the West acknowledged the Church to be a *worldly* power superior to that of the nation. At that time there was not, as there is today, a rival political institution which commanded a greater mass love, devotion, and sacrifice.

God supplanted in Russia. In modern times, there have been two attempts to *replace* God with the nation-state rather than merely to blur the distinction between the two. These two attempts occurred in Western Christian nations, Russia and Germany. The Communist attack on Christianity was, if anything, more savage than the Nazi.

The Communist philosophy is materialistic. All phenomena are believed to be reducible to concrete and quantifiable elements; the doctrinaire Communist lives in the "billard-ball universe" of the early nineteenth-century physicists, where measures of force and stress control society as well as the stars. The Communist philosophy is also atheistic;

the existence of God is denied and religion is denounced as "the opiate of the people," a consciously designed and consciously manipulated instrument whereby the ruling class makes the working class satisfied with its chains by promising that its suffering will be eased in the afterlife.

Religious sentiment cannot be destroyed, it can only be transferred. Divinity was at first assigned to Marx, and then both Marx and Lenin were worshiped; heaven became the "classless society," to be established by violent revolution throughout the world. It was a messianic vision, a "Christian heresy," in Arnold Toynbee's terms. Russian Communism, then, shares many characteristics with religion in the literal sense, even though it is both materialistic and atheistic. The Holy Trinity is Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. Marx wrote the Holy Book (*Das Kapital*), Lenin was his divinely inspired prophet, and Stalin, once the prophet's disciple, has latterly risen to the Soviet equivalent of God.

Russian citizens carry icons in mass parades about Red Square, but the pictures of Christian saints have been replaced by those of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. Capitalists, democrats, and liberals are enemies of the Church; Trotskyites are vicious heretics to be rooted out and destroyed. True, this may be devil worship, but the point is that it *is* worship. Letters appear from time to time in *Pravda* addressed to "Mighty Stalin," who "makes the winds to blow," "whose path we follow and kiss his footprints," who "has given us this pure, cool water to drink, Thank you Stalin."

Yet even the efficient organization and terror of the police state have not entirely stamped out Christianity; the new religion of nationalism has not entirely replaced the Orthodox Church. Thousands of Russians, at the risk of their lives, continue to attend Mass. And the Russian rulers have had to "compromise" with the Church, while striving to smash it. It remains to be seen whether or not they can succeed.

God supplanted in Germany. Dr. Ley, the leader of the Nazi Labor Front, once said, "I believe in one Lord God who made me and guides me, and I believe that this Lord God has sent Adolf Hitler to us." Baldur von Schirach, Nazi youth leader, wrote this prayer:

> Adolf Hitler, we believe in thee. Without thee we would be alone. Through thee we are a people. . . . Thou hast given us Thy Name . . . We speak it with reverence; we hear it with faith and loyalty. Thou canst depend upon us, Adolf Hitler, Leader, and Standard-Bearer. The Youth is Thy Name. Thy Name is the Youth. Thou and the young millions can never be sundered.

"We will have no other God than Germany," Hitler frequently declared.

At first Hitler announced his intention of protecting the "rights" of the "two Christian confessions." On July 20, 1933, a concordat was signed between the German government and the Vatican, at Rome, by Franz von Papen and Cardinal Pacelli. But soon after, both Catholicism and

the Evangelical Church were under attack. According to Nazi doctrine, the German "race" was sacred. Germany, though called by God to conquer and rule the world, was hemmed in by the powers of evil, incarnate in the Jews and a whole group of greedy alien nations combined for the purpose of defeating the divine intention. The Jewish antecedents of Christianity, its universalism, pacifism, and doctrine of brotherly love—the very heart of Christianity, in other words—stood unalterably opposed to everything that National Socialism stood for. Heroes do not love their neighbors, they subjugate them. Heroes do not worship a God of compassion, they hail a tribal god of "blood and soil."

A "Reichbishop" was imposed on the Evangelical Church. Orders went to the clergy listing both approved and banned sermon topics. Four thousand pastors formed an "Emergency League," upheld the Christian doctrine of the brotherhood of man, and denied the state's right to determine the Constitution of the Church. Thousands of devout Catholics and Protestants, pastors and laymen, were thrown into concentration camps for their rebellion and intransigence. Significantly, the Gestapo (state secret police) bent every effort to suppress publicity about what was going on. In the meantime, Reich Minister for Church Affairs Kerrl stated:

> There has now arisen a new authority as to what Christ and Christianity really is. This new authority is Adolf Hitler. . . . If this had been recognized, there would have been no split between Christianity and national socialism. All could have worked together to carry out the will of God, which is to secure the survival of our people. [quoted in 2, p. 84]

The majority of churchmen, however, continued to "compromise," with the plea that religion would be *totally* destroyed in Germany were they to oppose the government. The majority of German citizens accepted "Christianity" according to Adolf Hitler. Yet there were two Nazi failures worthy of note.

First, the attempt to resurrect worship of the pagan Norse gods failed, even though it was directed by Alfred Rosenberg whom Hitler had appointed to supervise Nazi ideological education. The majority of Germans embraced Nazism, but the majority scorned Wotan along with Rosenberg. Ninety-five per cent of them remained at least nominal members of one of the Christian churches (11, p. 185).

Second, the Church was the only organization in Germany which to some extent successfully opposed the state, and the Church was not and could not be crushed. Dictatorial regimes always single out Christianity as one of the first points of internal attack, for, in however weakened and compromised a form, *it is the only ideology of any consequence which claims to stand above and beyond the power of the state.* Science, education, contrary political doctrine—none of these has a secure foot-

hold for resisting totalitarianism. In a world embracing militarism ever more passionately, raising the nation-state to higher and higher idolatry, and veering steadily toward totalitarianism, the Church stands alone in its obduracy.

It was perhaps the greatest scientist of our time, Albert Einstein, who also happens to be an agnostic, who wrote:

> Being a lover of freedom, when the revolution came in Germany, I looked to the universities to defend it, knowing that they had always boasted of their devotion to the cause of truth; but, no, the universities were immediately silenced. Then I looked to the great editors of the newspapers whose flaming editorials in days gone by had proclaimed their love of freedom; but they, like the universities, were silenced in a few short weeks. . . .
>
> Only the Church stood squarely across the path of Hitler's campaign for suppressing the truth. I never had any special interest in the Church before, but now I feel a great affection and admiration because the Church alone has had the courage and persistence to stand for intellectual truth and moral freedom. I am forced thus to confess that what I once despised I now praise unreservedly. [quoted in 21, p. 194]

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Social Class

Long before the time when the early Christians were scoffed at by the Roman gentry as a bunch of slaves, paupers, and riffraff, religion was associated with social class. Religion has continued to separate the social classes. It is true that the division of Christianity into hundreds of churches and sects was partly based upon theological disputes. On the other hand, many sects, some of which later became churches, split off from already established churches in part because they accused the latter of having forsaken Christianity for worldly display and arrogance. In such cases, lower-class envy of and antagonism toward the upper classes provided some of the motivation for new creeds and religious organizations (19, especially pp. 29–34).

Social class in one way or another has always been associated with religious affiliation. In America's past, however, theological differences across the major faiths and even among the Protestant denominations was a sharper line of demarcation than social class. The steady trend toward cooperation among the denominations in recent years—through such bodies as the National Council of Churches and the International Council of Religious Education—was not caused by the waning of denominationalism, but the waning of denominationalism made that trend possible. The barriers are breaking down. A number of sects have merged with the established churches, and many of the branches of the established churches have amalgamated. Several obstacles remain, but the movement "is in the direction of universality" (5, p. 24).

Even across the major faiths of Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism, less attention is paid to theological differences now than in the past. Social class, however, has if anything gained in importance. Social class accompanies religion within the local community and over the nation. In any fairly large community there are upper-, middle-, and lower-class churches. While a local church membership is rarely drawn from only one class, it is usually drawn from one class more than from another. At least in Protestant churches, in those where membership cuts across class lines, "control of the church and its policies is generally in the hands of officials drawn from one class, usually the middle class" (12, p. 89).

Owing to varying circumstances, the most "wealthy" local church might be Baptist or Roman Catholic—instead of Episcopal or Congregational, which would be more typical. When the national scene is viewed in its totality, however, each major faith and Protestant denomination falls into a rank order of social class. Among the Protestant denominations, the Congregational, Episcopal, and Presbyterian generally include the middle and upper classes. The Methodist, Lutheran, and Baptist are "middle class" for the most part. The new pentecostal and holi-

ness sects—such as Holy Rollers, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Seventh-Day Adventists—are predominantly lower class (12, p. 89).

The membership of the Roman Catholic Church in America, by and large, is lower class. The general position of Jewish congregations is somewhat ambiguous. Measured in terms of income, education, and occupation, they would fall alongside the Congregational, Episcopalian, and Presbyterian membership, yet relatively few Jews are accorded upper-class status outside their own ethnic group. With this possible exception, Table 10 shows with a fair degree of accuracy the social-class distribution of each major faith and large Protestant denomination.

Table 10 Class Composition of Religious Bodies, 1945–46 *

BODY	PER-CENT DISTRIBUTION		
	Upper class	*Middle class*	*Lower class*
Entire sample	13	31	56
Catholic	9	25	66
Jewish	22	32	46
Methodist	13	35	52
Baptist	8	24	68
Presbyterian	22	40	38
Lutheran	11	36	53
Episcopalian	24	34	42
Congregational	24	43	33

* Reproduced from 12, Table 2, p. 86. The table was derived from a breakdown of four polls taken by the American Institute of Public Opinion in 1945–1946, covering approximately 12,000 cases. Each poll covered a "voting sample" of approximately 3,000 cases.

The tabulated percentages of Table 10 are approximations, not exact statements of fact. For one thing, they include subjective interviewer evaluations of type of neighborhood, house furnishings, dress, and the like. On the other hand, these percentages are good approximations: when further tabulations of the same samples were made according to such objective criteria as occupation and education, the percentage breakdown in each case followed closely the social-class breakdown.

The Church Competes with Other Social Agencies

The Church has seen many of its older functions either undermined or destroyed. Higher education at one time in this country was largely provided and controlled by the various Protestant denominations, a responsibility which the state now increasingly assumes. Charitable work within the parish has also waned as the state has taken over. In art, music, and literature, religious themes are much less employed than formerly (14).

Even church-sponsored social activity has been losing ground. At one time, one got the news at church, from the minister and the other parishioners, instead of by radio and newspaper. The round of social fellowship activities included morning and evening worship, prayer meeting on Wednesday night, Sunday school (and Sunday-school picnics), Ladies' Aid Society meetings, and the missionary society. True, this was not nearly so extensive a calendar of activities as most churches now sponsor; but formerly, outside the family and kin group, the limited number of church social activities was almost all that was available. Recreational activities were a much smaller part of the church program than they tend to be today, but because of a lack of competition their drawing power was far greater.

Perhaps more than in the case of any other invaded function, the Church has gone on the defensive in the realm of recreation. The Church is acutely aware that the attraction of secular and commercialized recreation has for many members turned the holy day of Sunday into a holiday, has made prayer meeting and "church social" pale in comparison with the radio, television, spectator sports, movies, public dance hall, Sunday drives, golf, and bridge. In a secular age, the Church adopts secular tactics, and so even many rural churches, with limited equipment, personnel, and funds, have Boy Scout meetings, movies or lantern-slide lectures, an orchestra, a basketball team, a dramatic club, and the like.

Organized recreation. Youth is the critical age grouping, upon which organized religion must depend for the future. Youth is also the age grouping most susceptible to the blandishments of secular and commercialized amusements, and so youth is the special target of attempts to "get them back into the Church"—with church-sponsored recreation. Controversy among Protestant clergy and laymen has resulted. One faction argues that our young people cannot be held with denunciations of "sin." They are going to engage in such activities anyway, and is it not better to have them play in the Church, where adult supervision can be guaranteed and "wholesome" activities ensured, rather than outside of it? It is better to fight the world with its own weapons than have our young people leave the Church.

Those who dissent argue that the Church has never extended its influence through an easy compromise with the "world." The sheer number attracted to the Church is no measure of its spiritual power. The Church lowers itself to the level of the cheap entertainment it strives to compete with. If youngsters use the Christian Endeavor as an assignation place, as an informal dating bureau, then the Church has won a Pyrrhic victory.

One thing is clear. While church-sponsored recreational activities may provide "wholesome" outlets for juvenile energies, they do not strengthen religion as such. Various other studies have corroborated the one made

of high-school youth in a Middle Western corn-belt community of some 10,000 population. For the young people of "Elmtown," religion—like wearing clothes or taking a bath—is something one must *do* to get by in the community. For 90 per cent of the boys and 80 per cent of the girls, religion has no "compulsive quality." Under test conditions, about 1 per cent listed "disrespect for church" as a "bad thing."

> The results of these tests agree with one another and with our observation that to most students the church is a community facility like the school, the drug store, the city government, and the bowling alley. To them, the church is a place where one goes to Sunday School, to young people's meeting, to a church party, and, to a small segment, it is a place to worship or to hear a sermon. It is not something special or supernatural as the ministers and some elders would have them believe. It is plain that about 7 out of 8 young people are not troubled by religious questions or problems. [6, p. 246] °

MODERN AMERICA: THE UNDERMINING FORCES

Today, as always, there are many deeply religious people who dedicate their lives to God. Viewed as a whole, however, modern American culture is secular, oriented to the things of this world. Whether modern America is compared with medieval Europe, pre-Revolutionary America, or middle-nineteenth-century America—to choose outstanding religious epochs—religious belief is revealed as insubstantial, as unalert acceptance, as weakened source of motivation and action. What are the forces which have undermined religious faith in modern America? Why did this development take place?

Brotherly Love and Success Striving

Like all other world religions, Christianity has declared that man is his brother's keeper, that "as ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise." Besides the call to love one's fellows in a selfless way, to seek to help them rather than wrest advantage from them, there has been the warning against worldly success, the warning that the spiritual way and the striving for wealth and for prestige in the eyes of others are incompatible. "For what shall it profit a man, what is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and lose himself, lose his own soul?"

All of the saints and mystics have uttered anguished cries against the self, its inability to break down the last barrier between God and person. It is very likely that only a small minority of even deeply religious people have, in any epoch, been able to make Christ's rule of love an integral part of themselves. Nevertheless, the social structure of the past was

° Reprinted by permission from *Elmtown's Youth* by A. B. Hollingshead, published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1949.

such that a *closer approximation* of Christian practice was possible to more people than at the present time.

Even with the rise of a new bureaucratic capitalism, with its emphasis on saving, profit, and individual responsibility for success or failure, the majority continued to live in farm families and small cohesive neighborhoods. Habits of mutual aid and mutual trust were not only religious ideals but also the very necessity of survival. Then, too, the majority were not sorely tempted to rise above their fellows precisely because the opportunity to do so was lacking.

Modern social structure. The last hundred years has seen a steady movement away from farm-family employment to bureaucratic employment, from the small cohesive neighborhood to the large city. Both trends have promoted a depersonalization of social relationships. The job no longer binds a man close to his home locality; it hires him out of his family and the area in which he lives. The job no longer is a common task performed with cooperating others so much as it is a narrow specialty controlled by distant and powerful others. The modern job requires little mutual aid among cooperating associates, for men in the same organization perform *different* tasks. It is a matter of doing one's own job so that others can attend to their jobs without delay or hindrance.

In the modern metropolis, one can hardly know one's "brother," if the term properly applies to the scurrying thousands, the faceless mass which moves up and down the street, which lines up before the ticket windows of movie palaces, which waits in line at the cafeterias. One is tied to no one, or possibly to only a few, by gossip and the sharing of experience. Relationships are not only depersonalized, they are also specialized. Those who entertain you, supervise you on the job, sell you a pack of cigarettes, carry your luggage—their interest in you, as well as yours in them, is limited to the narrow task or transaction that impermanently connects you with them.

In this atmosphere of temporary contact, mobility, anonymity, and specialization, there are wide variations in values, training, loyalties, interests, points of view, and prejudices. Each man can find other men with whom he is "at home," with whom he has much in common. But with most people around him, even most of those he meets, he will share much less than do men for whom the kin group and the neighborhood constitute the known social world. In the modern city, the barriers are up; there is a mutual willingness to limit most relationships to the specific issue, transaction, or task at hand. The case could hardly be otherwise. A genuine personal relationship with the thousands with whom one comes in daily contact would be as physically exhausting as it would be physically impossible.

The city is organized in such a way as to destroy further the sense

of mutual-personal responsibility. Hospitals and charity bureaucracies, not the Good Samaritan, minister to the wounded, the sick, and the poor. The police and the courts, not the kin group and the neighborhood, prevent the aggression of man against his fellow man. One who sought direct aid from his "neighbors" would very likely either be arrested or informed where he might go to file application for relief or redress.

Modern ideology. Despite the organized efficiency of the modern metropolis, each man is set adrift on the lone sea of self. As an isolated individual, he draws inward, and seeks a this-worldly redemption in and through himself. The most readily available means to seek redemption in modern America is to strive for individual success.

Our popular literature and our movies dote on the theme of success. Our college catalogues propagandize this or that institution as preparation for success. Our advertising assures us that wearing the right kind of shirt or brushing our teeth with the appropriate paste will open the door to the new heaven on earth. *How to Win Friends and Influence People,* a book of directions on how to make others like you so that you can then manipulate them into buying something or giving you a raise, is an all-time best seller of nonfiction—next to the Bible. Success is as much the obsession of modern man as sin was of medieval man.

It is no exaggeration to say that, for many people, success has become the modern equivalent of salvation. Both social structure and dominant ideology, therefore, have in the modern world become somewhat inimical to the Christian adjuration to love one's neighbor as one's self. The social structure welds men together in a formal, not a personal, way. The dominant ideology preaches self-seeking, going along by one's self for one's self. If one's primary aim is to rush past one's fellows, there can be no pause to raise up him who falls by the wayside.

Sin-forgiveness-redemption Cycle and Progress

The Christian drama is one of supplication to Almighty God to forgive His lusting, erring children for their failure to live as He has commanded. Not in pride but in mortification and contrition do we come unto Him. Only in and through Him, through His Son, Christ the Redeemer, is man raised up. "Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine; no more can ye, except ye abide in me. I am the vine, ye are the branches; he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit; for without me ye can do nothing."

Self-abasement is an attitude seldom encouraged by modern life. Particularly in America does man look about him with pride and satisfaction. It is here that an entire continent has succumbed to man's will in a few decades. The erstwhile wilderness has been transformed into the wealthiest, mightiest nation on earth. Modern science and technology

have opened up vast storehouses of treasure. We have exploited the resources of the continent, have spanned it with steel, and our power surges over roads, through tunnels, and into the stratosphere. Our man-made rain descends from the skies. We have conquered most of the microorganisms which for untold centuries periodically slaughtered our species. We fly through the air, plunge beneath the sea, and strip mystery away from the heavens with our instruments. The nature of matter is being pushed closer and closer to the realm of the known, so our scientists assure their awe-struck fellow citizens.

The doctrine of progress, in one sense, is a Christian heresy. It views a heaven on earth in process of becoming, and without the intervention of deity or providence; it is a paean of praise to humankind, an expression of unshaken confidence in man's ability to build, to solve, to conquer, by his own unaided effort. The doctrine of progress is not an American invention. It accompanied the rise of the new science in Europe. The doctrine of progress, however, has claimed more believers in America than anywhere else in the world.

It is true that many intellectuals today have voiced their skepticism, but the great mass of Americans hold firmly to the doctrine. Since they do, the religious way of life continues to be corroded by it. The citizens of Middletown may be warned by their pastors that they are weak and sinful creatures who must in all humility implore God's help and forgiveness. But they have coined a phrase, "Magic Middletown," which perfectly expresses their pride in the width of their streets, in their new buildings, in their wealth, but most of all in themselves.

It has been suggested by some that the threat of total annihilation from atomic bombardment will destroy man's confidence in himself and pride in his own accomplishments, will force him to his knees to seek God's forgiveness and help. That this will happen, at least on a large scale, appears unlikely. The bomb is a man-invented and man-devised instrument of destruction. The source of threat to America is recognized as one foreign power. That threat does, and probably for some time to come will continue to, provoke demands for human planning and human activity to counteract it.

Asceticism and Hedonism

The Christian tradition has been one of self-denial and mortification, of suspicion and denunciation of the things of the flesh. All bodily appetites have been viewed as making impossible or at least deterring from the spiritual life. Asceticism has particularly characterized the Protestant tradition. The old "Methodist discipline" banned smoking, drinking, dancing, and card playing. The Baptists were equally explicit. Although rigorous self-denial and self-discipline have by no means been required

by all religions, the very conception of God and man and the universe transmitted in Christian sacred writings, rituals, and beliefs do require asceticism.

Viewed in one way, of course, Christianity *is* whatever those who profess to be Christians believe it is. This kind of logic has serious flaws, however, for then all continuity with the past is broken, and new expediency can twist meaning into any counterfeit guise. If Christianity remains Christianity without self-denial and self-discipline, then Russian propagandists insist correctly that Russian dictatorship is the "people's democracy."

In any event, self-indulgence has become a major collective and individual goal; self-indulgence even has its own creed—"living one's own life." The Christian tradition appears more than a little alienated in a civilization where ice cream and liquor bars alternate along the street, where movie palaces tower above church spires, a civilization with millions of pleasure-bent motorists, a booming contraceptive industry, and a national pastime of dating and romance.

The "things of the flesh" are glorified. Illicit love, luxury, lavish display, frenzied merry making, the naked ego thrust, and resistance to and "rising above" convention are the themes of modern mass art. The advertising industry spends hundreds of millions of dollars every year to create mass dissatisfaction with the things one now wears, the house in which one now lives, the vacation one has not taken. Assurance is sought that one is having, or will have, "a good time." Parents are determined that their children shall "enjoy their youth." Our educational institutions, the churches themselves, attempt to ensure the same consummation.

Viewed sociologically, modern self-indulgence is neither good nor bad. It simply exists, and therefore must be described. The only pertinent issue is that self-indulgence is antithetical to religion and steadily undermines the religious way of life. Self-indulgence has virtually monopolized Christian holy days, which have become "holidays"—in the modern, not the traditional, meaning of the term.

Example of Easter. Easter is the annual celebration of the Resurrection, Christ's victory over death. From 1870 to the present, there has been a transition, at first slow and later rapid, from holy day to holiday in the United States. A sociologist has traced over that period a marked trend from "Christian" (announcements of sermons, descriptions of church services) to "pagan" (announcements of egg hunts, descriptions of finery displayed in the Easter parade) coverage in the New York City newspapers.

The year 1938 showed considerable evidence of the commercial use of the Easter symbols, particularly in the pagan elements of the complex. Fashionable

stores advertised pre-Easter clearance sales. One store advertised perfume in the following words: "Easter bunny plays cupid for you, bearing a gift of perfume to your lady love." Easter cruises were advertised, and Simon & Schuster urged readers to buy the perfect Easter gift—the Bible. A new adaptation of early Easter customs is found in the news account: "Egg Hunt Stirs Gashouse District—Four floors are combed—Sixth annual egg hunt conducted by the Gramercy Boys Club." The imputed American interest in giantism is shown in the following headline: "Brooklyn Grows Huge Easter Cross of 4500 Lilies—To Be Seen from Good Friday on for Two Weeks." [2, p. 67]

In 1939, the New York Telephone Company reported 35,512 calls in the twenty-four-hour period preceding Easter Sunday regarding weather predictions for that morning.

Restaurants urged potential customers in the following terms: "Bring the family to Schrafft's for Easter dinner . . . Most anywhere you end your parade, you are likely to be near a Schrafft's." This ad was inserted in the outline of an egg. Liquor stores advertised Easter week specials, and telephone companies urged individuals to send their Easter greetings by telephone. Trade was reported as heavy and the Stock Market closed for Good Friday. . . .

The cover of the magazine section of the Hartford *Courant* for Easter Sunday of 1947 carried a full-page picture of a young and beautiful girl, dressed in a white and rather elaborate gown, with an armful of lilies, standing in front of a large Christian cross. The girl is facing away from the cross, not toward it, and is clearly modern, not madonna-like in appearance. The verse and refrain of Irving Berlin's popular song "Easter Parade" express a young male's belief that "You'll be the grandest lady in the Easter Parade." Easter hats, romance, and pictures in the Sunday papers are the themes of this song. No mention is made of the Resurrection, and the Christian orientation of Easter Sunday, on which day the Easter Parade occurs, is ignored in the widely popular song. In 1948 a motion picture by this title stressed the themes of romantic love, success, prestige, and exhibition of expensive clothes and hats by unmarried females in the "Easter Parade." There was also emphasis in this picture on Easter as a seasonal rite. [2, pp. 67–68]

The symbol of the Easter bunny, who brings goodies to eat, has steadily displaced the symbol of Christ, who brings divine grace.

Here, reproduced in full, is a squib which appeared in *Time* during the Christmas season of 1948:

For behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy, which shall be unto all people. For unto you is born this day in the city of David a Saviour, which is Christ the Lord.

From various newspaper and magazine ads current last week:

"His Merry Christmas grows on the B.V.D. tree!"

"A brilliant new star in the perfume world. . . . to wear it is to be—Divine."

"SUBTLE BLASPHEMIES IN SILVER!!! If you'd rather die than give something dull, the schizophrenic stuff we call jewelry will save your worthless life. . . . Don't risk a crestfallen Christmas. . . ." [16, p. 38] °

Social Code of the Kin Group and Neighborhood in Modern America

Thus far we have stressed those forces undermining religious belief and practice. But Christianity, along with the other great world religions, has been more than a theology, more than a system of beliefs relating man and God. It has also been an ethical code governing man's relationships with his fellow men. The Old Testament is crowded with directions on how to treat one's wife, children, servants, parents, and neighbors in specific situations. Christ's doctrine of brotherly love was a generalized precept, but He also spoke in parables, to enlarge that theme. The duties of servant and master are spelled out, those of wife and husband, neighbor and neighbor, adults and children. "Whosoever shall give to drink unto one of these little ones a cup of cold water only in the name of a disciple . . . he shall in no wise lose his reward."

Where the great religions were founded. The great religions arose in the desert, centuries ago, where social relationships were well-nigh confined to the kin group and the small cohesive neighborhood. It is perhaps not without significance that Christ's only statement about secondary-group relationships was His cryptic answer to the Pharisees, who sought to trap Him in a charge of treason. "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's."

The "things which are Caesar's" in the early Christian era were few, and for the most part they were remote from the primary-group life and primary-group problems of that era. The "things which are Caesar's" were not total war, crop and rent control, labor-management disputes, raids on the national treasury by pension-hunting groups in the name of Christian charity, and resistance to their demands by others who thunder that the Christian virtues of hard work and thrift are being destroyed.

The modern social order is composed of much more powerful and ramified bureaucracies than those of the Roman legions, procurators, and tax gatherers. Caesar is no longer one, he is several. He is union and trade associations, the government (Federal, state, county, and local), the armed forces, the police and the courts, the Federal bureaus, the dairymen's league, the county medical association, the farm bureau, the consumers' cooperative, the Marshall Plan, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the United Nations, to name but a few. Many Caesars are organized to combat or destroy other Caesars, and all of them claim the allegiance of Caesar's minions.

° Courtesy of *Time*, Copyright Time Inc., 1948.

The duty of the husbandman to his hired hand was—perhaps still is—plain. The duty of a group of corporation directors to their 50,000 factory employees, who live and work in cities distant from the directors' conference table, is perhaps less plain. They also have a duty to the stockholders and to "the company" as an abstraction apart from the personnel who make it up. Given conditions of severe competition from other corporations, or world-wide depression, their decision to close one of their plants and transfer 2,000 men to the ranks of the unemployed is inevitable within the secondary-group, depersonalized context in which they fulfill their duties. They might argue, with justification, that no other course of action was open to them.

Impersonal determinants of modern problems. Whether a man is "worthy of his hire," or whether he is unemployed, depends in the modern world much more on impersonal forces than on the ethics of his employer, more on impersonal forces than even his own ability. A weaver's employment might depend primarily upon a good wheat crop in France to increase the effective demand for cloth woven on the Draper loom at which he happens to be skilled.

The important problems of aggression can no longer be solved within the kin group and the neighborhood, for they no longer occur there. National populations are swept into and out of international wars by depersonalized forces they can neither control nor stop. Who does not further aggression? The conscientious objector who refuses to bear arms but carries a stretcher into the front lines to bring out wounded fighting men so they can return another day? The chaplain who accepts the responsibility for maintaining the fighting man's morale? The weaver who does not know that his cloth will become army uniforms? The teacher who transmits knowledge that will be utilized in the mathematics of artillery-fire trajectory? In the modern world, literal Christian pacifism has become almost impossible, because any civilian in countless ways aids the state to prepare for and engage in total war by merely earning a living and being taxed for what he earns. Literal Christian pacifism may also have become impracticable. It has, in the view of an outstanding American theologian: "It has become almost a universal dogma of American Christianity that any kind of peace is better than war. This always means in the end that tyranny is preferred to war; for submission to the foe is the only certain alternative to resistance against the foe" (10, p. 42).

We live in a world in which major problems can no longer be solved by a literal application of personal ethics. But this fact has not undermined religion nearly so much as the growing belief that economic and political, in other words *man-made, events* control our destiny. Mass education, accompanied by the incessant clamor of on-the-spot news announcements, radio news coverage, and newsreels, rivets attention

upon man-made causes of change. Having little solitude, neither time nor interest in contemplation, seeing himself swept along by events that might be frightening but that are, to him, explainable in human terms, the average citizen today finds less relevance in seeking to learn God's Will.

Modern man's shifting interest in explanations of himself and the universe is shown by the recent increase in the proportion of popular-science magazines and the equally sharp decline in the proportion of religious periodicals. In 1900, 1 per cent of representative periodical groups were popular-scientific periodicals, and over 4 per cent were religious; in 1930, the proportions were almost 4 and less than 1 per cent, respectively (11, p. 451). An army chaplain has remarked, "This is one of the marked differences in the mental temper of both soldiers and civilians, as between World War I and World War II. Never once, in these later years, has any one asked me why God let the recent war happen and why He did not stop it" (15, p. 5).

The reader must not infer that Christianity has "failed" either to explain or to solve human problems. It is true that the personal ethic of Christianity and the modern world have become somewhat incongruent. What the above sentence leaves unstated is which of the two *should* be adjusted to the other. Depending upon whether one's values are anti-religious or proreligious, one may conclude either that Christianity has lagged behind the rest of society or that the rest of society has lagged behind Christianity.

Nor should the fact be overlooked that the type of society which is somewhat incongruent with the personal ethic of Christianity is about one hundred years old. Except for this brief moment in history, man has lived in another type of society for thousands of years, where all human relationships, for the most part, *were* controllable by personal ethics. By building too high and too fast upon the ancient foundation of kin group and neighborhood, it could prove to be true that modern society has only ensured an early collapse of the superstructure. If the religious formula is substituted for the formula of the sociology of religion—by forsaking the God of his fathers, modern man has hastened the Day of Judgment.

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CHAPTER 22 *Education*

> Forty years ago a man trained to proficiency in anything was respected accordingly, but was not regarded as an educated man, or "just as good," on the strength of it. A trained mechanic, banker, dentist or man of business got all due credit for his proficiency, but his education, if he had any, lay behind that and was not confused with it. His training, in a word, bore directly upon what he could do or get, while his education bore directly on neither; it bore upon what he could become and be. —ALBERT JAY NOCK

THE NATURE OF EDUCATION

The root meaning of the term "education" is indistinguishable from that of another term we have previously discussed, "socialization." Historically, it has meant the conscious training of the young for the later adoption of adult roles. By modern convention, however, education has come to mean formal training by specialists within the formal organization of the school.

Education as Total Participation

In one sense, education is the total experience of infant, child, and young adult as preparation for full membership in adult society. Anything that happens to the child, any experience he may have, is thus educational. But all peoples possess some system for conscious manipulation of plastic youth, to guide experience in the direction of socially approved ends.

Among preliterates. Education among preliterates is informal. Brothers and sisters, adult kinsmen, and in some cases the adult passer-by take a part in transmitting those social values and work techniques regarded by all in a homogeneous social world as essential. A large number of nonspecialists agree on what the child must and should know, and they take turns in imparting this knowledge.

Education among preliterates is also closely related to the child's present interests and closely related to what the child will *do*, later, as a functioning adult. A continuity between one generation and the next is preserved; unlike modern formal education, it does not drive a wedge between the generations, to create "discontinuities—to turn the child of the

peasant into a clerk, of the farmer into a lawyer, of the Italian immigrant into an American, of the illiterate into the literate" (21, p. 637).

Perhaps the vast gulf between preliterate and modern education has most graphically been stated by the same anthropologist:

> I once lectured to a group of women—all of them college graduates—alert enough to be taking a fairly advanced adult-education course on "Primitive Education." . . . I described in detail the lagoon village of the Manus tribe, the ways in which the parents taught the children to master their environment, to swim, to climb, to handle fire, to paddle a canoe, to judge distances and calculate the strength of materials. I described the tiny canoes which were given to the three-year-olds, the miniature fish spears with which they learned to spear minnows, the way in which small boys learned to calk their canoes with gum, and how small girls learned to thread shell money into aprons. Interwoven with a discussion of the more fundamental issues, such as the relationship between children and parents and the relationships between younger children and older children, I gave a fairly complete account of the type of adaptative craft behavior which was characteristic of the Manus and the way in which this was learned by each generation of children. At the end of the lecture one woman stood up and asked the first question: "Didn't they have any vocational training?" . . . that woman's question, naive and crude as it was, epitomized a long series of changes which stand between our idea of education and the processes by which members of a homogeneous and relatively static society transmit their standardized habit patterns to their children. [21, pp. 633–634]

In American history. Education in America's past was a point of transition between total participation and specialized training, or a point of transition between preliterate and modern types of education. Down to approximately the turn of the present century, however, American education stood closer to the former than to the latter.

The establishment of even primary schools as tax-supported public institutions was a slow process. As for secondary schools, "up to 1840 not much more than a dozen high schools had been established in Massachusetts, and not more than an equal number in the other States" (7, p. 700). Not until after the Civil War was the system of land-grant colleges inaugurated by the Federal government, the present-day state universities, supported by both state and Federal funds. Even so, until the turn of the century, the majority of Americans received little if any formal training beyond literacy—the reading, 'riting, and 'rithmetic of song and story. Higher education remained a prerogative of the propertied classes, for the most part.

The mass of Americans continued to acquire the bulk of their education informally, as part of an ongoing process of life activity. Girls learned the arts of homemaking from their mothers in preparation for carrying on a single-purposed tradition. Boys did chores around the

home and farm, adult kinsmen and neighbors supervised the mastery of techniques which had an obvious application in adult roles to be assumed at sixteen, seventeen, or eighteen years of age. In the earlier stage of the industrial revolution, boys entered small factories as apprentices, to learn an age-graded system of skills in order to become, ultimately, master craftsmen.

Those relatively few who continued formal training in the academy, high school, and college were either upper-class males whose families valued a classical background as a befitting mark of social-class position or middle-class males preparing for the ministry or the legal or medical professions. In the latter case, as with farm boys and apprentices, there was a close relationship between training and doing, or between training and what one soon would be doing, even though that training was more formalized and specialized.

Education as Specialized Training

Perhaps the main factor, if one can be singled out, which created a demand in America for formal education was the swiftly growing industrial-commercial economy. Expanding bureaucratic capitalism and its technology required a host of skills and adaptations for which the past was no guide. The home, the farm, the factory floor, and the rudimentary literary and arithmetic skills taught in the primary grades no longer sufficed to prepare the majority, for the new society year by year created discontinuities with the past.

> With increasing specialization, parental training becomes less and less adequate until reliance must finally be placed on socialization outside the family. This leads to the appearance of schools, separate agencies in the society to carry out the function of education. The schools have professional teachers, a physical plant, a large investment, and an aggregation of pupils. They can perform the complex tasks of education in a way that the parents could not. They, like the parent, are in an authoritarian position with reference to the child, but due to their professional interest in education as such and to their greater resources they can be more flexible in the kind of training they give and the newness of the knowledge they transmit. They are organized not only for the transmission of existing knowledge, but also for the discovery of new knowledge. They instill scientific discovery and advancement, and hence change, as ideals. [8, p. 219] °

Nevertheless, the school is a venerable institution in our civilization, going back beyond the ancient Greek city-state. Like the Church, although to a lesser extent, the school does not readily adapt itself to changed conditions. Both are institutions charged with the responsibility to bear and to transmit tradition. The professionals who man those in-

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stitutions can never be certain, in a period of frenzied and chaotic change, what trends are enduring guidelines to the future and what trends are mere fashions doomed by time for casual discard into the limbo of forgotten things.

Historically, the higher levels of the school have preserved a classical curriculum dealing with music, art, philosophy, literature, and foreign tongues, rather than with narrowed vocational techniques. In America, the higher levels of the school have attempted to effect a compromise between traditional education and the newer demands of an expanding and tradition-wrecking economy. This has become the focal point of the "crisis in education," to be discussed later.

FUNCTIONS OF MODERN FORMAL EDUCATION

To Complete the Socialization Process

The family gets the child first, but the modern family tends to leave much undone in the socialization process—the systematic inculcation of moral norms, social values, and beliefs. As the family steadily forsakes its ancient quasi monopoly over many functions, the school as well as other institutions steps into vacated places. A nationwide survey has indicated that some 90 per cent of the American adult public "feel that it is . . . the school's business to train the whole child—even to the extent of teaching him honesty, fair play, consideration of others and a sense of right and wrong" (26, p. 11).

Whether the school can do more than support trends of character already formed in the home has become a matter of debate. The fact that mounting pressure is laid on the school to perform a task once considered solely that of the family indicates, however, a widespread belief that much remains to be done outside the home. A sociologist has explained what appears to him to be a failure of the family to develop attitudes of responsibility in children.

> The situation has arisen partly because of our shift to urban life and to what the sociologist calls secondary-group organization of society—that is, a society marked by the disappearance of home and garden, the predominance of specialization of occupation, individualization of choice as to friends, religious life, and forms of recreation, and a general "touch-and-go," impersonal kind of social contact. Life in our cities, as compared to country and village life of a few generations ago, is superficial.
>
> Formerly a boy or girl living in a village or small town was trained in responsibility for the care of stock and for kitchen and other duties. . . . In contrast, today, with over half of our population living in cities, large percentages of our young people grow up without such obligations, without even a chance to assume responsibilities for such tasks. . . .
>
> As a result our boys and girls are growing up without the fundamental

training necessary for the freedom and consequent responsibility which all sane people believe to be essential to maturity. [32, pp. 178–179]

Whatever may have been added to the school's responsibility for socialization of the young, now as always it is charged with special concern for one area of social values—that of civic and patriotic responsibilities. The school, public or private, devotes much of its time and energy to the themes of cooperation, good citizenship, doing one's duty, and upholding the law. Directly through history textbooks, and indirectly through celebration of patriotic holidays, music, and poetry, patriotic sentiments are instilled. The nation's past is glorified, its legendary heroes venerated, and its military ventures justified. The cult of the nation-state is the special charge of the school.

To Transmit the Cultural Heritage

The cultural heritage, properly speaking, is incessantly transmitted to the young by all institutions. In the present context, "cultural heritage" is used in its popular sense, as a knowledge of the past, its art, literature, philosophy, religion, and music.

It is only at the upper levels of the school that any serious attempt has been, or now is, made to deal with this area. Of all the functions of the school, it is this which is most hallowed by tradition and at the same time most insecurely and uncertainly handled by the school. We will return to this subject later.

As Status-sifting Device

The school instills cooperative values through civic and patriotic exhortation. Yet the school's main emphasis is upon personal competition. For each subject studied, each child is compared with his companions by ranked letters or percentage points. The teacher praises those who do well and frowns upon those who compare unfavorably. In the grade school, this is done personally. In the college, the Dean's list and the publicity given "below grades" serve the same purpose. Periodically, report cards are sent to parents, and these also rank one child in comparison with the other children in his grade. This emphasis upon personal rivalry has been criticized in some quarters as needlessly damaging to the self-conception of those with inferior mental ability; it has also been deplored as training for rivalry rather than for cooperative endeavor. These charges are true enough. On the other hand, much of adult life in America is lived in the arena of occupational and social-class competition, where each jockeys for advantageous position to outdistance at least some of his fellows. The school's ranking system serves to prepare for a later ranking system, similar in operation even though more complex and wider in scope. Many of those who are emotionally frustrated by low ranking in the school are thereby prepared to accept lim-

ited accomplishment in the larger world outside the school. If the school's encouragement of personal rivalry is "wrong," in other words, then modern American culture rather than the school is "to blame."

The school not only ranks all those within its walls but also determines who shall remain to go on and who shall be discarded. The school sifts its raw material, passing some and rejecting others, mainly on the basis of intelligence, but also allowing such factors as diligence and social adjustment some weight (27, p. 188). The school is not a perfectly "just" sifting device, for the children of the rich may go to special preparatory schools or be spoon-fed by tutors to give them advantages denied other children; in the public schools, children from upper-class families are treated more leniently than those from the other side of the tracks. Upper- and middle-class children are also spared parental pressure to leave school in order to augment family income.

Accompanied by the extension of free public education through the high school and low-cost education in the state universities, the school's sorting process does, nevertheless, roughly correspond with native abilities. The school also roughly measures fitness for various occupational and social positions. The school is a readily *accessible* sifting device.

In our society, the school is the most readily accessible channel of vertical mobility; it is also the most frequently and heavily traveled one. While in many cases there is little connection between what one learns while young and what one does as an adult, prospective employers use formal educational attainment at least to separate the sheep from the goats. Along with recommendations, they use diplomas and degrees to determine who shall have what opportunity to prove his worth. Besides preparing for future occupational positions, formal education is also a common measure of status. Other things being equal, the high-school graduate ranks the grammar-school graduate, and so on, through postgraduate professional training.

As Vanguard of Progressivism?

"Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe," H. G. Wells once said. This may be true of "education" in the broadest possible sense, but it does not apply to the school. The school follows; it does not lead.

In the last few decades, the cry has gone up from many quarters that the school must take an active part in solving major social problems. Usually, although not always, spokesmen for this idea have been detractors of capitalism, and they have espoused a corporate, cooperative society to replace "the chaos of competitive individualism." Usually, although not always, such spokesmen have identified themselves as ideological socialists of one kind or another. The demand that the school lead in the vanguard of social revolution rang loud throughout the

thirties. Since that time, possibly owing in part to widespread fear of being labeled "Communist," this view has been publicly aired much less often.

Yet a modification of it—that the school can consciously and deliberately foster and organize "desirable" social trends, however modestly defined—is commonly accepted today, outside of as well as within professional educational circles. This belief, this hope, appears to be a delusion, except for minor programs that leave the power-wielding agencies of society unchallenged.

Community supervision. More than any other institution, except for the family, the school is expected to be responsible for socializing the young. The entire community thus has an important stake in what goes on in the school. Even twentieth-century American adults, who worship progress, who are fascinated by and applaud each new revolutionary mechanical gadget, are like adults in all times and places—conservatives, for the most part. One of the strongest bastions of conservatism is the conviction that "our children" should be taught the moral codes and social and political values which we (mature adults) were taught in the days of our youth. Adults, parents in particular, tend to watch suspiciously, to listen carefully to reports of "what goes on in school" made by their children who, in many cases, relish an opportunity to challenge "old-fashioned ideas" with what "the teacher told us." Not only unorganized parents but organized patriotic societies such as the American Legion and the Daughters of the American Revolution are poised in readiness to combat "subversive" influences. Ultimately the states and the Federal government, which increasingly assume control over a greater range of the total educational plant, stand guard.

The peculiar professional role of the teacher both reflects and incorporates close community supervision. The lawyer and physician are subject to public scrutiny when some flagrant violation of professional ethics is made known to the community. But for the most part they handle their own affairs; the relationship of professional and client is a private matter. The teacher's relationship with his clients, on the other hand, is a matter of public concern which is closely and jealously watched for any evidence of unorthodoxy.

The teacher is directly controlled by the community, in many cases in his private life as well as in his professional capacity. He tends to develop habits of conformity, timidity, and orthodoxy as defenses against a constant threat to his job security. As a person hired to transmit orthodox moral norms and abstract sentiments to the young, he is regarded as something less than a "regular guy" (31, p. 49). Like the clergyman, he is denied the intimate companionship of those in the community—businessmen, labor leaders, and politicians—who wield power. The teacher's role as a full-time guardian of the mores isolates him, off the job as

well as on. A survey of teachers' community relations in Ohio, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania disclosed that less than half held any official leadership position in club or organization (the majority of those who did admitted to being "pressured" to accept such responsibilities) and that these leadership positions were *all* in nonpower community-approved or community-demanded "teacher" roles—PTA, Church, Sunday school, and so on (6). The subordinate role of the teacher, in conjunction with a life lived with words and immature impressionable minds, may at times tempt some of them to revolutionary prophecy, but this occurs rarely, and when it does it is followed by swift and direful consequences to the offender.

The teacher's substandard salary, about which there is much more earnest talk than action, surely reflects his low professional status. By both the community and local school board, the teacher is also bedeviled by unceasing calls upon his free time—hourly and daily reports, collecting tickets at basketball games, suggestions on how to make the boys' lavatory more orderly, clerical and stenographic duties. "In one New York City school . . . the children recently got a morning off while teachers scurried about to complete follow-up reports on the principal's pet 'Have Your Head Examined' campaign against nits and lice" (28, p. 19). The morass of energy-frittering bureaucratic detail which is the average teacher's daily routine does not befit him for radical leadership.

Even in the higher reaches of educational administration, following, not leading, is the rule. The national Educational Policies Commission, in its pronounced shifts in program and philosophy over the past few years, has clearly indicated the subordinate role of formal education at the apex of its power and prestige.

> The question of leadership of educators in the field of social and political change has been much discussed, especially by educators. "Dare the Schools Build a New Social Order?" implies that they can if they dare. The present instance is evidence to the contrary. The policy of the Commission, which we assume to be acceptable to the great majority of American teachers and administrators, has been changed in the years since 1936 from the individualism of an industrial society to the patriotism and compulsory cooperation of the typical militant society. That changes in the philosophy of the Commission occurred subsequent to steps in the development of international crises indicates that education did not lead in the determination of events or even in the crystallization of public opinion. [14, p. 400]

Other agencies during the war were also acquiescing in the curtailment of civil liberties, and no criticism of such action is implied. It is nevertheless a fact that the Educational Policies Commission advocated such a policy, "voluntarily and without coercion," only after falling behind marching events.

In the higher reaches of the school, in the colleges and particularly in the large, urban, research-oriented universities, there is relative freedom from close community supervision. There are many reasons for this. The home communities of the student body are scattered in space, so that organization of mass parent pressure is difficult if not impossible. College students are or soon will be mature; their loyalties and identifications are much more fixed than are those of high-school students. Possibly in part for this reason, there is less general concern about a shade of unorthodoxy in professors than in high-school teachers. Most important of all, institutions of higher learning have a proud and respected tradition of teaching scientific truth without hindrance. Beyond that, the professor has (within certain indeterminate limits) the prerogative of expressing his own views on certain issues that are not demonstrable in the laboratory or by mathematical equation. "Academic freedom" will hardly ever be claimed by the high-school teacher, but it is a luxury permitted the professor, however cautiously he must indulge it.

The firebrand professor is rarely subjected to the direct and open attack which constantly threatens his high-school-teacher counterpart. Whispered confidences, however, a gentle clucking of his colleagues' tongues, perhaps a persistent refusal by his dean to explain why he has remained an assistant professor while men of his own age who have published much less have become full professors—any of these and other measures will doubtless lead to his reappraisal of "academic freedom," provided he wishes or is enabled to remain in the profession. It is more or less true of all life situations that the vested right to behave in a certain fashion remains a right only because the majority exercise it with discretion. The line drawn between arbitrary outer control and expedient self-inhibition is frequently thin.

The pressure on the teacher to conform is more direct in the American high school than university, but also more direct in the American university than, say, the British university. Those who teach in British universities also administer policy, and they are permitted some supervision over the allocation of funds. The situation in America is different. The boards of trustees who exercise final authority over both public schools and institutions of higher learning are frequently men neither qualified to judge nor interested in what education is about. For the most part, they are sincere laymen "chosen to guide education not because of their own attainments in learning but because of political preferment or business success" (20, p. 355). Such men are often more interested in established convention than in that potentially disruptive and imprecise ideal of academic freedom.

The school and its professional personnel, then, do not and cannot

stand in the vanguard of revolutionary change. This conclusion should startle no one. In all societies, those who teach and what they teach are more or less consonant with the other institutions, and deviate little from the line pointed by the agencies of power. Nor is any criticism of the school and schoolmen intended. Sociological analysis is neither praise nor blame, it is analysis. If we were to enter the lists of moral judgment, as convincing a case could be made for the school's integration with the rest of the social structure as for its departure from the rest of the social structure.

There are some who would argue that what our society desperately needs is more, not less, moral and social consensus. Perhaps most modern educators would agree with this statement, but they are concerned about the means being employed in some instances to secure it. The very reasonable fear that assails many modern educators is not of the more indirect and subtle pressures to conformity with which they have long made their peace but that today's hysterical witch hunts for Communists, real and imagined, may lead to authoritarian control of who shall teach, what shall be taught, and how it shall be taught.

Limits of attitude re-formation. The school gets the child *after* he has already absorbed a host of attitudes, beliefs, loyalties, prejudices, and shibboleths within his family group. When the child is enrolled at school, his attendance there is intermittent and only one of a host of influences which play upon him. The family continues to be the chief source of the child's attitudes and opinions. Even his play group influences these much more than does the classroom. The moral judgments of a large number of children in one test were found to correlate .55 with those of their parents, .35 with their friends, but only .03 with their teachers (22, p. 229, citing 13).

In a comparison of "liberal" and "conservative" opinions of 248 University of Buffalo freshmen with those of 78 upper classmen (almost all seniors), the following conclusion was reached:

> The most significant general educational implication is the slight effect that a college training has had on the real opinions of our students who are now seniors in the Arts and Science college. There is almost as large a proportion in the senior class who are conservative or reactionary in their responses as in the freshman class. Apparently this type of opinion is influenced far more by home training and religious disposition than by what the students are taking away from their college courses. [16, p. 431]

THE AMERICAN STATISTICAL TREND

If the mind of a civilization can be measured by the number and proportion who secure formal education, then modern America is preeminent. The lowest common denominator, literacy (the ability to read and

write), has been achieved by almost all Americans. In 1920, 6.5 per cent of persons fifteen years old and older were illiterate; in 1930, 4.7 per cent of persons fourteen years old and older were illiterate, but by October, 1947, the proportion had fallen to 2.7 per cent (3, p. 1).

Students

Except for war years, the number and proportion of Americans enrolled in school has steadily increased year by year. Table 11 indicates the situation that existed as of October, 1949. These figures show that

Table 11 School Enrollment of the Civilian Noninstitutional Population 5 to 34 Years Old, for the United States, October, 1949 °

AGE, YEARS	TOTAL NUMBER	ENROLLED IN SCHOOL	
		Number	*Per cent*
Total: 5–34	69,019,000	29,283,000	42.4
5	2,865,000	618,000	21.6
6–13	19,621,000	19,243,000	98.1
14–15	4,193,000	3,922,000	93.5
16–17	4,110,000	2,856,000	69.5
18–19	4,062,000	1,028,000	25.3
20–24	11,263,000	1,041,000	9.2
25–29	11,809,000	454,000	3.8
30–34	11,096,000	122,000	1.1

° Adapted from 5, Table 6, p. 9.

high-school attendance is now an almost universal experience. Since 69.5 per cent of those sixteen and seventeen years of age are still in school, it is evident that the majority now graduate from high school.

If the educational trend should continue in its present direction and at its present velocity, college attendance would also become the normal expectation of the majority in the not too distant future. As of April, 1947, the median year of school completed ° for persons sixty-five years of age and older was 7.7 (the completion of more than seven years of elementary school). The median year of school completed was 12.0 (graduation from high school) for persons 25 to 29 years of age (2, p. 1).

Although only a minority attend or graduate from college at the present time, the rate of increase has forged ahead much faster than has the rate for elementary or high school. Of American youth of college age, eighteen to twenty-four years old, 8.9 per cent were enrolled in school in 1920, 13.3 per cent in 1940, and 15.2 per cent in 1947 (23, p. 1, adapted from Table 2). Unlike enrollment in the lower schools, however, college enrollment represents no straight-line trend. Between

° The median year of school completed is that year which divides the given grouping into two equal parts—one-half having had more formal education, the other half less, than the median.

1930 and 1946, college enrollment fluctuated between about a million and about a million and a half and then, with the impetus of GI registration, it scaled over two and a half million in 1949. There was, in the school year 1951–1952, a decline of 10 per cent from that figure. How far college enrollment will continue to decline is a matter of conjecture.



FIG. 37. The expansion of American education. (The 1951–1952 data are estimates of the U.S. Office of Education.)

Full-scale war would make heavy inroads on college enrollment; on the other hand, there is much discussion by and pressure upon state legislatures and the Federal government to ensure a continued expansion of college facilities and enrollments.

In any event, while the population of the United States multiplied approximately three and a half times between 1870 and 1948, college enrollments multiplied over 40 times, rising from 60,000 to almost two and a half million. President Truman's Commission on Higher Education has proposed Federal-government intervention to double present college enrollments in the next twelve years. It is highly probable that if college graduates in greater numbers should continue to aspire to professional employment—the market, in a period of full employment, is now glutted

—the rate of unemployment among them would constitute a serious social and political problem.

Money and Facilities

Much publicity in recent years has centered upon many so-called crises in the schools. More than anything else, failure to appropriate and allocate "adequate" funds for public education has been the described villain. Because of this, our schools are supposed to be overcrowded and lacking in necessary equipment; it is said they fail to attract and hold good teachers because teachers' salaries are out of line with what educated people can command in business and the other professions.

Whether charges such as these are "true" or not depends upon the standard applied. A good argument could certainly be made for the superiority of the modern centralized rural school over the little red school house of years gone by. Year by year the states and municipalities appropriate increasing amounts of money to support public education. Standards of formal training for teachers continue to advance. There is less overcrowding in the school now than there was at the turn of the century. For each teacher in 1900 there were 37.2 elementary-school pupils and 25.5 secondary-school pupils; for each teacher in 1946 there were 32.7 and 19.4 pupils respectively (29, p. 9). With the fall enrollment of 1950, however, over-crowding had become much worse.

The publicity being given "the crisis in education" today, the heated speeches and reasoned editorials, hold up a standard that is an ideal, not one from which we have retrogressed. What seems to have happened is that a growing minority is dissatisfied with what the majority has more or less long been satisfied with; a growing minority insists that we spend more for public education than the majority is willing to pay. The majority attitude has shifted little if at all. It is an attitude that "education is a good thing" combined with a disinterest in the *process* of education and a disinclination to appropriate money for it.

This is a situation that occurs in many realms of thought and activity. The majority of Americans are Christians but do not lead a Christian life. The majority firmly believe in democracy but under test conditions are perfectly willing to deny such democratic "rights" as that of free speech to those groups they dislike. The majority "believe in education," but the $5 billion we currently spend for public-school education stands modestly beside the $4 billion for tobacco and the $9 billion for alcoholic beverages (11).

Teachers, even college teachers, receive much less compensation than other professionals whose training is comparable in cost and time expended. In 1948, the average college teacher received $4,098 in salary; the average dentist, $7,039; and lawyer, $8,121 (29, p. 60). Between 1939 and 1948, the general cost of living rose about 55 per cent, while

the pay of all teachers advanced only about 25 per cent. Between 1940 and 1949, the average salaries of all teachers had risen from $1,093 to $2,440, but when these figures were adjusted to the Consumer's Price Index, the actual increase was only to $1,448 (18, p. 99).

Relative professional underpayment is, of course, the source of the so-called teacher shortage, especially in the elementary grades. Were the American people willing to pay more than at present for public education, the so-called shortage could easily and quickly be alleviated. Of 134 male teachers questioned as to why they had voluntarily left the profession after July 1, 1941, "76% of the total asserted that low teaching salaries was a major reason for their resignation. Many of them admitted that they hated to leave the classroom and added some comment, as did the one who said, 'I would return to teaching tomorrow if I were assured an adequate salary'" (25, p. 72).

The present compares favorably with the past, in terms of teacher-pupil ratio and quality of physical plant. But the prospect for the future is indeed grim. No new building of any consequence was undertaken throughout the depression of the thirties and the war of the forties. The war boom in the baby crop started to strain the seams of the classroom in 1950, when there were a million more children enrolled in the primary grades than there were in 1949 (9). It is reliably estimated that by 1960 there will be 37,138,000 children enrolled in grammar and high school (9). This will be an increase of 10 million, almost 40 per cent over the 1947 enrollment (4, p. 1).

Building contracts now being let out are sufficient to replace obsolescent and condemned buildings, but they will not begin to provide for increased enrollments. One reason for this failure to plan for present—not to mention future—needs is the tremendous rise in building costs. If building costs of 1926 are assigned the index number 100, in 1950 they were 199 (9). It appears likely that unless the present trickle of federal funds for school construction swells to a flood, the program of education at the lower reaches of the school will deteriorate rapidly.

Mounting budgets and the failure of income to keep pace with enrollment have already caused serious deterioration of college-educational programs. In 1951, one-half of all private colleges in the United States were operating on a deficit (10). Raising tuition fees only keeps a bad situation from getting worse, for a time, because no college or university could ever remain solvent with student fees alone. The rate of interest on the investments of private institutions has diminished, from 5.27 per cent in 1930 to 3.74 per cent in 1945–1946. "Though Harvard added $72 million to its investments from 1929 to 1946, the buying power of its income stood still" (30). Alumni of other institutions are neither so wealthy nor so generous as Harvard's.

Many college faculties and presidents fear that federal control is

the ultimate price to be paid for federal subsidies. For many institutions, the Federal government is the only hope. Already many indirect approaches, the GI Bill and millions of dollars funneling into university research, are creating a growing dependence upon the government. Financial sponsorship of this kind expands the physical plant without adding a cent for instructional purposes. Meanwhile, the quality of instruction cheapens in even the wealthier institutions. Harvard has had to curtail its famous tutorial plan. Lecture sections become larger every-



FIG. 38. An overcrowded college. (By *Life* photographer Walter Sanders, copyright Time Inc.)

where, and distinguished full professors are "replaced" upon retirement with low-salaried instructors, raw with inexperience and with the signatures on their Ph.D.'s not yet dried.

THE CRISIS IN EDUCATION *

The really serious crisis in education has received very little attention. Teachers' salaries *are* low, but that fact is more a reflection of the crisis than a statement of it. Nor is it that there are too many, or too few, students, or too much obsolete equipment, or too few buildings or books or teachers. The really serious crisis in education results from the ever widening gap between the motives of students and their parents, on the one hand, and the values that the school, haltingly and confusedly, attempts to maintain and perpetuate, on the other.

* Much of the material in this section has been adapted from 12, an article previously published by the present writer.

Accent on Youth

Even within the community of modern Western nations, the United States has developed an accent on youth that has no parallel. A United States Department of Labor bulletin on family expenditures in Chicago has shown that in families with three children of whom at least one is under sixteen years of age, the clothing expenditures for the children exceed those for husband and wife combined, in all income groups up to $7,500 a year (15, p. 233). Voluntary donations for research and treatment connected with infantile paralysis are entirely disproportionate to the actual incidence of the disease and its mortality rate compared with cancer, that efficient killer of the adult.

Our censorship is designed to protect our youth. Our advertising is being addressed to ever younger consumers, today more and more the controllers of the family budget. Breakfast-food manufacturers act on the assumption that children will be able to persuade Mom to buy what Straight Arrow or the Lone Ranger tells them they should eat to grow big and strong. Much of the advertising aimed at the adult is designed to create uneasiness in the parent over his children's regard for him: "Your son will be proud of you if you drive this car." But over and above these considerations, there is the affirmation of youth as the cherished period of life. Our literature and popular arts stress the golden years, the important years, the years of carefree enjoyment, dalliance, and irresponsibility—roughly from sixteen to twenty-four years of age.

A new development. This emphasis upon the young was not characteristic of America before the turn of the present century. The shift accompanied a cumulative increase of social change. As change became ever more rapid, the middle-aged found themselves less and less able to understand and attune themselves to new gadgets and new transitional definitions of proper conduct.

Parents inevitably attempted to cling to the ways of living they had accepted during their own adolescence. Since parents, in any community, represented different age groups among themselves, the demands which some of them made on their children proved inconsistent with those made by other parents. Almost every child could point to other parents who were more liberal with *their* children. The result was increased conflict in the home, a growing sense of helplessness in dealing with the new generation, and, finally, an uneasy acceptance of standards that the children had picked up outside the home. Not only did youth become an increasing problem, but it also became, within the family, an almost isolated group, to be treated as separate and apart.

Other factors contributed to the same result. It has been estimated that only 43.5 per cent of today's population are the descendants of colonial forebears, and the high rate of intermarriage which prevailed

between "old Americans" and new immigrants has made the majority of modern Americans, in a broad sense, a second-generation people. This means an accentuation of the split between the generations, already widened by the accelerating rate of social change. Only the second-generation really belong, really understand, are ready to move in all areas of American life with assurance and ease. To be sure, the children in most modern American families are not literally second-generation, but since it takes several generations to eliminate cultural differences between parents and children stemming from immigration, the feeling of inequality remains for some time. Certainly hundreds of thousands of families during the present century have experienced, in some degree, a reversal of roles, the children interpreting proper modes of conduct to their parents. The totality of all this experience entered the broad stream of social change, and forced shifts in attitudes upon all families, even those which had had the second-generation experience more remotely.

The child as future success. Above all, there is the family's devotion to individual success, the real essence of the American dream, which has survived in ideology long after the economy ceased to expand at the rate of the late nineteenth century. Most elders retained faith in this vision by transmitting to their offspring their personally unfulfilled hopes. This was merely the family's reflection of the American faith in expansion, progress, tomorrow—a persistent frontier-industrial orientation. We have done much, individually and collectively, and we can do a great deal more. We want change, not stability; we look to the future, not the uncertain present or forgotten past; so, in whatever way we temporarily fail, our children will succeed.

An unprecedented standard of living reached far down the ladder, affording the majority of families the means to invest in the future—not primarily, to be sure, for the family, but for that isolated youth group which represented the future. Thus has come about the family's contribution to the accent on youth with all its ramifications, not the least exaggerated of which are the pronouncements of our child-guidance clinics and child experts who talk confidently of the "age of the child," "the child-centered home," and "the shift from the authoritarian to the democratic family"—this last meaning essentially that children are to be consulted on all matters that affect them.

Nevertheless, it is extremely important to note that actually we have not developed anything new that will serve to link modern youth with the adult world. We have no usable substitutes for that family-centered economy (most clearly developed on the frontier) in which children had a set of duties and responsibilities which were direct training for adult roles. Objectively speaking, all we have today is a type of tolerated parasitism. The adolescent does not fit, in any vital way, in the modern

social order. He is deprived of a place and a function "that will give a degree of security and a sense of usefulness that will make possible a modicum of self-respect" (24, p. 77).

Parents now face an isolated youth group which has renounced personal obligation and responsibility to them, while the parents themselves have come to accept adolescents' autonomy in a social world separate from their own. They have adopted a philosophy of sacrifice for a future embodied in their children. On this foundation has been erected the structure of the modern school.

The School on the Defensive

Alfred North Whitehead and dozens of others have pointed out that the educated man's sentimental, religious, and literary associations—which it is the school's traditional function to impart—are with a world past, a world neither urban, mechanical, industrial, nor international. In this sense, modern education does live in the past and has not kept pace with the changes which have overtaken our civilization. Little first-grade readers are illustrated with pictures of farm animals which many pupils will never see in the flesh. We continue to teach children the uses of thrift when later, in college, their economics textbook will probably inform them that mass thrift leads to international disaster. They are encouraged to develop habits of individualism in a world where great organizations make agreements binding on all their subordinates (17).

Learning and doing. With the content of education still oriented for the most part toward the past, and with all children now required by law to attend school until they are fourteen to eighteen years of age, the average student either is bored by or actively resents his classroom duties. Unlike the education of the primitive child, even unlike the education of our own past which was tailored to the needs of the upper-class youngsters who received it, the modern school widens a gap between what one learns and what one does or will do. This is why our formal system of education is so often joyless and tedious to the small child; there is no immediate relation between his own present-day problems and interests and the techniques he must learn, the knowledge he must accumulate. Memorizing verse, puzzling over the intricacies of fractions, learning the scaled notes for "Row, Row, Row Your Boat" do not enable him to do better the things he does, and wants to learn to do, outside the school.

This personal difficulty exists at every level of the school. The student now reading these lines is probably not a secure member of the upper class for whom modern education is an easily afforded luxury. If a male, he will find little direct connection (indeed, there is little) between our subject and the problems and interests which press to

the forefront of his attention—finding the girl to marry, establishing a home, perhaps selling automobiles, and making a place for himself in the community of his choice.

The success motive. While the content of modern education may be largely divorced from what the student will do after graduation, because of the prestige value of education there is an obvious relationship between school attendance and the hope of "getting ahead." We have already seen that a revolution of sorts is occurring in the American school, centering about unprecedented numbers in attendance. This revolution, however, has had little to do with education as traditionally conceived.

There are two major reasons why more youngsters are now in school than ever before. First, the fact is that we have little place for them elsewhere. A remarkable correlation can be drawn between the rate of unemployment in the depression and the number of state laws making public education compulsory, in some cases up to eighteen years of age. Compulsory education has forced many to attend school who have little if any motivation to do so.

Second, *higher* education offers the hope of jostling ahead in the race for individual success. If there is any doubt of this proposition, put the question to the school itself. The catalogues issued by the lesser institutions promise to train lower-middle-class youth to become teachers, salesmen, dieticians, and nurses. The publicity of the greater institutions, more unobtrusively, sees to it that the median yearly earnings of their graduates receive public notice. It *pays* to get an education.

So much has the promotion of material and social success come to dominate the thinking of many who are concerned with the school that the school's own spokesmen tend to rationalize course work in literature and philosophy as an ultimate, if not immediately recognized, aid in earning more money. Not so long ago, a rather pathetic old Greek professor pleaded with a faculty committee to retain his courses in the catalogue. He cited figures to show that professional men who had studied the language earned higher salaries than those who had not. The school stammers this type of instrumental excuse for its own existence in the face of the sullen, yet essentially logical, resistance to learning on the part of its young charges. If success is the goal, they have their own realistic ideas as to what is needed to win the larger cash prizes in today's competition—perhaps the degree, but not devotion to the process of acquiring it.

The American background and the curriculum. In general, America's social-class background is lower and middle class. A landed aristocracy does not create art and literature, yet this class has historically done more than any other to support their appreciation and diffusion. America's incipient landed aristocracy of the pre-Revolutionary period was demolished at the turn of the nineteenth century, along with primogeni-

ture and entail. Whatever stability of form and style may have been retained along the Eastern seaboard, it was the ever new and ever to be conquered Western frontier that placed its stamp upon the American ethos. Its drink—raw whiskey; its religion—the demoniac frenzy of the camp meeting; its drive—greed and conquest and physical action, held in check not by spiritual and ethical principles so much as by the sheer organizational requirement of loyalty to family and locality. The way was cleared for exploitation and commercialization, for the public-be-damned entrepreneur; for the specific middle-class value orientation which was and still is dominant for all social classes in this country—that all-pervasive ideal which makes individual success and collective progress virtually synonymous.

It was a new El Dorado of physical expansion, bustle, restlessness, pushing on. The men who wrought change received the resounding plaudits of the multitude. Those who contemplated and evaluated change were paid little heed and granted less importance. Too busy for leisure, too active for the cultivation of taste, and too taken up with the outer to appreciate or evaluate the inner, the wreckers and builders barbarized the European tradition of intellectuality kept feebly alive on the Eastern seaboard. When the family-centered economy deteriorated in the welter of city, factory, and independently achieved success, a cruder individualism, a firmer philosophy of dollars, became entrenched.

The development of subject matter in the American school faithfully reflected the changes taking place outside the classroom. It is no accident that the specifically American contribution to philosophy is pragmatism: pure instrumentalism in an exteriorized universe of impermanent materials.* It is likewise no accident that our psychology stresses not creativity, not contemplation, not the building of inner resources but "adjustment"—adjustment to the world not as perceived by the self but as presented to the self. In its most popular form, it demands conformity to herd expectation so that earning capacity will not be impaired. Squarely within this latter perspective is the report of President Truman's Commission on Higher Education. Speaking of the need to implement group democratic values, the only specific goals it urges are more buildings and more students, both rationalized by projecting into the future a hazardous estimate of the number of people who will find white-collar jobs.

The lower classes go to college. The very expansion of school facilities, however "democratic" in conception and execution, has further intensified the instrumental and anti-intellectual trend in the school and,

* The objection that this is not what either William James or John Dewey meant by pragmatism may be theoretically well taken. But who can deny that this is what pragmatism has become, in the hands of their disciples, and institutionally in present-day education?

most particularly, in the college. Before World War I, our relatively small college population was made up of upper-class and upper-middle-class males with some rudiments of a cultured background, who sought either to embellish a secure social position or to prepare for a profession of high prestige, with reasonable assurance of achieving that goal.

Since World War I, a swelling tide of first-generation collegians has deluged the campus. They lack any background for understanding or appreciating art, literature, history, or philosophy.* Add to this the fact that there is little connection between the work required of them and their very pressing present and future problems—social prestige, a good time, a mate, and a job—and their boredom and insecurity become understandable.

The crisis. The focal point of the present crisis in the school can be found in the dogged determination of a constantly increasing proportion of its students to resist the tasks imposed by a system that is itself divided on the question of what ends it is pursuing. The crisis results from a lack of common definition of purpose between the parents and their children, on the one side, and the school, on the other.

The school puts up no opposition to the demand of parent and child that it serve primarily to promote individual success. All are equally agreed on the importance of democratic-patriotic loyalties. It is another purpose which is the focal point of unorganized, and certainly for the most part tacit, opposition. The school has functioned historically as the formal agency transmitting the classical-cultural curriculum to the young. It is here that the school, itself progressively uncertain of the extent to which that heritage should be transmitted, finds itself on the defensive, fighting a kind of inarticulate rear-guard action.

An intensive investigation of college-student personal problems has disclosed that the two major orientations of the new student are social success on the campus now, in dating and in organized student activities, and career success in the future (19). The colleges retreat before the pressure of such motivation by listing fewer courses in classical languages in their catalogues and steadily including more courses dealing with "social adjustment" and vocational specialization. At the same time, however, there has been no major change in the philosophy of education that would rationalize the changes taking place in the curriculum.

The crisis in modern education does not result from the weakening of the classical-cultural curriculum; rather, the crisis results from the school's inability to decide what it is going to do with it, how far it will be modified, and exactly what is to take its place as it recedes. Parent and student could effectively reduce the dilemma by concertedly

* "Literary taste, not to speak of talent or genius, cannot be fashioned out of whole cloth at school. It must make a beginning at the mother's knee and be nursed on the hearth" (1, p. 78).

demanding vocational training (salesmanship, dietetics, accounting, cosmetology) plus techniques for better adjustment to the social world of the school (ballroom dancing, how to discuss football tactics intelligently, party demeanor, how to get bids from fraternities). But, if anything, parent and student are more divided in purpose than the school. They continue to "want an education" as much for its prestige value as for its vocational usefulness.

This is a knotty problem, for the prestige value of the degree inheres in its representing some familiarity with the classical-cultural curriculum; at the same time, its prestige aids in securing a job, even though it will not help in performing the tasks demanded by the job. The parent pays with his money, the student with his time, and while both want tangible and immediate returns, they also want to secure that admission card to the company of the elect, the degree. Probably most college teachers have listened to student complaints about having to take courses that "won't do me any good" in terms of the job future. Probably many college teachers have then replied that the student might transfer to a vocational school which would train him better, and for less time and money. Then comes the rebuttal: "But you *have* to be a college graduate to get anywhere or be somebody."

Who Is Responsible for the Crisis?

The ultimate authority for the supreme values of the campus, social and career success, is modern America. Were all parties concerned—the school, students, and parents—proclaiming social graces and job training to be preeminent over education in the traditional sense, there would be no grave crisis in the school. It is, in other words, the uncertainty and ambivalence of purpose which create the crisis.

Perhaps the new idea that everybody *should* "get an education" can be questioned, if education continues to mean what it has meant in the past. Is the intellectual way of life—the abiding search for the yet unopened door of explanation beyond explanation—something to which the majority should be exhorted? Unless all historical evidence is in error, only a minority in any generation has ever been fired by the quest, and it appears quite likely that the modern school is actively reducing the size of that minority.

Today, those students who most completely embody the dominant campus values, those who unequivocally "rate," are likely to be relaxed, spontaneous, and outgoing. The intellectuals, on the other hand, tend to be defensive, doctrinaire, withdrawn, lacking in self-assurance, and socially unpredictable. Ironically, those who most embody the traditional and official values of the school have become its pariahs, because the social world of the campus has little if any place for them (19).

It was during the rule of Hadrian that state-controlled education

reached its zenith of popular dissemination in the Roman Empire. It was also a time of unprecedented corruption, moral laxity, and superstition, in which Roman literature, philosophy, and science entered the twilight of their long and dark night. The golden age of American letters came in the middle of the nineteenth century. This was also the period when *popular acclaim* of intellectuality reached a higher point than ever before or since. The era of lyceum, labor-union library, public lecture and debate was proclaimed by a generation that was denied compulsory secondary education and easy access to the college.

The Campus Community

The social world of the student, with its anti-intellectuality and its major interest in dating, athletics, and social competition may steadily undermine the traditional purposes of the school. Nevertheless, it has achieved genuine community.

A camaraderie based upon common experiences—of examinations, eating together, loyalty to cliques and athletic teams, the shared confidences and dreams of the bull session—softens the influence of campus competition and affords a sense of shared community that for most graduates seems to be lacking in later life experience. Considered as a whole, campus values are more directly expressed than those of the adult community. In comparison, the social life of the working adult tends to be much more instrumental in character, much more devoted to living at the future, rather than within the present. For most American graduates, college was in retrospect a time of high adventure and exuberant good living—the popularity of class reunions testifies to that.

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PART FOUR

Social Change

CHAPTER 23 *The Explanation of Social Change*

> A dynamic theory, like most theories, begins by begging the question: it defines Progress as the development and economy of Forces. Further, it defines force as anything that does, or helps to do work. Man is a force; so is the sun; so is a mathematical point, though without dimensions or known existence.
>
> —HENRY ADAMS

In all times and in all places, men have been for the most part conservative; they have clung tenaciously to the moral norms and social values that came down to them from the past. Continuity with the past and preservation of the heritage from the past are for most men a precious hope and a firm determination. Culture and the social institutions which transmit culture to succeeding generations are themselves conservative forces. Nevertheless, the moral norms and social values, the culture and social institutions, of any society, all change through time.

WHY SOCIAL CHANGE

Social change occurs because all societies are in a constant state of disequilibrium. The mass of men may wish for a more perfect social equilibrium, a few men may consciously act to attain it—usually by resisting all direct and indirect attempts to modify what has come down from the past. But such efforts never altogether succeed. They do not succeed for several reasons.

The Desire for Change

Men are the most complex of earth's creatures. They want certain things and they want other things that seem at least logically contradictory. In the Western tradition, and perhaps in all others, men strive—either simultaneously or alternatively—toward individual liberty and collective security. Men may be conservative beings, but they welcome *some* change in their outlook, tools, and experience. Long before the dawn of history men migrated far and wide. In many such cases, archeologists and anthropologists have found no "good" (rational or utilitarian) reason why they left an area of abundant food supply for a cold and harsh environment.

This restless seeking after the new and the unexplored has been given

many names, such as the "inquisitive instinct" and the "wish for new experience." Terms such as these are inadequate, for they assume something to be static and unchanged which is itself dynamic and mercurial. At certain times and places, under certain circumstances, the wish for new experience is a compelling motivation. At other times and places, under different circumstances, it is held in check by countermotivations, such as conservatism, or the "wish for security."

Strong or weak, men's curiosity about that which they do not know and their desire for that which they do not possess are constant historical facts. Some men in every time and place are more curious than their fellows, more dissatisfied with at least something that is part of their common world—a tool, an idea, perhaps a religious system. The men who are consciously motivated to effect change, and who succeed, are the innovators. Often, they borrow cultural elements from other societies; less often, they invent a new cultural element.

If men are fundamentally conservative, why do some men borrow and invent and why does the passive majority often acclaim or at least accept their innovations? Part of the answer is that the subsequent changes that will follow the original change are unknown to innovator and majority. A new mechanical device such as the automobile was in retrospect accompanied by, even if it did not cause, a chain of further technological and social changes. The immediate purposes of inventors, businessmen, and public—joy of creation, increased efficiency and profit, and easeful and pleasurable travel—did not foresee such ramifications as changes in the patterns of courtship, the growth of the suburb at the expense of the city center, and the adoption of urban dress, habits, and style of life by rural people. The automobile, nevertheless, was one factor associated with all these changes—changes which were unplanned and probably unwanted by the majority. A change in one area or direction more often than not combines in unforeseen ways with other changes to produce unanticipated results. The total social order is in a state of disequilibrium; that is, any major change will reverberate far beyond that area in which it was first introduced.

The Malleability of Culture

Culture does not preserve itself intact any more than it creates itself or develops by itself. It is men who plan, strive, and act, not cultures. The social heritage is never a script that is followed slavishly by rote. A culture gives cues and directions to social behavior; it also sets limits to behavior. Cultures themselves change, however, in part because men follow somewhat different paths and because they are constantly beset by collective stresses and strains for which the past offers no guideposts.

Divergence of interests. Men's hopes and purposes are never perfectly integrated, even though the moral norms embodied in the social heritage

always stress harmony and forbearance. Priests and princes at one time quarrel and at another form alliances, at one time they quarrel among themselves and at another live in peace. The Marxian insistence that all history is the history of class warfare is an oversimplification, but it does contain a valuable truth. The clash of conflicting wills, purposes, and goals—spiritual, material, and ideological—is universal, even though it varies in extent and expression.

Most often, the incessant grouping and regrouping of divergent interests wastes itself in a mere reshuffling of personnel, with no major structural change resulting, such as usually happens in the internal warfare of all bureaucracies. Occasionally, however, the bonds of cultural transmission are burst, or a graceful leaching out in a new direction occurs—in either case, with a major change in social structure resulting. An example of the first is the Protestant Reformation, which rent asunder the universal Church. An example of the second is the rise of modern science and its attendant technology, which has been claimed by many to have formed the main features of the modern world—its wealth, materialism, and secularism. For the most part, modern science developed unchallenged, without an open clash of will and purpose.

Collective stress and strain. From time to time, a culture may be transformed by an invasion from outside itself. Preliterate cultures are usually spared any serious clash of internal interests, but they are frequently challenged by harsh nature, military enemies, or Western penetration. Famine and epidemic may decimate a tribe; such events are often followed by drastic changes in the institution of the family and in the division of labor. An unsuccessful war with a tribal enemy may humble them, subjugate them, and orient them toward the arts of peace. In recent decades, many preliterate cultures have been virtually smashed by Western penetration. Even if military subjugation and colonial rule are not their lot, mechanization, the ethic and practice of the impersonal market, the whole panoply of secondary-group organization may drastically transform their native religion, family life, and handicrafts—their entire culture, in other words.

The experience of a major invasion from outside has been much more rare in modern Western societies. Modern America, however, is now undergoing such an invasion. The threat of Communist world dictatorship has placed the United States—as the only major economic and military power left within the democratic-capitalist bloc—in the role of champion to defend Western culture. America's cultural tradition is alien to what has been done and to what will and must be done in order to assume that role: an enormous and permanently contrived military organization; a rapid extension of governmental control; a steady encroachment of administrative decision upon majority and even representative decision; and a snarled weaving of "entangling alliances" with foreign

powers. Many other causes aided in producing this effect, but it is the Communist threat from outside our own system which most swiftly accelerates the latter-day trend toward concentration of power and control. Resistance to military socialism is forcing America to adopt many of the enemy's tactics and procedures, however much in opposition to our own cultural tradition they may be.

Change as Unanticipated Result of Group Activity

Social change is never independent of human will and purpose, but certain combinations of will and purpose often usher in changes that were unplanned and unwanted. The more complex the society, the more applicable does this assertion become. One example of unanticipated social change has already been cited—that which followed the appearance of the automobile. Much more complicated and ramified in their effects are the unanticipated results of group activity. Unanticipated changes, more often than not, are mere by-products of a new technological device. The unanticipated changes which accompany group activity, however, often either seriously interfere with or defeat the goal sought.

The efforts of men in industrial society to make a living for themselves may produce slump as well as boom. The cumulative effects of millions of individual and group plans and decisions may cause a depression, which no one planned and no one wanted. At least some economists have warned that the labor-union drive to secure a higher standard of living through wage increases can ultimately result only in a lowered standard of living, via inflation, the reduction of the purchasing power of those increased wages.

The lowered birth rate of modern times resulted from the independent decisions of millions of married couples to maintain a high standard of living or to achieve a higher one. These decisions had nothing to do with the international balance of power, but they affected it. The nations of the West, with a low birth rate and a high standard of living, cannot put as many divisions in the field as the nations of the East, with a high birth rate and a low standard of living. The number of men in uniform is by no means the sole determinant of military effectiveness, but to whatever extent the future international balance of power may be governed by the numbers of men in opposing armies, the decisions of married people in the West to lower their fertility will have affected it.

Despite the earnest effort of Hollywood producers to grind out blatantly anti-Communist propaganda films, the total Hollywood product has probably aided the spread of Communism. The European intellectual wields far more influence than does his American counterpart, and he has declared open war on "America's poisoning of our cultural and spiritual values." Especially in French books, magazines, and newspapers

is the "menace" of America as cultural destroyer more feared—at any rate more publicized—than the military threat of Russia. The main "proof" of America's materialism, cheap and shoddy values, uncouth barbarity, and vicious determination to make over the whole world in her own mean image lies in America's movies. The connection between a Hollywood producer's decision to bring Betty Grable and Red Skelton to the French peasant and the resulting publicized contempt for the United States, and hence the strengthening of French Communism, may be tenuous, but the connection is there (See 18).

To repeat, the social equilibrium is unstable, itself always changing. It is for this reason that the "same" decision or action will have different effects, depending upon when it is made. Thus, a war at one time may be kept within manageable bounds; the decision to go to war and the waging of the war will result only in what was planned to result, for the most part. Such a war was the American Revolution, which secured economic and political independence from Great Britain. World War II was not such a war. The limited aim of smashing the German and Japanese challenge to the world was successful. The ultimate aim of redressing an upset balance of power was not successful, and, if anything, a more fearful challenge to the West emerged.

Both individual and collective decision and striving may undermine the very goal sought, if the equilibrium changes. Higher education remains, as it was in the recent past, the main highway to success. College presidents, college publicity directors, and politicians still hail education as the primary means of getting ahead. But several investigators are now warning that the saturation point has been reached and passed. Too many graduates and undergraduates have slowed traffic on the highway.

TO EXPLAIN A SPECIFIC SOCIAL CHANGE

It is much easier to explain social change in general than it is to explain any specific change. Time and change are one; time is a flowing stream, without beginning or ending, and every specific change is part of that undifferentiated stream of time. The social scientist, however, cannot surrender to the proposition that everything is ultimately connected with everything else or that the total past has caused the total present—even though that proposition is true. Fortunately, some contemporaneous and historical events are more closely associated with a specific social change than are others.

Some Preceding Social Changes Must Be Assumed

It is convenient to use the industrial revolution as a starting point for the explanation of many modern social changes. Such a procedure is legitimate enough, but the task of explanation has not been completed

because the industrial revolution is not thereby explained—it is assumed. If the task of explanation required that preceding change also be explained, where would the line be drawn? Some wag once said that to explain anything in historical sequence would take one back to Adam and Eve. But no social scientist would engage in such a task, and there is no reason why he should. While trends and events that occurred in the distant past continue to influence what happens today, the farther back in time investigation is carried the more tenuous becomes the straight-line connection. Only the immediate past contains all the factors which would theoretically explain a present condition. History has direct significance only within a limited range of time (9, particularly the "Simplified Diagram of an Historical Sequence," p. 190).

Conversely, the more remote in time the factor assumed to affect some present condition, the more do intervening events, trends, and circumstances weaken that assumed connection. By way of illustration, the American Revolution continues to affect American foreign policy in the present, but it affected American foreign policy more directly in, say, 1800 than it did in 1950. By the year 2000, the relationship will be even thinner.

Associated Factors Often Are Not Causes

Factors associated with a specific social change—perhaps those which can be expressed statistically, in particular—are often themselves not causes. They may, however, be used in the search for causes. Émile Durkheim's study of suicide is the classic example in sociological research of this procedure. When Durkheim compared the suicide rates of several Western countries, he discovered that the unmarried, the urban resident, and the Protestant had much higher rates of suicide than did the married, the rural resident, and the Catholic and Jew. But he did not attribute differences in the rate of suicide to marital state, residence, or religious affiliation as such. Durkheim pointed out, for example, that the suicide rate for Jews in Germany was at one time higher than that for German Catholics, lower at another time.

Durkheim reasoned that if a given religious affiliation was associated with now a high, again a low, suicide rate, at certain times religion combines with other factors to form an *index* of an underlying cause of high rates of suicide in the West. This cause he described as *anomia:* normlessness, uprootedness, individualism cut off from family, religious, and community ties. With this theory, Durkheim was able to explain a seeming paradox. The suicide rate tends to be higher during periods of economic depression *and* boom than when the business cycle is at midpoint. During a depression, men's usual aspirations and expectations are destroyed; during a boom their settled habits and social relationships

are at least disturbed, because their aspirations and expectations spiral upward. In both cases, anomia, or uprootedness, results.

A Specific Social Change Has Specific Causes

The connection between cause and effect in specific social changes is never a simple one. Because each specific time and place are themselves highly particular, the "same cause" will often have different effects. Likewise, the "same effect" will often result from different causes.

The same cause may have different effects, as shown by the following examples.

1. Population pressure by no means affects power politics in a uniform way. Some nations go to war when numbers far exceed the available food supply, but others do not. India and China in the past have not gone to war, even though they suffered far more population pressure than any of the Western military powers. Whether population pressure is followed by going to war depends upon many other factors: what neighboring states have to offer in land and resources, and their relative military strength; the type of social organization, which either encourages and permits or prevents large-scale military operations; and, by no means least, either a cultural tradition of militarism or perhaps one of quietism and mysticism.

2. Sometimes a certain factor operates in a consistent statistical direction for an entire population, but refined analysis shows that one part of that population is either unaffected or differently motivated by that factor. The great depression of the thirties was accompanied by a much lower marriage rate than had prevailed in the United States during previous decades. Among urban, immigrant-stock slum dwellers, however, the marriage rate increased. During the depression, an unemployed, unskilled worker who was married was more likely to secure public assistance than one who was single, and the "disgrace" of public aid and going into debt means much less to slum dwellers than it does to the "better element." The following explanation was given in one investigation made during the depression:

> The boy has a reduced success drive. He does not exercise the caution, foresight, and repression of impulse that the middle-class boy must use in courtship, as in all other relationships, to ensure that the channels of vertical mobility be kept open to him. In terms of social and economic betterment, the local Polish boy . . . by marrying . . . gains a better opportunity of holding a job, since, locally, single men are the first to be laid off; and his chances of securing work on the WPA, or getting on relief, are bettered. [4, p. 347]

3. "In some cases the influence of invention appears to be quite certain. Such was the influence of the automobile in building up the suburbs" (14, p. 87). This assertion apparently means that the automobile *caused*

the suburbs. More accurately, when and where the automobile is accompanied by certain other factors, the suburb will appear. There are many automobiles in Syria at the present time, but no suburbs. Syria remains a country with a few large central cities surrounded by isolated agricultural villages and roving desert nomads. The automobile was not accompanied by certain other factors in Syria as it was in America, and one of these was bookkeeping. It would be just as accurate to say that the "influence" of the American system of bookkeeping "appears to be quite certain . . . in building up the suburbs." Because of efficient bookkeeping, large distributive corporations were enabled to establish a network of consumers' outlets on the city rim, efficiently managed and controlled from the city center.

The same effect may have different causes, as shown by the following examples.

1. Sometimes what appears to be the same change is accompanied by totally different factors. The birth rate has fallen in Tahiti, and the birth rate has fallen in urban America. The causes are so different, however, that the phenomena themselves must be regarded as different. The low Tahitian birth rate has been explained as the result of subjugation by the white man, destruction of the native culture, the difficulties of making a living, and loss of "race pride." The low birth rate in urban America has been most widely associated with a *high* standard of living and the drive to maintain or augment it.

2. Suicide in the modern West, as Durkheim showed, is accompanied by factors of social and personal "disorganization." Western suicide usually results from desperation, misery, and the destruction of self-respect. The Japanese hara-kiri is suicide, but in a real sense it is also a different act. It is a ritual prescribed under certain circumstances by Japanese moral norms and social organization. Hara-kiri does not result from the destruction of self-respect; it is an expression of self-respect. Hara-kiri is not the result of social and personal "disorganization." No conceivable explanation of suicide in general would explain both Western and Japanese suicide.

By way of summary, social change and the factors which accompany social change are complex, variant, and nonrepetitive, to borrow MacIver's felicitous phrase. More simply, Henri Poincaré has said that history does not repeat itself. Any specific social change and its accompanying factors are a function of specific time and place. This does not mean that each social change should be, or even could be, approached as if it were totally unique. An analysis of the specific factors associated with a specific social change enables the investigator to generalize about one or more types of social change, after he has collected a number of cases.

Social changes are complex, variant, and nonrepetitive. This fact

becomes a matter of degree, however, when similar types of change are compared with similar types of causes. Although the falling birth rate in Tahiti may require a different explanation from that in modern America, the falling birth rate in Western Europe can be explained in much the same way as that in America. The factors which have forced the birth rate down in modern America and Western Europe are sufficiently similar, within similar total social contexts, to justify explaining the falling birth rate in both areas in the same way. Although hara-kiri may differ radically from Western suicide, Durkheim's explanation of variations in the rate of suicide will apply throughout the West.

The Special Case of Social Causation

The problem of change in the social sciences is much more difficult than it is in the nonsocial sciences. For most of the nonsocial sciences, the problem of change barely intrudes. The units of study in physics and chemistry are uniform in time and space, for the most part, so that repeated experiments reveal stability in the behavior as well as in the characteristics of those units. Change in the units of biology and geology does take place in time, but organic evolution and the rise and fall of continents proceed at a snail's pace in comparison with the rate of change in the units of social science.

Social change is swift. Social change is also complex, variant, and nonrepetitive, in greater or less degree. The most radical way in which social change is a special case, however, is that social change cannot be explained alone in terms of what forces or stimuli have acted upon the phenomenon under investigation, as change can be explained in biology and geology. The data of social science—men willing, acting, and purposefully applying means to secure their planned goals—are not mere passive recipients of stimuli. It is how outer stimuli are *interpreted* that largely determines social causation or social change, which is essentially the same thing. The evaluations, decisions, and actions of men, however they may be affected by outer factors or forces, play a significant role in social change.

Determinism. Conscious evaluations finally determine social change, but this does not necessarily mean that men possess "free will." Whatever happens has a cause. Thus, whatever persons or groups do to effect change is determined by whatever range of factors have impinged upon them. What follows is only a seeming paradox. What a man *is* is determined by his heredity, his environment, and his particular life experiences; but at the same time, what a man decides and wills to do initiates change in his own behavior, initiates change in his relationships with others, and thus may initiate, in however small a degree, social change.

The philosophical controversy over free will *versus* determinism has been waged for over two thousand years in Western thought. It cannot

be regarded as finally settled, by any means. Determinism has become a keystone of faith in modern science. The admission of free will, it is argued, would further admit the possibility of either an uncaused universe or a universe governed by a sovereign cause (perhaps God) which is beyond and above examination and explanation.

Scientific analysis of social change requires acceptance of the idea that behavior is caused in a knowable way. But the fact that men initiate action as well as being acted upon, that men respond to their interpretation of stimuli (at least in all social behavior) rather than to the stimuli themselves, does often make the tracing of cause and effect a difficult task. With the methods of analysis now available, it is perhaps more often than not impossible to state exactly what determining factors operated, in what way, in a specific social situation to determine one decision and goal rather than another. A nation's political leaders may decide to go to war. Each presumably made his decision on the basis of his heredity, environment, and personal experiences. Exactly how these factors combined in one moment in time to determine each decision, however, would be impossible to trace. For this reason, sociological analysis of change must at times accept the decisions and purposes of individuals and groups as given data, and go on from there to explain how these decisions and purposes were connected with further social change. This introduces the subject of the dynamic assessment.

The dynamic assessment. The dynamic assessment is the balance in the mind of the "conscious agent" of conditions and limitations, of available means to secure the goal toward which he has decided to strive. The causal role of the dynamic assessment is "to bring into a single order of coherent relationships the objectively diverse factors involved in social behavior. We begin with the dynamic assessment, while recognizing that back of it lie causal factors of another order" (9, p. 306). MacIver used the falling birth rate as an example:

> How does the decline of religious authority combine with urban congestion and the improvement of contraceptives in the lowering of the birth-rate? The suggested answer is that in *the dynamic assessment all the factors determining conscious behavior are brought into a single order.* The external factors enter not as such, but as considerations affecting or relative to the pursuit of ends. [9, p. 298]

Urban congestion, in and of itself, does not cause the birth rate to recede, but urban congestion economically penalizes married couples who have large families, and urban living more than rural living is associated with the motivation to acquire a high standard of living. Enumerated factors themselves will often explain little. A mere listing of factors, which ignores man's purposeful striving, may lead to serious misinterpretation. When the falling birth rate first came to the attention of social

scientists, it was found to be correlated with high economic status, and a causal relationship was assumed by some sociologists. At the present time, however, social-class differences in the birth rate are rapidly leveling off. Certain goals and social values have been taken over from those above by those below them in the social scale.

It is not the separate dynamic assessments of individuals so much as it is the weight of the combined assessments of groups and strata within a society which initiate social change. Analysis of social change, however, does not require a full knowledge of how every person views himself and his world from one day to the next, because people in one time and place tend to view the world in much the same way and to strive for much the same goals. In the analysis of change in a complex society, there is a further necessity to refine suborders such as race, social class, region, occupation, and so on. People in these various categories tend to interpret certain stimuli, for a shorter or longer period of time, in a sufficiently similar way to cause them to act in a similar way. That is why it is important to have statistical measures of the "exterior" characteristics of the group or stratum under consideration, and also as full a description as possible of the common experiences to which they are subjected.

At the same time—especially in a large dynamic society—the characteristics of various categories of people change rapidly in time. So do their life experiences, and so do their dynamic assessments. Old people in America, for example, have in recent years departed from former ways of interpretation and action. In the following chapter, the rise of the Townsend Plan is explained as the result of the common dynamic assessment that thousands of old Americans made during the early years of the depression. They were people with a rural-Protestant, lower-class background, for the most part, whose later life experiences frustrated their earlier hopes and expectations. They lived at a time when many other groups were organizing to make special demands for privileges from the Federal government, and the means of leadership and organization were granted to them. They determined in concert to redress the wrongs they believed had been done them.

In other words, to explain the *why* of social change, it is often necessary not only to have a full account of the various stimuli which impinge from the outside upon a group or stratum but also to infer how the group or stratum interprets those stimuli. Inference of this kind requires a subtle and partly artistic process of "sympathetic reconstruction." The observer uses "insight" to reconstruct in his own mind how the stimuli were experienced and what purpose and decision were formed as a result. This is a hazardous task, and only men of vast learning, wide experience, and intuitive knowledge of motivation—admittedly very few—have ever performed this task with any marked degree of success.

RATE AND DIRECTION OF SOCIAL CHANGE: THE FACTORS

Social change has occurred in all societies, in all periods of time. But the rate of social change varies a great deal from society to society. Whatever the rate of social change, it tends to move with a fair degree of consistency in one or another direction for long periods of time—centuries, in some cases. By way of illustration, for approximately a hundred years the United States has veered steadily in the direction of rapid technological advance, secularism, concentration of population in space, concentration of power and control, and what has been given the summary name of "materialism." All of these developments have been of one piece. They have exhibited what Sorokin has called the "logico-meaningful integration of culture."

The Ultimate Conditions

Both the rate and the direction of social change are governed in part by physical environment and perhaps also by heredity. The sovereign rule of the physical environment is, however, apparent only where nature is harsh and niggardly.

Physical environment. At the poles and in the deserts, there can be no cities, for there is no economic surplus. There can be little art and no learning; all available time and energy are expended in the business of keeping alive. Under arctic and desert conditions, maximum changelessness is manifested. When efficient adaptations to the demands of the physical environment have once been made, further change is both slow and insignificant, hardly meriting the term social change at all, since the institutional structure is left unmodified.

> The penalty which the Eskimos have had to pay for their audacity in grappling with the Arctic environment has been the rigid conformation of their lives to the annual cycle of the Arctic climate. All the bread-winners of the tribe are obliged to carry on different occupations at the different seasons of the year, and the tyranny of Arctic Nature imposes almost as exacting a timetable on the Arctic hunter as is imposed on any factory worker by the human tyranny of "scientific management." Indeed, we may be inclined to ask ourselves whether the Eskimos are the masters of Arctic Nature or her slaves. [17, p. 166] *

More temperate climates, in conjunction with available natural resources and natural means of transportation, *permit* rapid change. They will not *cause* change. The American Indian maintained an almost stagnant culture for centuries, in the very area which the European, with a

* From *A Study of History* by Arnold J. Toynbee, abridged by D. C. Somervell. Copyright 1946 by Oxford University Press, Inc.

more advanced technology and a different set of values, soon transformed into the industrialized behemoth among modern nations.

Likewise, the *absence* of certain such features can prevent the drift of change in a certain direction. A large and populous nation, without such sinews of modern war as coal, iron, and oil within its own borders, may either be handicapped in or prevented from becoming a great military power. The early collapse of Italy and the exhaustion of Japan in World War II attest to that fact. Even with a great technology that towers in size and productivity over that of the rest of the combined world, the modern United States cannot overcome certain brute facts of geography and geology.

There are a dozen major industrial areas in the world, and each sucks in mineral and agricultural raw materials and population closer to the most basic raw material—bituminous coal (12). Hence the industrialized nations, including the United States, are faced by a grim dilemma. The threat of atomic bombardment would appear to necessitate industrial decentralization, but such a move would drastically reduce the productive output of any nation which made it, and that nation would be unable to mount the offensive. So the physical environment limits change as well as permits its development.

Heredity. The operation of group-hereditary factors in social change is more difficult to demonstrate, even though probably present. Certainly no direct relationship can be traced between biological change and social change. Japan in seventy-five years was transformed from a feudal-agricultural to an urbanized-industrial society. Since even minor shifts in the genetic composition of large populations require centuries, the best that can be said for the "racial" argument in this connection is that Japan's population has long had the biological potentiality for rapid social change. Biological change itself was certainly not the cause of recent social changes in Japan.

On the other hand, individuals do vary widely in their inherited capacities. It is not entirely unreasonable to assume that large populations contain differing proportions of the highly gifted, although this claim has been neither proved nor disproved. It may be that biological factors have contributed in some degree to the combination of factors which created "great" periods of civilization, but attempts to prove this contention are reduced to tautology, or circular reasoning—the great periods themselves become "evidence" that the biological factor has been the causal one. Professor Hankins's statement is an example of this: "in the ever-changing texture of racial qualities and the infinite combinations still to be made there may in the future arise race blends quite as excellent as those which produced the Age of Pericles, the wonderful thirteenth century, the Renaissance, or the present era of European civilization" (6, p. 351).

The group-hereditary argument is usually based on the premise that major social changes result from a high proportion of gifted individuals in a given population, since gifted individuals alone are assumed to be responsible for such "advances" as are made. The "actual advance of the last two thousand years has been due to much less than one per cent of the individuals who have been born during this period" (5, p. 631). Professor Ogburn, on the other hand, has convincingly argued that the combination of social conditions either permits or represses the function of individual genius (13). Professor Hankins's own qualification of "racial determinism" may, however, be acceptable if accompanied by his own proviso that it "cannot be intelligently weighed" as yet: "the actual course of history is fundamentally determined by the conjuncture of racial, cultural, and geographic factors" (6, p. 367).

Institutional Integration

The extent to which the institutions of a society are integrated with one another in part determines the rate and direction of social change. Preliterate and modern Western society are polar examples.

Preliterate society. In preliterate society, any diversity of status or any specialization in the division of labor is narrow in scope. All members believe, act, and participate in a uniform way, at least in comparison with modern Western society. Being isolated, a preliterate society borrows little from other societies by diffusion. With relatively uniform individual participation in the entire culture, there is maximum resistance to change from within and without. Any voluntarily accepted innovation must be more or less acceptable to all. "Where societies are small and isolated, the accumulated changes mark the life of the group as a whole. Where a population mass is large and the territory which it inhabits is of considerable extent, change may go in one direction from one sub-group and in another in the case of a different sub-group" (7, p. 583).

Most important of all in the consideration of social change is "primitive fusion." Preliterate society is functionally undifferentiated. Not only do the way of life of all and the values of all tend to uniformity, but the social institutions are themselves "fused." Religion is expressed in making a living—the hunting party keeps an all-night vigil to secure the blessings of the gods before faring forth. "Such people hunt and fish and dig and weave and trade, but these utilitarian processes are woven into the social life and are invested with cultural significance" (10, p. 631). Custom and tradition saturate every area of activity, and the *same* customs and traditions weld the entire culture into a consistent institutional whole. There are thus both technological and psychological resistance to innovation or change. Members of some preliterate societies, where isolation has been preserved, have lived and died as their ancestors have lived and died for centuries.

Modern society. In contrast to preliterate society, change has become virtually the way of life for modern society. It is here that the "primitive fusion" has been split in two.

> The medieval way of life was much nearer to the primitive fusion than is ours today. A strongly authoritarian culture, based on religious orthodoxy, was enthroned and sought to be all-embracing and to control to its purposes the utilitarian aspects of life. But the fusion was incomplete. It proved impossible to weld into one the religious authority and the secular power. Economic activities developed in response to their own impulses, and the Church, which for a long time condemned "usury" and laid down rules about just prices, found it increasingly hard to control the direction of economic change. As a money economy replaced a barter economy and as labor became more free to offer itself to any employer, economic organization grew detached from the control of the traditional culture. At length the great technological advance of the later eighteenth century cleft with a new and sharper wedge the unity of culture and utility. The principle of utilitarian efficiency was liberated and built up its own systems devoted exclusively to the means as distinct from the ends of living. [10, p. 632]

Social Values and Moral Norms

Social values and moral norms greatly affect the rate and direction of social change. In comparative terms, preliterates resist all change, while members of modern Western society welcome all change. The direction of change is also in large measure controlled by these subjective aspects of society. The interest of medieval Europeans centered upon the supernatural with a fervor unmatched before or since. Modern Americans hail new gadgets and mechanical devices with an almost religious zeal. They tolerate with much less enthusiasm new types of bureaucratic-administrative control. They resist changes in politico-economic ideology—although such changes are taking place and will continue to occur, since so many Americans continue to want the things "socialism" will bring them even though they abhor the term "socialism."

Ideologies resist change much more than does technology, generally speaking. Ideologies themselves, however, differ in the degree to which they resist change. American ideologies of race relations, education, and religion have been less resistive to change than has that connected with the politico-economic realm.

Culture borrowing. It is not always true that technological change is more welcomed than ideological change. When the North African tribes first came into contact with the Mohammedans of the Near East, they took over their religion but failed to adopt Near Eastern science and technology. The norms and values of a receiving culture will also, in part, determine what social practices they will borrow from a donor and what ones they will reject. The mountain-dwelling Arapesh of New Guinea, described as gentle, cooperative, and unaggressive, eagerly ac-

cept each new art and dance form they can learn from the neighboring "beach people" but have refused to adopt their sorcery, black magic, and authoritarianism (11).

Peoples tend to reject an alien cultural form which they might borrow if no sanction for it can be found within their prevailing moral norms and social values. But often a people is approached on its "blind side," and a cultural form is accepted because it serves one or more interests. It is not then realized that the borrowed form may later disrupt the entire culture, including its norms and values. When the Tanala of Madagascar accepted the wet-rice method of cultivation, they were interested solely in improving their crop yields. They had no way of knowing that their religious and family institutions, finally their norms and values, would be changed as a result.

Sometimes changes are forced upon a preliterate people by superior military strength and administrative efficiency. European missionaries appear, backed by an economic and a political force which natives are helpless to resist. Christianity, accompanied by such a worldly retinue, initiates further changes to the extent that it cannot be blended with the prevailing native culture. In Samoa, where native religion had a minor role, Christianity easily, if indifferently, became a part of Samoan life. Ancestor worship, on the other hand, was the hub of native culture in Madagascar. Fear of angering departed ancestors had for centuries been relied upon to enforce the moral norms. Christian monotheism destroyed this sanction. Theft, formerly unknown, became commonplace. "Pagan villages are clean, since the ancestral spirits approve of this and punish slackness. Christian villages, where this sanction has been destroyed, are normally filthy" (8, p. 357). Moral norms limit and resist social change, but social change, in turn, changes moral norms. It must be kept in mind that society—and thus the factors of social change—is in a state of unstable equilibrium, so that change at any point effects further change throughout the whole.

The Technological Base

At least in recent centuries, the rate of increase in social change has itself increased, in the areas of social values, social action, and sheer technology. If technology is considered in isolation, there appears to have been a geometrical progression at work for the past thousand years or so (15, especially pp. 514–518 and 530). The number of mechanical inventions, the expansion of power facilities, and the productive output per man have increased as 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, and so forth, rather than as 2, 4, 6, 8, 10. In part, this can be explained by the sheer weight of accumulated knowledge. "Since an invention is made up of existing elements of knowledge, any particular invention can be made only if the elements which go to make it up are known" (15, p. 515). As the base

of technology has expanded outward at any given moment in time, the superstructure of future technology has been enabled to rise more rapidly. The geometric relationship between present and future technology is schematized in Fig. 39.

Stated differently, AB:xC::2:4 and DE:yF::4:8. This linear development, like all linear developments, cannot and will not continue indefinitely, however. Several investigators have already warned that the rate of scientific discovery, upon which the hope of further technological



FIG. 39. The potential of technological advance from a given base.

advance in part ultimately rests, has already been arrested (16, p. 129).

Technology does not cause itself. Although technology has advanced geometrically in the recent past, technology alone does not cause social change. It does not by itself even cause further advances in technology. Social values and the dynamic assessment also play a part. In one time and place, why are further technological advances welcomed? In other times and places, why are they resisted or rejected? The complex combination of changes in technology *and* social values which split the "primitive fusion" in Western society produced conditions that encouraged further technological change.

The falling death rate and rising birth rate depended in part upon advances in medical technology, especially in public sanitation; the falling death rate and rising birth rate, in turn, *permitted* (they did not cause) a more elaborate division of labor and the formation of a multigroup society. As many groups arose, as scientific method forged ahead,

as group and individual specialization created both a diversity and a greater conflict of interests, as the institutions of Church, state, family, and the economic order drew apart from one another, there was less and less resistance to new social changes, technological or otherwise.

There are two reasons for constantly lessened resistance to technological change. First, in a highly diversified society, where unshared elements of culture perhaps outnumber shared elements, a new technological element is introduced in only one part of one industry. The ramifying changes it may in turn produce throughout the total society cannot be foreseen, and there is no effective way for the unorganized masses to resist it, even if they choose to do so. Second, within a multigroup "mass society," the constant interplay of opposing interests and conflicting demands fosters a readiness to introduce and to accept new laws, new organizations, new propaganda techniques, new shibboleths, and new technology. The breakdown of unity in social values, in other words, prepares for the next technological innovation as much as the state of the technological base does.

Mass resistance to change in preliterate society is much more effective. If all men are hunters, then all men may resist the introduction of a new hunting technique. If an ancient way of making pottery is also a religious rite, a new technique will probably be rejected as dangerous heresy. Preliterate society is a unified social group; preliterate culture closely integrates its institutions. Neither characteristic applies to modern America.

The enthusiastic reception of change has become almost a way of life. While the old Hindu culture worshiped changelessness, modern American culture—more accurately, the persons and groups who maintain and transmit it—worships "progress." Yet conservatism, in however mutilated a form, remains alive. The "wish for new experience" is haunted by things past and troubled by grim forebodings of things to come, so that the "wish for security" is voiced more and more. On the one hand we cheer progress, which is what we call technological change; on the other hand, we beseech the Federal government somehow, some way, to stabilize the whole, order it, stop the effects of the very forces encouraged by mass faith in progress.

Invention and diffusion. The technological base is expanded by invention and diffusion. These two terms refer to differences more of degree than of kind. Diffusion is culture borrowing, from one people by another. It has been estimated that no modern culture owes more than 10 per cent of its total elements to inventions made by members of its own society (8, p. 325). Since an invention is "a combination of known elements into a new element" (15, p. 515), it can plausibly be argued that any invention is likely to result more from diffusion than from the contribution of the inventor. The technological base of any society, and

our own is an excellent example, is largely derived from various other historical and contemporary societies.

Our solid American citizen awakens in a bed built on a pattern which originated in the Near East but which was modified in Northern Europe before it was transmitted to America. He throws back covers made from cotton, domesticated in India, or linen, domesticated in the Near East, or silk, the use of which was discovered in China. All of these materials have been spun and woven by processes invented in the Near East. He slips into his moccasins, invented by the Indians of the Eastern woodlands, and goes to the bathroom, whose fixtures are a mixture of European and American inventions, both of recent date. He takes off his pajamas, a garment invented in India, and washes with soap invented by the ancient Gauls. He then shaves, a masochistic rite which seems to have been derived from either Sumer or ancient Egypt.

Returning to the bedroom, he removes his clothes from a chair of southern European type and proceeds to dress. He puts on garments whose form originally derived from the skin clothing of the nomads of the Asiatic steppes, puts on shoes made from skins tanned by a process invented in ancient Egypt and cut to a pattern derived from the classical civilizations of the Mediterranean, and ties around his neck a strip of bright-colored cloth which is a vestigial survival of the shoulder shawls worn by the seventeenth-century Croatians. Before going out for breakfast he glances through the window, made of glass invented in Egypt, and if it is raining puts on overshoes made of rubber discovered by the Central American Indians and takes an umbrella, invented in southeastern Asia. Upon his head he puts a hat made of felt, a material invented in the Asiatic steppes.

On his way to breakfast he stops to buy a paper, paying for it with coins, an ancient Lydian invention. At the restaurant a whole new series of borrowed elements confronts him. His plate is made of a form of pottery invented in China. His knife is of steel, an alloy first made in southern India, his fork a medieval Italian invention, and his spoon a derivative of a Roman original. . . .

When our friend has finished eating he settles back to smoke, an American Indian habit, consuming a plant domesticated in Brazil in either a pipe, derived from the Indians of Virginia, or a cigarette, derived from Mexico. If he is hardy enough he may even attempt a cigar, transmitted to us from the Antilles by way of Spain. While smoking he reads the news of the day, imprinted in characters invented by the ancient Semites upon a material invented in China by a process invented in Germany. As he absorbs the accounts of foreign troubles he will, if he is a good conservative citizen, thank a Hebrew deity in an Indo-European language that he is 100 per cent American. [8, pp. 326–327]

The technological base largely controls what *can* be invented, what *can* be borrowed by diffusion. A people with a simple technology may invent the bow and arrow, but not the bazooka. They may borrow the ax, but not the steam locomotive. What is invented or borrowed will also be controlled by the drift of attention and by social values and moral norms. The relationship works both ways, even though technology

does not by itself cause change in social values and moral norms. When technological changes have been permitted to occur because of present values and norms, the resulting shift in the social equilibrium may in turn change values and norms.

Technological change affects social values and moral norms. Several major shifts in social values and moral norms have occurred in recent decades. One of them is a movement away from family and community loyalty and responsibility, a movement toward individualism. At least up to the present time the industrial revolution has been a constantly accelerating process, and it has intensified social and psychological uprootedness as it has continued.

Technological invention and industrial expansion rapidly develop some industries and destroy others; they demand new skills and discard old ones. Human fate is decided at a distance. In the twenties, some remote technicians synchronized film and sound, and hundreds of professional actors were out of a job. Rail rates are readjusted by a Washington bureau in favor of the South, and thousands of textile workers in New Bedford must migrate or learn a new trade. Factories in the fields dispossess the independent farmer. War orders pour into one area and depopulate neighboring ones; peace reverses the flow of population. The continuity of experience between the generations is shattered. Between 1920 and 1934, over 46 million Americans moved from country to city or from city to country; during World War II, it has been estimated, 30 million Americans changed residence.

Because the expansion of technology has increased the average output in "hand" work, larger proportions of the gainfully employed have been released to perform "head" work. This kind of work requires manipulation of people instead of things. Manipulating others and being manipulated by others enhance individualism, the sense of being alone and operating alone.

Because of the rapidity and scope of recent change, much of it technological, individualism has steadily supplanted traditionalism; an uprooted tendency to "live one's own life" has supplanted loyalty to family, kin group, and neighborhood. The remote hierarchies of control and management in the economic and governmental spheres, called into being to administer the complex division of labor accentuated by technological accumulation, make further inroads on the individual's sense of responsibility toward others. This is only to repeat the important fact that objective and subjective factors of social change are interdependent.

The Role of the Innovator

What of the men who stand at the focal point of social change, the men who invent or transmit the bow and arrow, the printing press, the internal-combustion engine? What of the leaders of reform movements,

the authors of religious works and revolutionary tracts that capture the imagination and will of millions of readers? What of the generals who devise new military tactics, the politicians who introduce new forms of governmental administration? Do they, and to what extent do they, make social change? Or are they mere puppets, performing their antics as the firm hand of "social forces" tugs now one way, now another?

Sociological theory, as opposed to the interpretations of most historians, has stressed the role of "social forces." The given combination of circumstances, if it does not produce great men, is at least supposed to make possible the manifestation of their individual abilities. "Full many a flower is born to blush unseen," and the time and place of blossoming are presumed to create fame and seeming influence, or to deny attention by contemporaries and posterity. It has been pointed out that over a hundred inventions in recent years have been "invented" by two or more persons who were not in communication with one another. This would seem to indicate that the pressure of the economy, plus the availability of all the necessary elements already in the technological base, called forth the invention—if one man had failed, another would have succeeded. The accumulated evidence for a theory of biological evolution was ready at hand in the middle of the nineteenth century. "So also the theory of evolution and natural selection would have been developed even if Wallace and Darwin had never lived" (13, p. 227).

New mechanical devices and scientific discoveries depend upon the available accumulation of knowledge. With thousands of men constantly employed in these pursuits in modern civilization, it is plausible to assume that sooner or later any device or discovery that makes its appearance would have done so without the intervention of the one man historically associated with it. On the other hand, in some cases at least, without the intervention of one man there would have been a *delay*, and it again seems plausible that in some degree certain lines of development would have been different because of that delay.

Had Darwin's *systematic* theory of evolution (his was the first) waited ten years for some other man's expression, the impact upon philosophy, religion, and science might have been different, at least modified in one or another direction. Had Einstein never lived, his theoretical work in physics might have later stemmed from some other man's mind, but that delay would also have delayed the invention of the atomic bomb; this subsequent delay might very well have had incalculable effects upon the entire course of recent history.

Nontechnological innovation. It is the dynamic importance of leadership outside the fields of science and technology that is difficult to deny. The forces enabling leadership to be assumed, to take certain directions, must be present, in the fields of politics, religion, and reform movements. Still, the personality, ego drives, abilities, and ambitions of individual

dynamic leaders would appear in some measure to affect what they accomplish.

What if Lincoln had never lived? Luther, Hitler, Stalin? What if Franklin D. Roosevelt had been granted ten more years to live? We cannot answer questions like these because we cannot duplicate the total set of conditions prevailing at any given moment in time and test, first including the presence of the supreme dynamic leader, and second removing him. Some would argue that the given set of historical circumstances in each case would have produced the man they did. This again can neither be proved nor disproved. On the other hand, since each man is unique, the irreducible peculiarities of each leader *to some degree* must be assumed to give direction to that which he leads.

In the following chapter, two social movements, Moral Rearmament and the Townsend Plan, are analyzed in considerable detail. In each case, the set of historical circumstances which made possible these social movements is described, but each social movement in its own historical development is treated, had to be treated, as much like a biography as anything else. At that time and place, modern America, many similar social movements arose, capitalizing upon the same circumstances, but most of these others swiftly waned and died. The fact that these two succeeded where many others failed is not entirely attributable to the kind and quality of leadership they had, but neither can that leadership be totally discounted.

The question of free will need not be raised. Personality can remain entirely explained by a combination of heredity, environment, and personal experience. But personalities do differ. Even though it is true that the given set of circumstances largely determines what type of leader shall step to the fore, what happens then will in part—in a strictly deterministic view—be determined by what determined him rather than by what determined some other potential leader.

It has been argued that since intelligence in any population is distributed according to the normal curve, the proportion of highly gifted men in any two populations can be presumed to be fairly constant. The role of the innovator is thus discounted. Such an argument has a limited application. Genius is a crucial requirement only in the fields of technological invention and scientific discovery. In politics, religion, and social reform, traits of iron determination, disciplined will, monolithic zeal, fervency of belief, ruthlessness, in some cases the ability to lie and use guile and chicanery, in any case a dynamic presence that fires the imagination of the multitude—these qualities are, if anything, of far more vital importance than intellectual capacity of a high order.

At certain times and places, fanatical devotion and disciplined will have erupted and boiled in the current of history and changed its course. The explanation of much social change must take due consideration of

men as well as events. The early Christian Church, the October Revolution in Russia, and the Counter Reformation in Europe, among thousands of other such social changes, require a consideration of the character of the men whose vision and determination conquered.

Example of the Society of Jesus. The Jesuits, founded by Ignatius Loyola, have for centuries been world changers. Always before them has remained the vision of a world united under one Church. Certain aims and programs, here and there, have gone awry; the purpose has been held firm. If the Chinese Emperor loved traditional Chinese art, then groups of Jesuits spent years mastering an alien craft so that they could approach him on his blind side and seek to convert him, after painting murals the like of which he had never seen. They were proud patricians among the Japanese, who distrusted meekness, Christian or otherwise. They were meek and humble folk among the Indians of South America, who could be reached in this manner. When, anywhere in the world, the time of persecution came, they went to torture and death with head high and lips mute, to serve as a memorial to both Christian and pagan natives for generations to follow.

If the Church's view of the universe is challenged by modern science, Jesuits become modern scientists, in order to challenge modern science in turn. During the late Middle Ages, they wrote tracts to prove the sovereignty of the people, other tracts to prove the divine right of kings to rule, when time and circumstances dictated either course. They were repudiated by their own supreme temporal authority. Pope Clement XIV in 1773 pronounced the complete suppression of the Society of Jesus. It did not die; it continued its work, and ultimately was taken back into the body of the Church.

When the Reformation appeared victorious in Germany, when nine-tenths of the population had already gone over to Protestantism, and when Rome itself was resigned to the complete secession of Germany from the Catholic Church, it was the Society of Jesus, now with soft words, again with force and vituperation, now with undercover espionage, again with military alliances, which checked the further advance of Protestantism (3, p. 346).

For centuries the Jesuits have made the postulate of free will the cornerstone of their philosophy. The Jesuit belief in free will has strengthened their resolve to accomplish their ends in the face of insuperable obstacles. Paradoxically, the Jesuit belief in free will has determined much of history.

The Role of Power

The dynamic assessment is the point at which social change is initiated. Back of it lie all the other factors enumerated—the quality of leadership, the technological base, social values and moral norms, institutional

integration, and the ultimate conditions of physical environment and heredity. All of these factors determine limitations and opportunities for the weighing of various alternatives, and they set restrictions to and afford means for decision and action. The dynamic assessments of all in a population, however, by no means equally determine social change, its pace and its direction. The dynamic assessments of those who wield power in any society, their ambitions and goals and their uses of opportunity, are much more deterministic of change than the dynamic assessments of those who do not wield power.

In no society do the rulers wield power in a purely arbitrary way. It has been said that he who leads the mob must follow it. The dynamic assessments of followers in some measure place limits upon and channel the activities of leaders. This was clearly apparent in our brief discussion of the Jesuits. To the degree that power is concentrated in a few hands, nevertheless, to that degree is the mob led rather than followed. Modern dictatorships have veered close to a condition of absolute power. Where political leaders control the economy, and thus every man's job, where they control the channels of communication, schools, press, radio, and motion-picture industry, they are then enabled almost to create the dynamic assessments of the masses to suit their own purposes.

Nowhere is the fallacy that the technological base is the independent cause of social change more thoroughly disproved than in the United States government's recent extension of control over scientific and technological research, in the interest of military efficiency (1). One inevitable, perhaps necessary, result of this decision has been a block placed in the path of both "pure" research and the advancement of technology in nonmilitary directions.

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CHAPTER 24 *Social Movements*

> No human effort on a grand scale has ever resulted according to the purpose of its projectors. The advantages are always incidental. Man's accidents are God's purposes. We miss the good we sought, and do the good we little cared for.
>
> —NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE

No social change is independent of human will and purpose, but much social change—as was pointed out in the previous chapter—is more the by-product of men's dynamic assessments than their intent. Social movements, on the other hand, are examples of conscious striving to effect change. "Social movements can be viewed as collective enterprises to establish a new order of life" (2, p. 255). As will shortly become clear, the desired "new order" is, however, a renewal of something past. The new order is a demand for something once possessed that is now denied, or at least a demand for something men *believe* was once theirs.

CAUSE AND RESULT OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Before a social movement appears, those who are to join it are deeply dissatisfied with their lot. Their dissatisfaction stems from social change which has made cherished values insecure. Their self-conceptions have been damaged; their expectations of certain roles and goals have been frustrated. Thus, modern unionization has been interpreted as capitalizing on the "break in the skill hierarchy" of manual employment—industrial workers are ready to unionize on a mass scale when the great majority of them no longer have much opportunity to rise, when the American dream for them has dimmed, when automatic machinery robs them of advancement in skill and status (19, pp. 87–89).

Social movements do not emerge from sheer frustration alone. Social movements appear when mass frustration is channeled into collective endeavor to change those conditions believed to be responsible. Collective endeavor can appear and be maintained only when three conditions are fulfilled: mass dissatisfaction is aimed at some group, institution, or other symbolized menace; the total society is structured in such a way as to permit separative organization within it; and strong leadership and efficient organization emerge early in the movement's history. When all these conditions are met, the given social movement is likely

to achieve some measure of sucess. It will then in turn effect changes throughout the total society of which it has become a part.

Fail to Occur among Preliterates

Social movements are not encouraged in preliterate society. Most social movements are directed against some other segment of the population; at the very least, they claim special privileges for some as distinct from others. Preliterate social organization, however, is inclusive. A preliterate society is one primary group, or, if it is relatively large, it is held together by a number of overlapping primary groups. In either event, although an individual might resist, attack, or make unique demands upon another individual, he could not organize one group against another, for then the whole society would be in danger.

Social change does occur in preliterate society, but not with deliberate attempts to institute change. Protracted starvation, or military defeat or victory, for example, might be followed by a number of institutional changes, but these would take place evenly and concurrently throughout the population, and most likely without the purposive organization of some against others.

In Modern Society

Social movements require a fairly large population and a fairly complex social organization. When the "primitive fusion" is broken, when secondary group competes with secondary group in a society that has even a few cities, then social movements can and do occur. In brief, it is civilization which produces social movements—early civilization as well as modern society. The establishment of the kingdom at Jerusalem —related in the Old Testament—was a social movement, and it was followed by others. The Chinese Middle Kingdom gave birth to a great variety of them. Early Christianity was a social movement; so, too, were the Crusades.

Nevertheless, the tremendous *number* of social movements that arise in modern society makes organized protest and demand for redress much more characteristic of later than earlier civilization. Rapid social change, the concentration of the majority in cities, the geometric increase in the number of secondary groups—all these factors encourage both group dissension and conflict. New methods of rapid communication afford the means to organize efficiently great masses of people dispersed in space.

Social frustration. Modern social movements always provide a part substitute for the intimate local neighborhood which has been man's birthright for thousands of years but which is lost to the modern urbanite. It is no accident that social movements invariably start in cities, when organized are administered from cities, and for the most part draw upon an urban population for their membership.

The structural base of all social movements is a network of local primary groups—the "heavens" of the Father Divine movement, the house-parties of the Moral Rearmament movement, the local clubs of the Townsend Plan, the *Ortsgruppe* of the Nazi movement, and the cells of the Communist party. The ecstatic young disciple of Frank Buchman who cried, "Isn't Jesus jolly?" and those National Socialists who announced, after Hitler came to power, "Now Germany is one family," had found one social redemption in common. It was a sense of meaning and purpose derived from intimate and shared experience.

Social movements, partly by the will of the membership and partly by the deliberate manipulation of their leaders, tend to become social "microcosms." ° In a limited sense, they become isolated societies (limited because they remain subject to the laws of the encompassing society and to the vagaries of its economy) with their own loyalties and shibboleths, their own values and terminology, and their own collective aspirations. The we-and-they dichotomy is sharply drawn, sacred on the one side, profane on the other. Social movements compensate for life in urban, industrial, secondary-group society. They create little oases of intimate social cohesion in the midst of that vast expanse T. S. Eliot has called the Wasteland.

Psychological frustration: aspiration denied. Most leaders and followers of social movements are not neurotic; they are not self-paralyzed; they are not incapable of sustained personal action and sustained cooperation. Most of them are, however, afflicted with personality conflict in some degree. They are considerably at odds with themselves and the world about them, and theirs is a wide gap between aspiration and achievement.

Their experience of the social order has not shored up their self-conception, but has rather damaged it. The roles they want to play are unavailable. That they will achieve their goals is unlikely. Their previous training or historical tradition has led them to expect something that the present has failed to supply. *The social movement they join always promises to recapture for them that which has been lost.*

Psychological frustration: a world too big. The world which directly controls the individual is no longer the easily visualized neighborhood. It is the entire planet. To the extent that events at a distance govern individual fate, to that extent are men left helpless and bewildered. The American infantry captain's reply to a war correspondent's question aptly points up the gulf in the modern world between personal knowledge and personal involvement: "No, my men don't know what they're fighting for; hell, most of them don't even know where they are."

We live in a big world, one in which a bank failure in Austria can

° A term introduced in this context by Hadley Cantril, in 4.

ramify in such a way that ultimately the standard of living of an American Middle Western farmer is lowered. We live in a social climate such that even experts cannot prophesy when and where the next storm will break. The ordinary citizen can read few if any of the storm warnings—stock-market quotations, a new and as yet untested mechanical device, troop movements in Outer Mongolia, a drought on the Western plains, the expansion or contraction of credit, a rise in the consumers' commodity price index, perhaps an accusation from the Kremlin that the Prime Minister of Little Republic is a Fascist dog fawning at the heels of the Wall Street imperialists.

The majority of men do not understand, are incapable of interpreting, the meaning of obscure forces operating at a distance, but they have a vague and uneasy feeling that something large and ominous is being pointed at them. The propaganda of all social movements makes the complex absurdly simple; it reduces the confusion of the present to a size that enables the most unsophisticated intelligence to grasp "what is wrong." The programs of all social movements afford an equally simple remedy. The Jews caused Germany's defeat in World War I and they have taken your jobs, Hitler screamed: kill the Jews! War and depression are the result of insufficient purchasing power: vote for an old-age pension, Dr. Francis E. Townsend assures his followers, and peace and prosperity are assured. Unemployment, strikes, socialism, and war are solely manifestations of personal animus: examine your own heart, Frank Buchman pontificates, and all these evils will cease.

Role of the dynamic leader. The figureheads of social movements range widely in type. Some are emotion-spewing agitators, like Hitler; others are quiet exuders of becalmed confidence, like Frank Buchman. Whatever their personality differences, they do share one basic characteristic—they personally embody the frustrations and hopes of their followers. Thus Dr. Townsend is an aged, middle-class, Methodist, patriotic American, a man with whom his followers can closely identify, for they see themselves reflected in him.

Although the dynamic leader is "one of us," he also towers above "us." A comrade who shares misfortune with us, he is also an idealized demigod, a magic helper who irradiates confidence in his ability to secure *for* us what he has promised. The dynamic leader is a man with enough self-assurance to persuade his followers that victory is inevitable.

SOME GENERAL TYPES

Organized and Diffused

Thus far, we have discussed certain aspects of organized social movements. The two concrete social movements analyzed below are also organized. An organized social movement is one in which a single or-

ganization more or less monopolizes a single cause. A diffused social movement, on the other hand, heralds a vaguely defined cause, or several more or less affiliated causes; it is either an unorganized movement, without a hierarchy of command, a recognized leader, or a disciplined membership with a common focus of attention, or it is carried by several organizations, none of which is solely or completely identified with the cause and all of which pursue generalized goals more or less independently.

The women's movement, discussed in previous chapters, is an excellent example of the diffused type. It has from time to time proclaimed the political franchise, property rights, special wage-and-hour legislation, equal job and educational opportunity, a single standard of sexual morality, and prohibition. At certain times and places, an unorganized and inarticulate discontent has centered upon one or another demand. Literally hundreds of different organizations have worked periodically to attain certain "women's rights." Most of these organizations have operated independently of others, some have appeared and disappeared, and the long history of the women's movement has been one of advance and retreat, alternate success and failure, with the very nature of the cause changing much more radically than it ever would in an organized social movement.

The very amorphousness of this type of social movement often gives it a long lease on life, but a more seeming than actual persistence. The women's movement in this country is conventionally regarded as spanning a century. But its founders would fail to understand either the purposes or the activities of those who now claim to be laboring in the same vineyard. It is doubtful that such a phrase as the "women's movement" makes much more descriptive sense than would the "men's movement." On the other hand, those specific and organized parts of it, such as the antislavery movement and the prohibition movement, would.

There is an important reason for centering our attention upon organized rather than diffused social movements. The modern world tends constantly toward bureaucratic organization and centralized power. Both individuals and small local groups can accomplish little by their unaided efforts, even in the solution of many personal and local problems, since the source of many problems is itself bureaucratic organization. Attempts to solve problems emanating from organization inevitably conjure further organization. Whatever the source of any major problem in the modern world, only organization can solve it. So obvious has this state of affairs become that Moral Rearmament—which stresses a pristine Christianity, a "return" to the supreme importance of the individual's relationship with his God—addresses itself to statesmen, bankers, princes, generals, and labor-union leaders, to guard at least the individual's relationships with his fellow humans. Organized social movements, in other

words, increasingly supplant diffused social movements, and if social trends continue in their present direction, they are likely to displace them in the near future.

Religious or Secular?

Social movements are sometimes treated as being *either* secular or religious in nature. It is true that organized social movements vary in the extent to which the Deity is directly invoked; the Townsend Movement, for example, demands a pension, while Moral Rearmament could be called with some accuracy a religious sect. Nevertheless, while some social movements are not new religions, they are all religious in nature.

From National Socialism to Moral Rearmament, all organized social movements founded in the West make at least vocal obeisance to the will of God. The religious theme saturates even the proposed pension grab of the Townsendites. More pronounced than the directly religious theme, however, is what might be called the derivative religious theme. The cause heralded, the collective goals pursued, are always imbued with cosmic and providential significance. Whatever worldly matters concern the membership, they also seek and find inspiration and regeneration.

No matter what the cause, it is sacred, and the nimbus of sanctity shines brightest about the head of the leader. In the eyes of his followers he is a god (Hitler, Stalin) or an inspired prophet (Buchman, Townsend). His enemies are their enemies, his passions their passions, his dreams their dreams. In the beloved and revered leader are their most exalted hopes. Cause and leader fuse in a holy mission.

Inclusive and Segmented

Social movements like Russian Communism and German National Socialism are inclusive; they claim and encompass total national populations. Inclusive social movements are rare, and they occur only as political revolutions and only as they culminate in totalitarian government. In their beginnings, both Russian Communism and German Nazism were segmented movements—they appealed to and included only certain groups and classes within the national population. Since any large population contains a wide diversity of interests and values, an inclusive social movement must become totalitarian and must finally resort to force, because only such means can make a single creed binding in overt action upon an entire population. An inclusive social movement brings all other internal social movements to an end, once it is completed and until it is overturned. No completely "planned" society can permit the appearance of other social movements since they quarrel with things as they are, since they proclaim a *clash* of interests in the body politic,

and since, if only by indirection, they question the infallibility of the ruling clique.

In democratic society, social movements are segmented—they appeal to and include only that part of one or more segments of the population which voluntarily seeks to join. Some are segmented in a double sense; not only do they contain only a part of the population but also they are organized along the in-group–out-group axis. The early Moral Rearmament movement was singly segmented; it promised to ease certain personal-religious frustrations of educated, upper-middle-class Protestants, but not in opposition to another segment of the population. In its later history, however, when such collective goals as international peace, an end to labor unrest, and war against Communism were emblazoned on its shield, the movement became doubly segmented.

Sooner or later, all segmented social movements, no matter how specialized and pacific their aims, encounter opposition from individuals and groups who have different aims, who follow different creeds, so that sooner or later they all become doubly segmented. Even if Moral Rearmament had not later assumed a political guise, even if it had remained a simple cult of individual salvation, its success would have been measured by the amount of opposition from the orthodox and established churches. When the inevitable opposition appears, the potential threat of counteropposition which is inherent in every social movement is made apparent, if for no other reason than defense for its very life.

Arrested Development and Completed Cycle °

Social movements possess varying characteristics, so that their histories by no means run an identical course. When several of them are compared, however, a generalized pattern of development emerges which most of them will fit—provided they do not collapse before the stage of formal organization is reached. Very few social movements, however, persist to the next stage and become social institutions.

Social unrest. All social movements require for their genesis an upheaval of mass discontent and dissatisfaction. Usually, recent social changes have disrupted traditional social values which either the entire population or some segment of it holds dear. Roles and goals have been either made insecure or destroyed. The self-conception of the discontented has been damaged. Social unrest, mass dissatisfaction, does not cause social movements, but it is a necessary precondition to their development.

Following World War I, the majority of Germans were faced by national dismemberment, depression, unemployment, and inflation—and

° In part adapted from 7, pp. 689–709.

the seeds of National Socialism were sown. Moral Rearmament became a popular movement only when it began to tap the spiritual anguish of the religious segment of the upper-middle class, who saw all they had lived and hoped for threatened by various nationalistic and socialistic uprisings. During the depression, in America, the aged faced poverty, unemployment, and loss of homes; staring disrespectfully at them was an embittered younger generation that showed little willingness to assume responsibility for aged relations. The Townsend Movement was thus given a field to exploit.

At first, however, mass discontent usually runs off into futile and random movements, local and sporadic demands which soon expire, such as the Bonus March on Washington during the early period of the depression. There is little organization and less discipline. Individuals and groups flounder about, seeking something to which to attach, but there is nothing upon which to focus their attention and no directed channel into which to pour their energy. The total population, or some segment of it, is in a state of excited readiness; the people are looking for a Moses to lead them into the Promised Land, but either he has failed to appear or a strident chorus of small and off-key voices only adds to the general din and confusion.

The popular stage. At this stage, the beginnings of a social movement can be discerned. Discontent has become focused upon an enemy which many accept as such. More definite ideas are circulated as to what is wrong and what should be done about it. The as yet informal membership has harkened to one voice above all others. Attention has been centered upon a magic helper who will deliver them.

Collective slogans are coined at this stage, cries to rally the faithful, such as "Peace, It's Wonderful," or "Two Hundred Dollars Every Month," or "Absolute Purity, Absolute Honesty, Absolute Love, Absolute Unselfishness," or "Ham and Eggs Every Thursday." Beyond the slogan, a tentative program of action is presented by the revered leader which the faithful accept as guaranteed to succeed and which the wavering ones find more or less persuasive.

Followers hear of a community of kindred spirits that is far flung in space; the movement, they are told, is sweeping the nation. At this stage, local groups, clubs, or debating societies are formed, with local leaders who have heard the master; if the others have not heard him, the local leaders will interpret his word to them. Exaggerated and often fictitious reports of the number of fellow joiners are circulated. A spirit of invincibility wells up. Nothing can stop them. They love their leader. They love their fellows. They are a mighty army which will destroy the forces of evil. They will usher in whatever millennium is the stuff of their dreams.

Now or in the following stage, opposition is expressed by vested in-

terests or organizations who regard the uprising as a threat to themselves. To the extent that conditions are unsettled, vested political power is challenged and thrown off balance, and the entire institutional structure is insecure; depending upon the vigor and strength which the movement can muster early in its history, the resultant outside opposition will fail to crush it. Opposition which fails at this stage adds impetus to the movement; the sacred leader becomes a martyr, the followers are embattled heroes, and the cause is vindicated.

Formal organization. If the movement has not been arrested, if it has not ingloriously succumbed to opposition from without or apathy from within, it enters the formal stage. The collective slogan is expanded into a full-blown ideology; the collective purpose is sharpened to a few key collective goals. A hierarchy of command is established, with the sacred leader at the apex, his trusted lieutenants below him, and lesser leaders assigned, appointed, or elected for the network of regional and local organizations which becomes the structural base of the movement.

Bylaws and a systematic code of rules and procedure are instituted. The propaganda machine finds voice in newspapers, magazines, radio speeches, and conventions. Titles, forms of address appropriate to the hierarchy and the membership, are devised. Specialization within the ruling hierarchy emerges, with publicity men, organizers, and a business bureau to handle the income derived from regular dues and donations.

Many movements fall by the wayside at this stage. The wave of mass enthusiasm cannot be held at fanatic pitch indefinitely. Only too often it becomes apparent to even the most loyal of the membership that the collective goals are not to be immediately achieved—the millennium is indefinitely postponed. With formal organization, the likelihood of internal dissent mounts. More than a dynamic leader and his devoted followers is required to maintain an organization. Many of the necessary functionaries who are placed in the hierarchy of command are more financial and power opportunists than dedicated disciples. The necessary collection of dues or bequests and the allocation of this money raise frequent doubts in many followers as to the purity of the movement. This painful issue, for example, brought about the demise of the "I Am" religious cult, which flourished mightily and briefly in California.

For most movements, one critical necessity for survival at this stage, or further development into the next stage, is some measure of success in attaining the collective goals, or at least some tangible evidence that progress is being made in that direction. Religious cults or sects which avoid specific reforms in this world are freed from this hazard, for the efficiency or inefficiency of a new approach to the Deity is beyond empirical proof. Also, any movement, religious or otherwise, which retains only vague generalizations for collective goals, such as "human brother-

hood," does not face the harsh challenge to put up or shut up. But most movements are secular; they must produce, if not the millennium, at least *some* results. For example, a movement which centers about a pension will not persist when and if that pension sinks beyond the outer horizon of possible achievement. Perhaps all organized peace movements would perish if war should follow war with increasing rapidity. The majority of the membership in most movements may be gullible, but their enthusiasm and morale, their *esprit de corps*, in the long run requires support beyond a reiterated promise of ultimate victory.

Institutionalization. The final stage—acceptance by the total society as a permanent and incorporated fixture—is rarely achieved. Even successful movements usually level off at the stage of formal organization, change and are changed by history, and swiftly or slowly recede. A few, however, like Methodism and labor organization in this country, achieve institutionalization.

The two social movements which are analyzed below have reached the stage of formal organization. One, Moral Rearmament, might become institutionalized at some time in the future, but this appears unlikely for reasons which will be discussed. The other, the Townsend Plan, will very probably never develop further. Its main collective goal is completely at the mercy of a much more powerful organization, the Federal government of the United States. Were the plan made law by the Federal government, the Townsend movement would cease to have a reason for continuance; in the meantime, the Federal government is stealing its thunder.

TWO MODERN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Brief History of Moral Rearmament

Frank Nathan Daniel Buchman, born June 4, 1878, of Pennsylvania "Dutch" (German) stock, was educated at Muhlenberg College in Allentown, Pennsylvania. He has never married. In 1902, he was ordained a Lutheran minister, and did welfare work among boys in a Lutheran hospice located in a Philadelphia suburb. In 1908, a disagreement over policy led him to tender his resignation to the trustees "in anger." "Tired and in poor health he left for England to attend the Keswick Conference," where he had his spiritual awakening (14, p. 42).

Frank Buchman had visited a small village church in Cumberland, and there he had a vision of the Crucified, and of the abyss which separated "myself" from Him.

> My feelings . . . were very unhappy; I won't call them despairing; they were just feelings of great unhappiness. Grudges against certain religious people were there in my mind, fermenting; I felt that I could justly accuse those men

of hard-heartedness, high-handedness, and bigotry. They had always seemed to be opposing me—opposing my work. Yet the main cause of my disquiet was the knowledge of my own heart that it was guilty of three things, sticking there like glue, stopping all the free working of the generosity and happiness I longed to experience—selfishness, pride, ill-will; I could not get rid of them; while they were there I knew that the better part of me couldn't function as it ought. [1, p. 19]

FIG. 40. Frank Buchman. (From Acme.)

The love of God in Christ "had bridged the chasm dividing me from Him," and Buchman wrote to the six trustees against whom he had "nursed ill-will," told them of his experience, and begged their forgiveness. Frank Buchman had been changed, but, without a pulpit, he had no means of changing others. Without too long an interlude, however, he was offered the secretaryship of the YMCA at the Pennsylvania State College, a post he held from 1909 to 1915.

Some of Buchman's disciples have described the campus, as it was then, as a continuous orgy of drunkenness and a hellhole of Godlessness (14, p. 189). There is an apocryphal story "that when he arrived there was a sign hanging down from the roof of the 'Corner Room' [campus

hangout] in the center of town with the statement: 'Pure John, Convert Us if You Can' " (10, pp. 84–85).

Mr. Buchman's personal evangelism, his seeming preoccupation with sexual sin, and his abrupt and aggressive efforts to win students to a life of absolute purity, honesty, unselfishness, and love made him unpopular with many students and faculty members. He is a man of literal and unimaginative intelligence, certainly out of tune with the predominant undergraduate humor, deplorable though that humor may very well be. Several campus legends have been preserved for future generations of Penn State students. A lad is supposed to have been accosted with the question: "My boy, are you troubled by evil thoughts?" He is supposed to have answered, "No, to tell you the truth, I rather enjoy them." Yet Frank Buchman was then, as he is now, a man who excites the extremes of personal rejection or personal devotion. He made many converts and built a volunteer Bible class of 1,200 students which was called the largest in the country.

Frank Buchman is not unforgotten at Penn State, though most of the reported reminiscences are distinctly unfavorable to the man. One professor has said in retrospect, "Buchman oozed the oil of unctuous piety from every pore. I would not be interested in seeing him again if it were at the cost of having to shake hands with him" (10, p. 109). It might be well to remember in this connection that those who start new religious movements are always out of Nazareth to the unbeliever, and almost always without honor in the early place to which they are called. However, if Buchmanism was launched at any one place, that place was Penn State, for it was there that the unusual combination of personal evangelism and house parties was discovered and found effective.

While estimates of Buchman's motives vary, the majority of persons who have known him agree that he is a man of superior abilities. His traits, says H. P. van Dusen, include

> . . . a quite extraordinary skill in administration; personal attention to the importance of the minutest detail; intimate solicitude for each person's needs and idiosyncrasies; tireless resilence of body and nerves; playful and unclouded gayety of spirit; financial sagacity, not to say shrewdness; a sense for strategy which might quicken jealousy in a Napoleon; exuberant and contagious optimism. [18, p. 6]

Walter H. Clark found in Buchman "an unblushing flair for self-advertisement" coupled with "an apparent passion for self-effacement" (9, p. 34)—both of which, one might add, indicate a probable conceit, one in inverted form. A fellow Lutheran minister stated that Buchman had a passion "to hobnob with those in a position of social prestige,"

adding that he had seen letters from Andrew Carnegie which Buchman highly prized (9, p. 34).

While leaders of social movements are generally regarded as quacks and charlatans by discussants who examine them and their activities from outside the movement, it is nevertheless true that Buchman appears to have stirred a personal dislike in nonconverts which is uniquely astringent. As much as anything else, this dislike seizes upon the peculiar combination of saintly pose and theatrical publicity antics which Buchman has cultivated. There has been, however, no quarrel with Buchman's right to the title of dynamic leader:

> He alone has supreme authority wherever he is. Only a personal contact with him can reveal the subtle influences which together make possible the well-nigh incredible sway that he exercises. There is something almost hypnotic about it. Men and women will do anything for him. They abandon their wills to his, with eager consent. They count it a privilege to do the humblest tasks for him. They cheerfully give up all they possess—money, time, and abilities—to his direction. They do not think of it thus; they think they are free agents. [9, p. 106]

In 1915, Buchman left Penn State and for a year toured India, Japan, and Korea with Sherwood Eddy. In 1916, he was appointed lecturer at Hartford Theological Seminary, where his "naive fundamentalism" aroused the ire of students and other faculty members. He resigned from the seminary to organize his evangelical program of "world-changing through life-changing." He had made his decision following a summer visit to Oxford, while on his way to Washington to meet delegates at the World Disarmament Conference in 1921.

Early phase—Oxford Group. In strictest accuracy, Buchman's movement remained all of one piece once it attained the status of organized social movement. The third phase has by no means abandoned the aims and methods of the early one. And yet the major emphasis of the movement shifted twice. Not only do social movements effect changes in the outer world, but they are also themselves changed by their own dynamic in conjunction with changes taking place in the outer world. The microcosm never escapes the macrocosm.

Dr. Buchman had his earliest attention-arousing success at Oxford. His own particular brand of personal evangelism found many converts among students and dons there. Some of his followers later went to South Africa, where newsmen dubbed them the Oxford Group or Oxford movement (not to be confused with the earlier movement identified with Cardinal Newman).

At this time, Buchman's message had no political overtones. Verbally, at least, it was indistinguishable from that of Christ—the world can be saved only through personal regeneration, through individuals who have

surrendered to God and who are guided by the Holy Spirit. There was, however, a new emphasis—the sole cause of every problem, personal or social, is "sin," and problems can be solved only through confession of one's sins and atonement for them.

The stated aim of the Oxford Grouper is the achievement of four absolutes: absolute purity, absolute honesty, absolute love, and absolute unselfishness—the "Standards of Christ." No attempt is made to define these terms. Each person must determine what each of these absolutes means for him. There are, however, four standard ways of reaching them. The first is "giving in" to God during the "quiet time" in the morning, perhaps taking down in a notebook God's directions as these come through inspiration.* The second is checking with another Grouper, a "trustworthy friend, who believes in the guidance of the Holy Spirit" so as to avoid undiluted subjectivism in the interpretation of God's message. The third is carrying out God's directions by making restitution to those one has wronged, paying bills, "getting straight with others." The fourth is confessing one's sins to others and sharing one's inspirations and material resources with them (4, pp. 147–150, and 9, pp. 168–169).

The role of the "life changers" or "soul surgeons" has a central place in the liturgy. These quasi priests have the responsibility of getting potential converts to "surrender," a process which has three steps. They are urged to gain the confidence of the potential convert, to show a constant friendly concern for him, to appear jolly, radiant, and personally appealing—"like Christ." The next step maneuvers the prospect into circumstances where his "confession" will be facilitated. The object is to get him to admit his sinfulness, to confess as many sins as he can remember, under prodding and suggestion by the soul surgeon. The first confession may be private, although he may later be urged to make it public. The alleged reason for public confession is to help others who may suffer from the same sin and to lead the present sinner to put himself on record as a convert, thus preventing his backsliding.

The third step is a "follow-up," through a house party, usually at the palatial estate of a wealthy Buchmanite. The house party has none of the physical discomfort or grim terror of the lower-class camp meeting or evangelist's tent gathering. Unlike the Christian Scientists, the Buchmanites do believe in the reality of sin, but sin is represented not so much as moving God to wrath as being a source of personal inconvenience. Hell's fire has no place, so that converts have been recorded as saying,

* "PRAY: Powerful Radiograms Always Yours," Buchman is fond of writing. Buchman had been a cartoonist in college, which may in part explain his addiction to the language of the public-relations man. Buchman's message uneasily seats what mystics and saints have disclosed for centuries about the inner life beside the peppy phrases and booming brass of the publicity director. JESUS becomes "Just Exactly Suits Us Sinners." Another expression, which calls to mind a recent cigarette advertisement, admonishes "Jesus Christ still suits, saves, and satisfies."

"We just get together and chat about Christ," or, "Isn't Jesus jolly?" If the following expression is permissible, the Buchmanite's relationship with his God is chummy. At one house party, a woman gave eloquent testimony on the value of guidance. She was told, she claimed, to take a bus and then at a certain street "word came to me to get off. Before my eyes was a display of furs at great reductions. I bought a $1,000.00 coat for $300.00" (11, p. 290).

At the house party, the evening chat around the fireplace is a comfortable point of transition from a day of tennis, swimming, and general good fellowship. Comradeship provides a means for gradual assimilation in the group. Now the convert is bathed in the "spirit." After his public confession, he is gently prompted to become a life changer in turn, and seek out prospective converts. No conversion is deemed complete without the convert's assumption of the role of life changer. This technique is quite similar to that utilized so effectively by Alcoholics Anonymous.

There is little doubt that the strategy for the movement was well thought out by someone who had deep insight into the nature of human motivation and action. The primary group, in practice if not in theory, is dressed up in sociological garb. It also becomes an instrument for social control, directed from the top. A member of the movement seldom represents it alone. The "traveling team" is the ideal. Numbers afford "striking power." Seeming defeats can therefore always be offset by mutual encouragement among the "torchbearers." After the movement's genesis, even Buchman never traveled alone. A group of active, personable life changers always accompanied him. Several traveling teams have from time to time "invaded" a city. Tactics such as these help to create what is known as the band-wagon psychology—everyone else is doing it, it must have something; furthermore, it is the shape of the future, and you'd better jump on now.

These techniques for gaining converts did not, however, bloom to full flower at once. The man, his message, and his methods were initially tested by adversity and ridicule. He was roundly denounced as an erotic-minded sensationalist whose influence on the young was unhealthy. This charge was based upon his earlier identification of sin with fornication and masturbation, to the apparent exclusion of anything else, and his encouragement of lurid confessions in softly lit rooms. An editorial in the Oxford University undergraduate paper demanded that "student leaders of the semireligious cult known as 'Buchmanism' be suspended from the university" (9, p. 36). The editor of the *Isis*, Oxford University magazine, wrote:

> . . . there is an atmosphere hovering between giggles and fanaticism. Restraint is thrown aside. Souls are laid bare by hysterical confessions, and with a

fervor which no longer pretends to be religious. The theory of direct inspiration, even if it is put into practice, as it never is, calmly and conscientiously, must undermine individuality and destroy free will. This is exactly what it is doing, particularly in women's colleges where Buchmanism has firmly established itself and is producing the worst effects attendant on any perverted religious mania. [10, pp. 66–67]

By 1924, Dr. Buchman was securing confessions at upper-class American equivalents of Oxford, such as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. In 1926, President Hibben barred Buchman from Princeton's campus, on the charge that his followers were "surreptitiously probing into the sex lives and personal problems of undergraduate students, stimulating 'a most unhealthy interest in morbid sexual matters among the student body' " (9, p. 36). By an overwhelming majority, Princeton undergraduates voted to support President Hibben's action (10, p. 128).

Exactly what was going on is no more clear now than it was then. Sex is probably the one subject most capable of stirring lush rumors on the basis of hint and guess. When the Princeton scandal broke, one metropolitan newspaper illustrated the story with a full page of spicy cartoons, "pictures" of undraped coeds and drunken college boys. Buchman's stock hit an all-time low. By some of his countrymen he was regarded as Lucifer, by others as a hot-eyed Peeping Tom.

Middle phase—Moral Rearmament. Buchman's tactics soon changed. The Group reacted to adverse publicity by soft-pedaling the sexual theme and discouraging sensational confessions. Buchman himself later advised that some thoughts are better left unexpressed. By the turn of the decade, he was making an earnest effort to bring mature adults into the fold. He was especially interested in those he called the "up-and-outers."

Buchman's motives have been impugned by many people, in many ways. One of them is the charge that he is a little man whose sense of inferiority drives him to associate himself and his movement with big names. In its stark simplicity this charge may very well be unfair. Buchman is apparently sincerely convinced that the nations can be brought to God if only the "key men," the rich and the powerful, can be "changed." In his own words:

> I thank heaven for a man like Adolph Hitler, who built a front line defense against the anti-Christ of Communism. Think what it would mean to the world if Hitler surrendered to the control of God. Or Mussolini. Or any dictator. Through such a man God could control a nation overnight and solve every last, bewildering problem. They [social problems] could be solved within a God-controlled democracy, or perhaps I should say theocracy, and they could be solved through a God-controlled fascist dictatorship. [4, p. 152] °

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Buchman worked quietly for a time and gained the backing of several prominent clergymen and others of high social status. He secured funds from wealthy converts, sent out reams of publicity, and freely used the names of several public figures who had shown interest in his cause, such as Senator Harry S. Truman, Rear Admiral Richard E. Byrd, Supreme Court Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, Mr. and Mrs. Henry Ford, Mrs. Sarah Delano Roosevelt, and John D. Rockefeller. It was in the early thirties that Buchman proclaimed his movement as a panacea for economic depression and war.

Not until the war clouds began to gather over Europe, however, did the movement catch fire and sweep over much of the Western World. The igniting spark of the Moral Rearmament movement was touched off during a Buchman speech delivered in London, in May, 1938, when he said that "the world's condition cannot but cause disquiet and anxiety. Hostility piles up between nation and nation, labor and capital, class and class. . . . The crisis is fundamentally a moral one. The nations must rearm morally" (9, p. 47). This was the hour of German preparation to challenge the world, when the rest of the West, and especially its propertied classes, were seeking a means to keep things as they were. This was also a period when many intellectuals and liberals—still convinced that the strength of personal good intention and the might of individual conviction could dissuade the military absolute state on the march—were seeking a formula for universal peace. Many in the West had yet to discover that a tank can be stopped by an argument only if two conditions are fulfilled: first, that the argument is gotten through to the driver of the tank; second, that he is disposed to heed the argument.

Yet before the Oxford Group became MRA, before it became a synonym for pacifism and appeasement, Buchman had steered it away from undergraduate sex séances into political waters. He announced in 1933 that what this country needed was a "spiritual revolution," that "hunger marchers" should be "changed." What is unemployment? Everybody "who is not working for God is unemployed." How is the problem to be solved? Work for God (4, p. 154). Word magic such as this left many in the harassed propertied classes enthralled with a new hope and becalmed with a new peace. During the middle thirties, the Group proudly announced that strikes ceased under the ministrations of their life changers. Strikes "have no place in a Christian world," and the Group claimed to have settled the Pacific-coast maritime strike of 1934 by lifting the dispute "to a higher plane."

In the fall of 1938, Chamberlain of Britain and Daladier of France refused to aid Czechoslovakia militarily when the Czechs faced imminent invasion by Germany. Their refusal, which precipitated the Munich crisis, was in violation of previous treaties, but it received mass support in Britain and France. It was at this time that Buchman's movement

reached its peak of membership and influence, because it became identified, in and out of the movement, with the popular trend toward pacifism and appeasement. This shift in emphasis was publicly endorsed by political leaders in China, England, and America, among other nations. The Japanese Prime Minister cabled Buchman, "'Believing necessity of moral rearmament for solution of world's problems, sincerely hope for every success of your noble movement'" (4, p. 168).

In the late spring of 1939, Moral Rearmament descended in full panoply upon America. On June 4, 1939, a mass meeting was held in Constitution Hall, which was well attended by leading political figures. The meeting was opened with a message from President Roosevelt, and other messages and endorsements from high-ranking leaders were read. The principal address was given by Frank Buchman. Buchman's statements, as well as others made at that meeting, were read into the *Congressional Record* by Senator Harry S. Truman. The MRA crusade was even more enthusiastically hailed on the Pacific coast, where thousands flocked to mass meetings.

World War II erupted in September, 1939. Nevertheless, plans for mobilizing "one hundred million" radio listeners continued. In December came the world-wide broadcasts, as scheduled. They emanated from Boston and London. About 25,000 "listening parties" were said to have been arranged in England, France, China, Japan, Switzerland, Canada, the United States, the Scandinavian countries, and Holland. A "party" was arranged in Holland for Queen Wilhelmina and the Parliament. German victories continued.

Meanwhile, dissensions broke out in England and America. Members of the Group were denied exemption from military service in England. In the United States, Dr. Samuel Shoemaker, Jr., in November, 1941, requested certain Group members to leave the Calvary Church Parish House in New York City. He announced his own withdrawal from the movement "after careful thought and prayer" because "certain policies and points of view have arisen in the development of MRA about which we have increased misgivings" (9, p. 62).

Buchman was stricken a year later with a heart attack. He retired to Saratoga Springs, New York, in order to recuperate. Selective Service boards in the United States refused to defer life changers from military service. Their induction, and the growing conviction in educated circles that MRA was a discredited philosophy, almost broke Buchmanism then as had the Princeton scandal some fifteen years earlier. Thus does history alternately smile and frown upon social movements and their leaders.

Latest stage—crusade against Communism. The war brought MRA, as a crusade against war, to a halt. To what extent the movement was permanently damaged would, however, be difficult to assess. Buchman has answered questions about the number of his followers with vague

references to "millions" who have been "changed." Buchman and his followers deny that MRA has a membership. At least, no records have been made available to the public. As of 1939, MRA's probable peak of influence, a social psychologist has estimated "at least 50,000 people throughout the world would acknowledge Buchman as the man who had shown them a new way of life" (4, p. 146). It is quite likely that fewer people at the present time would do so. Nevertheless, money has poured in and propaganda has poured out regardless of the ebb and flow of membership.

Following the war, Buchman bought a palatial residence at Caux-sur-Montreux, Switzerland, which now serves as the international center of what is left of the Oxford Group movement.

> Here, amid beautiful surroundings, a kind of continuous houseparty remains in session. Celebrities and students, life-changers and invited guests from far and wide, numbering between three and four hundred or more, live and work in this community. For especially prominent persons and for older participants, there are luxurious quarters, staffed by volunteer maids and waiters; others live more simply in near-by quarters. There is a small theater for presenting the MRA message to "key people" who come to Caux. [9, p. 64]

From June 3 to June 14, 1948, MRA celebrated its "first decade" in Los Angeles (June 3 was Buchman's seventieth birthday). Leaders of the movement proclaimed as their basic accomplishments of the previous decade: "(1) a Christian influence on every Cabinet in Europe; (2) a curb on Communism in England and a booster of coal production there; (3) a stabilizing force in Italian politics; (4) an incentive to French industrial teamwork; and (5) 'an inspired democratic ideology' for Germany" (13, p. 79).

In various guises Buchmanism has capitalized three crises—the depression, the threat of World War II, and now the threat of Communist domination of the West. Buchmanism is once more gathering strength, but with a narrow focus of attention: an appeal to the particular anxieties of those who have most to lose. "The 200 delegates who descended on Los Angeles and Riverdale [in 1948] formed what might be called the country-club anti-Communist international" (12, p. 129). Pacifism has been more than abandoned, it has been denied. The MRA weekly newsletter, *A New World Is Our Business,* distributed to about 2,500 prominent businessmen throughout the world, deals almost solely with ways and means to "combat" Communism.

In the future (as in the past) history may point a new and rewarding detour to the movement, but it is probably traveling a dead-end street at the present time. The movement has the stamp of one man upon it, Frank Buchman; it was he who secured the half-million dollars for the Westminster Theater in London and the half-million dollars for the

Woman's Athletic Club in Los Angeles, both converted into MRA "regional" headquarters. At present, the movement does not appear to be sufficiently institutionalized to carry on after his death, which is imminent. By becoming one of hundreds of competing organizations with the chief aim of resisting Communism, the movement may have sacrificed its universal and "world-arching" appeal. This appraisal may in future prove to have been erroneous. Other social movements have survived darker days than have as yet befallen Buchmanism.

Theoretical Explanation of Moral Rearmament

Most of those who have been attracted to the man and his cause have been educated, well-to-do people whose early life orientation was within one of the Protestant denominations. They had accepted the reality of sin, personal redemption, and a personal relationship with the Deity. Yet they were also "worldly" people for whom traditional religion was an oft-told and perhaps monotonous tale, who had read Freud, and who were dimly or acutely aware of vast impersonal forces let loose in a world that the Biblical prophets never envisioned.

They were urban and mobile people, without community roots, hungering for companionship with searchers like themselves. They were spiritually lost twice over. The well-to-do churches of which they had been members had forsaken the drama of Christ's agony and revolutionary message to all mankind for a comfortable unalert acceptance. But they found the modern salvationist cults to be peopled by the uneducated and the poor, those with whom communication and a close personal relationship would be difficult. In the affairs of this world, the values of their own socioeconomic class were under attack by economic and political organizations pursuing strange new gods of collectivism. These were people desperately needing to be assured that profits are just, that peace and harmony can reunite all classes, and that Christianity and the capitalistic ethic of individual responsibility for one's own fate are one and the same. Buchmanism, in its various guises, reaffirmed their faith in themselves and the things they had lived for.

The early phase of the movement had an obvious appeal for excited adolescents, whose glands were pouring out sex hormones held in rein by middle-class respectability. The early house party served as a collective psychoanalyst's couch. It was even better. There was not only the relief of confession and catharsis, but also the heady wine of *sharing* one's guilt with guilty others. Sharing guilt, in a small group, creates a closed microcosm with its own norms and values.

Status and membership in the microcosm are obtained because one has been a sinner, not a saint, in the recent past. Hence the feeling of inferiority and the emotional insecurity that so often result when an individual cannot honestly

and completely identify himself with the prevailing moral code disappear completely. . . .

Furthermore, the individual is now an "in-group" member of a rather highly selected gathering. He has knowledge that others do not possess. The mutual confessions reveal his secrets to others and theirs to him. As an insider, the individual himself now qualifies as a soul-surgeon and life-changer. His status is enhanced and is recognized by other members of the group and perhaps by a few outsiders whom he begins to interest by his sympathy and apparent insight. Thus persons who may be social misfits or who are, for various reasons, psychologically isolated may achieve a sense of fellowship and social participation they have long sought. . . . Psychologically, the repetition of confessions may be a substitute gratification for the sin itself, thus giving the individual a mild erotic pleasure at the same time it provides relief and status. [4, pp. 161–162] °

The call of the primary group and the elevated self-conception derived from the role of life changer or soul surgeon, of course, have been an integral part of the movement, from first to last. The cause is as large as the universe, and the self is central to it.

It's not an institution;
  It's not a point of view.
It starts a revolution
  By starting one in you.

Self-regard is enhanced through the "direct telephone connection with God." In and through one's self, and others like one's self, the Kingdom of God is to be established, here, now, not in the vague eschatology of the traditional denominations, but as a life force permeating and governing the decisions of kings, statesmen, generals, and dictators.

Miraculously enough, nothing will be changed! Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the present course of social change will be reversed, and the secure and simple world of their childhood will be restored to the wealthy of middle age. Depressions will disappear from the earth, the angry demands of the dispossessed will cease, their voices will harmonize in loving cooperation. Strife will cease. War will cease. And what one has and what one is one will retain. One's traditional and deserved place in this world will be restored.

Besides shoring up the self-conception, assuring precious roles and goals, and providing a sacred cause, Buchmanism also affords a mental context whereby the complex becomes simple. It has made easily understandable the chaotic pattern of recent events. The blind march of power, crop failures, bank failures; the problem of the socialized worker in the dehumanized factory; the disintegration of consensus and the claim and counterclaim of organized group upon organized group; race, class, and

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national hatreds—these magically disappear in a golden haze of rhetoric and good intentions.

The message that nothing matters except listening to God's directions on how to improve *personal* relationships is comforting to those who have every motive to blind themselves to this major fact of the middle of the twentieth century: throughout the world the great mass of people no longer work for themselves and control their own lives; they work for others and are controlled by distant and unseen bureaucrats. In the Buchmanite world view, however, nothing matters except *personal* relationships, so that the rich and powerful are freed from the responsibility of understanding what is going on and from attempting to do anything about it.

Buchman's message is no real program for effecting any of the changes he claims would result from the "spiritual revolution." In fact, the movement's spokesmen have earnestly insisted that it has no program and no organization to put a program into operation. The movement is, of course, organized, although its program is certainly modest enough—be kind and thoughtful with your associates. But human problems today are only partly resolvable by kindness and thoughtfulness within primary-group relationships. Bureaucratic organizations dominate the social order, and bureaucratic organizations are neither kind nor thoughtful; they operate with depersonalized norms of efficiency, in competition with other bureaucratic organizations. Further, although a wealthy man may be "employed" if he does "God's work," an unemployed switch tender most certainly remains unemployed if no railroad hires him.

The secular revolutions mounting the offensive today, whether Fair Deal, Communism, Unionism, fascism, "fair shares," or mere demands for bigger pensions, threaten to strip the class from which Buchmanites emerge of their money, prestige, and influence. It is rather unlikely that secular revolution will be checked by Buchman's spiritual revolution. MRA is addressed to a narrow segment of the population; it can appeal strongly to only a narrow segment of the population; and its this-worldly purpose is to freeze the *status quo* at a time when time will not stop. Meanwhile, the word magic of the dynamic leader quiets the confusion and lulls the uncertainty of those who long for a time irretrievably past. His word magic spins a cocoon of forgetfulness, a dream world of unknowing security.

The Townsend Plan

Brief history. Dr. Francis E. Townsend was born in a log cabin in Livingston County, Illinois, on January 13, 1867. Of his subsequent career, two facts are especially noteworthy: he never became an economist; his life was a bitter struggle against poverty and failure until he came to

lead a host of poor and old Americans, determined to wrest from their government a birthright they accuse their society of having cheated them Townsend was in turn a farm hand, cowboy, roustabout, high-school student (graduated at the age of twenty-six), farmer, elementary-school teacher, hobo, miner, salesman, medical student, bookkeeper, newsboy, salesman, general medical practitioner in a backwoods community, army



FIG. 41. Francis E. Townsend. (From Acme.)

medical officer (World War I), semiretired general medical practitioner, Los Angeles County health department physician, unemployed, unsuccessful real-estate salesman, and finally, leader of a national crusade (15).

In poor health and destitute with his family at Long Beach, Dr. Townsend at the age of sixty-six assessed his own situation and that of other oldsters like himself who had flocked to California to seek retirement and a mild climate, only to see savings, part-time job, or annuity disappear in the early years of the depression. He had been an inveterate writer of "letters to the editor"—mostly denunciations of vice and gambling, but on September 30, 1933, in the *vox pop* column of the *Long Beach Press-Telegram* appeared the first draft of his "plan."

It called for the retirement of all United States citizens at the age of sixty "on a monthly pension of $200 or more, on condition that they spend the money as they get it." This pension was to be defrayed by a sales tax, later determined to be a 2-per-cent tax "on all business transactions." It was also later settled that the $200 should be spent within the month in which it was received.

Several answers appeared in the *vox pop* column of the *Press-Telegram*. Some praised the plan, others denounced it. Dr. Townsend had little else to do, so he answered every criticism. The paper was soon devoting regular and growing space to this correspondence, whereupon Townsend inserted an advertisement asking depression victims to volunteer for the collection of signatures. Within two weeks "four or five thousand people had signed the petition," and Townsend secured an office, "rent free" for a month—the "Old-Age Revolving Pension Headquarters." Thousands more signed petitions. Hundreds volunteered their help, without pay, to print or distribute leaflets.

> I had started a fire that I did not want to extinguish, but that I feared might be difficult to control. I was right. I soon saw that unless the people could be organized and their enthusiasm given direction and their purposes defined, there could well be a resulting confusion and conflict of opinion as to procedure which would end in disaster for the movement. The first thing to be done, obviously, was to get the people into an organization through which their zeal and enthusiasm might be amalgamated into a declared purpose. [15, p. 147]

Five years after the plan was launched, on March 22, 1938, the Townsend Foundation, "a common law trust," was formed. Dr. Townsend, two United States Senators, several Congressmen and ex-Congressmen, and a few businessmen were named trustees. One of them was Robert Clements, the man for whom Townsend once sold real estate, the organizing "brains" behind the movement.

The plan was at first financed by annual dues of 25 cents assessed upon members, for which they received a pamphlet describing the plan. The pamphlet also urged the new member to form a Townsend Club in his neighborhood. These local clubs would not only ease the administrative burden at headquarters, but would also create the mass pressure to be exerted on Congress. The purpose of the Townsend Clubs, according to the pamphlet, was to plan "uniform action to bring the Townsend Plan of old-age revolving pensions to a successful conclusion by an act of Congress."

Besides annual dues, other funds have been secured through a one-dollar-a-month assessment on a special elite arm of the movement, the Townsend National Legion. Various publications have proved profitable, especially the *Townsend National Weekly*, started early in January, 1935.

"Townsend National Weekly" is a sound property, in a business sense. Its circulation is sufficient to pay its way so that it is beholden to no advertiser. It seeks advertising because it believes in this thoroughly American method of bringing before the people the things they want and need. Furthermore, it can use this additional revenue in fighting for legislation to give the people sufficient purchasing power to patronize all advertisers products to sell [sic]. [15, pp. 181–182]

The Townsend National Recovery Plan organization is highly centralized. Clements arranged for all state managers to be appointed by national headquarters and not elected by local vote (4). Otherwise, "democracy" rules. Each local club of 20 or more elects 12 members to serve for one year as the Club's advisory council. The president of each club council is eligible to serve, through election, as a member of the Congressional district advisory council. The president of each such council automatically serves on the state council.

In the earlier phase of the movement, each local club was encouraged to pressurize state and national legislators with letters and signatures. As the lines of bureaucracy tightened, the real effort to effect reform funneled through the Washington Legislative Bureau of the Townsend Plan or, more prosaically, the Townsend lobby.

The peak of influence and power was probably reached in 1935, two years after the founding of the movement. Accurate membership figures are not available. Dr. Townsend claims that by October 24, 1935, when the first national convention was held in Chicago, there were exactly 4,552 chartered clubs, with an average membership of 500. It is extremely unlikely, nevertheless, that 2¼ million followers were ever enrolled.

In 1936, the Townsendites claimed 5 million! That was the year Gerald K. Smith and Father Coughlin (one a Protestant minister, the other a Catholic priest, both rabble rousers and tub thumpers leading quasi-fascistic fringe movements) joined forces with Townsend to support Lemke for President on the Union party ticket. The Roosevelt landslide of that year proved one or both of two things: Townsend's boast of mass support was grossly inflated; the New Deal had captured the loyalty of most people in the country who sought federal aid in one form or another. Curiously enough, there is no mention in Townsend's autobiography of his ill-fated renunciation of the two major political parties, of his coalition with Smith and Coughlin. He insists that Townsendism first and last has been ruggedly independent of affiliation with all other causes and movements.

The plan has never been enacted into law, but it has unquestionably hastened along other social-security measures. How enthusiastically legislators have danced to Townsend's fiddle would, however, be hard to say. He has claimed that President Roosevelt once "intimated" that the Social Security Act of 1935 was largely the result of the plan. Mrs. J. A. Ford,

director of the Townsend lobby, told Mr. Matthew J. Blanche (a graduate student who conducted a research project under the present writer's direction), in the spring of 1950, that "certain members of the Ways-Means Committee said that the Townsendites should justly claim credit for all social security legislation." One thing is certain: the Social Security Act, containing old-age-assistance provisions, was passed in August, 1935—seven months after the first Townsend Plan bill, HR 3977, was introduced in the Seventy-fourth Congress by Representative John S. McGroarty.

The McGroarty bill was referred to a House committee, where it remained. The history of subsequent Townsend legislation has been similar. Many Senators and representatives read speeches in favor of the new Townsend bill; no one speaks against it. The bill is then referred to committee, and it dies there.

For politicians, Townsend and his oldsters have been a collective hot potato to be handled gingerly. They have not dared to publicly oppose anything so drenched with American sentimentalism as "helping the old folks"; on the other hand, they dare not wreck the economy. When Congress convened in 1936, Townsend lobbyists were strong-arming legislators, and no one could be certain how powerful the movement was. Several irresponsible members of Congress were urging adoption of the plan and making political capital of the fact that their opponents were silent. By a majority of 240 to 4, the happy solution was chosen of investigating the plan and its leadership. "The financial returns of the movement to the founders were laid bare; the shady past of certain organizers and managers were exposed" (4, p. 184).

The Bell Committee ("Judases and moral prostitutes," Townsend called them) were a bit rough with the old man. They asked him if he read his Bible daily. Since in the Townsend literature his name often appears linked with those of Washington and Lincoln, did he consider himself as great a man as either of them? On May 21, 1936, the lean and cadaverous-cheeked leader refused to testify further, walked out on the committee, and instructed his lieutenants to refuse testimony. Townsend was remanded to district court for trial on the charge of contempt, fined $100, and sentenced to serve 30 days in the District of Columbia jail.

Townsend left for the West Coast. "Those of my advisors who were politically wiser than I, pointed out that the Administration would never permit me to be locked up during the summer or fall before the 1936 presidential elections" (15, p. 210). Two years later, he received notice to deliver himself to the marshal of the District of Columbia. On April 1, 1938, President Roosevelt signed an unconditional pardon. It is one of Dr. Townsend's choicest possessions.

As invariably happens when the dynamic leader is attacked by the powers that be, his followers rallied more fanatically than ever about

his standard. Dr. Townsend became a persecuted martyr in the eyes of the faithful, and in his own words the plan "took on new life and courage afterwards."

The plan itself has changed considerably since it was first announced. The proposed tax on all business transactions has been dropped in favor of a proposed fixed percentage levy upon the gross incomes of all individuals, businesses, and corporations. As Townsend himself explained the shift in his autobiography: "We have learned that a sales tax is a levy upon the little fellow; that a tax upon gross incomes would touch all equally." This is almost incredible candor, not to say incredible naïveté. Had the initial plan been adopted—Townsend had insisted that it was a Christian necessity to save the little fellow and that all who opposed it were diabolical anti-Americans—then what could he have said to the "little fellow," victimized instead of rewarded? Hell has been said to be paved with good intentions.

"Two Hundred Dollars a Month" no longer emblazons the Townsend propaganda, and Townsend's spokesmen in Congress no longer plead for it. The latest plan also includes other categories besides the aged. The Townsend Plan was represented by two bills introduced in the Eighty-first Congress early in 1949, and referred to the Committee on Ways and Means—HR 2135, introduced by Hon. John A. Blatnik of Minnesota, and HR 2136, introduced by Hon. Homer D. Angell of Oregon.

Both bills contain the same three essential parts. First, every citizen of the United States who is sixty years of age or over, every citizen who is disabled for a period longer than six months, and every widow who is a citizen and who has the care of one or more children under eighteen years of age is entitled to receive a monthly pension equal to that citizen's per capita share of the revenue collected for this purpose. Second, this pension must be spent within the confines of the United States, its territories and possessions, within thirty days after the time of receipt, and the recipient may not engage in work for wages or salary, although he may collect interest on investments. Third, to finance the pension there shall be a 3-per-cent tax on the gross incomes of all persons or companies (to be computed at the end of each calendar month), except that personal income up to $250 a month shall be exempt (adapted from 17).

The reason that the movement has abandoned its magic slogan "Two Hundred Dollars a Month" can only be conjectured. Very probably the new tack was taken when a storm of protest was raised by all qualified economists, of either "conservative" or "liberal" persuasion. The plan in its earlier form has been shown to be a pipe dream which, if enacted,

would not only wreck the economy but even reduce the pensioners to a worse poverty than they had previously known.

> The cost of paying pensions of $200 per month to all eligible citizens over 60 years of age, under the simple income test of the McGroarty Bill . . . would be at least $24 billion and probably more than $25 billion annually . . . [a sum] nearly twice the . . . total expenditures of federal, state and local governments for 1932. . . .
>
> The Townsend proposal, therefore, is to give to the 10,000,000 or so qualifying pensioners, representing about 8 per cent of the entire population of the country, about half of the total national income, leaving the other 92 per cent of the people to get long on the other half. [6, p. 22]

The cost in billions of dollars would double in about four decades, as the number of eligible pensioners doubled owing to our constantly aging population. This sum would not include the cost of administering the plan. The first areas of the economy to be obliterated would be those where a 2-per-cent "tax on all business transactions" would more than wipe out the small margin of profit, such as the security and commodities markets, as well as government securities.

In its latest form, of course, the plan is nothing more than a scheme for raising income taxes to get more in the hands of the indigent, with the amount going to each pensioner only a small fraction of $200 a month. In its latest form, the plan loses all distinctiveness, for the Federal government has indicated an increasing eagerness to take care of "the little fellow." Politicians are losing their fear of Townsend and his followers because higher Federal grants of all kinds are destroying the identification of Townsend with the pension grab.

Townsendism has had many political setbacks. The oldsters have never had a showdown with Congress. No Townsend bill has ever been voted down; several of them have been referred to some Congressional committee and have never seen the light of day again. Townsend associated himself and his movement with the third-party debacle of 1936. It happened again in 1948 when Dr. Townsend contributed to Henry Wallace's campaign chest in return for the Progressive party demand that the Townsend bill be brought to the floor of Congress. A similar offer made to both the Republican and Democratic parties was turned down (13, p. 27). The Ninth Townsend Convention was held in Columbus, Ohio, June 30 to July 4, 1949. It was decided to run a Townsend Plan candidate, on a third-party platform, in the presidential election of 1952.

Theoretical explanation. Dr. Townsend is unquestionably a man of integrity and sincerity, and probably many of his lieutenants are, but he and they are obvious babes in the woods of economic theory. On the other hand, the leaders of the movement understand human motivation, they realize what impact recent history has had on the lives and outlook

of our oldsters and other indigent citizens. Sheridan Downey, United States Senator from California and ardent supporter of the plan, has well stated the main reason and perhaps even the main justification for collective efforts such as Townsendism:

> A century ago there would have been some excuse for the reactionary who denied that society had any obligations toward its citizens, for he could have shown, with a measure of truth, that most families lived on the soil, that on such farms there was plenty of useful work to be done by even those of advanced age, and that in any case the family unit was economically strong enough to support its elder members. He could have claimed, too, that if any younger workers were thrown out of employment, they could always strike West and hew out some kind of a livelihood on that expanding frontier, if they had enough courage and strength.
>
> But those arguments have no reality today, no relevance to the facts of our industrial life. Our population has moved to the cities and the factory towns; our frontier has long since vanished. A man fired from his job at forty or fifty may turn to his family group for help; but though they may be able, in some cases, to give him enough to eat, they cannot give him work or independence. A young man entering an overcrowded labor market cannot 'go West and grow up with the country,' since conditions on one coast are about as bad as on the other. A steel worker discharged from a mill in a slack period can't buy or construct himself a mill of his own; the tools of production, in short, are far beyond his reach, and he has only one thing to sell—his labor. When that isn't wanted, he's helpless.
>
> Individually, then, we are each of us defenseless in a world moved and disrupted by vast impersonal forces. . . . [8, pp. 7–8]

The sociologist can have no quarrel with this statement or with other equally perceptive analyses of the plight of the aged to be found in the Townsend literature, however suspect the program of reform may be.

The Townsend movement, then, has been erected upon a foundation of widespread discontent with the present, a discontent which the old in America probably feel more than any other age grouping. The year 1947 was one of unprecedented high average income. Yet at that time, 54 per cent of American males aged sixty-five and over were receiving less than $1,500 per year, and 15.8 per cent were receiving no income at all. The comparable proportions for males aged forty-five to fifty-four were 20.2 and 1.7 per cent respectively (adapted from 3, Table 15). In a culture with a deepening accent on youth, the number of the aged grows. In 1850, there were 17.3 persons aged twenty to sixty-four for every person sixty-five and older. By 1950, there were 7.7, and it has been estimated that by the year 2000 there will be only 4.6 (5, p. 16).

While the experience of insecurity is widely complained of in our time, the discontent of the old is possibly more justified, certainly more understandable, than that of any other age grouping in the population.

They have seen time-honored roles and goals undermined and demolished. The majority of them at the present time face discard. The self-conception can be no more brutally attacked than with the knowledge that one is not wanted, has no function to perform, is shelved. In the past, under rural-familistic conditions, old age was much less a problem to one's self and to others. The plight of the modern aged has been discussed in a previous chapter. Suffice it to say that where once the majority of the aged remained self-supporting on the home farm, or continued to function actively until bedridden on the home farm of their adult children, they now have no useful work to do in the modern apartment or in the depersonalized modern economy of business and industry which seeks personnel in ever younger age brackets. "The ads say stenographers must be between the ages of 18 and 25; salesmen over 45 are not wanted; engineers over 35 need not apply" (5, p. 29). Only one-third of our people who are over sixty-five are still working.

The plight of the aged extends far beyond the door closed to useful activity. The "American dream" in realistic terms never meant a million dollars; for the aged, it has traditionally meant comfort, an opportunity to work if one chose to do so or retirement on life savings, and a home of one's own or at least an appreciated place in the home of one's married children. The old in increasing numbers find any or all of these denied them. They have no savings, they are unemployed, they live in a "home for the aged," or they regard themselves as useless burdens upon their married children. They are bored, insecure, helpless, shelved. Miserable and discontented, they are ripe for collective demands upon a society they feel has cheated them, provided an organization and a dynamic leader are made available.

It is an important fact that the Townsend propaganda has always made of "Two Hundred Dollars a Month" much more than a simple demand for a cash subsidy. In subtle fashion, the pension has become a symbol of redress for *all* deprivations and humiliations, a weapon to hurl at the bloated rich and the "college professors" (economists) who are the supposed enemies of Grandpa and Grandma, a means of striking back at society to reclaim from that society what is properly one's own. ". . . all thinking people recognized that it was a manifestation of power and determination on the part of the people to right the wrongs that had afflicted them so long and so severely" (15, pp. 150–151).

The plan makes it possible for people over sixty "to go on living as Americans should."

> Over and over again they are told that because of *their* efforts our country has progressed, that after lives of sacrifice and devotion *they* deserve attention and comfort, that because of *their* training and experience *they* alone are

peculiarly equipped to be the sensible disbursers of the money which will start and keep the ball rolling. In brief, they are promised a status which they have so far found only in their dreams. [4, p. 208]

Again, the self-conception is flattered by the assurance that the plan will save America. Much more stress is placed upon this than the material benefits to be showered upon pensioners, which are after all rather obvious. They are offered the dubious economic doctrine that rapidly spent pension money will create a vast storehouse of new wealth and will lead *every* American to a new El Dorado of prosperity. All that is needed "to insure a steadily growing standard of living for all Americans is to gear the volume of money in use to the present-day needs of the people, and see that the money is equitably distributed" (16, p. 13). War will then cease, for the sole cause of war is poverty, Dr. Townsend has insisted time and again.

The plan is presented as a bulwark of all the major social values with which uneducated, religious oldsters identify in a simple, emotional, and literal way. It is identified with Christianity: "it bore the impress of Christ's own teachings—it was the blueprint of practical, workable Christianity" (15, p. 150). It reflects patriotism: "[clubs] open their meetings with recitations of the pledge to the flag and close with mass singing of 'My Country Tis Of Thee'" (15, p. 193). It claims to support capitalism: "Let us keep our profit system and show our low-income folks how to rise above poverty even while our well-to-do folks get richer" (15, p. 242).

In many different ways Townsendism, like Moral Rearmament, promises to resurrect the past. America will once again be blessed with peace and prosperity and, most important of all, the old will once again have a secure and honored place. The days of one's youth will return; more accurately, the tradition of the old in the days of one's youth will be transformed into reality.

The plan, then, shores up the self-conception and promises to achieve projected roles and goals. The clubs provide meeting places where oldsters can find warm, congenial companionship among others of their age, situation, and outlook. The members dedicate their lives to a sacred cause which will save the world.

The plan also provides a mental context which simplifies the complex and quiets mental confusion. War, depression, unemployment, "radicalism," crime—these and other issues of the day are reduced to the following formula: they exist because you do not have enough money to spend, and they will disappear when you do.

The role of the dynamic leader should not be overlooked. Dr. Townsend is one with his followers, a simple, God-fearing Methodist and family man, a patriotic American who has been afflicted with poor health

and buffeted by depression and unemployment. He may take a plane from one Townsend camp site to another, but he dresses simply and assumes a "just folks" manner. He is one of them. He is also a magic helper, the confidante of statesmen and learned men, a tower of strength upon whom to lean in the hour of tribulation, a Samson who will slay the forces of evil, and a Moses who will lead his people into the Promised Land. In their eyes, as well as his own, he is a martyr to the sacred cause:

> When I got involved with the Townsend Plan at the age of 67, I was an old man. I mean that literally. I was tired and worn out and just about ready to roll over and call it a day. Then I was swept up by this sky-rocket and for ten years I have been going night and day, lecturing, broadcasting, writing, making motion pictures, organizing—and just haven't had time since to get tired. [15, p. 155]

Men are not motivated by the truth. Men are motivated by what they believe is true or by what they wish were true. It should be no cause for surprise that the Townsend Plan has survived a concerted and continuous attack by responsible economists. Yet *even if* all old Americans could be paid $200 a month for not working, and *even if* this resulted in a golden era of prosperity for everybody, it is hardly likely that the problem of the aged would be "solved." What they are striving for, many in a vague, fumbling, and unknowing fashion, is a place in society which tradition has promised the old but which reality denies. A pension would leave them on a more comfortable shelf perhaps, but still on a shelf.

The work of such groups as the New York State Joint Legislative Committee on Problems of the Aging will doubtless prove more effective in the unequal battle for old Americans. This committee uncovers work opportunities for the old, seeks the backing of labor unions and employers and legislators in doing so, sets up educational and training classes to rehabilitate work skills. In our time, the aged will probably not reclaim a vital role in family and community life, but at least a useful and remunerative function is a realistic goal toward which social reform can strive, *along with* subsidies for those no longer able to care for themselves.

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CHAPTER 25 *The Problem of the Twentieth Century*

> I limit myself to the following argument: modern gigantism deprives men of the possibility of being and of feeling themselves responsible in society and in politics, and consequently of being free; this anxious irresponsibility invites dictatorship from within and makes us powerless against dictatorships from without; our intimate disorder thus necessarily and infallibly delivers us to the "new order" of the totalitarians; if we do not like this, we must change methods or attitudes; but what are the methods and the attitude contrary to the gigantism and capable of averting it?
>
> I answer that there can be a solid and liberal order only in *small* communities, in commonwealths which preserve human proportions. There neighbor can speak to neighbor and the individual make himself understood. The consequences of actions are visible, love and hatred are tangible, and powers can be controlled and sustained by the citizen who has knowledge of the situation and persons. . . .
>
> Of those who say, "I should be willing to have such an order, but it appears to me impossible," I shall ask what they consider possible, beyond war and the totalitarian State, which is nothing other than the permanent state of war?
>
> —DENIS DE ROUGEMENT

A social problem is more than a set of conditions. Poverty was prevalent enough in the Middle Ages, but poverty was not then a social problem because it was regarded as God's will. A social problem is a set of conditions that the majority, or a substantial minority, disapprove as morally wrong. The twentieth century harbors a multitude of problems, as defined. Illegitimacy, crime, divorce, venereal disease, cruelty to animals, and unemployment are but a representative few.

Implicit in the recognition of problems such as these is the idea that they can be solved, more or less easily. Discussion and propaganda assume the essential stability of the social order; each separate problem is assumed to be an intrusion upon society rather than an integral part of it. The solution of each problem is thus made to appear a fairly easy matter. A little tinkering about the edges of things as they are is sufficient. The conventional approach to conventionally defined social problems, in other words, views the issue at hand as a mere hindrance to a potentially perfectible social order. The continuity from present to future is looked upon as assured.

The problem of the twentieth century is more vast, more all-encom-

passing, than any we have listed. It cannot be fitted into the conventional frame of reference. It is a social problem in that it comprises a set of conditions which have aroused widespread disapprobation. On the other hand, no conceivable tinkering about the edges of things as they are will solve it. In whatever guise it is presented, the problem of the twentieth century is that which threatens to *break* the continuity between present and future. There are few citizens—intellectual or busily inarticulate, self-contained or wild-eyed with impetuous schemes for deliverance—upon whom one insidious question does not intrude at every waking moment: will the future have recognizable design?

It behooves us to pause long enough to observe that in all times and places at least some men have expressed dissatisfaction with the way things were going. Throughout history, doubt and insecurity have been men's constant companions. We should also note that certain spokesmen of every period have bemoaned the passing of the golden age. The evidence of change always evokes remembrance of a more glorious era that is irretrievably gone. Universally, where perceptible social change has occurred in a single life span, regret and nostalgia for the past, fear of the future, have been recorded.

It is likewise true that, in any period of perceptible change, there is a tendency to exaggerate the importance of the present for the future. During the past three hundred years, spokesmen of every generation have viewed their present as an age of transition; they have imagined themselves on some sort of threshold to the future. Man's view of himself has always been myopic.

With all these warnings in mind, there still appears considerable warrant for the opinion that the connection between present and immediate future is now far different from what it has ever before been in Western civilization. One thing is certain: men may have lived always with doubt and insecurity, but there has never been a time when doubt and insecurity were voiced so continuously and persistently.

The difference is more qualitative than quantitative. The present sense of foreboding is total. It is not the fate of this or that institution or of some one tradition that is believed in jeopardy. It is certainly not death. Men have always lived with the foreknowledge that they would die, that posterity would remember them briefly if at all. But they died with the belief that what they had made part of themselves would live on. In previous epochs of rapid change, there was regret for what had changed, fear for what the immediate future would bring after one was forgotten—yet the meaningful continuity from one's own life to that of one's descendants was, for the most part, an abiding assurance.

The compelling motivation that is meaningful continuity, apart from personal fate, is proved by the indoctrination of the combat soldier. He is asked to risk his life in defense of his way of life. He is promised noth-

ing more. Stephen Spender may or may not be correct in his assessment, but he has stated that the poet's voice in the modern world is almost stilled. There are no great poets and there is no great poetry because poetry is the past expressed in the present for the future. The present has broken continuity with both.

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The problem of the twentieth century is, then, social change, accelerated to the point of breaking continuity in both individual career and entire institutional structure. Within the span of a single generation, there have been two world wars and the most disastrous economic slump in history. The crises loom larger and they occur more frequently. They are, for the most part, conjunctural phenomena, crises unplanned and unwanted, emerging themselves from the constant acceleration of social change.

Our values and traditions are endangered by what we do, and by what we must do as well as by what is done to us. A nation which worships progress, physical comfort, individual planning and individual success, hedonistic enjoyment and material possessions, with ideals of self-initiative, independence, and individual freedom is being forced to sacrifice all in war and continuous preparation for war. The vision of the untrammeled individual, following his own bent, planning his own future, with a secure social order in which to make his own way—in short, the American dream—is fading.

Unlike most national cultures, the American has included a positive evaluation of social change. At the turn of the present century, a time that Henry Seidel Canby has called "the Age of Confidence," America was in retrospect a rich, colorful, dramatic panorama of shifting scenic design. Yet the vast changes that had occurred were interpreted, could be interpreted, as a series of promises fulfilled.

The loom of time was weaving new cloth, new modifications of design; still, the basic pattern remained. Not only was the individual a relatively free agent, not only could the individual career be planned and executed with little hindrance or constraint, but the Church, the nation, the community, the family stood as fixed points of traditional anchorage. Social change had not so much disrupted tradition as it had fulfilled a national destiny of continental conquest, unprecedented wealth and material comfort, progress, peace throughout the world, and America a refuge to Europe's dispossessed, a beacon light of democratic idealism.

Social change in modern America has ripped and torn through this older, changing and yet stable, pattern. Headlines scream crisis after crisis, and shock waves reverberate through the social equilibrium. Planning one's career and planning one's life become increasingly difficult, if not impossible, as gigantic depersonalized forces push and pull and wreck. But as death has always been inevitable, so also has personal

failure and the crumbling of personal hopes always been a probability. What is peculiar to our time is the break in continuity of the total social system, something which has occurred in the lifetime of mature adults.

The majority are directly affected by this. They sense it, but they are probably not consciously aware of it. Only the minority of intellectuals realize the full enormity of today's total crisis. The majority, in the halls of Congress as well as in the factory, at the movies, ordering another beer at the corner taproom, are consciously aware only of moving from one separate crisis to another. They are concerned only with a series of makeshifts, halfhearted and half-earnest attempts to get somehow beyond the next decade or so, an alliance here, a law there, a price control over this or that commodity. Even the demand for a concerted and large-scale effort is also addressed to temporary stopgap and expedient.

Our majority blindly back and fill. They do not want to look closely at the shifting sands of the present they want to preserve. This dogged persistence of eyes closed to the immediate future, however, manifests the pervasive fear that it will not have recognizable design, a fear that is understandable enough since we all share it.

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The problem of the twentieth century has been described in many different ways, yet all point to essentially the same referent. Some say it is war. Others express concern for certain institutions—the "breakdown of the family," or the "decline of religion." Still others claim that the rise of depersonalized secondary-group mass society is the villain, with its peculiar combination of personal isolation and personal manipulation by bureaucratic power. Industrialism and urbanism have also received consideration. Many sociologists have invoked the culture-lag hypothesis, the failure of social innovation to cope with the disruption of mechanization.

Most would simply and emphatically declare that it is Communism, but this is surely a short-sighted view—these are the same people who a short decade ago simply and emphatically declared that it was Nazism. The immediate threat *is* Communism, but Communism is the present focal point of total crisis, not the crisis itself. When we ask what has enabled Communism to become the immediate threat, then we see that Communism is merely another manifestation of the problem of the twentieth century, and not the problem entire.

What has enabled Communism to become the immediate threat is not a revolutionary doctrine, not even the decisions of evil men. The world has been plentifully supplied with revolutionary doctrines and evil men for quite some time. Upon closer scrutiny, it appears that certain universal forces in the modern world have provided Russian Communism with the means of threatening the world.

What are some of these? Mass production, which concentrates control in a few over wealth, tools, skills, machinery—the ultimate panoply of total war. The effective end of self-employment and small-scale economic organization, and thereby the effective end of local resistance to events and decisions sometimes from unknown and usually from unseen sources. A formally integrated division of labor that destroys elasticity, that transfers dislocation at any point in the social system to all other points, that makes each citizen's livelihood dependent upon subservience to one or more administrative hierarchies of control. The concentration of power that enables the few to march the millions at the moment of command. Compulsory education that enables the few to propagandize the many, quickly and efficiently. The agglomeration of population in cities, where the autonomy and control of family and neighborhood are weakened, so that isolated individuals can be more easily manipulated. By no means least, the steady undermining of the old religion by the new, the new religion of nation-state worship, the state above all else, the amoral state, that may do anything and everything: no lie, no breach of trust, no cruelty, certainly against nonnationals but increasingly even against fellow nationals, is wrong, provided that the state thereby serves its own ends.

These and other universal forces in modern society converge on the graph of history at the point of disaster. Communism is the immediate threat because it has sooner, more ruthlessly, and more efficiently pushed to logical conclusion the forces manifest elsewhere. It is more what Russia shares with the West than the ideological differences between them that has enabled Russia to challenge the West.

The doctrine of world revolution has been more a convenient tool for "old-fashioned" national power politics than anything else. It is *tactically* more useful than the Nazi ideology of racial superiority. The Communist doctrine is exportable. It is an appeal to the underdog everywhere to group with other underdogs and destroy the masters in their own country. And yet, despite the bellowing alarm of certain of our own citizens, there is no evidence that in or out of Russia there has ever been a Marxist revolt of the proletariat against the capitalists. A minute segment of deluded intellectuals served as spies, there and elsewhere. A small, disciplined group of professional power seekers, there and elsewhere, has seized power in the name of the proletariat, only when their nation was disorganized and prostrate in the aftermath of war. Throughout Europe the might of the Red army, not the persuasive blandishments of the Communist propagandist, weakens the will to resist, emboldens native power seekers to exhort their fellow nationals to throw off the yoke of capitalist oppression. The immediate threat, viewed in this light, becomes no less apparent, but it is made less mysterious and awesome.

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The world is now formally integrated, tightly administered both economically and politically. But the world is now no more a social unity (much less, some would argue) than it has ever been. Tension, opposition, and contesting purposes were in the past for the most part limited in social and physical space. Where once these erupted and subsided at localized points, they now ramify throughout and beyond social systems. In this planetary arena of formal integration, decisions made anywhere, at any of the multitude of focal points of power, are bound to create clash and dislocation within and outside given social systems. Conjunctural phenomena, the unwanted and unplanned effects of plan and decision—as these converge with countless other plans and decisions—create ever more disruption throughout the whole as specific economic and political problems are being solved.

The Frankenstein monster that modern man has created is not the machine, but administrative organization. The lack of social unity, in conjunction with the host of power hierarchies, fosters the growth of the superhierarchy, the centralized government, to impose order upon the disorder of conjunctural change which arises when the lesser hierarchies go their individual ways or deliberately attempt to defeat other lesser hierarchies. In the last analysis, it is only force which can bring the lesser hierarchies into line.

Much the same pattern is repeated in the sphere of international relations. Here the lesser hierarchies are the centralized governments themselves. The economic and political plans and decisions of the various states converge on an even vaster scale of conjunctural phenomena. A protective tariff that closes the nation's ports to foreign produce is passed to satisfy the demands of that nation's organized farmers and, in the curious language of the political scientists, a "friendly nation" seeks aid from the enemy bloc because its agricultural economy is threatened. Nation A goes to war with nation B and defeats her. Five years later A asks B to join in military alliance against A's erstwhile friend C, that helped A to defeat B. This is a matter of tragic necessity, since with B no longer a threat to C, C is now in a position to challenge A.

Modern war is total war not because of technology, not because of the increasing destructive power of weapons, but because nations are now formally integrated, totally administered organizations as they never were even in the recent past. Wars are no longer fought between hereditary dynasties and their professional armies. In a real sense, wars are no longer fought between governments. Instead, total populations wage war upon other total populations, precisely because every total population is now totally administered by its government. Wars are no longer fought for treaty concessions, markets, or territories; they are fought either to secure unconditional surrender, that is, elimination of the

enemy from the arena of international power, or to enslave the total population of the enemy.

For many reasons, modern total war is inevitable. The most obvious reason is that the lesser hierarchies which are national governments in the sphere of international relations do not in turn have a superhierarchy to impose force upon them, as do the lesser hierarchies within the nations.

Many people of avowedly liberal intent espouse the idea of setting up a superhierarchy of power over the various nations. As is demonstrated below, this is impossible, at least within the liberal scheme of values. It would be possible only in terms of military conquest and military government. In the international sphere, power has polarized about the United States and Russia. These two nations are the only truly sovereign states left in the world. The aftermath of their titanic contest of arms will leave one of them dominant over the world. One state seeks this conclusion, the other does not, but the dynamic of ever greater concentrated power will not admit disinclination to use it.

Force and more force must be used, within and outside social systems, as the power hierarchies extend, as they clash, as they create unplanned and unwanted crises, and as more and more power concentrates in fewer hands, something which is both cause and result of crisis and recurrent crisis. Thus the problem of the twentieth century, in the first half of which, despite chaotic change and a series of fractures in tradition, Christian-democratic values retained some vitality beyond the slobbering lip service paid them by vulgarized "public relations," and individual liberty, freedom to plan and to execute, self and local autonomy were not only trumpeted but were in some measure realized. A long and glorious era appears to be drawing to a close. But the tragedy being performed has, at least in the West, few villains—unless the villain is the convergence of conjunctural social change.

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The writing on the wall has been accurately read by a few, even though it has been interpreted in various ways. Only solutions of an extremely radical nature have captured the imagination and loyalty of liberals and intellectuals. These radical solutions deal directly with power. In one way or another, one set of solutions advocates more power to redress the abuses and solve the specific problems arising from existing power. In one way or another, the other set of solutions advocates the reduction of power and the diffusion rather than concentration of that reduced power.

Of the first set of solutions—those proposing that some superpower or superagency be imposed upon the entire world to keep the multitude of lesser hierarchies in line—spokesmen in the East and West part com-

pany. Spokesmen in the East either with frank admission or crocodile-smiling subterfuge seek world-wide military and economic domination by the Communist ruling elite. Spokesmen in the West tend to good-willed confusion: they preserve a naïve faith that democracy can be extended as social structure, as well as concept, to incorporate an unlimited clash of values, interests, and power drives. They overlook what Thomas Jefferson repeated again and again, that democracy is a matter of personal and local autonomy; the farther it is extended, the more population it includes, the less it can realize itself, for democracy, in the last analysis, depends upon unanimity in purpose and values. Spokesmen in the West are in fact more willing to sacrifice democracy than they realize, for they—some a little, others a great deal—propose that One World or World Federation or United Nations be empowered to apply force against recalcitrant nations, in the form of economic sanctions, bombing by an international air force, military reprisal, and so on.

If the various nations of the world become lesser hierarchies of power because a greater hierarchy is imposed upon them, this will never eventuate through debate or agreement. The bases for such agreement have never existed; they do not and never will exist. If and when the superstate appears, it will do so through Eastern design or Western default—in either case, it will be a matter of military and economic domination.

Let us briefly review the "failure" of the United Nations. It is a gross oversimplification, and yet not entirely devoid of truth, to assert that the United Nations has failed because it was never designed to succeed, any more than was its predecessor, the League of Nations. The world, at present, is divided between two sovereign states, with a large number of quasi-sovereign states attached to the periphery of both; these satellites resist absorption so far as they are able and so far as they dare. All nations, of secure or tenuous sovereignty, preserve separate, distinct, and parochial interests, claims, and counterclaims to various markets, territories, populations, and influences, which they seek either to protect or to wrest from some other nation. The men who rule these various nations, and their populations, jealously cling to sacred sovereignty. The universal cult of the nation-state declares the nation-state to be supreme.

No United States Senator could ever have achieved office without proclaiming that the sovereign interests of the United States are or should be binding upon the world. That impassioned promoter of international organization, Herbert Evatt of Australia, has rejected the idea of world government as "impossible of acceptance" by small states. Soviet Russia has ignored the idea of world government as beneath contempt, in the United Nations has saved vitriolic denunciation for the more modest idea that that organization needs strengthening through limitation of the veto. In September, 1950, a United States Senate subcommittee, after spending eight months studying various proposals for

world federation, Atlantic Union, and world government, rejected all of them as impracticable.

A world government, a genuine sovereign entity and not mere goodwill rhetoric, would require the *surrender* of national sovereignty, the *surrender* of national power. The various nations, including Russia and the United States, would have to dismember themselves as entities. Such a solution is manifestly impossible. It is a solution unacceptable to rulers and ruled alike. At no time in the past has any nation ever voluntarily surrendered sovereignty; it could hardly be argued that the present augurs any such event.

Granted the impossible, that all nations of the earth, including the United States and Russia, should voluntarily renounce national sovereignty, to whom would national sovereignty be surrendered? Suppose Russia and the United States should draft an equal number of troops for an international police force designed to prevent the outbreak of war anywhere in the world. Who would direct that force? These are obvious enough questions, but the proponents of such schemes have failed to supply any answers. Nations can and do cooperate to end wars between smaller nations, but only when the cessation of hostilities is in the mutual sovereign interest of the separate larger nations. The United Nations successfully intervened to end the war in Palestine because this was at that time in the sovereign interest of both the United States and Russia. The United Nations did not succeed in preventing the invasion of Korea by Communist China because this was not in the sovereign interest of both the United States and Russia.

In the sphere of international relations, there are no friends and, in one sense, no enemies—only temporary coalitions of mutual interest and mutual antagonism. After accepting billions of dollars of American aid, Great Britain in the United Nations dragged foot in "branding China the aggressor" for its intervention in Korea. But Great Britain—until trade relations were broken in May, 1952—had a vital interest in the continuance of profitable trade with Communist China.

No nation now or ever has acted upon any other principle than self-interest, self-defined. How could any nation act upon any other principle? How many of the most idealistic liberals honestly wish their own government to act upon any other principle? No One World enthusiast has ever faced up to this inevitability: in any kind of world federation, where in fact as well as glowing principle each nation had an equal voice, the national interests of the United States, along with those of all other nations, periodically would be voted down. There may be some few who would accept this inevitability, at least until the time that it was rubbed home, but neither those of the masses who wield power and manipulate sentiment nor those of the masses who are swayed by power and sentiment would ever accept it. Indeed, in the real world in which we live,

such a hypothetical renunciation of power would invite—impel—disaster far beyond that which we must face.

The renunciation of national power is, of course, a phantom danger, for, given the present balance and operation of power and the universal cult of the nation-state, it will not and cannot occur. One World is more than a possibility, it is a probability, but no scheme of equal representation and participation, no reasoned debate or noble repudiation of power politics (Is there any other kind?), will serve as midwife at its birth. If and when achieved, One World will be policed by the soldiers of one nation or by the soldiers of a coalition of nations in military alliance.

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In the twentieth century, hierarchies of power continue to expand, and ever more power concentrates in fewer hands as bigger hierarchies come to dominate lesser hierarchies. Separate organizations create a multitude of specific problems by going their own way, unleashing conjunctural changes, and contesting the aims and purposes of other organizations.

Any multigroup society such as ours presents a great diversity in claim and counterclaim, in values, goals, purposes, and beliefs; as the lines of separative administrative organization are drawn more distinct and as the clash of interests becomes ever more apparent, the demands for the use of force in the name of the total society increase. The willingness, even the necessity, for applying such unilateral force also grows apace.

To cite one example, as the various labor unions have become more powerful, larger, and more efficiently organized, their leaders have fought a continuous battle with leaders of other unions for increased membership and allegiance. The interests of labor unions periodically clash with those of management, farmers, consumers, and government bureaus. With the almost total formal integration of the division of labor, strikes now tie up not one factory, not even one nationwide industry, but whole regions of the nation. The political party in power, whether "favorable" to organized labor or not, must encroach upon labor's power, "in the national interest" seize factories, by direct or indirect means dictate terms of settlement. That these terms currently are often "favorable" to labor, especially as regards wage demands, should not be permitted to obscure the fact that the Federal government's *right* to intervene "in the national interest" is steadily being legitimized in the eyes of the electorate.

The escalator clauses in many labor contracts, which make wage increases mandatory with any increase in consumer prices, are having two conjunctural (unplanned, unwanted) effects. They are spiraling

inflation higher and creating animosity toward organized labor among those citizens who are not protected from inflation in this way. Inflation and resentment of it will also legitimize further governmental encroachment upon "the rights of labor."

Internal centralized power and administrative organization, and total war, are mutually cause and effect. Internal administrative organization, as it extends, both makes possible and fosters total war. Total war, in turn, gives greater scope to internal centralized power. Plans are now under way for fixing wages and hours by governmental decree; governmental spokesmen are cautiously inflating trial-balloon "rumors" that industrial workers will either be ordered to remain working where they are or be transported to where they are "most needed." The men of power within the unions may go along, may even administer such decrees, but to the extent that they do they will cease being part of the labor movement and will instead become part of centralized government.

Besides organized labor, industry, business, organized farmers, the civil service, and most certainly consumers and citizens, organized or not, could also be cited. Where there are in modern society: first, a diversity and clash of organized interests and goals; second, continuous disruption of the social system because separate administrative organizations go their own way, often contest other organizations, in either event create conjunctural change; third, a popular demand that these separate organizations be brought into line and the technological and administrative means for doing so; then the superhierarchy of centralized government must increasingly utilize force, top to bottom, throughout the social system.

Communist and fascist dictatorships make a philosophy of force; they do not, need not, await any such process of creeping gradualism for the use of force. Only time can tell to what point short of authoritarianism the nations with a capitalist-democratic tradition will drift.

There is no plot, the leaders are as helpless as the led to stop the tide; many of the leaders, in fact, are bewildered and confused by the scope of the power that has been thrust into their hands. They exhort the led to various forms of voluntary action while the led, in turn, vigorously demand centralized and "strong" leadership. Both preserve a myth that once approximated fact in America's rural decentralized past, in Walter Lippmann's terms the myth of the "omniscient citizen": the individual is the ultimate source of political power, he is the community's direct rule maker and enforcer, and he has an intimate knowledge of all the political and economic forces that he directly controls. If anything, America's leaders have a more tender concern for the myth than the led who, as several editorial writers have insisted, are crying, "Tell us what to do and we'll do it."

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We have said that liberals and intellectuals present two polarized solutions for the problem of the twentieth century. One is more power to redress the abuses and solve the specific problems arising from existing power. The masses advocate this, too, but in terms of tribal devotion to the cult of the nation-state; intellectuals who veer in the same direction, as we have already indicated, envision an international world federation empowered to contain the thrust of separate national interests.

The other solution proffered in many guises by another wing of our modern intellectuals would breathe the breath of life into the myth of the omniscient citizen. Aware or not of what they do, they borrow a leaf from Thomas Jefferson's book and insist that total disaster can only be averted by decentralization, decentralization of power, decentralization of industry, decentralization of organization. Only through such decentralization, they insist, can the individual regain self-autonomy, cease being a buried statistic and a manipulated nonentity. Only by this most radical of all solutions, it is argued, can democracy in any meaningful sense be reborn: the location of economic and political authority within the person and within the local community.

Although some such discussants are willing to sacrifice a high standard of living as the price to be paid to realize their ideal, others claim that technology can be made to serve the individual and the small local group rather than remain their master through vast administrative organization. The development of light metals, intensive crop production, electricity—that elastic source of power which could be, even though it is not now, produced and used locally—all afford, it is said, the means of grafting present technology upon past social structure so as to avert disaster and at the same time check any headlong retreat into archaism.

Although only a minority of modern intellectuals has charted this course, the number has been growing and very likely will continue to grow for some time to come. That minority now includes such diverse spokesmen as Aldous Huxley, the novelist-mystic, and Peter Drucker, the economist. In recent years, a splinter group of the Young People's Socialist League has completely repudiated the traditional watchword of socialism—public ownership of the means of production—and has raised aloft the banner of economic decentralization. The Hutterite Brotherhood in Paraguay has successfully combined economic and political decentralization with a primitive and pristine form of Christianity.

Almost any "return to religion," as a matter of fact, embodies the decentralist principle. It affirms the dignity of the individual. It establishes a relationship between God and person that stands apart from human organization and human power. Basing its social ethic upon the relationships of human individuals throughout time and space, in however small degree religion undermines loyalty and duty to human

aggregates of administration, which are delimited in time and space. Even though the return to religion take place within an organized Church, a fulcrum of resistance to other administrative organizations is thereby provided, and the temporal power of the religious organization itself is both held in check and periodically challenged within the body of the Church by the strength of religious fervor. God-and-man, man-and-man—these reaffirmed relationships supply a continuous tension of decentralism.

But there is no perceptible trend toward a return to religion. Nor is there any trend toward decentralism directly, in economic and political affairs. On the contrary, every trend races in the opposite direction—that of concentration of power and control. Assuming for the moment that decentralization is the only adequate and proper solution of the problem of the twentieth century—and the reader is reminded that neither the statement of the problem nor its proposed solution are free from the biases of the given spokesman—what are the obstacles to its realization?

Man is not rational. This is a simple and obvious truism, and yet the underlying premise of most reformers is man's rationality. From Aristotle to John Dewey, the belief in the preeminence of the rational faculty in determining the future has remained for the most part unshaken. It was and remains the basis of our political ideology. It has survived the evidence of the cultural anthropologists, the semanticists, and the psychoanalysts. Most modern sociologists in certain phases of their work will stress cultural determinism, the imprisonment of thought within the structure of language, the imperial force of early-life conditioning, the power in the mores, the intracticability of habit, the compulsion of emotional identification with groups, symbols, and shibboleths, and the subliminal dominance of unconscious motivations. Most sociologists will insist upon all of these, and yet, when they exhort their audience to some reform or other—an incredible temptation to all literate folk which no professional sociologist ever completely abjures—the rational faculty is addressed. War, punishment of the criminal, racial prejudice are shown to be "irrational," and by direct plea or implication the audience is asked to modify its behavior in the light of the "facts" presented.

Reforms of organizational procedure are often quietly accomplished by administrative decision. There is no shred of evidence that reforms of such generality and magnitude that the public itself must take action have ever been accomplished except by a shrewd manipulation of power, of emotionalized sentiment, or, more frequently, of both. The irrational belief (that is, lacking any evidence) in man's essential rationality, however, will very likely continue to resist rational disproof.

Doubtless, many more than now do so could be made to admit the

necessity of decentralization to solve the problem of the twentieth century, to preserve the democratic values they espouse. Even so, that they would then actively work toward that goal is unlikely. The majority of men hunger for world peace, but the majority persist in those actions and emotionalized identifications and habits that, in part, make war inevitable.

In the sphere of social reform, rationality is the application of those means demonstrably necessary to secure the given reform. Neither power nor manipulated sentiment can usher in decentralization, since both destroy individual responsibility, the necessary bedrock of decentralization. Decentralization would require a vast convergence of decisions by separate individuals to collaborate in the same collective goal. A goal of that kind, of that magnitude, would require the *voluntary* renunciation of many other goals.

Many might believe decentralization was their all-impelling goal, but when the time for decision and action came, they would find themselves "irrationally" shackled by a host of counterloyalties and counterpreferences. They would have to renounce too much; in terms of their total scheme of values, they would even have to renounce themselves.

Decentralization might be required for a meaningful continuance of the entire social order, from immediate past to immediate future, but it would make most personal careers meaningless. For most men, the self is inextricably bound to the career and hence to the administrative organization which holds the career—labor union, business, government bureau, professional society, or university. An active program of decentralization would have to start with voluntary withdrawal from "the world," but the saints, now as ever, are few.

More than the career would be at stake. So many sacrifices would be entailed that the decision, on rational or irrational grounds, would not be taken. What of patriotism, in one sense the worship of the nation-state's centralized power? With the most conceivably efficient utilization of decentralist technology, there would be a considerable drop in the standard of living, an immediate reduction that would outweigh the extreme probability that if present centralist organization continues, the ultimate reduction will be far greater.

How many would be prepared to give up football games, multimillion-dollar Hollywood epics, chrome-plastered automobiles, television sets, fashionable clothing, and cheap and rapid public transport? How many would accept, at least for a short time, simpler and ruder techniques of living, a reduced diet of printed matter, tobacco, liquor, soft drinks, and perhaps the likelihood of outdoor sanitary facilities? Beyond creature comfort, amusement, petty egotistical display, and the squalor of reiterated distractions, how many would or could renounce the cult of progress, efficiency, the nation-state, and success?

There are other difficulties. Like pacifism, decentralization would only hasten, not avert, disaster, unless the movement were uniform over the face of the planet. As the world is presently organized, decentralization, like pacifism, would be an open invitation to military conquest. Decentralization is now possible only in areas protected from one focal point of centralized military might by another. The Hutterite Brotherhood in Paraguay, along with the land area of the United States, would fall under Communist rule were the United States army to disintegrate. The decision to decentralize could not now be taken within the range of choices acceptable to the majority. Only deeply religious persons stand ready to serve as an example of redemption to those who seek only to crush them along with the redemptive principle.

As Benjamin Franklin observed, very little is certain. Nevertheless, a voluntary reordering of modern society appears unlikely. More likely we will be moved, leaders and led, from crisis to crisis within the total enveloping crisis. The time of troubles, in Toynbee's phrase, has overtaken our civilization.

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We Americans tend to avert our gaze from whatever handwriting is on the wall. During religious service we say that man lives in a land of darkness in the shadow of death; more than anything else this is lip service to an older tradition that has been uprooted. To the advertising agencies was handed the task of formulating the aims and purposes of World War II. It was a false-confident and vulgar picture of kitchen appliances, television sets, pin-striped suits, and luxurious automobiles that they drew, a roseate future of creature comfort and mindless diversion that glowed but briefly against the gathering dark.

In the depth of the greatest of all depressions, Americans hummed a tune, "Happy Days Are Here Again," that remained for months among the most popular songs in the country. The theme of this song is not the discovery of a different source of content, but the blind, reiterated assurance that the life of money, possessions, success, and commercialized amusement is now as safe as ever, as "the skies above are clear again."

This buoyant optimism tends to blindness, but it has been accompanied by courage and resourcefulness. History may yet record that it was neither wealth, technology, know-how, nor efficient organization that enabled America to survive her time of troubles, but the ability and willingness of her people to build a new social order upon new, that is to say older, premises—at that time when circumstances permitted such a return. It appears likely, however, that before this task is begun our time of troubles will run its course. The opportunity of working and building to shorten that span of time may not be ours.

In 1936 appeared Professor Ralph Linton's *The Study of Man*, the best social-science textbook that has ever been written. Linton dedicated

his book "to the next civilization," for he descries looming on the horizon "centuries of darkness and despair."

A view of the future is something that has been vouchsafed no man. The future persistently meanders out of sight. It is also true that no future ever logically fulfills in any detail all of the trends and forces that could be described in any given present. That is why no utopia, whether optimistic like Bellamy's or pessimistic like Butler's, has ever been realized. Trends of any present always combine in unpredictable ways, they create conjunctural change, and unforeseen events always shift the channel of change.

It is, then, possible that our civilization will leach out in an as yet unforeseen direction, without either total collapse or totalitarian dictatorship. There are two sources of hope, and they are the two qualitative differences which as yet separate East and West. One is man's relationship with God. However weakened by hedonism, worship of science and progress, and worship of the nation-state, traditional religion remains the sovereign source of universal ethics, notions of humanity, brotherhood, and decency. Historically in the West, religion has now subtly and indirectly, again forcibly, challenged power within and outside the Church. It is true that from time to time religion has been used by temporal power in its own interests, but religion has always been untrustworthy in such ventures. That there is no "return to religion" at the present time does not negate the possibility that such a movement can occur in the future.

The second hope is this: as yet the West has preserved some state of balance among separate administrative organizations, as yet there is no single power hierarchy which totally subsumes all other administrative organizations. True, autonomy has shifted from individual and small local group to administrative organization distant in physical and social space, a continuous movement that is by no means being arrested. The growing sense of powerlessness in the diffused units of person and locality has produced mass apathy: conjecture of what "they" will do to us and for us, rather than plans for what we will do for ourselves; the numbed acquiescence to forces dimly visualized and almost as impossible to judge as to resist.

And yet, some measure of individual freedom inheres in the continued necessity of separate organizations to woo, flatter, and cajole their own followers and the general public. Public opinion may have become a pinchbeck and manufactured thing, but the artisans are many and they do not work in the same shop according to the same pattern. That our ruling elites defer to public opinion indicates their sharp awareness that the public's allegiance is divided among them. Some measure of choice and autonomy remains to the citizen because *separate* hier-

archies of power continue to compete, within and across the boundary lines of unions, corporations, and political parties.

Members of the ruling elites of big government, big business, and big labor have not as yet coalesced into one administrative organization. The unity to which the public is called is still couched in terms of purposes and values rather than sheer submission to organized power. So long as power does not become monolithic, then the possibility remains that means may be wedded to purpose in such a way that the Western tradition of liberty will build upon the society that is, rather than upon the ashes of totalitarianism, of war that was unceasing.

And if there is no leaching out, if the trend toward concentration of power and control should continue and the use of force within and outside social systems engulf our civilization, what then? Pessimism and despair, in the perspective of history, are foolish. History has been an interminable cycle of dark age and civilization. The next civilization has always started from that point at which the previous civilization declined. The knowledge, art, techniques, and philosophy of the previous civilization have been enriched as they have been developed and reinterpreted in the next. The achievements of our civilization have been too firmly registered, spread too far and wide, for the slate ever to be wiped clean.

The break in continuity between present and future is a short-term thing. Although civilizations have always entered their time of troubles and declined, as the wheel has turned again it has been moved by all that went before. Whatever we do now will in part determine what happens in the unseen future.

List of Visual Aids

The visual materials listed below and on the following pages can be used to supplement the subject matter of this book. We recommend, however, that each film be reviewed before using in order to determine its suitability for a particular class or group. For convenience the films are grouped by the chapters to which they are most relevant, but many might be used advantageously in the study of additional chapters.

Each title is identified as either a motion picture or filmstrip by the self-explanatory abbreviations "MP" or "FS." Immediately following is the name of the producer; if the distributor is different from the producer, the name of the distributor follows. The addresses of these producers are listed at the end of the bibliography.

Unless otherwise indicated, the motion pictures listed in this bibliography are 16-mm. sound black-and-white, and the filmstrips are 35-mm. silent.

CHAPTER 2

Embryology of Human Behavior (MP, Med Film Inst/IFB, 28 min). Explains the developmental growth of children. Intended for pediatric use but also suitable for other college and adult audiences.

Man in the 20th Century (MP, MOT/McGraw, 17 min). A popular presentation of the achievements in technology and material progress and of the social ills and problems of the twentieth century.

CHAPTER 3

Role Playing in Human Relations Training (MP, NEA, 25 min). A training film demonstrating the uses of role playing and the skills necessary to develop role playing in a group.

CHAPTER 4

Experimental Studies in Social Climates of Groups (MP, Iowa, 30 min). Shows behavior of a group of boys organized in clubs run on democratic principles, as an autocracy, and as a laissez-faire group. Shows responses when groups are changed from one climate to another. Gives statistics as to group actions and reactions.

The High Wall (MP, Anti-Def/McGraw, 32 min). Portrays a conflict between two groups of teen-age boys and traces the reasons for the conflict to parental attitudes.

CHAPTER 5

Boundary Lines (MP, IFF/McGraw, 10 min, Color). An animated cartoon emphasizing the necessity of eliminating the "boundary lines" of color, origin, wealth, and religion which separate peoples and nations.

Brotherhood of Man (MP, UAW/Brandon, 10 min). Animated cartoon, based upon *Races of Mankind* by Benedict and Weltfish, explaining that the differences among human races are superficial, accidental, and environmental.

Picture in Your Mind (MP, IFF/McGraw, 16 min, Color). Animated cartoon, using the same technique as *Boundary Lines*, develops the theme of intergroup relations and discusses the origins of prejudice.

CHAPTER 6

Bathing Babies in Three Cultures (MP, NYU, 10 min). Shows the interplay between mother and child in three different settings—bathing in the Sepik River in New Guinea, in a modern American bathroom, and in a mountain village in Indonesia. Produced by Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead.

Karba's First Years (MP, NYU, 20 min). A series of scenes in the life of a Balinese child. Produced by Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead.

We Do It Because (MP, MGM/TFC, 7 min). A popular explanation of various social customs such as shaking hands, tipping hats, kissing the bride, etc. (Passing Parade Series.)

CHAPTER 7

Child Development (MP, McGraw). A series of five motion pictures and five follow-up filmstrips correlated with Hurlock's *Child Development*. Individual titles and running times are:

Principles of Development (17 min).
Child Care and Development (17 min).
Heredity and Prenatal Development (21 min).
Children's Emotions (22 min).
Social Development (16 min).

Children Growing Up with Others (MP, BIS/UWF, 30 min). Illustrates the various stages of growth in children, their relationships with adults, reactions to social customs, and growth toward socialized behavior.

Children Learning by Experience (MP, BIS/UWF, 40 min). Portrays through a series of actual incidents the ways children learn and adapt themselves to their environment.

Life with Baby (MP, MOT/McGraw, 18 min). Explains and illustrates through many candid-camera sequences the mental and physical growth of children to age six. Filmed at Yale under the direction of Dr. Arnold Gesell.

CHAPTERS 8 AND 9

Feeling of Hostility (MP, CNFB/McGraw, 27 min). Case study of Clare, an outwardly successful but inwardly incomplete personality; and through dramatized flash backs into her early life at home and at school, an understanding of the reasons for her hostility toward herself and others.

Feeling of Rejection (MP, CNFB/McGraw, 23 min). A case history of a

neurotic young woman suffering from headaches and physical fatigue; and an explanation, through scenes of her early life, of the psychosomatic reasons for her physical ills.

Feelings of Depression (MP, CNFB/McGraw, 30 min). Case history of a man in his early thirties who suffers periods of great despondency; and an explanation, through scenes of his early life, of the psychological reasons for his condition.

Over-dependency (MP, CNFB/McGraw, 32 min). Case study of a young man who has been crippled mentally and emotionally by over-dependency upon his mother, sister, and wife.

A Psychoneurosis with Compulsive Trends in the Making (MP, NYU, 60 min, silent). A case study, from birth to seven years, of how a girl with superior biological capacity develops a neurosis through interaction with those in her home environment.

CHAPTER 11

The City (MP, MMA, 30 min). Portrays the growth and development of American cities and emphasizes the necessity of planning for community living. Produced in 1939, this film is one of the classic documentaries.

A U.S. Community and Its Citizens (MP, UWF, 20 min). Portrays the community of Milford, Conn., and explains the reasons for people living closely together in such communities.

This Is Tomorrow (MP, MGM/TFC, 10 min). A condensed version of *The City*.

Valley Town (MP, NYU, 27 min). Produced in 1940, this film portrays an industrial community and the effect upon its people of technological unemployment.

CHAPTER 12

Machine: Master or Slave (MP, NYU, 14 min). Produced in 1941, this film presents some of the problems of technological progress as they affect the lives of workers and consumers.

CHAPTER 13

What Price Government? (MP, Hoover Com, 20 min). A pictorial report of the findings of the Hoover Commission with incidental explanation of the reasons for the size and complexity of the Federal government.

CHAPTER 16

Color of a Man (MP, Cong Church, 18 min). Portrays Negro conditions in the South; explains these conditions; and contrasts these conditions with modern Negro schools and hospitals.

Immigration (MP, EBF, 11 min). Explains through photography and animated maps how the United States became populated and why Europeans emigrated from their countries.

New Americans (MP, RKO/McGraw, 18 min). Portrays the experiences of a typical refugee immigrant and his adjustment to life in the United States. (This Is America Series.)

CHAPTER 17

The Family–An Approach to Peace (MP, MOT/McGraw, 17 min). Contrasts popular conceptions of life in foreign lands with photographic scenes of everyday life throughout the world; and emphasizes the similarity of peoples everywhere.

CHAPTERS 18 AND 19

Are You Ready for Marriage? (MP, Coronet, 15 min). A couple wishing to get married learn what it takes to be ready for marriage. Advice with a check list of criteria is given by a marriage counselor.

Courtship to Courthouse (MP, RKO/McGraw, 15 min). Presents the divorce problem in the United States (1948), explains factors contributing to divorce, and relates the divorce problem to an understanding of courtship and the responsibilities of marriage. (This Is America Series.)

Families First (MP, NY Commerce, 17 min). Contrasts the relationships and conditions prevailing in two different families; shows the tensions and antisocial attitudes in one family and the affection and harmonious relationships in the other.

Family Circles (MP, CNFB/McGraw, 31 min). Shows how the interplay of home and school affects the development of children. Dramatizes the experiences of three pupils and demonstrates how parental attitudes and family conditions affect the development of children and their achievement in school.

Marriage (MP, McGraw). Series of five motion pictures and five follow-up filmstrips correlated with Bowman's *Marriage for Moderns*. Titles and running times are:

This Charming Couple (19 min).
Marriage Today (22 min).
Choosing for Happiness (14 min).
It Takes All Kinds (20 min).
Who's Boss? (16 min).

Marriage and Divorce (MP, MOT/McGraw, 15 min). Surveys the problems of broken homes and divorces, and relates these problems to general family relations.

CHAPTERS 20 AND 21

Buddhism (MP, RFA, 30 min, silent). Explains the outward aspects of Buddhism–images, temples, forms, ceremonies, etc. (Comparative Religion Series.)

Islam in Egypt (MP, RFA, 15 min, silent). Explains the customs, laws, and beliefs of Mohammedanism. (Comparative Religion Series.)

One God (MP, Assn, 37 min). Explains the characteristics and forms of worship of Catholics, Jews, and Protestants.

Primitive Religions (MP, RFA, 15 min, silent). Explains the religious beliefs of primitive man. (Comparative Religion Series.)

CHAPTER 22

Children Must Learn (MP, NYU, 13 min). Shows a school in the rural South and how its curriculum has little relationship to the lives and problems

of its pupils. Stresses the need for school-community cooperation. Produced in 1940.

Design of American Public Education (MP, McGraw, 16 min). Contrasts the old-fashioned educational process with the newer decentralized system tailored to meet the needs of today's young people.

The School and the Community (MP, McGraw, 14 min). Emphasizes the importance of community participation in improving the educational and recreational facilities of its schools.

Who Will Teach Your Child? (MP, CNFB/McGraw, 24 min). Explains the necessity and the problems of recruiting, training, and holding teachers of superior ability.

DIRECTORY OF SOURCES

Anti-Def—Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 212 Fifth Ave., New York. (Films distributed by McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.)

Assn—Association Films, Inc., 347 Madison Ave., New York 17.

BIS—British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. (Films distributed by United World Films, Inc.)

Brandon—Brandon Films, Inc., 200 W. 57th St., New York 19.

CNFB—National Film Board of Canada, 1270 Ave. of the Americas, New York 20. (Films distributed by McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.)

Cong Church—Congregational Christian Churches, Department of Visual Aids, 287 Fourth Ave., New York 10.

Coronet—Coronet Films, Coronet Building, Chicago 1.

EBF—Encyclopaedia Britannica Films, Inc., 1150 Wilmette Ave., Wilmette, Ill.

Hoover Com—Citizens Commission for the Hoover Report, 15 W. 46th St., New York 19.

IFB—International Film Bureau, 6 N. Michigan Ave., Chicago 2.

IFF—International Film Foundation, Inc., 1600 Broadway, New York 19. (Films distributed by McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.)

Iowa—State University of Iowa, Bureau of Visual Instruction, Extension Division, Iowa City.

Med Film Inst—Medical Film Institute, 2 E. 103d St., New York 29. (Films distributed by International Film Bureau.)

McGraw—McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., Text-Film Department, 330 W. 42d St., New York 36.

MGM—Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Hollywood, Calif. (Films distributed by Teaching Film Custodians, Inc.)

MMA—Museum of Modern Art, Film Library, 11 W. 53d St., New York 19.

MOT—March of Time Forum Films, 369 Lexington Ave., New York 17. (Films distributed by McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.)

NEA—National Education Association, 1201 16th St., N.W., Washington 6, D.C.

NY Commerce—New York State Department of Commerce, Film Library, 112 State St., Albany 7.

RFA—Religious Film Association, Inc., 45 Astor Place, New York 3.
RKO—RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 1270 Ave. of the Americas, New York 20. (Films distributed by McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.)
TFC—Teaching Film Custodians, Inc., 25 W. 43d St., New York 18.
UAW—UAW-CIO, Film Division, 8000 E. Jefferson Ave., Detroit 14. (Films distributed by Brandon Films, Inc.)
UWF—United World Films, Inc., 1445 Park Ave., New York 29.

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